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The thesis of this dissertation is that the materials provided by Donald Davidson's 
philosophy of language provide the basis for an attractive version of moral realism to be 
called Hermeneutical Moral Realism. I explain here why this thesis is interesting, and 
outline the discussion to follow. 
Moral realism is a position in meta-ethics claiming that some moral utterances are 
true or false, and that, among those, some are true. This position is perennial. It has never 
lacked for supporters or critics, and its supporters have never lacked for arguments for 
their view. I merely continue a long tradition. Of course, moral realists typically appeal to 
theses in metaphysics to support their meta-ethical view, and again, I follow a long 
tradition. What's different is that I find myself attracted to the core theses, and many of 
the supporting arguments and extended implications and articulations, of Donald 
Davidson's philosophy. This position has been employed as a basis for meta-ethical 
discussions very rarely, and never very interestingly. If I wanted to use these theses, I felt 
a strong need to show that they were at least plausible, or, as I see them, very attractive. 
For what is the interest of a defense of moral realism on the basis of unattractive or 
implausible metaphysics? 
Because of the nature of my thesis, this dissertation has had to be quite long. To 
give my defense of moral realism interest, I had to offer a justification for fundamental 
Davidsonian claims. That occupies me in the first two chapters. I had to apply those 
claims in epistemology. That occupies me in the third chapter. And then I had to apply 
them in meta-ethics. That occupies me in the fourth and fifth chapters. 
I should remark on two principles, one substantive and one methodological, that I 
find that I've adhered to throughout, though not on a principled basis. The first is that 
some concepts are too complicated to articulate. The concept of truth, and the thin moral 
concepts of goodness and rightness, are beyond our powers of articulation. We can never 
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offer theories of these concepts in the sense of a narrow cluster of claims from which all 
other claims about them can be derived. For these concepts are equal in extent to the 
mind itself, and no mind can understand itself in detail. 
The second is that one useful way of proceeding in philosophy is by way of 
consideration of close alternative theories to one's own. Considering a near competitor 
gives insight into one's own view; rejecting the major near competitors lends strong 
support to one's own view. I don't mean to suggest solipsistic "opposition research." I've 
learned a good deal from every view I examine. 
Let me outline the discussion. In the first chapter, I offer Davidson's approach to 
truth. For Davidson, the concept of truth is substantive and involves worldly connection, 
but not articulable in any form of "theory of truth." As I put it, the concept of truth 
outstrips our capacity to express it. 
Davidson's approach finds its roots in Tarski's semantic theory of truth. But 
Tarski's theory has also inspired minimalism treatments. I discuss one such approach, 
Paul Horwich's, and find it wanting. That treatment gives me a better sense for the 
substance of truth, and also defeats one of the nearest competitor theories. I take on 
Horwich's use theory of meaning en passant. A use theory of meaning is attractive in 
various ways, and Horwich's comes attached neatly to his minimalism. Considering the 
pair as such gave me more insight into either theory than considering each alone would 
have done. 
Tarki's (and hence Davidson's) approach is semantic in the sense that it makes 
truth depend on a worldly connection. That approach, likewise, is very close to traditional 
correspondence theories. Again, I take on an alternative theory; in this case, Russell's. I 
discuss the development of Davidson's objection to correspondence theories, and show 
why his final work presented a consideration which, though traditional, was new in 
Davidson's work and which combines with his older approaches to refute the traditional 
correspondence theory. 
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Davidson's own approach is humble. He does not offer a theory of truth. Rather, 
all other semantic concepts are to be understood with reference to truth, which is a basic, 
never-to-be-articulated concept. However, we can say some interesting things about truth. 
The formalism of a Tarskian theory is itself revealing enough to account for such 
phenomena as the unity of the proposition. An assertion's or belief's content is its truth-
condition, which is worldly (though not to be confused with a "fact," as that term has 
come to be used in technical philosophy). Some such truth-conditions are events with 
causal powers. That fact is crucial to what will follow. 
With Davidson's approach to truth clear, I can move on to the even more 
controversial position that meanings are truth-conditions. Chapter two is less responsive 
and more constructive than chapter one. I do discuss alternative approaches to meaning. 
The use theory retains its charms, and internalist approaches are ever-popular. I reject 
both. Internalism, though, is instructive because it is a penetrating solution to a real 
problem, the one Frege pointed out in "Sense and Reference." I begin to offer an 
alternative solution that, I hope, adequately treats of the intensionality of content 
attributions, without internalizing attributed content. 
Davidson's account of meaning is externalistic and holistic. Meaning and attitudes 
share contents, and they are both assigned in radical interpretation; they exist only as a 
consequence of interpretation and the triangulation between interpreter, speaker, and the 
world. 
The externalistic aspect of content is that contents are truth-conditions, external 
and worldly entities. Given evidential constraints on the assignment of contents to 
utterances and hence attitudes, nothing else could be contents. I describe the sort of 
constraints on interpretation that show that truth-conditions are contents, and what sort of 
principles interpretation must follow in order to discover meanings. 
The holistic aspect of content is that attitudes have content at all only because 
they fit in a network of other attitudes. The intensionality of content first observed in 
 4 
contact with internalism shows that we do not attribute attitudes without attention to their 
context. 
Two other aspects of content are worth discussing. First, content is limitedly 
indeterminate. This is an important fact about Davidson's approach with a major bearing 
on its plausibility. I try to limit the scope of semantic indeterminacy, and make the 
remaining indeterminacy palatable. Second, content is knowable though external. This is 
important because a main line of response to externalistic anti-sceptical arguments like 
Davidson's tries to show that externalism doesn't so much refute scepticism as change its 
direction. Internalists might be in doubt about the world, but they know their own 
thoughts; externalists might know the world, but are left in doubt about their thoughts. I 
offer an account of self-knowledge that tries to solve the paradoxes the Davidsonian 
position appears to present. 
In the third chapter, I turn to a pair of applications: Davidson's anti-sceptical and 
anti-relativistic arguments. As a prelude, I discuss Kant's treatment of similar issues; that 
allows me to introduce some Kantian notions that I will have occasion to call upon later. 
Davidson offers two anti-sceptical arguments. The first, known as the Omniscient 
Interpreter argument, has been widely discussed and, to my satisfaction, refuted. I 
diagnose the problem with the argument: its premises fail to appeal to the externalistic 
aspect of content. Later, Davidson offers an argument running straight from externalism 
and holism to the defeat of scepticism. I discuss this argument in some detail and find 
that it slays the sceptical dragon. While the concept of truth escapes our grasp, we can 
show that a coherent body of beliefs must have mainly true members. Coherentism seems 
to be the most plausible approach to justification, though not, of course, to truth. 
I then turn briefly to the issue of relativism. Relativism is hard to articulate, and I 
find in the end that no version of relativism is both coherent and interesting. The coherent 
versions serve only to remind us that interpretation is sometimes difficult; the interesting 
versions make no sense on a truth-conditional account of meaning. 
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Next, I turn to meta-ethical issues. Moral realism is two claims: some moral 
utterances are true or false, and some of those are true. Various philosophers have 
rejected the first claim. Their thought constitutes a tradition of non-cognitivism about 
ethics. To defend moral realism, I discuss the prominent non-cognitivism of Simon 
Blackburn. 
Expressivism has not been expressed with great clarity by its defenders. I begin 
by formulating its theses in terms drawn from Searle's illocutionary act theory. I then turn 
to Blackburn's justifications for expressivism. He offers arguments having to do with 
metaphysical parsimony, with the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral, and with 
moral motivation. I find that moral cognitivism is no less parsimonious than cognitivism 
about anything else, that expressivism has no account for the supervenience of the moral 
on the non-moral, and that it chooses a view about moral motivation from an inadequate 
set of options. 
I follow on these undercutting considerations with positive arguments against the 
view. Expressivism has it that moral utterances are neither true nor false, but we certainly 
treat them as though they were: we embed moral utterances in various kinds of truth-
conditional contexts. Blackburn has offered several ingenious theories for why non-
cognitive discourse has every indicator of being cognitive. I show why none of them 
actually solve the problems. 
In the final chapter, I confront moral scepticism and the nearest competitor view 
to Hermeneutical Moral Realism, New Wave Moral Realism. I begin by characterizing 
New Wave Moral Realism, which is an Aristotelian meta-ethics based in the externalism 
of Kripke and Putnam, Putnam's functionalism, and Rawlsian coherentism about moral 
theory. 
I turn then to Hermeneutical Moral Realism, an original contribution to meta-
ethics. I appeal to the externalistic and holistic nature of the attitudes and find some 
insights into moral beliefs. 
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First, thanks to their externalistic nature, moral beliefs' meanings are their truth-
conditions. This fact gives us some hints on how to attribute moral beliefs. Further, it 
makes moral beliefs eligible for anti-sceptical and anti-relativistic treatment. The general 
arguments against scepticism and relativism should apply to moral beliefs. 
Second, moral beliefs have holistic attachments to one another. This claim brings 
my view in contact with ethical particularism, an extremely interesting, attractive, and 
plausible proposal. I contend that only a modest particularism is warranted; this modest 
particularism is also a form of modest generalism. A more extreme form of particularism 
would fail to adequately respect the holistic nature of content. Particularism was the 
denial of principles, so I conclude that there are moral principles. However, I try to 
accommodate the evidence for particularism with a treatment of moral concepts as, just 
like the concept of truth, inarticulably complex. Moral content, I contend, flows from 
moral judgments to more abstract moral claims. Finally, the pursuit of Rawlsian wide 
reflective equilibrium represents the most plausible method for moral epistemology. 
Third, moral beliefs have holistic attachments to other attitudes, notably desires 
and intentions. Here, I try to offer a treatment of moral motivation that adequately 
accounts for the evidence for the Humean theory of motivation but that is, nevertheless, 
Kantian in orientation. I borrow from Davidson's discussion of akrasia, desire, and 
intention, and argue that moral judgments involving thick moral concepts are holistically 
attached to desires and that moral judgments involving thin moral concepts are 
holistically attached to intentions. I belief that my approach is unique. 
Finally, I briefly confront arguments for moral scepticism. Obviously, I turn to 
Mackie's treatment, but then I consider the Moral Twin Earth argument offered against 
New Wave Moral Realism. I find that the argument succeeds against the New Wave, but 
fails against Hermeneutical Moral Realism. What's noteworthy about this fact is that New 
Wave Moral Realism, like Hermeneutical Moral Realism, is based in an externalistic 
account of meaning and looks to a token identity theory in philosophy of mind for an 
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analogy to its treatment of moral properties. I diagnose why Hermeneutical Moral 
Realism, a Kantian view, can survive sceptical challenges that its nearest Aristotelian 
cousin cannot. 
The strategy, then, is to prepare the ground with a broad metaphysical approach to 
meaning and mind, and then apply these basic insights to moral utterances and beliefs. 
The approach of the dissertation is very strategic, in the sense that, once the groundwork 
has been laid in the first chapters, I never confront an issue later on without having 
resources to draw on. My treatment of expressivism is fairly independent of the general 
strategy, but elsewhere I display little or no tactical virtuosity, but rather a sense for the 




The basis of Davidson's philosophy, and hence my argument, is an approach to 
truth. Davidson's mature view is close to that of the early Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein 
says: 
4.12 Propositions can represent the whole reality, but they cannot represent what 
they must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it — the 
logical form. 
To be able to represent the logical form, we should have to be able to put 
ourselves with the propositions outside logic, that is outside the world. 
5.63 I am my world. (The microcosm.) (Wittgenstein 1922, pp. 79, 151) 
I can't represent the truth-making relation, for to do so, I would have to step outside 
myself and consider that relation from, as it were, the side. This I cannot do. Thus there is 
a sharp limit imposed on what can be said about truth. We can't, at bottom, say what truth 
is. Nevertheless, we can grasp that truth is a relational concept; truth-bearers have 
relations to their truth-conditions. 
The nearest relatives to this approach are minimalist and correspondence theories 
of truth. Minimalism centers on the inarticulability of the concept of truth, but 
exaggerates inarticulability into contentlessness. Correspondence theory grasps that truth 
is a relational concept, but then tries to articulate the precise nature of the relation and the 
relata. That can't be done. 
The correct view is not a theory of truth at all. There can't be a theory of truth, for 
truth is too fundamental to be articulated. Rather, the correct view treats truth as a 
substantive phenomenon with relation to which other phenomena can be characterized. 
Moreover, the correct view is willing to make claims about truth, just not claims that 
should be taken to reveal the nature of truth. 
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In the first section of this chapter, I consider minimalism about truth. I take Paul 
Horwich's view as my foil, since it's a justifiably prominent version of the theory. I begin 
by considering the nature of Tarskian theories, which inspire both minimalism and the 
details of Davidson's own approach — the fact that minimalism and Davidson's approach 
both descend from Tarski illustrates their logical closeness. I then characterize 
minimalism and offer various criticisms of it. I conclude by considering Horwich's use 
theory of meaning. The next chapter directly considers theories of meaning, but I opted to 
compartmentalize my discussion of Horwich. 
In the second section, I consider correspondence theories. I examine a certain 
Russellian tradition to be found in Russell's 1912 manuscript and in recent work by 
Herbert Hochberg. Traditionally, Davidson has offered a classical argument known as the 
Slingshot as refutation of correspondence theory. I consider the merits and flaws of the 
Slingshot, and conclude that it provides only a substantive constraint on correspondence 
theories. However, in his final work, Davidson offered another classical argument against 
correspondence theory, the Bradley Regress. As with the Slingshot, the Bradley Regress 
only provides a constraint on correspondence theories. However, the two constraints 
working together foreclose all logical options: no correspondence theory can meet both 
constraints. I take this to illustrate the inarticulability of the concept of truth. 
In the third section, I offer a perspective on Davidson's views about truth. 
Davidson's views have undergone substantial development. In earlier work, Davidson 
denies the existence of truth-conditions. In later work, he seems to tacitly affirm the 
existence of truth-conditions. I argue that Davidson's overall view makes more sense if 
we introduce truth-conditions; the later work is more satisfying than the earlier. 
Davidson's view is able to account for what the correspondence theory could not, the 
unity of the proposition. The main reason that truth-conditions need to be introduced is to 
serve as causes of beliefs. Since Davidson's theory of causation has it that causes and 
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effects are events, I consider whether truth-conditions can be events. I conclude that they 
can. 
1.1 MINIMALISM ABOUT TRUTH 
1.1.1 Tarski's Theory of Truth 
Tarski developed his theory of truth during the dark days of positivism, when the 
truth predicate was widely thought to be paradoxical and metaphysical and hence 
indecent. To dispel these fears, Tarski sought to identify a predicate that would be 
adequate for all legitimate traditional uses of the truth predicate, but that would be neither 
paradoxical nor metaphysical. Tarski's theory has received masterful expositions1, so I 
give a breezy rehearsal to hit the high points. 
The paradox, of course, is the Liar. If we allow a truth (and hence a falsity) 
predicate into a language, then we can predicate falsity over the sentence in which the 
falsity predicate appears, leading to paradox. Tarski tries to solve this problem by 
hierarchizing languages, and asserting that, while a language may contain a truth 
predicate, it does not contain a truth predicate that can be applied to sentences of that 
very language. Attributions of truth are inherently metalinguistic. 
The metaphysical aspect of truth is its irreducibility to decently physicalistic 
concepts. Tarski tried to solve this problem by reducing truth to other concepts that 
would themselves receive physicalistic reductions: satisfaction and, implicitly, translation 
or synonymy. 
Despite the technical formality and the appearance of reform, Tarski's theory is 
plainly a correspondence theory intended to be in line with our ordinary intuitions about 
truth. In "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages," Tarski is clear that he "...shall 
be concerned exclusively with grasping the intentions which are contained in the so-
called classical conception of truth ('true—corresponding with reality')...." (Tarski 1933, 
                                                
1 See Kirkham 1992, pp. 141-74; Soames 1999, pp. 67-97; and Field 1972, among indenumerable others. 
Tarski's own presentation, of course, is Tarski 1933; see also the less technical treatment in Tarski, 1944. 
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153) Elsewhere, he gives this insight into why he calls his theory 'semantic:' "...semantic 
concepts express certain relations between objects (and states of affairs) referred to in the 
language discussed and expressions of the language referring to those objects." (ibid 
1936, p. 403) It seems natural, then, to say that a semantic theory of truth would be a 
theory that makes truth depend on a relation between objects and expressions referring to 
those objects. Finally and yet elsewhere, Tarski says that, "The desired definition does 
not aim to specify the meaning of a familiar word used to denote a novel notion; on the 
contrary, it aims to catch hold of the actual meaning of an old notion." (ibid 1944, p. 13) 
Tarski demands of his theory that it be formally correct and materially adequate. 
Formal correctness means, more or less, solving the Liar.2 But a definition identifying the 
set of true sentences, Tr, will be held to be materially adequate just in case: 
...it has the following consequences: ...all sentences which are obtained from the 
expression 'x ∈ Tr if and only if p' by substituting for the symbol 'x' a structural-
descriptive name of any sentence of the language in question and for the symbol 
'p' the expression which forms the translation of this sentence into the 
metalanguage;  (Tarski 1933, p. 188) 
This is the famous Convention T, Tarski's criterion of material adequacy. Any theory that 
fails to imply each instance of the schema "'p' is true iff q," where 'q' translates object-
language 'p' into the metalanguage, is materially inadequate. 
Tarski wants to be able to state his theory — better, theories, since there will be at 
least one per language. Since, for a language with infinitely many sentences, there will be 
infinitely many instances of "'p' is true iff q," he needs to produce a finite substructure 
that has each instance of the schema as a consequence. The intuitive idea of this 
substructure is that there will be some small number of axioms (ideally, one) for each 
word of the language, and that an instance of the schema is a consequence of the axioms 
for the words constituting the sentence, plus finitely many rules of inference that put the 
axioms into inferential relations with one another. These axioms will relate words to 
                                                
2 See Etchemendy 1988, p. 54. 
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objects by way of the semantic concepts of reference and satisfaction. Setting aside 
proper names, the substructure of the theory is axioms stating the satisfaction conditions 
for the predicates of the language. For instance, the following might be an axiom: "for 
any x, x satisfies (in German) "ist weiss" iff x is white." This axiom plus some further 
axioms should have the implication that, "'Schnee ist weiss' is true (in German) iff snow 
is white," which is an instance of the schema that appears in Convention T. 
There are four important points to which I want briefly to call attention. First, 
there is no attempt whatsoever to define truth. There is only the attempt to define truth for 
a given language. This is acceptable to Tarski, because the various definitions of truth for 
various languages will satisfy Convention T, and are hence materially adequate. Nothing 
more can be sought, for no sequence of characters is true or false independently of the 
language in which it appears, or true or false without modification. They can only be true 
in this language, false in that, meaningless in another. 
Second, Tarski has failed to reduce truth to physicalistic notions. He has reduced 
truth to satisfaction, but satisfaction is not apparently a physicalistic notion.3 Third and 
relatedly, in addition to satisfaction, Tarski also relies on the unreformed concept of 
translation. Davidson will exploit this fact to get additional use out of Tarski's formal 
structure, but someone like Field or Quine would no doubt object to the tacit reliance on a 
non-physicalistic, intensional concept. But the use of translation rather than mere material 
equivalence is important. That p iff q is insufficient for the correct embedding of a 
structural description of 'p,' along with q, in an instance of the schema from Convention 
T. "'p' is true iff q," where 'q' does not translate 'p,' but is merely materially equivalent to 
'p,' would misstate the reason why 'p' was true (if true at all). 
Fourth, Tarski's theory is obviously realistic, since a semantic theory relates 
words to objects. But it does not invoke new ontology. The truth conditions of an object-
                                                
3 Hartry Field (Field 1972) objects to this feature of Tarski's theory, noting that Tarski has failed to make 
the notion of truth physicalistically acceptable. I agree that Tarski has not reduced truth to the physical, but 
I don't require that a concept be a member of the physical family of concepts to be acceptable. 
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language sentence are stated in a metalanguage sentence that makes no reference to 
anything that wasn't referred to in the object language sentence. Hence, stating truth 
conditions does not require the introduction of particulars, properties, facts, logical forms, 
or any of the other paraphernalia of correspondence theories (unless the object language 
sentence itself introduced these items). I believe that the theory thereby achieves the real 
aim of the correspondence theorist — showing that and how truth depends on a relation 
between the mind and language on the one hand, and the world on the other — without 
indulging in unhelpful metaphysical speculation. 
Beyond whatever substance it's lent when the debts owed on the concepts of 
satisfaction and translation are paid off, the theory seems quite thin. We aren't told what 
truth in a language is, only which things are true in a given language and why; we're told 
nothing at all about truth. It's unclear whether truth is a substantive property with 
explanatory power. Truth isn't obviously related to meaning, the semantic concept par 
excellence.  Some, like correspondence theorists, might think that these are deficiencies, 
but others would disagree. A minimalist would disagree; the minimalist revels in the very 
desiccation that might make the theory seem inadequate. Davidson would also disagree, 
though for a very different reason: he thinks that, while truth is connected to meaning, is 
a substantive property with explanatory power, and that we have an inter-linguistic notion 
of truth, none of this can be put into theory. Truth is too basic or foundational (not: too 
simple or elementary) a concept to have light shed on it by a theory; to wax poetical, truth 
is the light we shine on other concepts. In the rest of section 1.1, I consider minimalism 
and some related ideas. 
1.1.2 Horwich's Minimalism 
In various places, Horwich characterizes minimalism in different ways. For 
instance: 
The minimalist picture of truth has three principal components: first, an account 
of the utility of truth (namely, to enable the explicit formulation of schematic 
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generalizations); second, an account of the concept of truth (namely, that 'true' is 
implicitly defined by the equivalence schema); and third, an account of the nature 
of truth (namely, that truth has no underlying nature, and that the explanatorily 
basic facts about it are instances of the equivalence schema). (Horwich 
1990/1998, 145) 
Glossing this will do for some presentation of Horwich's theory. The first component is 
obviously misstated. The concept of truth, or the truth predicate, rather than a property of 
truth, is that the utility of which must be accounted for. 
The concept of truth has as its utility that it permits us to formulate schematic 
generalizations explicitly. Horwich has in mind sentences like, "Everything Einstein said 
was true." That this is an explicit generalization is obvious. But what makes it schematic? 
Imagine trying to get across the point of that sentence without using the truth predicate. 
You couldn't do it: "For anything, if Einstein said it, then it." The nearest we can come to 
saying it is to give the following schema, which is, strictly speaking, nonsense: "For any 
p, if Einstein said that p, then p." The thing about this schema that makes it nonsense is 
that 'p' shows up both in a 'that'-clause, and also as one of the arguments of the if-then 
truth-function. So 'p' is both a noun and a sentence. The schema is an extra-linguistic 
guide to meaningful sentences, but it isn't itself a meaningful sentence. The role of the 
truth predicate is to allow us to give various instances of these sorts of schemas explicitly, 
in a language, rather than implicitly, by picking up the right vibe from a meaningless 
schema. The truth predicate allows us to treat 'p' consistently as a noun, because we 
predicate being said by Einstein, and then being true, of it, without ever treating it as a 
sentence. 
Why should we believe the first component? According to Horwich, the only 
other method we have available for forming the sort of generalizations we can form with 
the truth predicate is substitutional quantification, which is inordinately complicated or 
requires a prior explication of truth; further, the truth predicate doesn't appear to have any 
other utility. Since substitutional quantification seems fishy to me, too, I accept the first 
point. But the second point is substantive and many of the objections to minimalism turn 
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on it. It might be argued that we need the truth predicate to help us state and account for 
certain general laws concerning truth; for instance, that if something is true, then it is 
good to believe it; that if you're justified in believing something, then it's probably true; 
that we might want the truth predicate to attribute a substantive property to sentences.4 
The second component is that the truth predicate is "implicitly defined by the 
equivalence schema." The equivalence schema is: "The proposition that p is true iff p." 
(ibid, 136) This seems problematic. The schema is not a sentence; it's not even 
meaningful. How can something that is meaningless define — give the meaning of — 
anything? Perhaps the meaninglessness of the schema is what accounts for the fact that 
the way it defines the truth predicate is implicit. But to define something implicitly would 
be to imply (perhaps with confederates) the sentences in which it is true. A meaningless 
schema that is neither true nor false can't imply anything. Horwich is speaking 
imprecisely in this instance. He's perhaps clearer when he says that,  
Because it contains no more than what is expressed by uncontroversial instances 
of the equivalence schema,  
(E) it is true that p if and only if p,  
I shall call my theory of truth 'the minimal theory.'" (ibid, 6; italics prior to 'E' 
mine) 
Here, Horwich suggests that the theory of truth expresses, not the schema, but its 
instances, such as "It is true that cats chase birds if, and only if, cats chase birds." That 
would make more sense. The schema is meaningless, but the instances are meaningful; so 
the series of instances seem more suitable as a definition than the schema itself. 
Unfortunately, the theory/implicit definition is now somewhat cumbersome. Since 
each instance of the schema will be a part of the theory, and there are infinitely many 
such instances (as there are infinitely many truth bearers to be embedded in instances of 
the schema), the theory will be infinitely long. Further, there are no deeper axioms to the 
                                                
4 I veer between speaking of a property of truth and a predicate. Since I don't accept properties, resolve in 
favor of 'truth' being a substantive predicate. 
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theory than the instances of the schema; unlike Tarski, who gives finitely many axioms 
(stating satisfaction conditions for words) that will imply infinitely many sentences 
satisfying Convention T, Horwich has a theory with infinitely many axioms.  
One should have a further qualm. It isn't strictly speaking true that "It is true that 
cats chase birds if, and only if, cats chase birds." Consider the sentence embedded, non-
truth-functionally, within the antecedent of that conditional: "cats chase birds". Whether 
that sentence is true if and only if cats chase birds depends not just on how things stand 
with cats and birds, but also on how things stand with the words 'cats,' 'chase,' and 'birds' 
and the grammar of their language. If those are words of English, then the instance of the 
schema is true; if not, then the instance of the schema might be false. Recall that Tarski 
never tried to define truth because he was working with sentences, and sentences have 
their truth-conditions only relative to a language; hence, Tarski only defines truth relative 
to languages. Horwich is more ambitious. With his instances of the equivalence schema, 
he is trying to define truth, without modification. Hence Horwich's primary truth-bearers 
must not be in any language. 
Why should we believe the second component? Horwich presents a two-premise 
argument: 
1) ...the facts in virtue of which we mean what we do by 'true' are those that best 
account for our use of the term. 
2) ...our use of the term is best explained by our acceptance of the equivalence 
schema. (ibid, 145) 
Premise 1 is supported by a use theory of meaning. Use is, or determines, meaning; the 
facts that determine use, then, determine meaning. I discuss the use theory of meaning in 
1.1.5. Premise 2 says that the fact that determines our use of the truth predicate is our 
acceptance of the equivalence schema. This premise is supposed to be supported by there 
being no other uses of the truth predicate than those 'explained' by the equivalence 
schema. But this is troublesome. The equivalence schema is a schema, not a sentence. It 
isn't even meaningful, much less true. So how can we accept it, and how can it explain 
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anything? Again, we need to replace the equivalence schema with its instances. Our use 
of 'true' is best explained by our acceptance of the instances of the equivalence schema. 
It's unclear why the instances of the equivalence schema are not uses of 'true' in need of 
explanation, though I suspect that the explanation will be with reference to the fact that 
the instances of the truth schema are necessary truths. 
Why should we believe the third component, the claim that truth has no 
underlying nature? The most direct defense of the third component is with reference to 
the first and second components. But the statement of the third component leaves open 
the question whether truth is itself a nature, or property, but one that is basic (and hence 
not underlain by any other). Horwich accepts that truth is a property, albeit a very thin 
one: "...the truth predicate must indeed be rendered in logic as a predicate. Thus there is a 
perfectly legitimate, weak conception of property according to which minimalism implies 
that truth certainly is one." (ibid, 142) But according to stronger conceptions of 
properties, truth is not one: truth gets no physicalistic reduction, for instance; it has no 
explanatory power. Replying to the suggestion that truth is substantive but irreducible, 
Horwich argues: 
...suppose that a concept of 'truth' ...is introduced by means of the stipulation that 
it will apply to the proposition that snow is white if and only if snow is white, to 
the proposition that E=mc2 if and only if E=mc2, and so on. Then it would seem 
to be consistent with our intuitive conception of 'real nature' and of 'property 
constitution' that the 'truth' of the proposition that snow is white consists in snow 
being white, that the 'truth' of the proposition that E=mc2 simply consists in E 
being equal to mc2, etc. — which will imply that 'truth' as such has no real nature. 
(ibid, 144) 
The idea seems to be this. Since each truth-bearer will be true for a unique reason, if 
being true were the reason a thing were true, then being true would be unique for each 
sentence. No two instances of truth would be instances of the same thing. Or, to put the 
point more nominalistically, the concept of truth would be equivocal: to attribute truth to 
one truth-bearer is to say something different about it than one says of any other truth-
bearer to which one might attribute truth. 
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The early Plato vibe of my gloss, "being true is the reason a thing is true," might 
suggest the problem. Being true is not the reason something is true, any more than piety 
is the reason someone is pious. Euthyphro is pious because he prosecutes his father for 
wrongdoing; Socrates is pious because he goes willingly to his death. The fact that the 
accounts for their piety are different does not imply that piety is an equivocal concept. 
Likewise, that that "Snow is white" is true is accounted for with reference to snow's being 
white, while that "Grass is green" is true is accounted for with reference to grass's being 
green, doesn't imply that the truth predicate is equivocal, that is, that it attributes 
something different to "Grass is green" than it does to "Snow is white." Horwich's 
argument consists chiefly in the demand that, for a concept to be univocal, the 
explanations for its applications must be identical; that each thing that satisfies a 
predicate must satisfy it for the same reason. This demand is unjustified. 
Why might Horwich have gone wrong in this way? Consider multiple 
applications of a predicate like "is red." It's easy to see why accounting for each 
application of this predicate might be similar. We can (perhaps) give a reductive 
definition of the predicate, with reference to wavelengths of light. Whenever one is asked 
why something is red, one can always give the same answer: "Because it reflects light of 
such-and-such a wavelength." That different applications of the predicate get the same 
account is a marker of reduction, on a certain (early Plato) notion of what it is to account 
for something. If Horwich assumes that truth is either minimal, or else reductively 
definable, then his argument would show that it is minimal because it shows why it is not 
reductively definable. Were it reductively definable, each account for the application of 
the concept would be the same, but that is not the case. However, it may be that truth is 
both substantive and irreducible. Recall that this argument of Horwich's appears in the 
context of trying to defeat the possibility that truth is both substantive and irreducible; it 
appears that Horwich has begged the question. 
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The situation now is complicated. The third component is ambiguous; it says only 
that truth has no underlying property, not that it is not a basic, but still substantial, 
property. It's plain that Horwich thinks that saying that truth has no underlying property is 
enough to guarantee that is it not substantial, but he is wrong. Horwich did give a bad 
argument for the claim that truth is not itself a substantial, basic property. So the first two 
components might show that truth has no underlying nature, but they're not enough to 
show that it is not a basic nature, and Horwich gives us no reason to accept this latter 
claim. 
We can resolve the ambiguity of the third component in favor of what can be 
supported by the first two components: the claim that truth doesn't have a nature, but 
might yet be one. Put in nominalistic terms, this is just the claim that truth gets only a 
minimal definition; it doesn't get a definition that tries to reduce it. And it seems that this 
is probably what Horwich has in mind; elsewhere he remarks that "...truth is not 
susceptible to conceptual analysis and has no underlying nature." (Horwich 1995, p. 71) 
He seems to identify not being susceptible to conceptual analysis with having no 
underlying nature, and having no underlying nature with not having a nature, which 
means being minimal and having no explanatory power. The step from not having a 
nature to having no explanatory power might be sound, but the step from not having an 
underlying nature to not having a nature is not. Unanalyzed (and unanalyzable) concepts 
might serve in explanations. 
Beyond the three components, Horwich gives other explanations of minimalism. 
For instance, he gives five dimensions along which it is possible to 'inflate' truth; part of 
minimalism will be explanations of why we can get along without inflating truth along 
any of these dimensions. 
The first such dimension is compositionality. A theory of truth might try to reduce 
truth, or give it underlying structure, by proposing that the truth of a truth-bearer can be 
accounted for with reference to the satisfaction of its parts. Such a Tarskian theory would 
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contain only finitely many axioms, those defining satisfaction conditions for words, and 
would give instances of the truth schema as theorems. Horwich says that, 
The minimalist policy is not to deny such principles relating truth, reference, and 
satisfaction, but to argue that our theory of truth should not contain them as 
axioms. Instead, they should be derived from a conjunction of the theory of truth 
and quite distinct minimalist theories of reference and satisfaction. (Horwich 
1990/1998, p. 10) 
The concept of a minimalist theory appears to be getting a little confused here. One was 
under the impression that the failure of truth to appear in explanations was a consequence 
of its minimal nature. But now, instances of the truth schema are going to help explain 
why words have their reference and satisfaction conditions. Perhaps, since the statements 
of these conditions are themselves minimal, the instances of the truth schema can help 
explain them without losing their pristine minimality. 
The minimality of reference and satisfaction consists in the fact that "...reference 
[and] satisfaction... are just as non-naturalistic, and in need of infinite, deflationary 
theories, as truth is." (ibid. p. 117) What's not clear is why the minimalist should wish to 
have the concepts of reference and satisfaction at all. The role of these concepts in 
Tarskian theories is to serve as an axiomatic derivation base for the infinite series of 
theorems constituting the testable element of the T-theory for the language. The reason to 
have such a finite derivation base is that the human mind can't grasp an infinitely 
complicated theory. Since Horwich believes that we do, in fact, know infinitely complex 
theories, there's no role for reference or satisfaction to play in his view. That, no doubt, is 
why he has theories of reference and satisfaction falling out as a free consequence of his 
infinite theories. So Horwich is right, in a sense, that minimalism doesn't block 
compositionality. But the minimalist needs to explain why it is that we ever cared about 
compositionality at all, since his theory has no place for it other than byproduct. 
The second dimension along which truth can be inflated is analysis. As we have 
seen, for Horwich, it is not possible to give an analysis of truth in other terms. I accept 
the minimalist position here, for reasons to be discussed in 1.3. 
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The third dimension is complexity. An inflationary theory might claim to give an 
analysis of truth; that such an analysis was correct would imply that truth is complex, 
since an analysis can only break a complex down into its parts if it is, in fact, complex. 
Minimalism "denies that truth, reference, or satisfaction are complex or naturalistic 
properties." (ibid. p. 11) I won't remark much on this except to point out that 
irreducibility or resistance to analysis does not imply simplicity. It's possible that truth 
can't be reduced or analyzed because it is simple. But it's possible that truth can't be 
analyzed because it is so enormously complex that we can't formulate the analysis. 
Whatever we would reduce it to escapes us. As I will contend in 1.3, that is the case; the 
problem with so many basic concepts, such as truth and goodness, is not that they are 
absolutely simple, but that they're so massively complex that we could not hope to 
articulate them. We tend to run together 'basic' and 'foundational,' on the one hand, with 
'simple' and 'elementary,' on the other. That is a mistake. 
The fourth dimension concerns the form of an inflationary theory. An inflationary 
theory of truth might take the form of a finite number of non-trivial statements that, when 
combined with other statements, allow everything about truth to be deduced. 
Minimalism, on the other hand, offers an infinite number of trivial statements. The lack 
of explanatory power of such a theory is justified by the fact that truth actually has no 
explanatory power, because it is minimal. Whether truth is actually devoid of explanatory 
power will be the focus of 1.1.4. 
The fifth and final dimension concerns the connections between truth and other 
concepts. A theory that connects truth with, say, meaning, might be thought to inflate 
truth by making it central to some other philosophical issue that is plainly not susceptible 
to minimalist dismissals. Minimalism will try to retain the purity of truth by 
disconnecting it from other concepts. The crucial case is the connection of truth with 
meaning. Whether truth is connected with meaning can be partly shown by checking 
alternative accounts of meaning, ones that don't connect truth with meaning, and seeing 
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whether they're at all plausible. Since Horwich proposes a use theory of meaning that is 
intended to have precisely the effect I want to avoid — disconnecting truth from meaning 
— I discuss this issue in some depth in 1.1.5. 
The purpose of this section has been to present minimalism, and I've done that 
with reference to two "bullet-point" presentations by Horwich. Obviously, the 
presentation has been quite critical. But I don't pretend to have refuted minimalism at this 
point. What I've done is present a set of difficulties; some of these might be solvable, 
others might not, but my goal has been to feel my way around and try to get clear on the 
contours of the target. The real arguments against minimalism appear in the next two 
sections. 
1.1.3 Davidson's Critique of Minimalism 
Davidson's most sustained discussion of deflationist approaches to truth appears 
in his papers "The Folly of Trying to Define Truth" and "Truth Rehabilitated." Across the 
two papers, he presents three arguments against deflationism. The first argument deals 
with our comprehension of the instances of the truth schema: 
The problem concerns the semantical analysis of sentences like: "The proposition 
that Caesar was murdered is true if and only if Caesar was murdered." The 
predicate "is true" requires a singular term as subject; the subject is therefore "the 
proposition that Caesar was murdered." Presumably it names or refers to a 
proposition. But then, what is the role of the sentence "Caesar was murdered" in 
this singular term or description? The only plausible answer is that the words "the 
proposition that" are a functional expression that maps whatever the following 
sentence names onto a proposition. In that case, the sentence itself must be a 
referring term.... [Possibly] in its first occurrence, the sentence names some... 
interesting entity. But then we do not understand the axiom, since the sentence 
"Caesar was murdered" is used once as a name of some interesting entity, and 
once as an ordinary sentence, and we have no idea how to accommodate this 
ambiguity in a serious semantics. (Davidson 1997, p. 10) 
I mentioned this problem in the last section but set it aside. The problem is familiar: 'p' in 
any instance of the truth schema "it is true that p if and only if p" serves two roles: once 
as part of an apparently referring term ('that p') and once as a sentence. To allow it to 
serve both roles is to engage in substitutional quantification, which Horwich wants to 
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reject. To require it to be always a sentence is to make 'that p' unintelligible. To require it 
to always be part of a name is to make it impossible to understand how it ends up as one 
of the truth-bearing arguments of the biconditional. 
Horwich replies that this is a theory-driven objection. The problem, according to 
Horwich, is that Davidson's compositionalist scruples make it impossible for him to 
understand how 'that p' could be a name if 'p' is treated as a sentence within it: 
Davidson's... objection... is that expressions like 'The proposition that dogs bark', 
construed as singular terms, are unintelligible. However, this rather 
counterintuitive claim is entirely theory-driven: it is derived from Davidson's 
inability to find any account (of the sort required by his truth-theoretic paradigm) 
of how the referents of such expressions could be determined by the referents of 
their parts. (Horwich 1990/1998, p. 133) 
We should probably just give up on the truth-theoretic paradigm, Horwich concludes, 
rather than accept that we don't understand 'The proposition that dogs bark.' Horwich 
seems to be going wrong in two ways. The requirement that a theory of meaning respect 
compositionality is not theory-driven; at least it is not driven by the truth-conditional 
nature of Davidson's theory of meaning. It's driven by a basic fact about language, which 
is that infinitely many utterances can be understood by a finite mind. The natural way to 
account for this fact is to give a theory of meaning that has finitely many axioms, and 
which accounts for the meanings of infinitely many complex utterances by reference to 
the meanings of their components. For any theory that accounts for compositionality, 
then, there must be only finitely many linguistic primitives in any language; if there were 
infinitely many primitives, then the language would be unlearnable. But if each and every 
utterance of the form 'that p' were a primitive, then a language, such as English, with 
infinitely many utterances of that form would be unlearnable. At a minimum, denying the 
compositionality of that form would require that each time we hear or use a new 
utterance of that form, we must learn a new linguistic primitive, which seems wrong. 
To defeat this objection, Horwich needs to give a compositional account of how 
the meaning of 'that p' is determined by the meanings of its parts. Horwich accepts this 
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when he says that, "I would argue that understanding a sentence consists in nothing more 
than understanding its parts and appreciating how it has been constructed from them." 
(Horwich 1999, p. 23) Unfortunately, Horwich thinks that coming up with such an 
account is trivial; he continues: 
But if this is so, then compositionality is ensured, no matter what view is taken of 
how the meanings of words are constituted. In particular, if the meaning of a word 
derives from its conforming to a basic regularity of use, then the meaning of a 
sentence will consist in being constructed in such and such a way from primitives 
whose uses conform to such and such basic regularities. (ibid.) 
Here, Horwich ignores the classical problem of accounting for the meanings of 
expressions in indirect contexts. Consider two expressions, p and q, which are governed 
by the same rules of use. Consider further a speaker who believes that p but does not 
believe that q. To report of this speaker that he believes that p would be to say something 
true, while to report of this speaker that he believes that q would be, apparently, to say 
something false. But, since the two expressions are governed by the same rules of use, 
then, on Horwich's use account of meaning, they ought to be intersubstitutable with no 
change in meaning. But apparently they are not. Compositionality provides an important 
constraint. My point here is not that the use account of meaning cannot deal with 
compositionality in opaque contexts. My point is only that Horwich must offer such an 
account. Dismissing the problem as trivial is mistaken: we might wish to regain our pre-
Fregean innocence, but regaining our pre-Fregean naïveté is less attractive. 
Elsewhere, Horwich actually seems to try to turn the non-compositionality of his 
theory into an advantage: 
...would it not be better to pursue a Tarski-like strategy of explaining the truth of 
the infinitely many propositions in terms of the referents of their finitely many 
constituents? The answer, it seems to me, is No. The Tarski-style approach offers 
false hope (1) because, as is well-known, there are many kinds of proposition 
(e.g., statements of probability, counterfactual conditionals, etc.) whose truth we 
have no reason to believe can be explained on the basis of the referents of their 
parts; and, more importantly, (2) because such a strategy would miss those 
propositions that are constructed from the primitive concepts that are not 
expressed in our language. If all propositions are to be covered, then there would 
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have to be axioms specifying the referents of all the infinitely many possible 
primitives. So the Tarskian approach would turn out to need no fewer axioms than 
the Minimal Theory. (Horwich 1990/1998, pp. 136-7) 
There are two lines of argument. First, because we don't yet know how to make Tarskian 
accounts of compositionality work for some sentences, compositionality is to be rejected. 
Horwich seems to be insisting that compositionality is an arbitrary imposition with no 
basis in evidence. But it's a truism that compositionality is present in learnable languages 
with infinitely many possible utterances. The fact that we don't seem to be learning new 
singular terms whenever we hear new statements of probability or counterfactuals 
indicates that the meanings of these utterances are determined by their parts, the 
meanings of which we already knew; that's compositionality. Horwich seems to have 
confused requiring a theory to account for compositionality with requiring a theory to 
have been invented by Tarski. Second, Horwich notes that a Tarskian theory with finitely 
many axioms wouldn't capture every possible proposition. That's true, but whether it 
matters or not depends on what a proposition is. Tarskian theory is metalinguistic: we 
give a theory of truth for a language. The fact that my theory of truth for, say, German 
doesn't allow me to state the truth-conditions of propositions that aren't expressible in 
German isn't an objection to my theory. Only if the truth-bearers are non-linguistic 
propositions, as in Frege, does it count against a finitely axiomatized theory of truth for a 
language that it fails imply certain propositions. I argue below that there are no such 
Fregean propositions. If that's right, then the advantage Horwich claims for his theory, 
that it gives the truth-conditions of propositions that a language-bound Tarskian theory 
fails to give, won't be an advantage. 
Horwich's assessment of Davidson's challenge seems off in another way. 
Davidson claims only that 'The proposition that dogs bark' is, if a singular term, 
incomprehensible, not that it is incomprehensible. Davidson denies, on these grounds, 
that it is a singular term. Horwich says that Davidson's point is counterintuitive, but it's 
hard to see where one might have gotten the intuition that 'The proposition that dogs bark' 
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is a singular term; that "intuition" seems far too heavily theory-laden, because couched in 
much too theoretical terms, to be a good test for a theory. Horwich explains that, "One 
might suspect that Davidson's attitude derives from scepticism about propositions; 
however he is quite explicit that this is not the objection. But in that case — if there really 
are such things — how can the expressions specifically designed to refer to them be 
unintelligible?" (Horwich 1999, p. 23) Horwich has gotten things backwards. If 
expressions of the form 'that p' refer to propositions, then they are singular terms. But if 
they are singular terms, then their meaningfulness cannot be consistent with 
compositionality. Anything the meaningfulness of which cannot be consistent with 
compositionality is not meaningful. By a pair of modus tollens inferences, Davidson 
arrives at the conclusion that expressions of the form 'that p' do not refer to propositions. 
To attack minimalism, Davidson appeals directly to the compositionality requirement, not 
to the additional conclusion, also based on that requirement, that propositions do not 
exist. Davidson's claim is not that expressions of the form 'that p' are unintelligible; it's 
that they would be if Horwich were right. 
Not only does Davidson think that we do understand 'The proposition that dogs 
bark,' he offers a theory about how the utterance is understood, his well-known analysis 
of that-clauses. In that analysis, Davidson suggests that the logical structure of sentences 
with that-clauses is as follows: one sentence that includes 'that' as a demonstrative and 
says something about that, and another sentence that is that.5 For instance: 
The proposition that dogs bark is true. 
...gets analyzed as: 
Dogs bark. 
That proposition is true. 
                                                
5 See Davidson 1968, esp. pp. 102-6. 
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'That' in the second proposition refers to the actual ink pattern just above itself. No 
intensional entities (beyond the sentence "Dogs bark") are called for.6 
Does Davidson's analysis of that-clauses solve the problem he presents for 
minimalism? Horwich could give the truth schema a makeover so that it looks like this: 
p 
that is true iff p 
...and its instances look like this: 
Dogs bark. 
That is true iff dogs bark. 
Does that solve the problem? No: many instances of the new truth schema will be false, 
because the referents of the instances of 'that' are language-bound entities: sentences in 
languages. If we rely on homonymy between the referent of 'that' and the right side of the 
'iff,' we will often go wrong, since the two homonymous utterances might be in different 
languages and have different truth conditions. What Horwich needs is a way for 'that' to 
refer to a proposition in the sense of a Fregean thought. Until such propositions are 
introduced, the instances of the truth schema are language-bound; the schema is more or 
less just disquotational. 
I now move to another Davidsonian argument, one that fails for complicated 
reasons. Davidson argues: 
Disquotation cannot, however, pretend to give a complete account of the concept 
of truth, since it works only in the special case where the metalanguage contains 
the object language. But neither object language nor metalanguage can contain its 
own truth predicate. In other words, the very concept we want to explain is 
explicitly excluded from expression in any consistent language for which 
disquotation works. (Davidson 1997, pp. 10-11) 
This argument works on two assumptions. First, we attribute truth to linguistic items. 
Second, the only possible solution to the Liar is a Tarskian, hierarchical solution in which 
                                                
6 Doesn't the second sentence say that it's about a proposition? Well, yes: it says, "That is a proposition and 
that is true." But all that should indicate is that 'proposition' in English doesn't necessarily refer to 
intensional entities other than sentences. 
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falsity is never predicated over a sentence of the same language of which the falsity 
predicate is a word. In the absence of either assumption, the argument won't go through.  
Here's how it's supposed to work. If truth and falsity are attributed to linguistic 
items — sentences — then there must be some relation between the language of the truth 
predicate, the meta-language, and the language of the sentence, the object language. If the 
relation is identity, then the Liar emerges. If the relation is not identity, then truth can't be 
defined in general, but only for particular object languages. Since Horwich's minimalism 
defines truth through the infinite list of instances of the truth schema, Horwich's 
minimalism will necessarily fail. 
In the absence of the first assumption, that truth-bearers are sentences, we can 
define truth because there need be no relationship between the language of the truth-
bearers, which are not in a language, and the language of the truth-predicate. We define 
truth for propositions. In the absence of the second assumption, we can deal with the Liar 
even if the object language is the metalanguage. 
Horwich rejects both assumptions. He thinks that the truth-bearers are 
propositions in the sense of Fregean thoughts, not linguistic items. And he believes that, 
while all propositions are either true or false, some sentences may be neither, which 
amounts to accepting a "gappiness" solution to the Liar when it's applied to linguistic 
items. 
Let's begin with the claim that the truth-bearers are propositions. Propositions are 
pretty dubious entities. Horwich gives the following argument for the existence of 
propositions: 
Let us imagine a body of sentences characterized by their concern with a certain 
range of phenomena; and suppose that we have mounted an investigation into the 
relations of deductive entailment that hold amongst these sentences. Suppose that 
the results of our investigation suggest an attribution of logical forms having the 
implication that some of the sentences will clearly entail the existence of entities 
of a certain type — call them 'Ks'. Suppose, finally, that we believe that some of 
those sentences express truths. Taken together, these considerations would 
provide a basis for thinking that things of type K exist.... 
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It is easy to see how these general conclusions will apply to the case of 
propositions. In the first place, we can suppose that an adequate account of the 
logical forms of belief attribution involves the supposition that 'that p' is a singular 
term.... In the second place, we may assume that some propositional attitude 
statements are certainly true.... Thirdly, we should take these assumptions to entail 
that there is an entity.... (ibid pp. 88, 89-90) 
Davidson fans have to accept this argument (since it's done up so nicely in accordance 
with Davidson's "method of truth in metaphysics"), so I will. There are propositions. But 
the argument doesn't tell us what propositions are. Propositions, I would suggest, are 
sentences in languages. 'That p' is not, as Horwich suggests, a singular term. 'That' is a 
singular term; 'p' is the sentence/proposition to which 'that' makes reference. Sentences 
are the objects of belief. That this presents me with certain problems is obvious; I'll deal 
with those problems later on when I come to Davidson's theory of attitude attributions. 
So Horwich has not shown what he needs to show to resist Davidson's argument, 
which is that the truth-bearers are not linguistic. They are propositions, but propositions 
might well be linguistic entities. But is there any special reason to deny that propositions, 
in Horwich's Fregean sense, exist? There are reasons. I offer one Quinean argument and 
one Russellian argument. 
The Quinean argument has to do with indeterminacy.7 Let's take for granted (what 
I show in 2.4) that there is at least modest indeterminacy of meaning, in the following 
sense: if there is a meaning-preserving translation of an utterance from one language into 
another, then there are also other translations that will also apparently preserve meaning. 
But there's nothing more to preserving meaning than apparently preserving meaning; if 
the meaning that is to be preserved were something that we couldn't tell whether we had 
preserved, then meaning would have gone private. Indeterminacy is a consequence of the 
public nature of meaning. 
But if meanings were propositions, then, for a translation, interpretation, or 
indirect attitude attribution to preserve an utterance's meaning or give an attitude's 
                                                
7 See Davidson 1968, pp. 100-1. Also, of course, Quine 1960, esp. pp. 27, 72-9. 
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content, one would have to pick out the meant proposition. In general, the existence of 
Fregean propositions would lend too great a determinacy to the states and utterances that 
took those propositions as their contents. Thus there are no such propositions. Horwich 
disagrees. He argues that indeterminacy is rampant in all walks of language, and if it 
doesn't lead to scepticism about anything else, it shouldn't lead to scepticism about 
propositions.8 
Consider, for instance, the old heap problem. One grain of sand is not a heap; if n 
grains of sand are not a heap, neither are n+1 grains of sand; hence, there are no heaps of 
sand. Horwich rejects the second premise: "...we must allow that there is some unknown 
(indeed unknowable) number, h, such that h grains cannot make a heap but h+1 grains 
can. Thus we are allowing that the predicate 'is a heap' has an extension, albeit an 
indeterminate one. True, we could not, even in principle, discover the extension." (ibid. p. 
81) There are two problems with this approach. 
First, Horwich has confused two kinds of indeterminacy. The indeterminacy he 
appeals to for heaps is epistemic: anything is either a heap or it is not, but sometimes we 
can't tell, and in that case there's indeterminacy. But the indeterminacy of meaning goes 
beyond the epistemic. We can begin with merely epistemic indeterminacy: we can't tell 
which proposition is meant by an utterance. But with meaning, nothing is terminally 
hidden. Hence epistemic indeterminacy applied to meaning yields ontological 
indeterminacy. It's not that there's a fact of the matter but we can't know it; it's that there's 
no fact of the matter to be known. But if there were propositions in Horwich's sense, then 
there would be a fact of the matter to be known; so there are no such propositions. 
Second, Horwich's account of indeterminacy appears to contradict his own use 
account of meaning. On the use account of meaning, the meaning of 'is a heap' is 
determined by its occasions of use. So whether something is a heap or not is determined 
by whether it occasions the use of 'is a heap.' If it occasions neither the use of that 
                                                
8 Horwich 1990/1998, p. 78-84, 94n. 
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predicate, nor the use of that predicate in a negative way ('is not a heap'), then it neither is 
nor is not a heap. It could only be a heap or not if the rules of use for the predicate told us 
whether to apply the predicate or not; if the rules don't say, then it's not (even 
unknowably) a heap or not. There can't be a pile of sand for which the rules determine 
whether  'is a heap' applies or not but nobody knows what the determination of the rules 
is. The use theory appears to undermine his notion of indeterminacy as unknowability. 
Absent a more serious argument against the indeterminacy of meaning, then, Horwich 
has no response to this argument against propositions. 
The other argument against propositions is related but of an older (1905, to be 
precise) vintage: it's an argument at least hinted at in Russell's polemic against Frege in 
"On Denoting." Russell argues: 
We say, to begin with, that when C occurs it is the denotation that we are 
speaking about; but when 'C' occurs, it is the meaning. Now the relation of 
meaning and denotation is not merely linguistic through the phrase: there must be 
a logical relation involved, which we express by saying that the meaning denotes 
the denotation. But the difficulty which confronts us is that we cannot succeed in 
both preserving the connexion of meaning and denotation and preventing them 
from being one and the same; also that the meaning cannot be got at except by 
means of denoting phrases. (Russell 1905, p. 49) 
There are two lines of thought here. First, there is no way to state the relation between 
sense and reference ("meaning" and "denotation") that both accounts for the fact that 
sense determines reference and also distinguishes between sense and reference. I find this 
line of argument difficult to understand. One doesn't like to be dismissive toward one of 
the greatest philosophers of our time, but I suspect that Russell has confused himself by 
making a pair of errors: using a phrase in quotation marks to refer to the meaning of the 
phrase, but also to refer to the phrase itself; and thinking that the relation between a 
word's sense and its reference (i.e., the relation of reference) is the same as the relation 
between the word and its reference (i.e., the relation of reference). So I don't pursue this 
line of thought. Second, we can refer to senses ("meanings") only with reference to their 
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relations to linguistic items (denoting phrases), and this is problematic. Here I think 
Russell has it right. 
How can we refer to meanings? Well, how do we refer in general? Perhaps we 
don't do much in the way of reference; a line of thought begun by Russell and continued 
by Quine would have it that our language's apparently referential apparatus is, at its 
deepest level, only quantifiers, variables, and predicates. But let us accept that reference 
occurs and even that, in at least some contexts, definite descriptions refer. Consider this 
apparently referential term, 'the mother of Buffy.' Now, the mother of Buffy is named 
Joyce. But I can manage to refer to Joyce otherwise than by using her name. I can refer to 
her by first identifying something with a relation to her (Buffy), and then giving a 
function ('the mother of') that takes one from the name following 'of' to that object's 
mother. The trouble with Fregean meanings is that we more or less have to use a method 
like this to refer to them. It's not apparently possible to refer to a meaning otherwise than 
by giving a linguistic item, and using a function that takes one from that phrase to its 
meaning: "the meaning of 'p'." 
We don't need the non-Russellian account of the referential powers of definite 
descriptions; the same conclusion will follow even if definite descriptions are not 
referential. Let "The mother of Buffy is ill" be: there is a unique x, such that x mothers 
Buffy, and x is ill. We still identify x with reference to its relata, Buffy. Likewise, "The 
meaning of 'p' is an abstract entity" might best be read: there is a unique x, such that 'p' 
means x, and x is an abstract entity." Again, we identify x with reference to its relata, 'p.' 
What's wrong here is that meanings are not supposed to be linguistic items. Thus 
their criteria of identity and individuation ought not be linguistic. But if we can identify 
and individuate them only with reference to their linguistic relata, then their criteria of 
identity and individuation will turn out to be linguistic anyway. 
How does this apply to Horwich's claim about propositions? The propositions 
Horwich wants to make the truth-bearers amount to Fregean thoughts, which were, for 
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Frege, the senses of complete sentences. Thus any argument against senses should apply 
to Horwich's propositions. Horwich's propositions require criteria of identity and 
individuation. Since propositions are to be non-linguistic items, these criteria must not be 
linguistic. But because of their peculiar nature, propositions can only be identified and 
individuated with reference to their linguistic relata. The claim that propositions (in the 
relevant sense) exist leads to the contradiction that there are entities that can be identified 
otherwise than with reference to their linguistic relata, but that can only be identified with 
reference to their linguistic relata. Thus propositions (in the relevant sense) do not exist. 
I turn to the Liar. Horwich suggests that there are four possible solutions to the 
paradox: 1) deny bivalence, 2) deny that truth and falsity can be predicated of sentences 
in a language of sentences in the same language, 3) deny that instances of 'p' in 
paradoxical sentences express propositions, 4) reject the paradoxical instances of the truth 
schema.9 (1) and (2) are obviously quite radical solutions, to be avoided if at all possible. 
Given his acceptance of propositions, the obvious way to go would seem to be to adopt 
(3) and (4). (3) would tell us that some sentences aren't apt to be true or false, because 
they fail to express propositions; (4) would carry out the procedure of excluding those 
sentences from the truth schema. The fact that the instances of 'p' in paradoxical 
sentences don't express propositions would explain why we are to reject instances of the 
truth schema concerning 'p.' Horwich rejects (3) but adopts (4). Here's his problem with 
(3): 
...for any condition C, one might happen to believe that the proposition meeting 
that condition is not true — which (since any object of belief is a proposition) 
would imply that 'The proposition meeting condition C is not true' expresses a 
proposition. And this will be so even if it happens to turn out that the proposition 
it expresses is the one meeting C... (Horwich 1990/1998, p. 41) 
This argument seems to beg the question. Horwich assumes that everything that seems 
like a belief is one and hence has a proposition as an object. But this seems false. Try as I 
                                                
9 Horwich 1990/1998, p. 41. 
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might, I cannot believe that the slithy toves did gyre and gimble in the wabe. I might 
think that I believe that, but I'd be wrong. Likewise, even if I try to believe that the 
proposition meeting condition C is not true, there may be no proposition meeting 
condition C; that can be true even if 'the proposition meeting condition C is not true' 
might have been thought to express just precisely that proposition. Maybe it's 
meaningless. 
The trouble with accepting (4) while rejecting (3) is that one would like an 
account of why the paradoxical instances of the truth schema are false. (3) gives just such 
an account. In place of (3), Horwich announces a set of apparently arbitrary rules to 
exclude the paradoxes: "(a) that the minimal theory not engender 'liar-type' 
contradictions; (b) that the set of excluded instances be as small as possible; and — 
perhaps just as important as (b) — (c) that there be a constructive specification of the 
excluded instances that is as simple as possible." (ibid. p. 42) Assuming such a 
specification, one would want an account of why the sentences specified to be excluded 
should be excluded, and this Horwich does not provide. It seems that by his own lights, 
Horwich should accept (3) and use it to explain (4) and thereby solve the Liar. 
But accepting (3) involves claiming that certain sentences are problematic 
because they don't express propositions. Since I've argued that no sentence expresses a 
proposition (in the relevant sense), I'm committed to the rejection of (3) as useless. 
However, I imagine that there is an alternative, (3'), that would deny that instances of 'p' 
in paradoxical sentences are meaningful. This is a generalization of (3). (3) says what (3') 
says, but on the assumption that being meaningful, for a sentence, is expressing a 
proposition. Since I deny propositions, I deny the move that goes from (3') to the more 
specific (3). The job of working out some version of (3') is the job of explaining why the 
instances of 'p' in paradoxical sentences are meaningless. Horwich's (3) would have done 
that had there been propositions. Horwich's rules (a)-(c) are a pretty weak attempt to 
provide the basis for rejecting exactly the right instances of 'p.' However, some 
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specification of (3') would have to work for the truth-value gaps approach to work. Since 
I'm inclined to accept a truth-value gaps approach, I'm committed to there being some 
specification of (3') that will exclude exactly the paradoxes. I don't know of any reason 
Horwich couldn't help himself to the same principle, whatever it is, so I think that 
Horwich could, if he were so inclined, provide some justification for (4). I conclude, 
then, that one of the assumptions of Davidson's argument was mistaken: the hierarchical 
approach is not the only possible solution to the Liar because a truth-value gaps approach 
could work. Since Davidson's argument required both assumptions, and only one of them 
seems to be true, this argument is unsound. 
I'll be quick with Davidson's third objection, mainly by putting it off. Davidson 
explains: 
Horwich recognizes that to maintain that truth has, as he says, "a certain purity", 
he must show that we can understand it fully in isolation from other ideas, and we 
can understand other ideas in isolation from it. He does not say there are no 
relations between the concept of truth and other concepts; only that we can 
understand these concepts independently.... 
Understanding a sentence, he maintains, consists in knowing its "assertibility 
conditions" (or "proper use"). He grants that these conditions may include that the 
sentence (or utterance) be true. I confess I do not see how, if truth is an 
assertibility condition, and knowing the assertibility conditions is understanding, 
we can understand a sentence without having the concept of truth. (Davidson 
1996, p. 33) 
The objection turns on the relation of truth to other concepts. For Davidson, truth is 
central to meaning; for Horwich, meaning is prior to and independent of truth. But if 
Horwich, in giving sentence meanings, ends up giving a list of truth-conditions, then his 
account will, like Davidson's, make truth central to meaning. Whether Horwich makes 
this mistake — he does — is a matter better put off for the full discussion of Horwich's 
theory of meaning in section 1.1.5, so I leave off here. 
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1.1.4 Explanation-Oriented Critique of Minimalism 
It would appear that there are general facts about truth: whether or not a sentence 
is true seems susceptible of explanation, and that sentences are true seems to explain 
further facts about them. But part of what it is to be a minimal property is to both lack 
explanatory power, and not to require explanation. So if truth is involved in explanation 
either as explanans or explananda, it is not minimal. In this section, I focus on arguments 
dealing with truth in explanations. I go through in two passes. First, I look at the example 
of the normativity of truth. Second, I look at the more general argument against 
minimalism offered by Anil Gupta. 
We seem to desire to believe p only if p is true, and p's truth seems to be 
important to its desirability; further, we strongly prefer to have this desire. Dummett 
makes the point in this famous passage: 
...it is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements.... We 
cannot in general suppose that we give a proper account of a concept by 
describing those circumstances in which we do, and those in which we do not, 
make use of the relevant word, by describing the usage of that word; we must also 
give an account of the point of the concept, explain what we use the word for. 
(Dummett 1959, pp. 2-3) 
For Dummett, truth is a goal of enquiry, and this is a fact that must be accounted for on 
any theory of truth. Two issues emerge. Is truth a goal of enquiry? And, can any account 
of this fact be given if we accept minimalism? 
The claim that truth is a goal of enquiry has come under attack by, unfortunately, 
Davidson, while engaged in debate with Rorty. Here's what Davidson has to say: 
...truths do not come with a "mark", like the date in the corner of some 
photographs, which distinguishes them from falsehoods. The best we can do is 
test, experiment, compare, and keep an open mind.... Since it is neither visible as 
a target, nor recognizable when achieved, there is no point in calling truth a goal. 
Truth is not a value, so the "pursuit of truth" is an empty enterprise unless it 
means only that it is often worthwhile to increase our confidence in our beliefs, by 
collecting further evidence or checking our calculations. (Davidson 1997, pp. 6-7) 
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For Davidson, there is a tension between the objectivity and normativity of truth. If truth 
were normative, it would have to be visible and recognizable. But to be objective, it must 
be neither. Objectivity, in this context, means independence from us. Truth's objectivity 
would consist in the fact that whether something is true is determined by factors 
independent from us, our epistemic situation, what's useful for us, and so forth. 
Pragmatists and others opted to give up the objectivity of truth and identify it with 
something visible and recognizable, assertibility. But truth transcends assertibility under 
any specifiable conditions, unless those conditions themselves so transcend any actual 
situation in which anyone might find herself as to amount to infallibility. So Davidson 
takes the other alternative and retains the objectivity of truth, while abandoning its 
normativity. 
The major premise of the argument is that, for something to count as a goal of an 
agent, that agent must be able to envision the goal while aiming at it, and recognize her 
achievement of it (should she in the end achieve it). This seems straightforwardly, indeed 
obviously, wrong as a constraint on what we should count as goals. 
Consider the first constraint: envisioning. In the simple example of trying to hit a 
target with an arrow, it's obvious that I need not envision the target to try to hit it. I could, 
for instance, try to hit a certain distance to the left of some other object, knowing that the 
target is that distance from the other object. Here, the analogy is with the relationship 
between truth and justification: I can aim at truth by aiming at something with a certain 
relation to justification.10 I could even use The Force or follow the Tao in my attempt to 
hit the target, and still count as trying to hit it. 
Consider the second constraint: recognition. In the example, I need not check to 
see whether I have hit the target to count as having tried to hit it. Now, I do have to be 
able to recognize, in general, hittings of targets with arrows before I can intend to hit a 
target with an arrow, because in the absence of the ability, I can't take hitting a target with 
                                                
10 See section 3.2 on the tightness of this relationship between justification and truth. 
 38 
an arrow as the content of any intention of mine. The proposition "I have hit a target with 
an arrow" isn't one that I can intend to make true, because I wouldn't understand it. 
So there is something to the second constraint. But all we're required to do by the 
recognition constraint is to have the concept of truth. Certainly we must accept that we 
must grasp the concept of truth before we can take truth as a goal, but, since we do grasp 
the concept of truth, that's no objection. 
At a deeper level, I want to consider an argument Putnam offered in this context.11 
Putnam argues that you can't grasp conditions of warranted assertibility without grasping 
conditions of truth. Consider the conditions of warranted assertibility of a sentence like, 
"The cat is eating." We could take more or less internalist or externalist notions of the 
conditions. On an internalist approach, the conditions of warrant might be: that I have a 
there's-a-cat-eating sort of experience. But what are the conditions of warranted 
assertibility of a sentence like, "I am having a there's-a-cat-eating sort of experience?" 
Surely, that I have a there's-a-cat-eating sort of experience. But, by no coincidence, that is 
the truth condition of the sentence. On an externalist notion, the conditions of warrant 
might be: that there's a cat eating, and perhaps I'm aware of that by some reliable 
mechanism. Again, the truth conditions are part of the conditions for warranted 
assertibility. In both cases, I have to be in a position to grasp that some sentence's truth 
conditions are met to be in a position to grasp that some sentence's (perhaps the same 
one) conditions of warranted assertibility are met. It's hard to envision a notion of 
warranted assertibility that can be taken as a goal across the board without also taking 
truth as a goal in at least many instances. It's therefore a mistake to deny that truth can be 
goal in favor of taking warranted assertibility as a goal; one must meet either to meet the 
other. 
Truth can be both objective and a norm; we must be in a position to envision and 
recognize truth to be in a position to envision and recognize warrant, and being 
                                                
11 Putnam 1991, pp. 266-9. 
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envisioned and potentially recognized is not a precondition on taking something as a goal 
anyway. I accept the intuitive claim that truth is a goal of enquiry and reject Davidson's 
Rortian argument. 
But what sort of explanation is necessary of the fact that truth is a goal of 
enquiry? I argue that, whatever the explanation is, it will have to accept that truth is a 
substantive property. For Horwich, we seek the truth because it's useful: 
Consider in the first place those of a person's beliefs of the form 
(1) <If I perform action A then state of affairs S will be realized>. 
The psychological role of such beliefs is to motivate the performance of A when S 
is desired. When this process takes place, and if the belief involved is true, then 
the desired result will in fact obtain. In other words, if I have belief (1) and desire 
S, then I will do A. But if my belief is true, then, given merely the equivalence 
axioms, it follows that if I do A then S will be realized. (Horwich 1990/1998, p. 
44) 
Horwich continues by saying that we should care about the truth of beliefs that 
aren't of the form (1) because of their inferential relations with beliefs that are of form 
(1). Let's consider some belief (1') that is of form (1), and run through the argument: 
(A) We should believe that (1') only if believing that (1') is useful. 
(B) Ceteris paribus, believing that (1') is useful only if that (1') is true. 
(C) Ceteris paribus, we should believe that (1') only if that (1') is true. 
Since we can derive (C) from (A) and (B), those two claims might be thought to account 
for the truth of (C). Let's call this account, and all accounts that share its form but make 
reference to different sentences in place of (1'), instances of schema (N). The trouble with 
(N) is that (A) seems to be false, and (B) not provable given minimalist scruples. 
What about the ceteris paribus clauses? I insert ceteris paribus in (B) to allow for 
the fact that sometimes a false belief might be useful, and this weakening of one of the 
premises will flow through to the conclusion, (C). But why doesn't (A) get a ceteris 
paribus? For (A) to get a ceteris paribus would be for there to be some other reason to 
believe a sentence other than its usefulness. 
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(A) is the claim that belief's point is exclusively practical. But that seems false. 
We like to know things just for the sake of knowing them, beyond any practical purposes. 
It strikes us as tragic that so many of our fellows are devoid of purely intellectual 
curiosity. That high-grade reflective knowledge even has a practical point is a fairly 
recent development: all men by nature desired to know, long before knowledge was 
power. 
Consider a simple example. As it happens, William the Usurper was crowned 
King of England on Christmas Day, 1066. But how bad off would I be if I believed that 
William had been crowned on, say, All-Saint's Day? Or New Year's Eve? Is there some 
lesson of history that would be misapplied by anyone who had William's coronation date 
a bit off? Surely not. Yet it would irritate me no end to find that I'd been wrong about the 
date. 
How much damage would rejecting (A) do to Horwich? Instances of (N) are 
simple hypothetical syllogisms. Whether the antecedent of the first premise can be 
connected in the conclusion with the consequent of the second premise depends on 
whether something can be found that can plausibly serve as consequent of the first 
premise and also antecedent of the second. That (1') is useful can't plausibly serve, 
because we care about truth for other reasons than its usefulness. What other reasons are 
there for believing things, other than that it's useful to believe them? Consider two 
equally useless beliefs, p and ~p, and assume that p. We would prefer to believe that p in 
this situation, but the two beliefs are equally useless. The only difference between the two 
beliefs is that one of them is true. But (A) reformed along these lines: 
(A') We should believe that (1') only if believing that (1') is useful or that (1') is 
true. 
...isn't going to work for minimalism, since on (A'), (1')'s truth is making a difference to 
something else, whether we should believe it. Horwich disagrees: 
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It might be thought that if truth is intrinsically valuable, then minimalism is in 
trouble, since it surely lacks the resources to explain that value. But this criticism 
is unjust. For the difficulty that attaches to explaining why true belief is 
intrinsically good is no more or less than explaining, for any other particular 
thing, why it is intrinsically good. The problem stems from our failure to 
understand the concept of intrinsic goodness, rather than from our adoption of the 
minimalist conception of truth. (Horwich 1990/1998, p. 62) 
I suspect that Moore was right and that we're never going to understand the concept of 
intrinsic goodness any more than we're going to understand the concept of truth. But 
Horwich seems to be wrong to say that minimalism's problem with understanding the 
intrinsic goodness of truth has to do with intrinsic goodness. Horwich says that it's hard 
to understand of any "particular thing," like kindness, why it is intrinsically good. That's 
true, but at least with kindness there's something in the goodness of which one can 
believe. The problem with minimalism here is that it denies the existence of that which is 
commended, truth. 
For minimalism, claims that seem to be about truth aren't. We only use the truth 
predicate to generalize. So consider again (A'), the claim we're left with when we 
abandon the narrowly consequentialist conception of the value of truth: 
(A') We should believe that (1') only if believing that (1') is useful or that (1') is 
true. 
Why might we believe this? Well, the natural source for a claim like this would be a 
universal claim of which it is an instance: 
(UA') ∀x(we should believe that x only if believing that x is useful or that x is 
true) 
But how might the minimalist discover such a claim? Likewise, what about (B), the claim 
that, ceteris paribus, believing that (1') is useful only if that (1') is true? (B) can be 
derived from a certain universal claim: 
(UB) Ceteris paribus, ∀x(believing that x is useful only if that x is true) 
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To purify the argument of any essential reference to truth, we would have to add the 
relevant equivalence axiom: 
(EB) That (1') is true iff (1') 
Horwich won't interpret this truism in a way that accords with compositionality, but let's 
assume that he makes the use theory of meaning work for the interpretation of that-
clauses. Instantiating (1') for x in (UB), and then running across the biconditional in (EB), 
will get (B). But how would we figure out that (UB), or (UA')? Horwich's answer is 
amazing: 
...it is plausible to suppose that there is a truth-preserving rule of inference that 
will take us from a set of premises attributing to each proposition some property, 
F, to the conclusion that all propositions have F. No doubt this rule is not 
logically valid, for its reliability hinges not merely on the meanings of the logical 
constants, but also on the nature of propositions. But it is a principle we do find 
plausible. (Horwich 1990/1998, p. 137) 
The base for the inference to (UB), then, is the infinite list of its instances. Why must all 
of the instances be included? Why not use inductive or abductive reasoning on a subset of 
the instances to induce the generalization? To induce something about truth — that it's 
connected to usefulness — would be to treat truth as a substantive property, which 
Horwich cannot do. But note that (B) is one of the instances, and the question I asked 
was, How do we know that (B)? The natural answer is, because it's an instance of a 
generalization that we believe. But we believe the generalization, according to Horwich, 
because we believe all of the instances. There would be a vicious circle here if Horwich 
accepted that (B) had any support at all. 
For minimalism, there are no substantive truths about truth. The truth predicate is 
a device of generalization. We come to the very heart of minimalism when we realize that 
(A') and (B) and every other claim that apparently involves truth doesn't, but is only a 
way of summarizing or restating some other claim, one that doesn't involve truth. Since 
no claim not involving truth could support (A') and (B), and there are no claims involving 
truth, these claims are basic and receive no justification. They must be a priori. But on 
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the face of it, a claim like (B): Ceteris paribus, believing that (1') is useful only if that (1') 
is true, is not a good candidate for a prioricity. The claim seems straightforwardly 
empirical: it's about the causal effects of believing a claim. The fact that a ceteris paribus 
clause is necessary should help us to remember why. 
Recall that Horwich offered a (mistaken) account, (N), of why it is good to 
believe claims of form (1) only if they're true. That account turns out to have been 
schematic; i.e., not really an account at all. There is no general claim to account for, there 
are only the instances. (N) is really a pattern according to which we may create accounts 
of our own for each instance of (1) about which we have any interest. However, some 
instances of (1) will be false and yet useful to believe, or true and yet useless to believe; 
that's why (B) has a ceteris paribus clause. Yet (N) did not account for this; it was a proof 
of (1) that appealed only to conceptual truths and hence allowed no room for error. While 
(N)'s purity may lead us to believe that (B) is a priori, the application of (N) to particular 
contexts will soon convince us that whether truths are more useful to believe than 
falsehoods is an empirical issue, which is what one would expect from claims about 
utility.12 
The above discussion has shown the implausibility of minimalistic accounts of 
one general claim that seems to involve truth, that truth is a goal of enquiry. But the point 
is a general one: minimalism can't handle any general claim that apparently involves 
truth. I'll show this by reflecting on the presentation by Anil Gupta. 
                                                
12 In my argument here, I've been inspired by Lynch, 2004. But Lynch makes an interesting argument that I 
don't employ. Lynch points out that Horwich is committed to infinitely many axiomatic normative claims 
of form (1). Hence, Horwich is committed to an extreme form of normative particularism when it comes to 
belief. Whether this is true or not depends on what we require of normative generality. Lynch says that 
particularism is implausible because it makes normative learning difficult, and denies that normative 
reasoning appeals to general principles. In this context, the point would be that we don't seem to have to 
rederive each instance of (1) on the basis of a brand new instance of (N), and that we should nevertheless 
be able to derive all instances of (1) from something, to account for why we know them. But it's not clear 
why the general principle can't be the skill of applying (N) to new instances of (1), and why normative 
learning can't have been the discovery of (N). 
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Gupta's argument begins with a characterization of deflationism as the 
conjunction of four theses. The first thesis, disquotationalism, is that the truth predicate is 
a device of disquotation. The second and third theses give the function of the truth 
predicate: we have a truth predicate so that we can express infinite conjunction or 
generalizations. The fourth thesis is essential. It states that the truth predicate serves its 
expressive functions because of its disquotational power.13 
For Gupta, the issue turns on what it is for a sentence with the truth predicate to 
express an infinite conjunction or generalization. Consider these three sentences: 
2) [Sky is blue and snow is white] and [Chicago is blue and snow is white] and... 
3) ['Sky is blue' is true and snow is white] and ['Chicago is blue' is true and snow 
is white] and... 
4) For all sentences x: [x is true and snow is white].14 
This is a set of examples meant to stand in for more serious infinite conjunctions. 
Sentence (2) is the literal infinite conjunction. Sentence (3) is the same conjunction, but 
with semantic ascent by means of the truth predicate. Sentence (4) is the generalization 
abbreviated through the use of the truth predicate. So we are able to use (4) to express 
(2). 
A more serious example might help us understand what's going on here. Consider 
something that we might want to say, like (4'):"If a claim has been confirmed using 
scientific methods, then it is likely to be true." According to minimalism, without the 
truth predicate, this sentence would go like (2'): "If p has been confirmed using scientific 
methods, then it is likely that p; if q has been confirmed using scientific methods, then it 
is likely that q; if r...." Thus the sentence is an infinite generalization or conjunction. It 
                                                
13 Gupta 1993, p. 287. 
14 ibid., p. 286. The eccentric numbering matches Gupta's, but I left out his totally uninteresting sentence 
(1). The numbering in the rest of this section disregards the numbering from before these sentences from 
Gupta. 
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can express that infinite content because of the disquotational power of the predicate 'is 
true.' 
Let's consider the relationships between (2), (3), and (4). For minimalism to show 
that (4) expresses (2), there would have to be the appropriate sort of equivalence between 
each of (2) and (3) and (3) and (4). There are three grades of equivalence worth 
considering: mere material equivalence, necessary equivalence, and sameness of sense or 
meaning. If either of the equivalences is mere material, or even logical, equivalence, then 
it's hard to see how (4) could express (2). 
Let me define an 'explanatory relata' of a sentence p as a sentence that either 
serves in a non-trivial way in an explanation of p, or for which there is an explanation in 
which p serves in a non-trivial way. Minimalism claims that truth is not an explanatory 
feature: it neither requires, nor provides, explanations. So any explanatory relata of (4) 
must equally well be an explanatory relata of (2), since (4) has as its function expressing 
(2). Assume that q is an explanatory relata of (4). We may agree that (2) and (3) are each 
true if and only if (4) is true, while denying that q is an explanatory relata of either (2) or 
(3). It's possible to explain one of two materially equivalent sentences without explaining 
the other. Likewise if the equivalences are taken to be logical or necessary. The only 
equivalence that's sufficient to give (4) and (2) exactly the same explanatory relata would 
be sameness of sense or meaning.15 
But is it plausible that (4) and (2) have the same meaning? Not at all. To see this, 
we should check a more serious example. Recall: 
(4'): If a claim has been confirmed using scientific methods, then it is likely to be 
true. 
(2'): If p has been confirmed using scientific methods, then it is likely that p; if q 
has been confirmed using scientific methods, then it is likely that q; if r.... 
                                                
15 ibid., p. 289. 
 46 
It's much easier to explain (4') than it is to explain (2'). To explain (4'), we could use 
inductive or abductive reasoning about things with the property of truth to show that 
being confirmed using scientific methods tracks well with truth. But to explain (2'), we 
would have to explain each conjunct. Since we can explain (4') without explaining (2'), 
they don't have the same meaning, and (4') doesn't express (2'). We need the property of 
truth to figure, in a substantive way, in (4') for it to be explainable. Hence truth is 
substantive, not minimal. 
Horwich's reply is very weak: 
Anil Gupta rightly notes that the instances of the generalizations that we use the 
concept of truth to formulate will not say exactly the same thing as what we 
wished to generalize unless corresponding instances of 'The statement that p is 
true' and 'p' express the very same proposition — which... is not very plausible. 
But this point does not undermine the minimalist story about the function of truth; 
for... that function requires merely that the generalizations permit us to derive the 
statements to be generalized — which requires merely that the truth schemata 
provide material equivalences.  (Horwich 1990/1998, p. 124) 
Gupta's argument is that, if minimalism were true, then anything that explained (4) would 
have to explain (2), since minimalism claims that (4) is just (2) abbreviated. But it is 
possible to explain (4) without explaining (2). Hence, (4) is not just (2) abbreviated.  
Horwich's reply appears to be that the derivability of all of the conjuncts of (2) from the 
generalization (4) is sufficient for (4) to express (2). One gets the feel that Horwich is 
lagging behind in the conversation, or didn't follow Gupta's argument all the way 
through, because the possibility that (4) and (2) only need to be materially equivalent for 
the one to express the other is specifically dealt with in Gupta's argument. It's not clear 
what Horwich would say were he to respond to Gupta's argument in a more full-blooded 
way. 
Horwich, however, denies that truth has any explanatory power. With respect to 
generalizations like (4'), he claims that, "Given the function of our concept of truth, we 
can see that these generalizations are not focused on truth, not really about truth. Rather 
they belong to that class of special schematic generalizations that rely on the equivalence 
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schema for their formulation." (ibid. p. 141) (4'), contrary to appearances, does not relate 
truth to confirmation by science. It's just another way of saying (2'). But, as we've just 
seen, it is patently not a way of saying (2'). The only way that we could be in a position to 
explain (2') would be to have the list of conjuncts in hand. But we could explain (4') on 
the basis of inductive or abductive reasoning about the connection between truth and 
science. 
The point to be made might be even clearer if we set aside explanation and focus 
on justification. Under what circumstances might we be justified in claiming (2') and (4')? 
If we had its infinitely many conjuncts in hand, then we would be justified in claiming 
(2'). But, setting aside that that circumstance will never obtain, even if it did, we would 
not be justified in claiming (4'). Having a list of infinitely many propositions, asserting 
that, if it's confirmed by science, then it (is true), will not justify the universal 
generalization of those propositions. To have the generalization, we would need to have 
in hand the negative existential claim that there are no more propositions. So there is a 
circumstance that would justify (2') but not (4'). 
Let's try the other direction. If we had suitably many instances of (4'), and we 
thought that they supported the generalization, and that such a generalization would 
support counterfactuals, then we would be justified in claiming (4') (and hence (2')). But 
that's because we would be treating (4') as the statement of a law, not a mere universal 
generalization. If we were to set aside this feature of (4'), that is, set aside that it makes 
important reference to truth, then we would never be in a position to claim (4'). Yet not 
only could we be in a position to claim (4'), it seems that we are in a position to claim 
(4'). Hence truth is key to the justification of (4'), so truth must not be minimal. 
1.1.5 Horwich's Use Theory 
Why address the theory of meaning as use at all, much less in the section on truth, 
rather than on meaning? The doctrine that meaning is use makes a difference to our 
assessment of Horwich's minimalism. Minimalism thins out truth so much that the truth-
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conditional account of meaning would be implausible were minimalism true, as Dummett 
explains: 
...if we accept the redundancy theory of 'true' and 'false'.... we must abandon the 
idea which we naturally have that the notions of truth and falsity play any 
essential role in any account either of the meanings of statements in general or of 
the meaning of any particular statement. (Dummett 1959, p. 7) 
The danger to my project is obvious: I intend to turn general arguments against 
scepticism and relativism that rely on the truth-conditional account of meaning into 
support for moral realism. Minimalism, by undercutting the account of meaning, would 
undercut my arguments against scepticism and relativism, and thence indirectly 
invalidate my project. But, on the other hand, since the minimalist undermines an 
attractive theory of meaning, he must offer his own in its place. But what if no such 
theory — one designed to be a natural fit with minimalism — were plausible? Then the 
minimalist would be unable to place his theory in the context of an overall philosophy of 
language, which is certainly a deficiency. This attack is, to be sure, ad hominem, but still, 
if successful, it points out a real problem with minimalism. So in this section I present 
Horwich's use theory. The presentation of minimalism in 1.1.2 was critical but did not 
attempt to close the case. This section will be different. I think that Horwich's use theory 
is susceptible to very quick refutation, and I provide it in this section. 
Horwich's theory is not, precisely, a use theory of meaning, for Horwich does not 
claim that uses are meanings: "Meanings are concepts" (Horwich 1998, p. 44). Rather, he 
claims that what it is to have a given meaning is to be used in a certain way. The meaning 
itself, a concept or property, is independent. 
Basic to Horwich's approach is his view of the relation between the logical forms 
of meaning claims (claims of the form, "x means F") and their reductions. As Horwich 
notes, a constraint he calls Strong Relationality is "satisfied by just about every theory [of 
meaning] that has ever been seriously entertained." (Horwich 1998, p. 23) The Strong 
Relationality Constraint is a constraint on reductive theories of meaning that they 
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preserve the logical form of the claims they reduce, which is obviously relational: to say 
that x means F is to relate x to F. Horwich rejects the Constraint: 
Notice... that this is a very substantive commitment, and that it stands in need of 
justification. For why should it not be, on the contrary, that although there is 
perhaps some relation to dogs that constitutes the property of meaning [the 
concept] DOG, this is completely different from the relation to tables that 
constitutes the property of meaning [the concept] TABLE? (ibid, p. 24) 
Horwich's goal in (as distinct from his argument for) rejecting the Constraint is this. He 
wants to reduce "x means F" to facts about the use of 'x.' But 'x's being used in a certain 
way is not, apparently, a relational property; in any event, it does not seem to be a 
relation to a meaning. So if any reductive analysis of "x means F" had to retain the 
relational logical form of the original, then the use theory couldn't even get off the 
ground. 
Horwich doesn't have an argument against the Constraint, but he argues that it 
requires justification that it has never received. There's nothing in the nature of reductive 
analyses, he points out, that requires them to preserve logical form. Let 'u(x),' some 
underlying property, be a purported reduction of 's(x),' some superficial property. Then 
'u(x)' constitutes or reduces 's(x)' just in case: 
(1) 'u(x)' and 's(x)' apply to the same things, and 
(2) facts about 's(x)' are explained by (1). (ibid, p. 25) 
But nothing in these two conditions on reduction or constitution demands that superficial 
relations be constituted by underlying relations; perhaps what underlies the relation is a 
monadic property. I think that Horwich is right to say that the Strong Relationality 
Constraint is not a necessary constraint. However, there is at least one consideration in its 
favor.  
To offer a reduction that differs in logical form from that which it reduces is to 
offer a substantially revisionist reduction. An underlying property is the property being 
underlain; being H2O is being water. What makes one property "underlie" the other isn't 
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an ontological distinction, but an epistemic one. One property underlies another just in 
case it is that property, but understood in the context of a theory that reveals a great deal 
about the nature of that property. Being water doesn't explain much about water, since 
wateriness is not embedded in a powerful theory. Being H2O, however, is embedded in a 
powerful chemical theory that explains a great deal about water. So replacing a 
superficial property with its underlying property is not to replace one thing with another, 
but to "replace" one thing with itself but in a more informative way. 
Finding underlying properties, then, is a scientific endeavor. Science should be 
conservative and not reject established ideas without good reason. Now, suppose that the 
logical form of being water has feature A, while the logical form of being H2O has 
feature B, and nothing with either feature has the other. Since being H2O just is being 
water, to replace being water with an underlying property with a different logical form is 
to violate conservatism. Often, scientists must do this, but never without fairly good 
reason. 
Likewise in the context of meaning. The fact that the meaning predicate is 
relational suggests that we ought to look for a relational underlying property. It may be 
that we won't find one, but the Constraint is a good heuristic device. So while Horwich is 
right to point out that we may set aside the Constraint, he is wrong not to pay the 
Constraint its due as a principle of scientific conservatism. 
Here's a less abstract way to see why conservatism in the form of the Constraint 
ought to be respected if at all possible. Consider two meaning claims, "'a' means F" and 
"'b' means G." We would expect that these two claims share some content, the relation of 
meaning; this is suggested by the appearance in both claims of the 6-character string 
'means_'. But for Horwich, "means F" is a monadic predicate. Thus it will be only an 
accident of spelling that it seems very much like the distinct predicate, "means G." But 
since they have nothing in common, there is no longer any reason to believe that an 
analysis of one of them will at all resemble an analysis of the other; for instance, that one 
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of them can be analyzed with reference to its use won't even begin to hint that the other 
one can be analyzed with reference to its use. Since no two meaning claims have 
anything at all in common, Horwich, to persuade us that his theory is correct, will have to 
give an independent reductive analysis of each and every meaning claim that we could 
make. Only by obeying the Constraint can we be in a position to offer a theory of 
meaning, as distinct from a theory of "means F" and a different theory of "means G," and 
so forth, which, for no apparent reason, happen to look a lot alike. 
Horwich's reducing meaning_F to use but at the same time positing meanings is 
puzzling. What is the sense in positing meanings? Intuitively, one of the advantages of 
the use theory of meaning is that it does away with mysterious relata of words; use looks 
more amenable to physicalistic reduction than do intensionalistic meaning posits. Why 
give up this advantage? What does introducing meanings do for Horwich? Davidson 
remarked, topically: "Paradoxically, the one thing meanings do not seem to do is oil the 
wheels of a theory of meaning.... My objection to meanings in the theory of meaning is 
not that they are abstract or that their identity conditions are obscure, but that they have 
no demonstrated use." (Davidson 1967, pp. 20-1) Horwich does make propositional 
attitudes consist of concepts (meanings) stuck together, but this claim isn't very 
informative about attitudes: it just says that the meaning of 'Fa' is the meaning of 'a,' plus 
the meaning of 'F.' Perhaps it's enlightening to be told that my mental contents are 
independent entities that exist in a Platonic realm to which other people have access, but 
if that's what's interesting, Horwich spends little time on what's interesting. 
The monadic reduction of meaning_F is troubled, and all the detritus of relational 
theories of meaning appears still to be in place. But why is the reduction of meaning_F to 
use a good one? Horwich explains: 
The overall use of each word stems from its possession of a basic acceptance 
property. For each word there is a small set of simple properties which... explain 
total linguistic behavior with respect to that word. These explanatorily basic 
properties fall into various kinds... where each such kind is defined by the 
distinctive form of its members and by the range of phenomena they are needed to 
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account for. The present theory is focused on the semantic feature of a word. The 
distinctive form of that feature is that it designates the circumstances in which 
certain specified sentences containing the word are accepted; and the primary 
explanatory role of a word's acceptance property is to account for the acceptance 
of other sentences containing the word. 
... for each word w, there is a regularity of the form 
All uses of w stem from its possession of acceptance property A(x), 
where A(x) gives the circumstances in which certain specified sentences 
containing w are accepted. (Horwich 1998, pp. 44-5) 
Horwichian semantics won't be like Tarskian semantics. For Tarski, semantics is a 
relational discipline; words are related to objects. But for Horwich, semantics seems to be 
(more or less by definition) a non-relational discipline. It specifies certain paradigm 
sentences in which a word is used, acceptance of which defines what it is for a word to 
have its meaning. That a speaker accepts those sentences (plus various worldly 
phenomena) commits her to the acceptance of most other accepted sentences that involve 
the word, and thus explains why she is inclined to utter or at least accept them in the 
appropriate contexts. 
Key, from my point of view, are the relations between the use theory and truth. 
Davidson tries to soften the opposition between the use and truth-conditional theories of 
meaning: 
What is clear is that someone who knows under what conditions a sentence would 
be true understands that sentence, and if the sentence has a truth value, then 
someone who does not know under what conditions it would be true doesn't 
understand it. This simple claim doesn't rule out an account of meaning which 
holds that sentences mean what they do because of how they are used; it may be 
that they are used as they are because of their truth conditions, and they have the 
truth conditions they do because of how they are used. (Davidson 1997, p. 13) 
On this possible account, use and truth-conditions are mutually determining, and use 
determines meaning. Such an account wouldn't be functionally very different from one 
that has it that use and truth-conditions are mutually determining, and truth-conditions 
determine meaning. Horwich, however, places the disagreement: 
 53 
...even if Davidson were to accept a use theory of truth conditions, this approach 
would conflict on the question of explanatory order with the use theory of 
meaning. For on the latter view a sentence's truth condition is a consequence of its 
meaning, not constitutive of it. (Horwich 1998, p. 72) 
This puts the difference between the use theory and the truth conditional theory very 
sharply. If Horwich can show that knowledge of truth conditions flows from knowledge 
of meaning (otherwise than by being the same thing), then all's well. Horwich says that, 
on the use theory, we discover a truth-condition through a 3-stage procedure: 
First, we know the meaning of "snow is white" by knowing its mode of 
construction and the uses of its component words. Second, we know the meaning 
of "true" by accepting instances of 'The proposition that p is true iff p' and 
accepting '(u)[u is true iff (∃x)(u expresses x & x is true)]', and then inferring 
instances of the disquotation schema, '"p" is true iff p' — including '"snow is 
white" is true if and only if snow is white.' And third, in so far as we understand 
all the constituents of that biconditional, we can be said to know that "snow is 
white" is true if and only if snow is white. Thus our knowledge of the truth 
conditions of "snow is white" derives from our knowledge of its meaning. (ibid) 
The third phase isn't very interesting; it's the phase at which we point out what we've 
already accomplished. The second phase, note, involves inference. The derivation 
appears to be logical; the appropriate instance of the disquotation schema is derived from 
other items of knowledge through an argument. I don't believe that this argument works, 
so I'll look at it very closely. 
How shall we represent the knowledge of the meaning of whatever sentence we're 
talking about; a, for instance? This will turn out to be crucial and I'll have to discuss it at 
length. 
The three phrases, "the proposition that p," "p", and p all look much more similar 
than they should. The first is the same of an abstract entity, the second is the name of a 
sentence, and the third is a sentence. To make things clearer, I introduce 'a' to name a 
sentence, 'b' to name a proposition, and 'A', to be a sentence. 'A' is the sentence that a 
names, and b is the proposition that it expresses. 
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Now, let's look at the most formally expressed of the premises: (u)[u is true iff 
(∃x)(u expresses x & x is true)]. Between two eventual names that will replace 'u' and 'x,' 
there is the relation of expression. We may take it that whatever will replace 'x' is 
intended to name a proposition, while whatever will replace 'u' is intended to name 
something that will express a proposition. But now note that nothing is to be true unless it 
expresses a proposition that is true. Hence, for a proposition to be true, it must express a 
proposition that is true. We need to make clear that 'u' is to be replaced by a sentence. 
Our grasp of truth, phase 2, seems to consist in our grasping two claims; an 
instance of ''The proposition that p is true iff p," and some suitably modified version of 
the very formal-looking claim. Let the first of these be premise (1) Tb ↔ A. b, recall, is 
the proposition expressed by 'A.' That proposition is to be true just in case A. Let the 
second be premise (2) ∀u{Su → [Tu ↔∃x(uEx & Tx)]}. For any sentence, that sentence 
is true just in case it expresses something that is true. We'll take for granted that only 
propositions are ever expressed. Finally, what we're trying to discover here is the truth 
conditions of a sentence like "Snow is white." So our conclusion, hopefully, will be that a 
(i.e., 'A') is true iff A: (C) Ta ↔ A. 
It's readily apparent that our argument cannot get off the ground, but that's 
probably because we haven't yet encoded our grasp of the meaning of a. That should be 
premise 3. How shall we express this knowledge? On a first glance, the argument will 
probably require some claims about what expresses what, since the second premise 
includes the relational predicate, 'expresses.' But what is expression? Horwich never 
exactly says, but I think his meaning comes out clearly here: "Two words express the 
same concept in virtue of having the same basic acceptance property." (ibid, p. 46) 
Concepts are meanings, and meanings are determined by acceptance properties. Yet here 
words are said to express concepts. I guess that 'express' and 'mean' express the same 
concept. 
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Premise 3 is supposed to encode the speaker's grasp of the meaning of a. But the 
meaning of a is b. Meanings are what are expressed, so we may introduce our first pass at 
premise (3) aEb. We may also state the trivial: (4) Sa, a is a sentence. 
The strategy is plain; we're trying to prove a biconditional claim, so we assume 
each side of the biconditional and prove the other side in a conditional proof.  
Based on our premises, we can prove that A → Ta: 
(1) Tb ↔ A 
(2) ∀u{Su → [Tu ↔ ∃x(uEx & Tx)]} 
(3) aEb 
(4) Sa 
(5) Sa → [Ta ↔∃x(aEx & Tx)] ∀, 2 
(6) Ta ↔∃x(aEx & Tx)  →, 4, 5 
(7) A    Assume for → 
(8) Tb    ↔, 7, 1 
(9) aEb & Tb   &, 3, 8 
(10) ∃x(aEx & Tx)  ∃, 9 
(11) Ta   ↔, 10, 6 
(12) A → Ta    →, 7, 11 
But the reverse cannot be made to work: 
(13) Ta   Assume for → 
(14) ∃x(aEx & Tx)  ↔, 6, 13 
(15) aEc & Tc   ∃, 14 
(16) Tc   &, 15 
(17) A    ↔, 16, 1 
To get A, we must have Tb, and to get Tb, we must instantiate the existential on line 14 
to b. But we can't, due to the constraint that a constant introduced on the basis of an 
existential be new to the proof. One might think to try a reductio: 
(15) ~A   Assume for reductio 
(16) ~Tb   ↔, 1, 15 
(17) aEb & Tb   &, 3, 16 
(18) ∃x(aEx & ~Tx)  E, 17 
(19) ~Ta   contradiction 14, 18 
(20) A    contradiction, 13, 19 
But (18) doesn't contradict (14); no contradiction seems to be in the offing. If a is true 
(i.e., 'A' is true) and 'A' is false, then there's something that a expresses that is false, but 
that doesn't contradict the claim that there's something that a expresses that is true. We 
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need to make it clear that the proposition that a expresses is unique; a expresses only one 
proposition: we need to change premise (3). Currently, (3) only says that a expresses b, 
leaving open the possibility that there might be many things that a expresses, some true 
but some false. We must restrict a's expressive power, so that it may only express the one 
proposition: ∀x(aEx → x=b). This won't do either. By instantiating 'x,' we find only that, 
if a expresses anything, it's b. But perhaps a doesn't express anything. We need to assert 
that a does express exactly one thing: (3R) ∃x[aEx & ∀y(aEy ↔ x=y)]. But this will 
force a change to premise (1). We will wish to instantiate 'x' in (3R), but as long as (1) 
has mention of b, we won't be able to instantiate 'x' to b, which is what we need to do. 
But (1) must, in some way, identify the proposition expressed by a. If we use any name, 
the argument will be blocked. How can we identify the proposition otherwise than by 
naming it? We may introduce a definite description. All we know about b is that it is the 
proposition expressed by a, so let us identify it as: ιx(aEx), the thing such that a expresses 
it. Premise (1'), then, will be: Tιx(aEx) ↔ A: the thing expressed by a is true iff A. 
But now that we have this definite description in place, we may notice that (3R) is 
a sentence with a definite description, expanded out according to Russell: 
(3R) ∃x[aEx & ∀y(aEy ↔ x=y)] 
is what's meant by: 
(3') aE[ιx(aEx)] 
that is, a expresses the thing expressed by a. Since we are working in an extensional 
context, it doesn't strictly matter whether we expand the descriptions or not; I find it 




The idea should be pretty plain. The thing of which φ is true is identified twice, once by 
name but once by definite description. But the description is: the thing of which φ is true. 
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It's plain, then, that anything of which φ is true must be that thing. With the name 'b' 
removed and the definite description in place, and proof rule ι, the argument works: 
(1') Tιx(aEx) ↔ A 
(2) ∀u{Su → [Tu ↔ ∃x(uEx & Tx)]} 
(3') aEιx(aEx) 
(4) Sa 
(5) Sa → [Ta ↔ ∃x(aEx & Tx)]  ∀, 2 
(6) Ta ↔ ∃x(aEx & Tx)   →, 4, 5 
(7) A     assume for → 
(8) Tιx(aEx)    ↔, 1', 7 
(9) aEιx(aEx) & Tιx(aEx)  &, 3', 8 
(10) ∃x(aEx & Tx)   ∃, 9 
(11) Ta    ↔, 6, 10 
(12) A → Ta     →, 16, 20 
(13) Ta    assume for → 
(14) ∃x(aEx & Tx)   ↔, 6, 13 
(15) aEb & Tb    ∃, 14 
(16) aEb    &, 15 
(17) b=ιx(aEx)   ι, 3', 16 
(18) Tb    &, 15 
(19) Tιx(aEx)    =, 17, 18 
(20) A     ↔, 1', 19 
(21) Ta → A     →, 13, 20 
(22) Ta ↔ A     ↔, 12, 21 
This argument is valid. In the first pass at the argument, we were able to prove A → Ta; 
we were able to prove that here without appeal to the new proof rule ι. That rule was 
important in deriving the other direction, Ta → A, as one would expect. 
But how interesting is this argument from Horwich's point of view? Recall that 
the point of this project was to show how one grasps the truth conditions of sentences. 
But let's consider the substance of the premises. (4) is unexceptionable, and (2) seems 
reasonable. But (3') is trivial (as the silliness of the ι rule shows). It says only that a 
sentence expresses the proposition that it expresses. That is not a substantial claim; it 
does not actually identify the proposition. Our identification of that proposition has been 
"linguistic through the phrase." We were supposed to be basing our knowledge of 
sentences' truth-conditions on substantial knowledge of meanings, but no such substantial 
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knowledge is present. Likewise, (1') is trivial: it says only that the proposition expressed 
by a sentence 'A' is true iff A. The situation here recalls the Russellian argument against 
propositions from section 1.1.3. 
But perhaps my repair of the argument has been improper. Instead of replacing b 
with a definite description and introducing proof rule ι, I should have introduced a new 
premise that states explicitly that a expresses only one proposition: (5) ∃!x(aEx). This 





The sense should be clear. We count two things of which φ are true, but we know that 
there is only one such thing; hence, the things we counted must actually be identical. 
Returning to our original premises that included the name 'b' of the proposition expressed 
by a, but introducing a new premise (5) stating that there is exactly one such proposition, 
we can again make the argument work: 
(1) Tb ↔ A 




(6) Sa → [Ta ↔∃x(aEx & Tx)] ∀, 2 
(7) Ta ↔∃x(aEx & Tx)  →, 4, 6 
(8) A    Assume for → 
(9) Tb    ↔, 8, 1 
(10) aEb & Tb   &, 3, 9 
(11) ∃x(aEx & Tx)  ∃, 10 
(12) Ta   ↔, 11, 7 
(13) A → Ta    →, 7, 12 
(14) Ta   Assume for → 
(15) ∃x(aEx & Tx)  ↔, 7, 14 
(16) aEc & Tc   ∃, 15 
(17) aEc   &, 16 
(18) b=c   !, 3, 5, 17 
(19) Tc   &, 16 
(20) Tb   =, 18, 19 
(21) A    ↔, 1, 20 
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(22) Ta → A    →, 13, 21 
(23) Ta ↔ A    ↔, 12, 22 
As with the previous argument, it is possible to show that A → Ta without appeal to 
anything new. But we must appeal to premise (5) and the new proof rule ! to show that 
Ta → A. For the truth of a sentence to imply the sentence, we must assume that the 
sentence expresses only one proposition. But it's not plain that we're in a position to 
accept that. Horwich explains: 
...there is the question of which of the many such properties of a given word is to 
be the one associated with its meaning. The right answer, I shall argue, is that we 
want the property that is explanatorily basic.... if we think of this as a 
generalization regarding the use of the word, then the one we choose is the one 
that provides the simplest account of all the word's individual uses. The fact that 
there may well be no such thing — but only a range of equally good choices — is 
what constitutes the indeterminacy of meaning. (ibid. p. 41) 
For the argument to go through, each sentence with truth conditions must be associated 
with exactly one proposition, but as Horwich admits, that is not the case. A sentence is 
associated with a range of propositions, and there's no fact of the matter which one it 
expresses. 
Perhaps this suggests another reformulation of the argument. Now, the problem 
appears to be with premise (2): ∀u{Su → [Tu ↔ ∃x(uEx & Tx)]}. So far, we have 
required that there be exactly one proposition expressed by a. But maybe we should 
rewrite (2) so that it asserts that a expresses at least one proposition, and that a is true iff 
every proposition a expresses is true: (2') ∀u{Su → [Tu ↔ ∃x(uEx & ∀y(uEy → Ty))]}. 
Then we could return to the original premises (1) and (3)-(4). We can prove Ta → A, 
which is the opposite of the direction were able to show on the original, unreformed, 
premises. 
(1) Tb ↔ A 
(2') ∀u{Su → [Tu ↔ ∃x(uEx & ∀y(uEy → Ty))]} 
(3) aEb 
(4) Sa 
(5) Sa → {Ta ↔ ∃x[aEx & ∀y(aEy → Ty)]} 
(6) Ta ↔ ∃x[aEx & ∀y(aEy → Ty)] 
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(7) Ta     assume for → 
(8) ∃x[aEx & ∀y(aEy → Ty)] →, 6, 7 
(9) aEc & ∀y(aEy → Ty)  E, 8 
(10) ∀y(aEy → Ty)   &, 9 
(11) aEb → Tb   ∃, 10 
(12) Tb    →, 3, 11 
(13) A     ↔, 1, 12 
(14) Ta → A     →, 7, 13 
However, we will not be able to prove A → Ta, which was provable on every other 
version of the argument: 
(15) A     assume for → 
(16) Tb    →, 1, 15 
(17) ~Ta    assume for reductio 
(18) ~∃x[aEx & ∀y(aEy → Ty)] ↔, 6, 17 
(19) ∀x~[aEx & ∀y(aEy → Ty)] ~∃, 18 
(20) ~[aEb & ∀y(aEy → Ty)] ∀, 19 
(21) ~aEb ∨ ~∀y(aEy → Ty)  ~&, 20 
(22) ~∀y(aEy → Ty)   ∨, 3, 21 
(23) ∃y~(aEy → Ty)   ~∀, 22 
(24) ∃y(aEy & ~Ty)   ~→, 23 
(25) aEb & Tb    &, 3, 16 
(26) ∃y(aEy & Ty)   ∃, 25 
(27) Ta    contradiction, 24, 26 
But 24 and 26 don't contradict and I don't see any other contradiction on the horizon. 
There seems to be no reason not to accept A while rejecting Ta. Horwich's argument 
won't go through unless we assume that each sentence expresses exactly one proposition. 
Thus, Horwich's semantics requires too much determinacy; it can't accept even the 
modest indeterminacy that he accepts. The situation here recalls the Quinean argument 
against propositions from section 1.1.3. 
So far, I've been very accepting of Horwich's premises. But there is a major 
contradiction lurking within them. Recall that Horwich presented fairly clear versions of 
premises (1) and (2). But I had to do some interpretive work to arrive at premise 3: aEb. 
Horwich's sentence that I tried to encode with premise (3) was: "First, we know the 
meaning of "snow is white" by knowing its mode of construction and the uses of its 
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component words." What you know when you know the meaning of a, is that a expresses 
b, I have been claiming. 
But this interpretation conflicts with Horwich's opposition to the Strong 
Relationality Constraint. We should not, according to Horwich, represent a sentence's 
having a meaning by relating to its meaning. Rather, having that meaning is a monadic 
property. So (3) should have been: Fa, given some suitable F. So far, this isn't troubling, 
but what are we to make of (2): ∀u{Su → [Tu ↔ ∃x(uEx & Tx)]}? I made up premise 
(3) so that it would coordinate with the 'uEx' of (2). It's fairly easy to rewrite (3), but what 
can be done with (2)? Anything that does away with the relation between 'u' and 'x,' and 
hence satisfies the denial of Strong Relationality, will also unhook the sentence from 
truth. To make the argument work, we need the truth of the sentence to connect with the 
truth of a proposition, and to make that connection, we need to connect the sentence with 
the proposition. But that is the thing that we may not do if we deny Strong Relationality. 
Horwich accepts all of this: "...the use theory does indeed violate the commonly assumed 
requirement that there be explanations of the links between given meaning-constituting 
properties and given meanings. But this requirement is misconceived; so our violating of 
it is not objectionable." (ibid, p. 66) This claim requires consideration. 
Let F(x) be the meaning-constituting property of a, and let b be the meaning of a. 
What Horwich is now telling us is that Fa has no "explanatory links" to b, or, 
presumably, to aEb: "...as we saw..., the expectation that one will be able to read off (and 
hence to explain) which particular meaning is engendered by a given meaning-
constituting property is misguided." (ibid, p. 220) According to Horwich, knowing Fa 
will not help you learn that aEb. But recall that what it is for one property to underlie 
another is for them to be co-extensional and for the one to explain facts about the other. If 
having a given meaning-constituting property doesn't even determine which meaning a 
word has, how can it possibly account for any feature of that meaning? 
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In particular, consider the result of deepening the relatively superficial premises 
(2) and (3). (3) turns into (3''): Fa. But (2), shorn of reference to the superficial relation of 
expression, is inconceivable. Strangely, if we try to appeal to the meaning-constituting 
properties, we will no longer be in a position to grasp sentences' truth-conditions; to grasp 
sentences' truth-conditions, we have to remain at the superficial level and treat meaning 
as relational. As soon as we actually commit to the signature thesis of Horwich's use 
theory, we will no longer be able to grasp sentences' truth-conditions. Surely this theory 
fails as badly as it is possible for a theory of meaning to fail. 
The point of the argument I've been analyzing was to show how we can learn 
sentences' truth-conditions on the basis of a grasp of their meanings. The point of 
showing that was to demonstrate the contrast between Davidson's truth-conditional 
semantics and Horwich's use-theoretic semantics. For Horwich, the difference between 
the theories is in order of explanation: one accounts for uses on the basis of truth-
conditions, while the other accounts for truth-conditions on the basis of uses. We've seen 
how very badly things went when Horwich tried to account for truth-conditions on the 
basis of uses. But Horwich ties his approach to Davidson's in a different way: "once its 
precise content is elaborated, Davidson's Principle of Charity arguably boils down to the 
use theory of meaning." (ibid, p. 72) The Principle of Charity is dear to my heart, and 
since the use theory of meaning looks like a disaster, I hope that the one doesn't boil 
down to the other. What does Horwich have in mind? Recall which regularities of use 
constitute meaning: 
... for each word w, there is a regularity of the form 
All uses of w stem from its possession of acceptance property A(x), 
where A(x) gives the circumstances in which certain specified sentences 
containing w are accepted. (ibid, pp. 45) 
It's plain why Horwich sees the similarity. 
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For Davidson, speakers exhibit the attitude of holding sentences true. In 
interpretation, we must optimize agreement between the sentences we hold true, and the 
sentences the speakers hold true. If they hold one of their sentences true under the same 
circumstances under which we would hold one of our sentences true, then the two 
sentences mean the same. 
For Horwich, speakers exhibit the attitude of acceptance. In interpretation, we 
must check for identity of acceptance conditions. If they accept one of their sentences 
under the same circumstances under which we accept one of ours, then the two sentences 
mean the same. 
The two accounts do look to be more or less the same. But while Horwich is 
trying to reduce Davidson's account to his own (Davidson's account 'boils down' to the 
use-theoretic account), the natural thing for Davidson to do is reduce Horwich's to his 
own. Recall that Davidson's third objection was that Horwich claims that meanings are 
constituted by acceptance conditions, but to accept something is to accept it as true. 
Hence, the concept of truth is a prerequisite for grasp of Horwichian meanings. Horwich 
replies: 
Granted, accepting a sentence goes hand in hand with accepting its truth. But, 
equally well, supposing something goes hand in hand with supposing its truth, 
doubting something goes hand in hand with doubting its truth, and so on.... 
Consequently, its relationship to truth is not what distinguishes acceptance from 
other attitudes... and does not help to constitute its nature. Thus the relevant 
concept of acceptance does not presuppose the notion of truth. (Horwich 1998, p. 
95) 
Horwich says that the fact that acceptance is acceptance as true doesn't imply that 
acceptance is based on truth, since that other attitudes are doubting to be true or hoping to 
be true doesn't imply that doubting or hoping are based on truth. But of course on the 
truth-conditional account, they are based on truth: you can't hope that p without knowing 
p's truth-conditions. 
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Horwich presents minimalism and the use theory as structurally similar to 
Davidson's theories of truth and meaning, which they are, but as differing in explanatory 
order. The core of the view, then, is the derivation of a sentence's truth-conditions from a 
grasp of the meaning of the sentence, plus the meaning of the truth predicate. That 
derivation totally failed. At every turn, it displayed one of the failures of Horwich's 
theory. First, that it commits itself to propositions but gives no criteria by which to 
identify them. Second, that it commits itself to overdeterminate meanings while admitting 
indeterminacy. Third, that its meaning-constituting properties are devoid of explanatory 
power. All of this shows that the correct order of explanation runs from truth-conditions 
to uses, not the other way around. Truth is a substantial property with explanatory power. 
1.2 TRADITIONAL CORRESPONDENCE THEORIES 
1.2.1 Universals and the Slingshot 
A correspondence theory of truth is one that defines truth as correspondence to a 
fact, so the correspondence theorist must give theories of correspondence and facts. I 
don't worry about correspondence. I use the term ‘fact’ in a way that’s more respectful of 
the history of philosophy than it is of ordinary usage: I take facts to be controversial 
entities; anything that I'm willing to call a fact will have to bear some sort of similarity to 
the sort of things talked about by Russell, early Wittgenstein, and other classical 
correspondence theorists. The similarity has to be in the content of the idea of a fact, not 
in the purpose for which the idea is invoked. Not just anything that makes sentences true 
can count as a fact. 
We can divide theories of facts into two kinds, those that make universals 
(properties, relations) constituents of facts, and those that don't. Neither kind of theory 
will be acceptable. In this section, I employ the formal argument known as the Slingshot 
to show that, if universals are not constituents of facts, there will be far fewer facts than 
the correspondence theorist needs for her view to be remotely plausible. In the next two 
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sections, I consider Davidson's arguments concerning the unity of the proposition — 
which amount to the Bradley Regress — and argue that theories that satisfy the Slingshot 
will fail to provide unity for their facts. First, I present a naïve correspondence theory that 
will immediately fail. Second, I present a sophisticated recent view offered by Hochberg 
and derived from Russell; this theory will also fail, though it's somewhat more difficult to 
see why. The point of looking at the naïve theory is to see the pattern that will recur in the 
analysis of the sophisticated view. The two theories are variations on a theme. 
The Slingshot is a classical argument, but I take the recent presentation by 
Stephen Neale to be the most authoritative treatment to date. The Slingshot will take four 
dummy premises:, Fa, Gb, a≠b, and ❤Fa, where '❤' is some one-place sentence 
connective. We then test two assumptions: that sentences within the context of '❤' are +ι-
subs, and +ι-conv. To be +ι-subs and +ι-conv is for the proof rules of ι-subs and ι-conv 
to be validly employed within sentences within the ❤ connective. 
Since I'm using the Slingshot to study facts, our ❤ connective works like this: 
❤Fa is true if and only if 'Fa' is made true by the fact that p 
❤ is defined, then, with reference to the fact that p. The Slingshot itself, as a formal 
argument, can take any one-place sentential connective, but I'm not concerned with the 
Slingshot as a formal argument. I want to apply it to the particular case of facts. 
The Slingshot tests whether we may apply ι-conv and ι-subs within the ❤ 
context, so we must state these proof rules. ι-subs is these three rules: 
ιx(φx) = ιx(ψx) ιx(φx) = α ιx(φx) = α 
Σιx(φx) Σιx(φx) Σ(α) 
∴ Σιx(ψx) ∴ Σ(α) ∴ Σιx(φx) 
The intuitive idea of these three rules that allow the substitution of one definite 
description for another or for a name should be fairly clear. Wherever Σ is an extensional 
predicate and none of the premises is within the context of a non-extensional sentence 
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connective, these are valid, as Russell and Whitehead showed.16 ι-conv is the following 
pair of rules: 
ι-intr: T[Σ(x/α)] ι-elim:  T[α=ιx(x=α ∧ Σ(x))] 
∴T[α=ιx(x=α ∧ Σ(x))] ∴T[Σ(x/α)] 
Here, the intuitive idea may be less clear. Σ(x) is to be some formula with at least 
one instance of x and in which Σ is an extensional predicate; Σ(x/α) is Σ(x) with every 
instance of x replaced by α; and Tφ is just some sentence in which φ appears; for 
instance, φ, φ → ψ, or ❤φ.17 An example may make things clearer. Let Σ(x) be: x is a 
bachelor. Let Σ(x/α) be: Xander is a bachelor. And let Tφ be: It's very disheartening to 
see that φ, so T[Σ(x/α)] will be: It's very disheartening to see that Xander is a bachelor. It 
seems that, if Xander is a bachelor, then the thing that is Xander and is a bachelor is a 
bachelor. We may then replace Xander's name with a description: 'the thing that is 
Xander and is a bachelor', or 'ιx(x=Xander &  x is a bachelor)'. But, if it's disheartening to 
see that Xander is a bachelor, then surely it's disheartening to see that the thing that is 
Xander and is a bachelor, is a bachelor, and contrariwise. But that is ι-intr and ι-elim. In 
general, if we identify a thing by name and say something about it, then surely we could 
identify the thing by describing it as the thing that is it and of which whatever we wanted 
to say about it is true; it seems that such identification is only more tedious than 
identification by name but will have the same semantic and cognitive value. 
The Slingshot shows that if ❤ is +ι-subs and +ι-conv, then it also allows the 
substitution of materially equivalent non-general sentences. Hence, if Fa ↔ Gb and ❤Fa, 
then ❤Gb. But let's assume that Fa and Gb are, intuitively, not made true by the same 
fact. Then there is a problem, since one of them being made true by a given fact implies 
that the other is made true by the same fact; in short, that there's only one non-general 
fact. No plausible correspondence theorist is going to invoke only one non-general fact. 
                                                
16 See Neale 2001, p. 160 
17 ibid, p. 179 
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What I need to show is that, on any theory of facts that denies universals, ❤ will 
turn out to be +ι-subs and +ι-conv. Unfortunately, I have no knock-down argument, but I 
think that denying universals and also at least one of ι-subs and ι-conv is going to make 
for a fairly unnatural-seeming theory. First, I consider ι-subs. ι-subs is a rule dealing with 






That seems pretty harmless, assuming that 'F' is extensional. We are told that a is F, and 
that a is b. Then we note that 'Fa' is made true by the fact that p. But surely, the fact that 
makes true Fa will also make true Fb, since they make the same attribution to the same 
thing, albeit in different words. So it seems right to accept that, if Fa is made true by the 
fact that p, then so is Fb. 





Recall that we have rejected universals. It's hard to see, then, what the difference is 
between the contribution of 'a' and the contribution of 'ιx(Gx)' to the constitution of the 
fact could be. They seem to each contribute the same object, a. And as the previous 
argument showed, if two linguistic items contribute the same object, we will allow them 
to be intersubstituted within the ❤ context. So it's hard to see how we can resist accepting 
ι-subs. 
Let me try an example. Assume that we agree that the fact that Xander is a 
bachelor is made true by the fact that p. Now, we want to figure out which fact to check 
for in considering whether the male slayerette is a bachelor, while bearing in mind that 
Xander is the male slayerette. It seems that we should check for the very same fact; we'll 
 68 
check a certain entity, Xander, the male slayerette, and see whether he's a bachelor. It's 
hard to find room for additional facts. Likewise if, instead of 'Xander' and 'the male 
slayerette,' we have 'the male slayerette' and 'Buffy's best natural friend,' since the latter 
two are the same, there will again be only one fact to make true both of, "The male 
slayerette is a bachelor" and "Buffy's best natural friend is a bachelor." Where would we 
look for additional facts? 
A contrast might help. Assume that we accept universals. Then perhaps the 
descriptions contribute, not Xander, but one or more universals. For instance, instead of 
contributing Xander, 'the male slayerette' might contribute maleness and the property of 
being a slayerette. In that case, there could be a semantic difference between a name and 
a definite description satisfied by the referent of that name, or two co-satisfied definite 
descriptions. Denying universals seems to cut off that possibility, so it seems that denying 
universals does make '❤' +ι-subs. 
How about ι-conv? Similar considerations apply. Consider this argument: 
❤ Fa 
∴❤ a = ιx(x=a & Fx) 
'Fa' is made true by the fact that p. But where else could we look for the fact that makes it 
true that a is the thing that is a and of which 'F' is true? Could such a fact be distinct from 
the fact that p? Consider the example of Xander's bachelorhood. That Xander is a 
bachelor seems to be the very same fact as the fact that Xander is the thing that is Xander 
and a bachelor. For Xander's identity, and his bachelorhood, are both present in the 
former fact, and the latter, and nothing seems to have been lost or added in the transition. 
It's just hard to see what the denier of universals who accepts facts is going to say here; at 
a minimum, I think that it's up to such a theorist to offer a positive theory of the 
difference between the truth-making facts for the two sentences. 
But if we agree that, on a theory of facts that denies universals, '❤' is +ι-subs and 
+ι-conv, then the Slingshot will show that '❤' allows for the substitution of materially 
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equivalent non-general sentences. The argument properly speaking has four parts. For 
each part, we assume that Fa ↔ Gb and ❤Fa. For the first two parts, we assume Fa; for 
the first part, we say a=b, whereas for the second, a≠b. For the second two parts, we 
assume ~Fa; for the third part, we say a=b, whereas for the fourth, a≠b. All of the 
possibilities have been covered. I spare actually presenting the argument; those curious 
can consult Neale 2001, pp. 183-6 for a formal presentation. The upshot is that {Fa ↔ 
Gb, ❤Fa, ❤+ι-subs, ❤+ι-conv} implies ❤Gb. But ❤Fa said that 'Fa' was made true, if 
true, by the fact that p, and now, knowing only that 'Gb' has the same truth value as 'Fa,' 
we can see that it is made true by the very same fact. Since 'Fa' and 'Gb' are arbitrary non-
general sentences, we can see that there are at most two non-general facts: the one that 
makes true non-general sentences true, and the one that makes false non-general 
sentences false. 
Throughout, I have discussed the Slingshot only in application to non-general 
sentences. While I don't know of any good reason why the Slingshot can't be applied to 
general sentences, I don't know how we would begin to apply the crucial ι-subs and ι-
conv rules to sentences like ∀x(Fx ↔ Gx) ↔ ∃y(Hy & Jy) and ❤∀x(Fx ↔ Gx) to show 
that ❤∃y(Hy & Jy). There are no names to convert into definite descriptions. 
What if general truths like these are Slingshot-proof? That would encourage the 
suggestion that universals are what's necessary to block the Slingshot. The problem with 
non-general sentences, we might see, is that they include names and hence introduce 
particularity. Particulars can be definitely described, and thus allow their names to be 
converted into definite descriptions and for those descriptions to be substituted for one 
another. But sentences that make no reference to particulars, but only to general entities, 
might be not be susceptible to Slingshot-style reductions. 
1.2.2 The Naive Correspondence Theory and the Unity of the Proposition 
What I will call the 'Naive Correspondence Theory' is your basic correspondence 
theory that makes facts consist of particulars and universals, and that also accepts 
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Russell's Theory of Descriptions. With universals and Russell's theory in hand, it's easy 
to deny ι-conv and ι-subs. 
Consider ι-conv. This rule allows us to convert a name in a sentence into a 
definite description without changing the content of the fact that would correspond to the 
sentence. But with universals in hand, we can immediately see the difference between  
the contributions made by names like 'a' and definite descriptions like 'ιx(Gx).' The latter 
does not contribute a to the sentence. It contributes the universal G-ness. So the fact that 
would correspond to 'Fa' would consist in a and F-ness, while the fact that would 
correspond to 'Fιx(Gx)' would consist in F-ness and G-ness (all facts to be suitably 
quantified). These facts are obviously different because they have different constituents, 
so if we accept universals and Russell's theory, it will be very natural to make ❤ -ι-conv. 
Consider ι-subs. This rule allows us to substitute co-satisfied definite descriptions 
without changing the content of a sentence containing either description. But if the 
content of a description is a set of universals, and not a particular, then different 
descriptions will have different content even if they're co-satisfied. Assume that 
ιx(Gx)=ιx(Hx), and that Fιx(Gx). The latter fact consists in F-ness and G-ness, suitably 
quantified, and has nothing to do with H-ness, even though the only thing with G-ness is 
the only thing with H-ness. So substituting the descriptions within the latter sentence will 
produce a sentence that, though still true, would correspond to a different fact. So it's 
natural that ❤ will be -ι-subs. 
Since Russell's theory is plausible on other grounds, the naive correspondence 
theory only really goes out on a limb in accepting universals. But the attractions of the 
correspondence theory are substantial; they're probably worth getting over allergies to 
universals. Unfortunately, though, appealing to universals in semantics leads to a 
different problem, the Bradley Regress.18 
                                                
18 This is not to say that universals, themselves, are a problem. It could be that universals exist; maybe they 
should appear in our best ontology. But they're useless for semantics, so the motivation to accept them 
should be non-semantic. 
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From his first presentation of it in 1967 up to his later writings about truth in the 
90s, Davidson had relied on the Slingshot as his only weapon against the correspondence 
theory. But, perhaps as a consequence of the publication of Neale's book, Davidson has 
realized that the Goliath of the correspondence theory needs more than a single hit from a 
Slingshot — it needs the blast of a double-barreled shotgun. So in his final work in 2005, 
Davidson presented a set of considerations that amount to the Bradley Regress to show 
that no theory that accepts universals can account for the unity of the proposition or the 
fact. (On the other hand, that it can account for the unity of the proposition will be a key 
advantage of Davidson's own theory of truth.) 
Here is the problem. The mark of the complete (assertive) sentence is that it's 
susceptible to truth and falsity in a way that a mere list is not. So the words in the 
sentence have to contribute something other than some set of particulars and universals. 
The contributions of the words have to be melded into something unified. Likewise the 
sentence itself must be a unity. If facts are left as mere sets, then the fact loses its unity; if 
the sentence is just a list, then the sentence loses its unity. Under these circumstances, 
facts are no longer able to serve as truth-makers and sentences no longer able to serve as 
truth-bearers. But if facts are integrated by some relation, such as the instantiation of the 
universal by the particular, or the co-instantiation of the two universals, then this relation 
must be another constituent of the fact, requiring integration with the other constituents 
just as they required integration with one another. Even the simplest facts, then, would 
have infinitely many constituents; an implausible view. Davidson explains: 
The problem is easier to state in semantic terms, and Plato gave us what we need 
to recognize it as a problem when he said that a sentence could not consist of a 
string of names or a string of verbs. The sentence 'Theaetetus sits' has a word that 
refers to, or names, Theaetetus, and a word whose function is somehow explained 
by mentioning the property (or form or universal) of Sitting. But the sentence says 
that Theaetetus has this property. If the semantics of the sentence were exhausted 
by referring to the two entities Theaetetus and the property of Sitting, it would be 
just a string of names; we would ask where the verb was. The verb, we 
understand, expresses the relation of instantiation. Our policy, however, is to 
explain verbs by relating them to properties and relations. But this cannot be the 
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end of the matter, since we now have three entities, a person, a property, and a 
relation, but no verb. When we supply the appropriate verb, we will be forced to 
the next step, and so on. (Davidson 2005b, pp. 85-6.) 
The problem is the double role of the predicate. On the one hand, the predicate is said to 
contribute a general entity, a universal. But so far, all we have is an inert list. The 
predicate must also somehow attribute the universal to the particular. These semantic 
tasks can be distinguished. We can reduce the predicate to one of its roles, the referential 
or contributive role, and allow some new word to attribute the universal to the particular. 
But that is now the predicate, and the original subject and predicate just a pair of subject 
terms. So the problem recurs. 
At the outset, we may say that it's possible to contribute a universal to a sentence 
without attributing it to any particular. We may take 'Fa' and reduce the predicate to a 
mere contributor: 'a instantiates F.' Now 'F' brings F-ness to the sentence, but doesn't 
attribute F-ness to a. The new predicate 'instantiates' does that. Unfortunately, the new 
predicate also contributes a new universal, instantiation, and attributes it to the pair of a 
and F-ness. So, while we can have words that contribute universals without attributing 
them, it doesn't look as though we can have words that attribute universals without 
contributing them. For a word to do the job of relating the universal some other word 
contributes, it must contribute the relation between the universal and that to which it is 
attributed. 
Nothing that we say about universals is really going to help with this problem. 
Frege may have come up with the least bad solution. For Frege, in 'Fa,' 'a' contributes the 
object a, and 'F,' we can misleadingly say at the outset, contributes the functional concept 
Fx. Concepts, for Frege, are functions that take objects as arguments and return The True 
or The False as values. If this can be made intelligible, we immediately account for the 
truth-aptitude of the proposition: a proposition contains an object and a function that 
takes that object and returns truth or falsity, so of course the proposition will be truth-apt. 
How do the functional concept and the object unify? Frege says that a concept "is 
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unsaturated — it contains an empty place; only when this place is filled up with a proper 
name, or with an expression that replaces a proper name, does a complete sense [thought, 
proposition] appear." (Frege 1891, p. 139) But how does such a thought appear? 
Functions don't take arguments and return values all by themselves: there must be some 
difference between just listing Fx and a, and giving a as an argument to Fx as a function. 
For Frege, the difference is that listing contributions of different words is 
impossible, but using predicates attributively is possible. Frege tries to solve the problem 
by saying that 'F' does not contribute Fx (despite Fx's being its referent), it only attributes 
it: "A concept — as I understand the word — is predicative." (Frege 1892b, p. 182) and, 
"...the three words 'the concept "horse"' do designate an object, but on that very account 
they do not designate a concept, as I am using the word." (ibid, p. 184) So for Frege, a list 
of particular and universal (object and concept) isn't possible, since concepts can't be 
listed. Hence whenever a predicate appears, it appears in the attributive, never the 
contributive, mode.  
Unfortunately, Frege finds himself in a conflicted position. On the one hand, he 
wants to tell us about concepts: they're unsaturated functions, and that's why they take 
objects as arguments and return truth-values. On the other hand, he wants predicates to 
appear only attributively.  If we can't somehow use predicates to contribute concepts to 
the discussion, then we can hardly learn that they are unsaturated. But if we can somehow 
contribute them, then we can't use predicates attributively. Either we can't solve the 
problem because we don't know what we're talking about, or we can't solve the problem 
for the standard reason of the double role of the predicate. 
Unfortunately, Davidson fails to understand just why Frege's approach won't 
work. He says, "...if, as Frege maintained, predicates refer to entities, and this fact 
exhausts their semantic role, it does not matter how odd or permeable some of the entities 
are, for we can still raise the question of how those entities are related to those other 
entities, objects." (Davidson 2005b, p. 145) The problem is quite the reverse: predicates 
 74 
don't really refer to entities. Predicates' semantic role is exhausted not by referring to 
concepts but by attributing them to objects, but that leaves us in the dark about just what 
concepts are. 
1.2.3 A Sophisticated Correspondence Theory 
What we need is to divorce the contributive and attributive functions of the 
predicate. Herbert Hochberg, in proposing a more sophisticated correspondence theory, 
agrees: 
Thinking of truth values as values of a function [as in Frege] obscures a basic 
point. If one thinks in terms of facts, one easily sees that the function cannot be a 
constituent of the value, the fact, and also be what maps an argument onto such a 
value. The relevant constituent of a fact is a property or relation, while what maps 
a term onto a fact is a function. (Hochberg 2003, p. 79) 
For Frege, the truth-maker for a sentence was The True, and the function that took the 
sentence and returned this truth-maker was the predicate. But that won't work. Hochberg 
suggests that the truth-maker is a fact. The function that takes the sentence and returns its 
truth-making fact is not the predicate; the predicate's role is to contribute a universal. The 
universal is a constituent of the truth-making fact, and is not a function that returns it. 
There is some other function that takes sentences and returns facts. 
The predicate, then, has lost its attributive function. What constitutes the fact as a 
unity, then? Hochberg's Russellian answer is logical form: 
Forms like Φx are common forms of monadic atomic facts, but they are neither 
monadic properties of such facts nor dyadic relations obtaining between the 
"constituents" of such facts.... Facts can be said to be complex in that they have 
terms and attributes and are of a form. Thus the terms and attributes can be 
thought of as "components." But in that they are neither reducible to nor 
analyzable into such components, they are not complexes of them — and the form 
is not a component "in" the fact but a logical form of the fact — one can say 
"logical character of" but must not be misled into thinking that it is then a 
universal property exemplified by such facts. (ibid, p. 164-5) 
The logical form of a fact is what unifies the referents of the subject and predicate into a 
unified entity capable of serving as truth-maker. But if we list out the contributions of 
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subject and predicate, we will still have exhausted the constituents of the fact. This is 
supposed to help solve the Bradley Regress by allowing facts to consist in finitely many 
elements while still being unified by an element that, though 'internal' to the fact, is also 
not a constituent in the fact. 
Logical form, then, serves part of the attributive function, in holding universals 
together with the particulars that instantiate them. But attribution also has a linguistic 
aspect. Universals are attributes of particulars, independent of language, but we don't 
attribute universals to particulars, independent of language. We need some function from 
language to the world: 
The distinction between propositional functions, on the one hand, and properties 
and relations, on the other, allows us to arrive at one simple resolution of the 
Bradley-Frege problem about predication.... Let Φx be the logical form of a 
monadic atomic fact.... If we distinguish the form of the fact Fa, the form Φx, 
from the function (λΦ,x) Φx, where the latter, for the arguments F and a, has, as 
value, the fact Fa, we can recognize a further function that yields the same fact as 
value, for three arguments — the function (λΦ,x) Φx, the property F and the 
object a. But there is no further fact, or more complex form of a fact, involved.... 
(ibid, p. 81) 
The λ-function is the language-world function we require. It takes sentences and returns 
truth-making facts. 
Note that Hochberg repeatedly uses the phrase 'the fact Fa.' At a first pass we 
might guess that this is intended to name the truth-making fact for the sentence 'Fa.' But 
that won't work. Recall the Russellian argument against propositions from 1.1.1.3. If we 
can't identify an entity otherwise than by reference to its linguistic relata, we don't have 
an extralinguistic entity. But facts are intended to be extralinguistic. If 'the fact Fa' is 
intended to be shorthand for 'the fact which would make true the sentence "Fa" if it 
obtained,' then we have identified the fact with reference to its linguistic relata and don't, 
apparently, have an extralinguistic entity. 
Logical form is not the only Russellian innovation to which Hochberg appeals. 
We may identify facts only by the use of definite descriptions, but the descriptions need 
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contain no linguistic relata of the facts. Allowing T(x,y) to mean that x is a term in y, 
A(x,y) to mean that x is attributed in y, and IN(x,y) to mean that x informs y, we may 
produce a definite description of the truth-maker for 'Fa': 
ιp(T(a,p) & A(F,p) & IN(Φx,p))19 
Having given the elements of the theory, let me now try to sum them up. 
The Bradley Regress is the problem that predicates seem to have both attributive 
and contributive functions, but their contributive function "gets in the way" of their 
performing their attributive function. If the predicate contributes a universal, then it's not 
obvious how it also attributes the universal to the particular. The sophisticated theory 
divides what we took to be the function of the predicate into three. The contributive role 
is played by the predicate, which contributes a universal. The attributive role is divided 
into two, the extralinguistic role of uniting universal with particular in a fact, and the role 
of actively using the predicate to attribute the universal. The former role is played by 
logical forms of facts. The latter role is played by λ-functions that take sentences and 
return the facts in which the appropriate universals appear as attributes. No apparent 
regress threatens. 
Nevertheless, the theory fails. First, we need to look for the λ-functions that relate 
language to fact. Consider the sentence 'Fa.' How does the λ-function "know" to return a 
fact that contains a and F and is informed by Φx? The latter doesn't seem to appear in the 
sentence, and the λ-function specifically takes the sentence 'Fa' and returns the 
appropriate fact. What in the sentence connects with the logical form? Hochberg 
explains, "Exemplification, as a logical form, is represented by sentential structure and 
the formation rules of the schema, and thus derivatively by 'Φx.'" (ibid, p. 165) This 
won't be sufficient. 
Hochberg discusses a proposal by Sellars to eliminate the appearance of reference 
to relations by eliminating relational predicates, replacing them with spatial relations 
                                                
19 Hochberg 2003, p. 168 
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between subject terms; for instance, we might use 'a's being above 'b' to say that a loves 
b. Hochberg argues that this trick does not abolish universals: 
Sellars has created a notation where the predicates are not merely incomplete or 
unsaturated in Frege's sense [i.e., predicates like  'Fx' include space(s), in this case 
the ‘x,’ for the subject(s) and thereby display their incompleteness], but where 
they disappear when the individual variables or constants are "withdrawn." ...But 
this does not mean that we cannot isolate what plays the role of "R" in "aRb." It 
means that what plays the role of "R" cannot be set down, as I just set down a 
token of "R," without setting down tokens of subject terms. Sellars has failed to 
eliminate predicates. (ibid, p. 159) 
Sellars's maneuver here seems to be exactly the same as Hochberg's. Sellars doesn't want 
for there to be a word to refer to a relation, so he employs structure to perform the task. 
As Hochberg points out, structure is just going proxy for the word; the word is still 
present but in a different, invisible, notation. Likewise: when Hochberg allows sentence 
structure to represent logical form, there is still a word for logical form present in the 
sentence, albeit in an invisible notation. 
But assume that we reject this argument, and allow that sentence structure can 
represent logical form. We must refer to the fact independent of linguistic relata, and the 
structure of a sentence is linguistic relata. We must find, for theoretical purposes, some 
other means of referring to logical form. I digress and return to this issue below.  
If logical form is contributed, then there seems to be a need to attribute it to the 
fact. Hochberg disagrees. He claims that form is internal to the fact, though not a 
constituent, and that the precise sense to be given to 'internal' will make clear how form 
can unify the fact without being a constituent. It would seem that the fact that the form 
informs the fact is a fact, which would require further analysis, thus reintroducing the 
Bradley Regress, but the sense in which the form's informing the fact is internal to the 
fact is intended to prevent this implication: 
...that a is a term of such a fact is then expressed by the claim: a stands in T to 
[i.e., a is a term in] the fact having a as a term, F as attribute and Φx as form. And 
this is equivalent to saying that the fact exists, to "the fact having a as a term, F as 
attribute and Φx as form exists," on Russell's analysis of definite descriptions. 
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Given that there is such a fact, it trivially follows that a is a term of it. For on 
Russell's theory we trivially have: ∃!(ιp)(T(a,p) & A(F,p) &IN(Φx,p)) ↔ T(a, 
ιp(T(a,p) & A(F,p) & IN(Φx,p))).... The same is true of the logical relations A 
and IN.... In view of this feature of such relations, they can viably be taken to be... 
internal.... (ibid, p. 171) 
It's true that the claim that the fact exists is materially equivalent to the claim that a is a 
term in it. So here are three biconditionals: 
∃!(ιp)(T(a,p) & A(F,p) &IN(Φx,p)) ↔ T(a, ιp(T(a,p) & A(F,p) & IN(Φx,p))) 
∃!(ιp)(T(a,p) & A(F,p) &IN(Φx,p)) ↔ A(F, ιp(T(a,p) & A(F,p) & IN(Φx,p)))  
∃!(ιp)(T(a,p) & A(F,p) &IN(Φx,p)) ↔ IN(Φx, ιp(T(a,p) & A(F,p) & IN(Φx,p))) 
But obviously these show a material equivalence between the three claims about the 
constituents and form of the fact, as well. But it doesn't seem plausible that a material 
equivalence between the claim that a is a term in a fact, and that F is attributed in it, 
suffices to show that they're true in virtue of the same fact. On the contrary, it seems 
perfectly plain that a's being a term in a fact and F's being an attribute in that fact are 
different facts. Likewise, Φx's being the form of the fact seems to be different from the 
fact itself. Φx's being the form of the fact was to be 'internal' to the fact in some special 
sense, but the only sense that I can see is material equivalence between the claim that the 
form informs the fact and the claim that the fact exists. Material equivalence is obviously 
insufficient for identity of truth-maker. 
Hochberg points out20 that the equivalence is an instance of a Principia 
Mathematica theorem, ∃!(ιx)(Φx) ↔ Φ(ιx)(Φx). Perhaps that is why the equivalence 
shows some sort of internality between the claims. The idea would be that each of the 
three claims that's materially equivalent with the existence claim for the fact will be 
internal to that claim, but not to each other. But this piece of Principia Mathematica is 
not so helpful. If we accept the theorem, we do so because we accept Russell's theory of 
descriptions. But on that theory, the materially equivalent claims are really the same 
claim in different notation; they're the same claim because they receive the same 
                                                
20 ibid, p. 171 
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canonical expansion into ∃x[Φx & ∀y(Φy ↔ x=y)]. Thus, the material equivalence 
between the claim that Φx informs the fact, and the claim that the fact exists, is a matter 
of rephrasing. But this brings the informing of the fact and the fact into a closer relation 
than mere internality; it makes them identical. But if the fact that Φx informs the fact just 
is the fact, then it's not plain how Φx's informing the fact can account for the unity of the 
fact. There's no substantial relation between Φx's informing the fact and the fact any 
longer: we're appealing to the fact to account for its own unity. Only something external 
to the fact can substantially account for its unity; but only something internal to the fact 
can really unify it. To unify the fact, the form's being its form would have to be both 
external and internal. 
Let me return, anti-climactically, to the matter of identifying logical form with 
reference to linguistic relata. We may refer to a and F-ness, presumably, with 'a' and 'F-
ness;' with, in general, names and nominalized adjectives. But English, at least, seems to 
have no word for the logical form of a fact that includes a single term and a one-place 
relation. The previous sentence sought to refer to such forms with reference to the facts 
they unify. But our problem was to refer to facts, and we need to refer to forms to refer to 
facts. If we can refer to forms only with relation to facts, then our attempt to ground out 
reference is viciously circular. 
We might try to refer to forms with reference to sentences that would correspond 
to facts with those forms, but this is patently to make forms linguistic, which they are not. 
Or perhaps we can point; Russell said: 
It is not at all clear what is the right logical account of "form," but whatever this 
account may be, it is clear that we have acquaintance (possibly in an extended 
sense of the word "acquaintance") with something as abstract as the pure form, 
since otherwise we could not use intelligently such a word as "relation." 
...As a matter of introspection, it may often be hard to detect such acquaintance; 
but there is no doubt that, especially where very abstract matters are concerned, 
we really do have an acquaintance which we find it difficult to isolate or to 
become acquainted with. The introspective difficulty, therefore, cannot be 
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regarded as fatal, or as outweighing a logical argument of which the data and the 
inference seem to allow little risk of error. (Russell 1913/1984, pp. 98-9) 
Russell's argument is nicely put. He does not claim that we must be acquainted with 
logical form in order to grasp relations; he claims that we must be acquainted with 
something as abstract as logical form in order to grasp relations. He seems to be 
assuming that our objection to logical form is that they are abstracta, and we object to all 
abstracta. But the objection here is that logical form is inadequate to help solve the 
problem it was introduced to solve. I've accepted other abstracta, universals, for sake of 
argument, and I would accept logical forms, too, if only they could be made to work. 
Given the apparent uselessness of logical form, Russell's second point, that the 
difficulty of finding acquaintance with forms should not persuade us that we have no 
such acquaintance, loses force. It's true that, if logical forms are the best explanation for 
our ability to entertain propositions, then we have good reason to believe that we have 
acquaintance with such forms, however difficult it may be to isolate the acquaintance. 
But logical form is not the best explanation; it is part of an inadequate explanation. 
However, recall that our goal was to secure reference to facts independently of 
linguistic relata. The immediate problem is securing reference to forms independently of 
linguistic relata. The obvious solution is to refer to forms by indexical or name; by 
somehow attaching a referring term to the form. But whether forms exist or not, it's very 
hard to see how we could attach referring terms to them when we can't isolate our 
acquaintance with them. So it's not at all apparent that we can secure reference to forms, 
and hence to facts, in such a way that they're extralinguistic entities. 
I conclude that the correspondence theory is hopeless. To avoid the Slingshot, we 
must posit universals. But universals bring on the Bradley Regress. To avoid this, we 
must posit logical forms. But these don't help, they just push off the Regress another step; 
and we might not be able to posit extralinguistic forms anyway. We can't have facts that 
both pass the Slingshot and also account for the unity of the proposition. 
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1.3 A DAVIDSONIAN APPROACH 
1.3.1 The Importance of Truth-Conditions 
Davidson is of two minds about the existence of truth-conditions. His official 
position is that there are no such things. Nevertheless, he thinks that a Tarskian truth 
theory of a certain kind can function as a theory of meaning. A Tarskian truth theory, one 
might think, specifies truth-conditions. If meanings are truth-conditions, and truth-
conditions don't exist, what has happened to meanings? What do we give when we 
interpret? 
It's in dealing with interpretation and the acquisition of language that Davidson's 
other view appears. Meanings in the guise of the contents of assertions appear repeatedly 
as tangible things when Davidson discusses how we interpret speakers and learn a first 
language. In this subsection, I compare the two positions and argue that Davidson needs 
truth-conditions. In the next two subsections, I argue that he can have them, too. 
Davidson denies the existence of meanings rather brazenly at several places. In 
what follows, I will sometimes speak of how things would be if meanings were 
theoretical constructs (which, I contend, they are not). The phrasing is suggested by this 
passage: "...we must view meaning... as a theoretical construct. Like any construct, it is 
arbitrary except for the formal and empirical constraints we impose on it." (Davidson 
1973, pp. 256-7) This is perhaps the clearest statement of the negation of meanings in 
Davidson's works, but it's a neat fit with only some of Davidson's other ideas. First I 
document the neat fits, then the poor ones. 
Even before announcing the truth-conditional theory of meaning, Davidson had 
begun to attack meanings: 
Paradoxically, the one thing meanings do not seem to do is oil the wheels of a 
theory of meaning — at least as long as we require of such a theory that it non-
trivially give the meaning of every sentence in the language. My objection to 
meanings in the theory of meaning is not that they are abstract or that their 
identity conditions are obscure, but that they have no demonstrated use. (ibid., pp. 
21-2) 
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The point is sharply put. Davidson does not argue that meanings do not exist: only that 
they are of no use for the theory of meaning. Here's what he means. If our theory of 
meaning is to be non-trivial, it can't just say that the meaning of "Φα" is the meaning of 
'Φ,' somehow concatenated with the meaning of 'α.' 
But Davidson goes further than to announce the uselessness of meanings for the 
theory of meaning. He denies the existence of meanings: for by denying the existence of 
truth-conditions, while maintaining that truth-conditions are meanings, one denies 
meanings. And he does deny the existence of truth-conditions: 
Nothing…, no thing, makes sentences and theories true: not experience, not 
surface irritations, not the world, can make a sentence true. That experience takes 
a certain course, that our skin is warmed or punctured, that the universe is finite, 
these facts, if we like to talk that way, make sentences and theories true. But this 
point is put better without mention of facts. The sentence 'My skin is warm' is true 
if and only if my skin is warm. Here there is no reference to a fact, a world, an 
experience, or a piece of evidence. (Davidson 1974, p. 194) 
Here, Davidson claims that "that experience takes a certain course," "that our skin is 
warmed or punctured," "that the universe is finite," make no reference to facts, the world, 
experiences, or pieces of evidence. To what do "that" clauses make reference? According 
to Davidson21, the answer is sentences, but that won't do. The sentence "Our skin is 
warmed" does not make it true that our skin is warmed. Rather, our skin's being warmed 
makes it true that our skin is warmed, but our skin's being warmed is not a sentence. 
Elsewhere, in the paper "On Saying That," Davidson makes another move that 
requires truth-conditions. Davidson considers several theories of belief attribution, finally 
settling on one that makes use of his paratactic analysis of "that" clauses. For Davidson, a 
sentence like, "Galileo said that the earth moves" is to be analyzed like this: "The earth 
moves. Galileo said that." 'That' in the second sentence refers to the first sentence itself. 
But of course, Galileo didn't say "The earth moves." He didn't speak English. So how can 
'that' refer to what Galileo said, when it doesn't refer to any utterance of Galileo's? It 
                                                
21 See Davidson 1968. 
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seems to me that 'that,' in "Galileo said that," is ambiguous between two readings. On one 
reading, it refers to an actual utterance by Galileo. On another, it refers to the meaning of 
that utterance. Davidson would disagree. He remarks: 
We are indeed asked to make sense of a judgement of synonymy between 
utterances, but not as the foundation of a theory of language, merely as an 
unanalyzed part of the content of the familiar idiom of indirect discourse…. 
The fact that an informal paraphrase of the predicate ['samesays;' x and y are 
samesayers just in case x says something and y says something with the same 
meaning] appeals to a relation of sameness of content between utterances 
introduces no intensional entities or semantics. Some have regarded this as a form 
of cheating, but the policy is deliberate and principled. [There is a] distinction 
between questions of logical form (which is the present concern) and the analysis 
of individual predicates…. It is also worth observing that radical interpretation, if 
it is succeeds, yields an adequate concept of synonymy as between utterances. 
(Davidson 1968, p. 104; content after first ellipsis is from footnote 14, same page) 
The passage is complicated. First, Davidson (twice, in different words) distinguishes 
between introducing semantic entities, in this case meanings, when doing semantics, and 
introducing them when analyzing some particular predicate. Second, he asserts that 
radical interpretation will ground a concept of synonymy; presumably one that does not 
require the existence of meanings. 
The first point we can accept with equanimity. In "On Saying That," Davidson 
can narrow his concern to the logical form of "that" clauses, including ones in belief 
attributions. That task doesn't require the introduction of meanings: it is a semantic task, 
and, ironically, meanings don't help with theory of meaning. The second point is more 
doubtful. The only relevance of the claim that radical interpretation will give us all the 
synonymy we need is to deny that we will need meanings even when we do come to 
analyzing the 'samesays' predicate. But it is false to say that radical interpretation does 
not appeal to meanings. On the contrary: at every step in his discussions of radical 
interpretation, Davidson appeals to meanings. The pattern is massive and overwhelming, 
if also, at times, obscure. 
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Before I turn to that pattern, I need to deal with two problems. First, in section 
1.1.3, I used a Russellian argument against propositions. The argument ran as follows. 
Meanings, Fregean senses, are not to be thought of as linguistic entities. But, if an entity 
can only be identified with reference to its linguistic relata, then it seems to be a linguistic 
entity; indeed, being identifiable only with reference to linguistic relata might even be 
definitional of the linguistic nature. But Fregean senses are only identifiable with "that" 
clauses in which 'that' takes its reference from the sentence, a linguistic entity, that 
follows it. Hence Fregean senses are linguistic entities, though they're not supposed to be. 
The problem is that I seem to have replicated the analysis, except that my 
meanings are truth-conditions, not senses. Thus the same argument should apply to my 
view. Nevertheless, it doesn't. 
Fregean meanings and truth-conditions are very different sorts of things. Fregean 
senses play no causal or explanatory role in the world; their role is exhausted by their 
being invoked in semantics and interpretation. But at least some truth-conditions are 
tangible things: events with causal relations. They can thus be identified otherwise than 
with reference to linguistic relata: they can be identified with reference to their causes or 
effects, and in many cases by pointing. For instance, one might say that "That," uttered 
while pointing, "makes it true that there is an explosion (at that place at that time)." The 
first instance of 'that' refers to the indexed object, the explosion. The second instance of 
'that' refers to the sentence, "There is an explosion." The first instance of 'that' thus refers 
to the truth-condition of the referent of the second instance of 'that.' The truth-condition 
has thus been identified otherwise than with reference to its linguistic relata. Of course, it 
would be easy to refer to it with reference to linguistic relata: in "The truth-condition of 
'There is an explosion' obtains," the truth-condition is referred to solely with reference to 
the sentence whose truth-condition it is. But that we can identify a truth-condition with 
reference to language doesn't imply that we can't identity it otherwise, and the objection 
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to Fregean senses was that they could not be identified otherwise than by reference to 
language, not that they could be identified with reference to language. 
The second problem I should deal with has to do with the paratactic analysis. In 
section 1.1.4, I appealed to Davidson's paratactic analysis when attacking minimalism. 
But here I have claimed that the paratactic analysis is not right. The paratactic analysis is 
of limited applicability, or is incomplete. 
Consider this sentence: "When I say that the cat is ill, I say that because it matters 
that the cat is ill." Here, the paratactic analysis works for two instances of 'that;' it 
requires modification for the other. Consider how things would be if the paratactic 
analysis were correct. Since the referent of all three 'that's seems to be "the cat is ill," we 
could replace the sentence with this: 
The cat is ill. 
When I say that, I say that because that matters. 
But this pair plainly has a different meaning from the original sentence. If all three 'that's 
refer to the preceding sentence, the sentence is false. The problem is that the sentence 
"The cat is ill" doesn't matter (according to me), so I don't say anything because of its' 
mattering. I say that the cat is ill because of something else, something that does matter: 
the cat's being ill. The cat's being ill is not a sentence, but some other kind of thing. It's to 
that something else that I refer when I say that it matters that the cat is ill. 
The paratactic analysis, then, is incomplete. Some instances of 'that' that appear in 
"that" clauses do refer, as Davidson says, to utterances or sentences. But others refer to 
things independent of language: things that matter, have causal power, and so forth. 
This revision does not fall afoul of the problem of compositionality. On an 
analysis of "that" clauses according to which "that the cat is ill" is to be treated as a 
unified singular referring phrase, we must learn a new linguistic primitive every time we 
hear a new "that" clause. Here, though, the word 'that' is the linguistic primitive, and it 
refers to some entity connected with the sentence that follows the word 'that.' The 
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sentence, of course, does not refer to that entity or any other; sentences are not referring 
terms. Since the problem of compositionality would emerge only if the "that" clause were 
itself a referring device, and it is not, compositionality requirements do not block my 
approach.22  
Why does Davidson deny that there are truth-conditions? The Slingshot provides 
the narrowest reason. In 1.3.3, I'll deal with the Slingshot. But there is a broader reason, 
having to do with an imagined connection between traditional correspondence theory, 
representationalism, and realism: 
…the real objection [to correspondence theory] is… that such theories fail to 
provide entities to which truth vehicles can be said to correspond. If this is right, 
and I am convinced it is, we ought also to question the popular assumption that 
sentences, or their spoken tokens, or sentence-like entities or configurations in our 
brains, can properly be called "representations," since there is nothing for them to 
represent. If we give up facts as entities that make sentences true, we ought to 
give up representations at the same time, for the legitimacy of each depends on 
the legitimacy of the other. (Davidson 2005b, p. 41) 
He continues: 
The realist view of truth, if it has any content, must be based on the idea of 
correspondence, correspondence as applied to sentences or beliefs or utterances 
— entities that are propositional in character; and such correspondence cannot be 
made intelligible. …it is futile either to reject or to accept the slogan that the real 
and the true are "independent of our beliefs." The only evident positive sense we 
can make of this phrase, the only use that consorts with the intentions of those 
who prize it, derives from the idea of correspondence, and this is an idea without 
content. (ibid, pp. 41-2) 
A sentence is said to correspond to whatever it represents; that is realism. But we cannot 
make sense of correspondence, so we cannot make sense of representation: so realism is 
an empty slogan. 
We have a fairly good idea of the problem Davidson has with correspondence. 
Rejecting traditional correspondence theories that appeal to facts of Russellian vintage, 
                                                
22 To my mind, this counts as a revision, not a rejection, of Davidson's account. Davidson's insight was a 
trick allowing us to deny that "that" clauses were, as wholes, referring terms, and my revision accepts the 
trick. It rejects the claim that every referent of an instance of 'that' that begins a "that" clause refers to a 
sentence. But whether I've "revised" or "rejected" Davidson's account is a semantic issue of the sort that 
even philosophers should ignore. 
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he thinks that he has rejected any theory that makes language represent reality. But the 
narrowness of the traditional correspondence theories is out of tune with the breadth of 
the notion of linguistic representation. Rejecting the one does not require rejecting the 
other. 
Davidson's conception of representation is never made clear. But we can tell that 
whatever it is for x to represent y, it's for realism to be true about x, and realism's being 
true about x is sufficient for skepticism about the truth of x: 
[Realism accepts] the intuitive idea that truth, aside from a few special cases, is 
entirely independent of our beliefs; as it is sometimes put, our beliefs might be 
just as they are and yet reality — and so the truth about reality — be very 
different. (ibid, p. 33) 
Realism might sometimes be put this way, but probably not by realists. Nobody adopts 
realism to ground the case for scepticism. We adopt realism because we think that the 
mind is hooked up to a reality beyond itself. The fact that traditional realism of the 
Descartes-Russell variety never figured out how the hook-ups worked notwithstanding, 
the idea of realism was never that we were out of touch with external reality, it was that 
there is an external reality with which to be in touch. 
We can have realism without scepticism. Realism is only the claim that our 
sentences, when true, are true because of their meanings and the way things stand with 
meant reality. We can have linguistic representation, too: a sentence represents as 
obtaining the condition under which it would be true. It doesn't represent by resembling, 
and there's no sense at all to be made of comparing the two, as sense could be made of 
comparing Cartesian representations to what they represent. And it doesn't represent by 
naming: a sentence is not a name for a fact. 
Davidson's denial of truth-conditions is just the denial of facts coupled with the 
failure to grasp that there could be any form of realism other than Cartesian or Russellian. 
This failure is a colossal failure of Davidson's usually colorful philosophical imagination. 
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Because of his official position, we won't really catch Davidson claiming that 
truth-conditions exist. But we'll find him coming so close that it's hard to see what else he 
might have meant. The interpretations to follow rest on some equations: that meanings 
are truth-conditions, and that anything called the 'content' or 'subject matter' of a sentence 
is its meaning. 
It might seem that with those equations in place, it would really be impossible for 
Davidson to deny the existence of truth-conditions. Of course sentences have content, so 
if I find him saying that sentences have content and decide that I've found him saying that 
truth-conditions exist, then it might seem that I've cheated. I need to be clearer about 
what I mean. Of course truth-conditions exist, in some sense. What I want to point out is 
that, for Davidson, truth-conditions don't exist just as theoretical constructs: they're 
concrete entities that exist independently of language and independently of semantic 
theories of truth for languages. So what I'm looking for is not passages that just have it 
that truth-conditions, meanings, contents, or subject matters exist, but that identify any of 
those things with external situations or events that don't seem like theoretical or linguistic 
entities. 
Here is a fairly clear statement that makes subject matter exist: 
My approach [to interpretation] is externalist: I suggest that interpretation depends 
(in the simplest and most basic situations) on the external objects and events 
salient to both speaker and interpreter, the very objects and events which the 
speaker's words are then taken by the interpreter to have as subject matter. (ibid, 
p. 64) 
Here, external objects and events are taken to be subject matter. Interpretation, that is, the 
giving of meanings, depends on subject matter. That's obvious: subject matter is meaning, 
and of course giving meanings depends on meanings. What's relevant here is that 
meanings are held to involve concrete objects and events. These are not influences among 
theoretical entities (as meanings might be if they were non-existent truth-conditions that 
"existed" only in the structure of a Tarskian theory), but real, tangible things that exist. 
Perhaps clearer: 
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One place to begin is by asking how the sentences directly tied to perception get 
their content. ...Perceptual sentences have an empirical content given by the 
situations which stir us to accept or reject them, and the same goes for the beliefs 
expressed by those sentences. (ibid, 1997a. p. 137) 
It's hard to see what it would be for a situation to "give" a sentence empirical content, 
unless it amounts to being that empirical content. To be sure, Davidson continues to point 
out that more is required for a sentence to have a given empirical content than that it is 
held true under the right circumstances: it must be embedded in the right context of other 
beliefs. For instance, I can be trained to say "There's an electron" whenever the cloud 
chamber shows one, without having any idea what an electron is. In that case, it's 
plausible to say that the empirical content of the sentence is really "There's a little line-
shaped cloud." But that's not to say that there's any empirical content to "There's an 
electron," spoken by the competent physicist, other than the situation that prompts the 
utterance. 
It's important that perceptual beliefs are fairly basic. Whatever it is that prompts 
my assent to "e=mc2," it's surely not some specific situation or event — at least not if that 
utterance on my part is to have its customary content. The truth-condition of that 
utterance is no particular happening in the world, but something of an entirely different 
order. Perceptual beliefs have easily recognizable truth-conditions, but many other beliefs 
have much more exotic truth-conditions. 
In arguing for the claim that language is public (without resting on the false 
premise that language is necessarily conventional), Davidson says: 
Without... sharing of reactions to common stimuli, thought and speech would 
have no particular content — that is, no content at all. It takes two points of view 
to give a location to the cause of a thought, and thus to define its content.... [When 
a] common cause has been determined... the triangle which gives content to 
thought and speech is complete. (ibid, pp. 212-3) 
Here, giving location to the cause of a thought is defining its content. But giving location 
seems very much like defining, so there's excellent reason to believe that cause is content. 
Relatedly and with perfect clarity, Davidson says that: 
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...we must, in the plainest and methodologically most basic cases, take the objects 
of a belief to be the causes of that belief.... Communication begins where causes 
converge: your utterance means what mine does if belief in its truth is 
systematically caused by the same events and objects. (ibid, 1983. p. 151)23 
Can the object of a belief just be the referent of the subject of the sentence that expresses 
the belief? It cannot. If the belief that Fa had its content just because a caused it, then 
there would be no difference between the content of Fa and the content of Ga. It's a's 
being F that is the content, hence object, of the belief, so it's a's being F that is the cause 
of the belief (in the plainest and most methodologically basic cases). But if the truth-
condition is the cause, then, since causes are concrete things that exist in a pretty ordinary 
sense, then at least some truth-conditions are ordinary entities, not strange theoretical 
abstracta. 
Finally, Davidson remarks: "If anything is systematically causing certain 
experiences (or verbal responses), that is what the thoughts and utterances are about.... If 
nothing is systematically causing the experiences, there is no content..." (Davidson 1990, 
p. 201). Here, the (typical) cause is the content. But content is surely the same as 
meaning, and meaning is truth-condition. Hence, for at least some assertive utterances 
(perceptual sentences), the truth-condition is the event that causes (prompts) the 
utterance. These truth-conditions are tangible, fully really, concrete things. (Of course, 
this account needs to be enriched for the many cases of non-perceptual sentences.) 
In this subsection, I've reviewed Davidson's rhetoric against truth-conditions and 
found that his view was deeply confused. I've shown that he needs truth-conditions to be 
the referents of some instances of 'that,' and that he seems to appeal to concretely existing 
truth-conditions in discussions of interpretation. There are many more passages that I 
could cite with similar import to the last few. It remains to be seen that we can have the 
concept of a truth-condition, but Davidson himself has given us no reason more general 
                                                
23 Davidson is so pleased with this formulation that he quoted himself in the 1990 paper "Epistemology 
Externalized," a paper that postdates his "Afterthoughts" on "A Coherence Theory of Truth and 
Knowledge." 
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than the Slingshot, and has given a view that seems to require there to be truth-
conditions. 
1.3.2 The Transcendence of Truth and the Necessity for Truth-Conditions 
It is impossible to give a theory of truth; it is impossible to give a theory of truth-
conditions. It is possible to say a few informative things about both, but the concept of 
truth cannot be articulated. 
If we can't have a theory of truth, then what are Tarski's semantic theories? 
Semantic theories are not theories of truth, but theories of truth in languages. Semantic 
theories don't even attempt to articulate the concept of truth: on the contrary, one must 
already have the concept of truth before one can even figure out what's going on with 
semantic theories: 
The central difficulty [with the thought that a semantic theory is a theory of truth] 
is due simply to the fact that Tarski does not tell us how to apply the concept to a 
new case, whether the new case is a new language or a word newly added to a 
language.... This feature of Tarski's definitions can in turn easily be traced to the 
fact that they depend on giving the extension or reference of the basic predicates 
or names by enumerating cases: a definition given in this way can provide no clue 
for the next or general case. (Davidson 2005b, p. 17) 
Tarski's theories just list the truth-conditions of all the sentences of a language; or, more 
precisely, derive that infinite list from a set of axioms of reference and satisfaction. There 
is no metatheory from which the axioms are derived; nor does a set of axioms work for 
more than one language. 
To be recognizable as theories of truth for languages, Tarskian theories must be 
recognized by someone who grasps what truth in a language is, and that can only be 
grasped by someone with the concept of truth. Without an extra- or at least inter-
linguistic concept of truth, one is ill-placed to grasp the point of Tarskian theories: what it 
is that they're all theories of, what holds them together. That is why minimalism in which 
the truth-bearers are sentences is a hopeless theory. The minimalist claims that the list of 
T-sentences exhausts the content of the concept of truth, but one has to know more than 
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the list to grasp just what the list is. The concept of truth transcends the articulate theories 
offered by Tarski and minimalists. 
The concept of truth has empirical significance and ties to the concepts of belief 
and desire. None of that is captured by Tarskian theories. Consider the empirical 
significance. Davidson explains: 
...given a language we understand, an interpreted language such as English, we 
recognize as true all sentences of the form "'Snow is white' is true if and only if 
snow is white." Tarski calls such sentences "partial definitions" of truth. 
Obviously, a definition that entails all such sentences will have the same 
extension (for the specified language) as the intuitive concept of truth with which 
we started. To admit this is to count T-sentences as having empirical content; 
otherwise Convention-T would have no point, nor would Tarski's insistence that 
he is interested in defining truth only for interpreted languages. (ibid, p. 23) 
Tarskian truth theories, on their own, appear to be mere stipulations. But they are 
intended to be responsive to empirical facts about what speakers mean. Davidson makes 
this point in two ways. First, if Tarski's definitions were mere stipulations, then why 
would Convention-T be a requirement on such definitions? Convention-T tells us that a 
theory of truth for a language is to count a sentence as true for that language only if that 
sentence is true. But whether the sentence is true is an empirical fact about that sentence's 
meaning and how things stand with that meant reality. 
Second, if Tarski's definitions were mere stipulations, then why would Tarski 
intend for them to apply to interpreted languages? Any theory that tries to state the truth-
conditions for sentences in an interpreted language is obviously responsible to the truth-
conditions that those sentences actually have. This empirical basis for Tarski's theories is 
obviously not captured by those theories; this is one way in which the concept of truth 
outstrips what we can say about it. 
The obvious reply is that the concept of truth outstrips what Tarski has said about 
it, but that we need to say more. One might entertain the notion of introducing a theory of 
truth-conditions — for instance, a theory of facts — and articulating the concept of truth 
with reference to those concepts. Davidson remarks: "It is a mistake to look for an 
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explicit definition or outright reduction of the concept of truth. Truth is one of the clearest 
and most basic concepts we have, so it is fruitless to dream of eliminating it in favor of 
something simpler or more fundamental." (ibid, p. 55) There is something on face absurd 
about trying to define truth. To give a definition is to clarify a concept, by giving its — as 
yet ungrasped — meaning in terms that are already fully grasped. But what concept do 
we grasp before truth? And what philosophical construct will be more clear? 
To grasp any sentence at all, it's necessary to grasp its truth-conditions; that is, the 
circumstances under which it is true. That claim will be true on any reasonable theory of 
meaning. The truth-conditional theory of meaning goes further and says that grasping 
truth-conditions is all that there is to grasping meanings, but every theory will agree that 
if you don't know the circumstances under which a sentence is true, you don't understand 
the sentence. But if it's impossible to understand any sentence without knowing the 
conditions under which it is true, an implicit grasp of the concept of truth is a prerequisite 
for understanding anything that is understood in the form of a sentence. Thus literally 
nothing can be grasped prior to a grasp of the concept of truth. 
Likewise, surely no philosophical notion introduced to help articulate truth could 
possibly be clearer than the concept of truth. As the discussion of sophisticated 
correspondence theory should have shown, the notion of logical form, or something of 
the sort, is a prerequisite on any theory of facts that is to survive the slingshot. But surely 
the notion of logical form is no clearer, no more obvious, than the concept of truth? No 
piece of philosophical artifice can help us articulate the concept of truth: the 
philosophical invention will of necessity be less familiar to us than the concept of truth. 
That's not to say that we can't use philosophical notions to say interesting things about 
truth, only that they can't make the concept of truth any clearer or more understood than it 
already is. 
If truth can't be articulated, neither can the notion of a truth-condition. Davidson's 
complaint that correspondence theories "fail to provide entities to which truth vehicles 
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can be said to correspond" is odd. To articulate the concept of truth-conditions, one 
would have to articulate the concept of something that determines whether a sentence is 
true or false. Surely we have a handle on determination. So to articulate the concept of 
truth-conditions, we would have to articulate the concept of truth, which we cannot do. 
So the problem with correspondence theories is not that they fail to provide truth-
conditions, it's that they try to provide truth-conditions. 
The concept of truth, and with it the concept of a truth-condition, are 
unanalysably fundamental to the operation of thought. That permits us a certain looseness 
in talking about truth-conditions. No theorist can be held responsible for producing an 
exhaustive theory of truth-conditions, since no such theory can be produced. We can say 
many interesting things about truth-conditions; for instance, that some of them are events, 
that some of them probably are not events, and so forth. But we can't say much that will 
be true of all truth-conditions. 
Given the centrality and ubiquity of the concept of truth, a certain argument of 
Friedrich Hayek's would make it seem obvious that the concept can't be articulated.24 
Hayek argues that it's inherent in the phenomenon of representation that no system can 
represent itself. For x to represent y, there must be an isomorphism of some kind between 
the elements of x and the elements of y. But for x to represent at all, it must be embedded 
within a larger system, within which it takes on representational power. With no such 
larger system, a so-called representation would just be a physical object with no 
intentionality. Hence, for x to represent y, x must be embedded in a system more 
complicated then y. So for a system to represent itself, it must be more complicated than 
it is: it must be as complicated as it is to have the relevant isomorphism, but more 
complicated than that, in order to have intentionality at all. 
                                                
24 See Hayek 1952, pp. 116, 179-86, Hayek, 1955, pp. 8-11, Hayek, 1963, p. 60, Hayek, 1964, p. 25. see 
also Register, 2003, pp. 9-35, for a critical synthesis of these texts. 
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Since the concept of truth is so central to our mental lives — we can't understand 
language, and hence thought, without it — and is so ubiquitous — each and every 
understood sentence or thought displays a unique application of the concept of truth — to 
articulate the concept of truth seems tantamount to articulating one's own mind, and this 
one cannot do. 
Of course, many systems can represent themselves with some degree of coarse-
grainedness. That's why we can say anything informative about ourselves, and about the 
concept of truth. But a general theory of truth will run into one or another limit. It either 
fails of real generality, and is really just a set of true claims about truth that apply in 
specific contexts, or else attains generality at the cost of illumination and applicability. 
My present approach is not to try for a general theory of truth, but to limit myself to some 
remarks about truth (truth-conditions) in specific contexts. 
1.3.3 The Unity of the Proposition 
If we accept the theory of descriptions, Neale says, we can have a correspondence 
theory that will survive the slingshot. The problem is this. The theory of descriptions is a 
substantive piece of semantics. If we accept Tarski's conception of semantics — that it 
characterizes the connections between language and world — then there should be some 
sort of metaphysical analogue to the theory of descriptions, something that accounts for 
the difference of meaning between co-referential definite descriptions. This metaphysical 
analogue will not, of course, be an entity of any kind. It will be a match in structure 
between our metaphysics (of truth, say) and our semantics (the theory of descriptions). 
The theory of universals is one such account. By providing universals to be contributed 
by the predicates that appear within the description, it explains why the description 
contributes, not its referent, but one or more universals and some quantificational 
structure to the sentence in which it appears. Universals, sadly, led to the decomposition 
of the proposition. If we want to survive the slingshot, then, we need some different 
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metaphysical analogue for the theory of descriptions: some different account of the work 
done by predicates. As Davidson says: 
[Neale] shows in convincing detail how awkward it is to evade the argument. It 
can be done, as Russell's semantics did it, by making properties parts of facts and 
so the entities that correspond to predicates. This is a course I have argued against 
on the grounds that it cannot be incorporated into a satisfactory theory or 
definition of truth, and entities that are made up in part of abstract entities can 
hardly be thought of as empirical truth-makers. (Davidson 1999, p. 667) 
But it can be done otherwise than by introducing universals. Davidson would go on to 
provide just the trick necessary — or rather, Davidson would go on to point out that 
Tarski had already provided just the trick necessary, without anyone noticing. 
The problem of the unity of the proposition is the problem of the double function 
of the predicate. The predicate must attribute something to the subject. But, it has been 
thought, it must then contribute whatever it attributes to the subject. But it's not clear how 
a predicate can both refer and predicate. A naïve view might ignore the problem. A 
sophisticated view might introduce some further element, like logical form, to do the 
attributive work, while the predicate does the contributive work. 
The best approach, Frege's, had the contributive function lying around more or 
less as an afterthought. The predicate attributes a concept to the subject, but never 
contributes the concept. Unfortunately, the account of the truth of the proposition relied 
on the concept, which was a function taking referents of subjects as arguments and 
returning True or False as values. To solve the problem, we need to go beyond Frege. He 
was right to say that predicates refer to nothing, but wrong to introduce concepts. 
Frege's near approach to the best view is consistent with Frege's following his 
dictum that, "The meaning of a word must be asked for in the context of a proposition, 
not in isolation." (Frege 1884, p. 90) Frege begins with the proposition, the truth-bearer. 
Outside of the context of a proposition, the predicate has no meaning at all; inside that 
context, its meaning is its functional role of returning True or False given a reference. 
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That is, the semantic role of the predicate is specifically what's necessary to account for 
the truth of the proposition. 
Why should things come out so neatly? On Davidson's account, the sentence and 
its truth-value is the given, and words are theoretical entities that we posit to account for 
the truth or falsity of sentences: 
...what is most open to observation is sentences and their uses, and truth is the 
semantic concept we understand best. Reference and related semantic notions like 
satisfaction are by comparison theoretical (as are the notions of word, predicate, 
sentential connective, and the rest); there is no question about their 'correctness' 
beyond the question whether they yield a satisfactory account of the truth-
conditions of sentences and the relations among sentences. (Davidson 1988, p. 
181) 
The semantic concept with which we begin is the concept of truth, and to give a 
theory of meaning for a speaker is to give a theory of truth for his utterances. But why 
should such a theory have any substructure at all? Why should it do anything but give the 
infinite list of T-sentences? Since truth-conditions are meanings, we do not understand 
sentences unless we know their truth-conditions, which are given in T-sentences. But 
because our minds are finite, and sentences are infinite in number, we need some finite 
theory from which we can derive the infinite list of T-sentences. For that reason, we need 
the axioms of a Tarskian theory of truth for a language, which are finite in number but 
adequate for the derivation of the T-sentences. These axioms assert the existence of 
theoretical entities: words. They divide these words into kinds: quantifiers, predicates, 
and so forth. They then attribute properties to these theoretical entities: this entity has the 
property of referring to this object; this entity has the property of being satisfied by these 
objects, and so forth. The predicates have exactly the features — satisfaction, mainly — 
necessary to account for the truth-value of sentences because they are theoretical posits 
designed for the purpose of so accounting. 
It might seem that an apparatus designed in this way would have to be trivial. The 
predicates can't explain what they're introduced to explain, because their contribution is 
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defined with reference to what it is to account for. This objection misses its mark. The 
overall concept of predicate satisfaction is devoid of explanatory value; the fact that it 
applies to a word is constitutive of that word's being a predicate. But that's a matter of 
course. Concepts don't explain things: sentences explain things. Particular claims about 
which objects satisfy which predicates do have explanatory value, and those are some of 
the claims made in a Tarskian theory. The correct solution is this: 
Tarski's essential innovation is to make ingenious use of the idea that predicates 
are true of the entities which are named by the constants that occupy their spaces 
or are quantified over by the variables which appear in the same spaces and are 
bound by quantifiers. (Davidson 2005b, p. 159) 
A predicate need make no contribution whatsoever. The predicate itself is what's satisfied 
by the subject; the attribution function, disappearing into the function of being satisfied, 
is the sole function of the predicate. The predicate's role of being satisfied perfectly 
accounts for the unity of the proposition. It could do nothing else.  
There is an important objection to this idea, captured clearly by Hochberg: 
To avoid taking "F" to represent an attribute, and the sentence to represent a fact, 
Davidson talks in terms of "F," or "Fx," being satisfied by, or, as Quine 
sometimes puts it, true of a. ...one can treat satisfaction as a relation between a 
thing or sequence and a sign (predicate, open sentence) and take the truth maker 
as a dyadic fact that has a linguistic item, a predicate or open sentence, as a 
constituent. Thus we arrive at a variant of linguistic idealism, in that a linguistic 
item is involved in the truth maker, rather than merely the truth bearer. (Hochberg 
2003, p. 176) 
Since the whole thrust of this dissertation is intended to be in the direction of realism, a 
conviction of idealism would call for capital punishment. Hochberg takes for granted that 
Davidson's view of truth is exactly like the classical correspondence view, except with 
predicates replacing universals. But the object's satisfying the predicate does not exhaust 
the truth-maker. Rather, truth-conditions are non-linguistic entities. If something — an 
event, say — that could have been a truth-condition turns out to actually be one — there 
is an utterance that is true just in case that truth-condition exists — then the event could 
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be described as an object's satisfying a predicate. But, even in the absence of the 
predicate, the same event would have existed and had most of its causal relations intact. 
With that in mind, let me return to Hochberg's argument. The best way to 
characterize the difference between linguistic realism and idealism is counterfactually: as 
a matter of what would have been, had things with language been different. Assume that 
Fa. But then, even if 'F' had not been coined, it still would have been the case that Fa 
(except in some unusual cases). 
The counterfactual needs some accounting for, because it has a "that" clause in it, 
and, as I've argued, some such clauses are systematically ambiguous. What have I said is 
the case? What is "that Fa"? Does 'that' in this "that" clause refer to the sentence that 
follows, or to its truth-condition? The following is false: 
Had 'F' not been coined, 'Fa' would have been true. 
That captures the linguistic reading by quoting the referred-to sentence. But this sentence 
is false because, had 'F' not been coined, 'Fa' would have been meaningless. But this is 
true: 
Had 'F' not been coined, it would have been the case that Fa. 
Here, it's plain that 'that' does not refer to 'Fa,' but to 'Fa's truth condition, which is (in 
most cases) extralinguistic. 
In addition to unifying the proposition, this conception of predication also gives 
the metaphysical analogue of the theory of descriptions. Instead of contributing an object, 
a definite description is an "incomplete symbol" that, in context, asserts that some unique 
object satisfies one or more predicates. The account of predication accounts for the 
semantic contribution of definite descriptions. 
The theory of descriptions is a semantic theory, which has a limited ontological 
analogue: the account of predication. The account of predication is not a general theory 
of truth conditions, so it is not a general theory that makes truth-conditions into linguistic 
or partly linguistic entities. 
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The present perspective allows us to see more deeply what's wrong with 
traditional correspondence theories. The traditional notion of a fact, composed of 
particular, universal, and unifying form, tried to analyze away the concept of truth, by 
replacing it with concepts like reference. But the concept with which we must begin is the 
concept of truth; reference can only be understood as a theoretical property of words, 
which themselves must be understood as theoretical entities introduced to help account 
for the truth of sentences. By insisting that the parts of a sentence all refer to something, 
the traditional fact-theorist wants to look for the meaning of a word outside of the context 
of any proposition; that cannot succeed. 
The fact that Davidson's account of predication provides the ontological analogue 
of the theory of descriptions, and so, like that theory, permits a theory of truth that 
involves truth-conditions, earns for Davidson the right to have truth-conditions. His 
paratactic account and his accounts of radical interpretation required just those, so I think 
that Davidson's view is substantially cleaner with truth-conditions added explicitly.   
1.3.4 How Events Can be Truth-Conditions 
On the face of things, there's no problem with events being truth-conditions. 
Plenty of unusual, but still real, objects have been thought of as truth-conditions. 
Mulligan, Simons, and Smith, in a justly well-regarded paper,25 have suggested that 
tropes ("moments") are truth-makers. If it's even remotely plausible that an instance of a 
color can make a sentence true, then there's no presumption against an event making a 
sentence true. 
Nevertheless, some philosophers have argued that no event is a fact — where 
"fact" just means truth-maker or truth-condition. In this section I deal with the arguments 
of Jonathan Bennett. Bennett accepts that events exist, but claims that they supervene on 
facts, and that no event is a fact. He makes two arguments to this effect. The first is a 
                                                
25 Mulligan, Simons, and Smith, 1984. 
 101 
linguistic argument, directed against Davidson's account of the semantics of event-talk. 
The second is an argument dealing with the nature of event-causation. 
Davidson argues that many sentences quantify over events, and hence introduce 
events into the ontology of the speaker. For instance, "He gesticulated wildly," if it is to 
imply that he gesticulated (without the addition of the premise that everything that 
gesticulated wildly, gesticulated), must be read as something like, "There was an event 
such that he performed it, it was a gesticulation, and it was wild." Since the account 
strives for generality, "He gesticulated" will have the same reading, less the final clause 
that mentions the wildness of the gesticulation. Obviously the conjunction with which we 
parsed the first sentence implies the second sentence. 
Bennett does not try to undercut Davidson's argument for the conclusion; rather, 
he confronts the conclusion head-on. Davidson's view gives reference to, and 
quantification over, events primacy over attributing events, or participation in them, to 
objects. This is grammatically problematic, according to Bennett: 
Do we understand "He gestured" through the thought that he made a gesture? If 
Davidson's theory is correct, we do, and then one of the following must be true: 
(1) We could not educate a child into knowing a big fragment of English from 
which perfect nominals [which phrases, Bennett argues, we use to refer to events] 
were absent.... (2) We could do it, but the child would perform clumsily with 
adverb-dropping inferences, not having our smooth rules for handling them.... (3) 
The child would think differently from us, or perform worse than us, because he 
would employ the perfect-nominal apparatus in his thoughts: he would think 
"They performed well" in the form "Their performance was good", even though 
he could not say the latter. (Bennett 1988, p. 18) 
In a spirit of charity, we should overlook the obvious reading, which makes the argument 
blatantly question-begging. The obvious reading has it that, since Davidson is wrong 
about us, if his theory applied to someone, the someone would speak differently from the 
way we do, which we do not: so his theory does not apply to us. Hopefully, something 
deeper is going on. One could read the passage as a somewhat occulted challenge: 
Davidson, explain to us why, if your theory is true, we speak as we do. The challenge 
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then takes the form of a trilemma: choose one of these three disastrous consequences of 
your theory, Davidson, and make it seem less disastrous. 
Even so, the second consequence is unsalvageable as a challenge to Davidson. 
There is no way to take it as anything other than a question-begging assertion. If 
Davidson's theory is true, then we have the smooth rules for adverb-dropping inferences 
that we think we have — indeed, the point of Davidson's theory is to account for just 
those smooth inferences, and Bennett gives no reason to think that Davidson's theory fails 
at this point. So really there are only two disasters to choose from. 
Consider the third point: that if Davidson's theory were true, we would think 
"Their performance was good," rather than "They performed well." The difference 
between these two sentences, from my Davidsonian perspective, is in their degree of 
explicitness. The first one explicitly quantifies over an event: it says that there was an 
event that was a performance, it was by them, and it was good. But the second one 
implicitly says just the same. The second one focuses our attention on the performers 
rather than their performance, but that's a matter of tone or shading, rather than meaning 
properly speaking. Since Davidson's theory accounts for the neatness of the adverb-
dropping inference from "They performed well" to "They performed," by assimilating it 
to the case of "Their performance was good" implying "Their performance occurred," 
Davidson's theory holds up well here. 
Consider related sentences, without adverbs: "Their performance occurred," and 
"They performed." The first one explicitly quantifies over the performance. The second 
one could be interpreted to assert that the referent of 'they' satisfies the predicate 
'performed.' Here, without adverbs present, the second theory seems better, since 
Davidson's account lacks point. But of course Davidson's theory would be false if it 
lacked application here. The point of Davidson's account is that the implication between 
these sentences of first-order logic: 
∃x(x was a performance & x was by them & x was good) 
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∃x(x was a performance & x was by them) 
...can account for the implication between: 
They performed well. 
They performed. 
If we parse the second of those as a simple subject-predicate sentence, say, Pt, 
then the implication seems to have been lost. So Davidson's theory has to apply in the 
case where there are no adverbs. Nevertheless, it seems that Pt is a better first-order 
interpretation of "They performed" than ∃x(x was a performance & x was by them). 
On the truth-conditional account of meaning, a sentence's truth-condition is its 
meaning. We should ask what is the truth-condition of Pt, but also of ∃x(x was a 
performance & x was by them). Can either of these sentences be true without the other 
being true? Certainly not; and that doesn't seem to be accounted for with reference to 
mere necessary equivalence. The very same event, the performance, seems to make both 
sentences true. In the absence of adverbs, it doesn't matter whether we quantify over 
events or not; the event makes the sentence true either by being that over which the 
sentence quantifies, or by being the satisfaction of the predicate by the referent of the 
subject. The two adverb-free sentences mean the same. 
Recall the challenge: if Davidson's theory were true, we would think "Their 
performance was good," rather than "They performed well." If we can somehow stomach 
this consequence, then we will have passed the gamut Bennett has laid out for Davidson. 
But we should accept this consequence, in revised form. If Davidson's theory is true, then 
it doesn't matter whether we think that their performance was good, or rather that they 
performed well. The two sentences have the same meaning. When we think the one, we 
think the other. The only difference between them is a subjective difference in tone or 
shading. 
The other challenge, the one involving causation, is more complicated. It begins 
with the notion of an event and its companion fact. Bennett has names of events, which 
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take the form S-P-T. 'S' refers to the subject of the event; 'P' refers to a trope, an instance 
of the property P*, that the subject exhibits, and 'T' refers to the time at which S exhibited 
P/P*. In "Willow's going crazy yesterday," for instance, Willow is the subject of the 
event, going crazy is a property that she exhibited (and this event name involves her 
particular going crazy), and yesterday is the time at which Willow exhibited going crazy. 
The companion fact of an event is that fact which we assert to obtain by asserting 
that the event occurred: for instance, "Willow went crazy yesterday" asserts the obtaining 
of the companion fact of the event named by the event name "Willow's going crazy 
yesterday." If 'x' names the event, then 'F(x)' will name its companion fact. (ibid. pp. 128-
9)  
Allowing en, for a given value of n, to refer to an event, and C(x,y) to assert that x 
caused y, Bennett has a proposal for the meaning of causal assertions of the form C(e1,x): 
Bennett's view is that C(e1,x) means that some fact that is part of F(e1) caused x, whatever 
x might be. If events were facts, then to say that e1 caused something would be to say that 
F(e1) caused something, but, apparently, it isn't. This quotation needs to be extensive, 
since Bennett's account is complicated: 
Fact causation rests ultimately on the idea of one fact's being a [necessary part of 
a sufficient] condition of another. So, if C(f1, f2) is true and f3 is a much stronger 
fact than f1, then C(f3,f2) will not be true, because f3 will be much too rich, too 
strong, for it to be true that without it some sufficient condition for f2 would have 
fallen short of sufficiency.... If events were facts, then "C(e1,e2)" would mean that 
the companion fact of e1 was a cause of the obtaining of the companion fact of e2; 
in the vast majority of cases, however, the former fact is much too rich to be a 
[necessary part of a sufficient] condition of the obtaining of the other fact. Just 
yesterday, the job I did in my garden caused a backache. If "the job I did in the 
garden" named a fact, it would be something like 
the fact that without any preliminary warming up I spent 40 minutes 
vigorously raking and carrying leaves from a large maple tree, getting 
them off the lawn and onto the other side of the driveway, using a new 
plastic rake, alternating between left-sided and right-sided sweeps with the 
rake... 
plus some more. But that fact was not an [necessary part of a sufficient] condition 
my getting a backache, for there was no sufficient condition for the backache that 
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needed that fact in order to be sufficient; a small part of the fact was all that was 
needed, namely that I worked vigorously for 40 minutes without a preliminary 
warm-up. (ibid, p. 136) 
Bennett is giving a mereological account of fact-identity and fact-causation. A fact can 
consist of many parts. To have a cause, we need a sufficient condition for the effect. The 
sufficient condition is a fact. Some parts of that fact are necessary to its sufficiency to 
bring about certain of its effects; others are incidental to that sufficiency. If a fact C is 
necessary to some larger fact S's (of which it is a part) being sufficient for the existence 
of some further fact E, then C is a cause of E. The account does not suggest that S must 
be a proper part of C, so the account includes the case in which C, by being S, is itself 
sufficient for E, as the special case in which C is not a but rather the cause of E. (ibid., 
pp. 44-5. I ignore further specifications Bennett introduces to handle cases of causal 
overdetermination and transitivity in causal relations.) 
The reason that e1, Bennett's raking his garden, cannot be the cause of his back's 
aching, is that the companion fact F(e1) (the fact that Bennett raked his garden) is too 
rich. The problem is not that F(e1) is itself sufficient for the effect; it is not. The problem 
is that only a small part of F(e1) (the fact that Bennett worked out for 40 minutes without 
a workout) is necessary for the larger fact (that Bennett did a 40-minute work-out without 
warm-up, and Bennett's back was such that that sort of work-out would damage the 
muscles of his back, and such damage is experienced as pain the next day, and...) to be 
sufficient for the backache. Other parts of F(e1), such as that the rake with which Bennett 
was raking was new, are not necessary for the sufficiency of the complete cause. 
For Davidson, causation is an extensional relation between events. Explanation, 
on the other hand, is an intensional relation between descriptions of events. Bennett goes 
wrong by confusing causation with explanation. Consider the case of Bennett's backache. 
Bennett's raking his garden with a new rake was the cause of Bennett's backache. 
Bennett's working-out without stretching was also the case of Bennett's backache, 
because Bennett's raking his garden with a new rake was identical with Bennett's 
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working-out without stretching. The fact that raking his garden with a new rake fails to 
explain the backache is a failure on the part of the description we have chosen. The 
pertinent description is the one that calls our attention to the features of the event that 
have a lawlike relation (we may suppose) with backaches. 
Where Bennett speaks of necessary parts of sufficient conditions, Davidson would 
speak of descriptions that are necessary, or sufficient, for an explanation of the effect. To 
explain the backache, it was necessary that the raking not follow stretching. To be 
sufficient, there were any number of descriptions that had to be satisfied. If we say that 
the aching of Bennett's back was caused by the raking Bennett did with a plastic rake, we 
will have said something true, though explanatorily worthless. The description of the 
cause has no explanatory relationship to the description of the effect, even though the 
cause described has a causal relationship to the effect described. 
The choice here is between Bennett's mereological account of fact-causation, and 
Davidson's description-oriented account of event-explanation. Where Bennett chops up 
the causing fact into many parts, each of which is a necessary condition on the 
sufficiency of the cause's causing the effect, Davidson leaves the cause a unified event, 
but distinguishes between the explanatory value, not of the parts of the event, but of 
different descriptions of it. Davidson's account is preferable. Obviously, I can't seriously 
adjudicate the dispute here, but I can point out considerations that strongly support 
Davidson's view. 
The first consideration is the sheer bizarreness of Bennett's view. What exactly 
are parts of facts? If we have a conjunctive fact, then we might imagine that the conjunct 
facts are parts. But the fact that Bennett raked his garden with a plastic rake is not plainly 
divisible into two facts: the fact that he raked his garden, and the distinct fact that he used 
a plastic rake. If it weren't for the first "part," the second distinct "part" couldn't obtain. 
On the other hand, if he hadn't used some rake, he couldn't have raked his yard. With this 
sort of deep interdependence, it's not plain that the notion of a part has any purchase. It's 
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just not plain what sense we can make of raking the garden with a plastic rake being a 
part of the raking of the garden. "With a plastic rake" isn't removable from the whole of 
which it is allegedly a part, so what is the application of the concept of a part? 
The second consideration has to do with what Bennett would have to do to 
articulate the notion of fact-causation (as distinct from allowing that events are facts, and 
saying something about event-causation). The general notion of a fact, or truth-condition, 
is one that can't be fully spelled out. But one is sceptical that Bennett could spell out his 
fact-causation without spelling out facts. 
Bennett would have a choice to make between trying to articulate the relations of 
necessity and sufficiency that inform his account, and claiming that these concepts are 
baseline. If they are baseline, then by introducing fact-causation, he has made little 
progress on clarifying the nature of causation. Davidson's account, which makes 
causation a basic concept, is just as clear and substantially simpler. If they are not 
baseline, then Bennett must explain how sufficiency can relate facts, without spelling out 
just what a fact is. Perhaps that is a task that can be performed, but I doubt it. 
Bennett's argument against events' being facts was just that, if events were facts, 
his account of fact-causation would be mistaken. But it is. So there is no particular reason 
to deny that events are among the facts.
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2 Meaning and Interpretation 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
In chapter 1, I put forward the view that truth is correspondence to truth-
conditions, but that there could be no theory of truth-conditions. By taking a Tarskian 
theory of truth, along with a "no-theory" theory of truth-conditions, as our theory of 
meaning, we produce a "semantic theory of meaning" that seems to satisfy three classical 
and standard conditions on such theories: 
Publicity: meanings can be grasped on the basis of publicly available evidence. 
Finitude: infinitely many possible sentence meanings can be grasped on the basis 
of a grasp of finitely many meanings. 
Extensionality: sentence meaning determines truth-condition. 
That the theory satisfies Extensionality is obvious. That it satisfies Finitude is a 
consequence of the structure of Tarskian theories. How exactly it satisfies Publicity is the 
subject of most of the rest of this chapter. 
The first section of this chapter considers two of the main alternative approaches 
to meaning, by way of considering their objections to the truth-conditions theory. I begin 
by discussing Dummett, whose objection is precisely that the truth-conditional theory 
cannot satisfy Publicity. I contend that it can; moreover, Dummett's use-theoretical 
conception cannot. Then I discuss the Fregean objection (specifically, David Sosa's very 
clear articulation of it) made standard by "Sense and Reference." I conclude that the 
Fregean objection shows that attitudes require characterization beyond their content, but 
that this fact has no implication for theory of meaning. That is an important fact when it 
comes to moral reasoning. 
The following two sections offer the substance of my Davidsonian account of 
meaning and the attitudes. Davidson picks up Quine's idea of radical translation, and 
argues that this hermeneutical approach to language and the attitudes supports a number 
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of subtle and interesting theses. From my point of view, there are two key theses. The 
first is content externalism, the thesis that the content of assertions and beliefs is external 
to the mind. Externalism is a commitment of any theory that satisfies Publicity, and the 
truth-conditional theory of meaning is the leading contender for satisfying Publicity; only 
the use theory seems poised to satisfy Publicity, and I contended that it could not. The 
second key thesis is holism. The attitudes, I contend, are holistic because of their 
intensionality. Here, I contend that the truth-conditional theory can account for the facts 
Frege offers as an objection to externalistic theories of meaning. 
The last two sections consider secondary but still important issues. First, I discuss 
the indeterminacy of meaning. Semantic indeterminacy is a consequence of satisfying the 
publicity constraint on theories of meaning. Since any theory must satisfy that constraint, 
we're stuck with modest indeterminacy. Second, I discuss self-knowledge. What 
motivates a concern for this issue? Strictly, it's extraneous to my line of argument. 
However, that externalism can't account for self-knowledge is offered as a main line of 
criticism to the externalistic anti-sceptical argument I offer in the next chapter. So I 
concern myself with the paradox of self-knowledge given the hermeneutical approach to, 
and externalistic nature of, the attitudes. I contend that externalism does not block self-
knowledge as long as we have a correct account of what it is to know oneself. 
2.1 OBJECTIONS 
In section 2.1.1, I consider Michael Dummett's response to the truth-conditional 
theory of meaning. Dummett makes two objections, the first striking at the heart of the 
argument for the theory: Dummett denies that the truth-conditional theory satisfies (I). 
His second objection is that no one could possess a Tarskian theory anyway. In section 
2.1.2, I consider the classical Fregean objection that denies that the theory can handle 
attitude attributions. 
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2.1.1 Dummett's Objections 
Dummett announces the doctrine of meaning as use, but then explains that this is 
not a theory on a par with meaning-as-truth-condition, or meaning-as-method-of-
verification: "The slogan 'Meaning is use' is... of a different character: the 'use' of a 
sentence is not, in this sense, a single feature; the slogan simply restricts the kind of 
feature that may legitimately be appealed to as constituting or determining meaning." 
(Dummett 1974a, p. 222-3) What is the restriction? "The meaning of... a statement cannot 
be, or contain as an ingredient, anything which is not manifest in the use made of it, lying 
solely in the mind of the individual who apprehends that meaning..." (ibid, p. 216) As 
Dummett uses the phrase, "the use theory of meaning" just is what I've called the 
Publicity constraint. 
Dummett gives two arguments that amount to critiques of Davidson's view. The 
first is that the truth-conditional theory of meaning fails to satisfy the Publicity 
constraint/use theory of meaning: 
On a platonistic interpretation of mathematical theory, the central notion is that of 
truth: a grasp of the meaning of a sentence belonging to the language of the theory 
consists in a knowledge of what it is for that sentence to be true. Since, in general, 
the sentences of the language will not be ones whose truth-value we are capable 
of effectively deciding, the condition for the truth of such a sentence will be one 
which we are not, in general, capable of recognising as obtaining whenever it 
obtains, or of getting ourselves into a position from which we can so recognise it. 
Nevertheless, on the theory of meaning which underlies platonism, an individual's 
grasp of the meaning of such a sentence consists in his knowledge of what the 
condition is which has to obtain for the sentence to be true, even though the 
condition is one which he cannot, in general, recognise as obtaining when it does 
obtain. This conception violates the principle that use exhaustively determines 
meaning.... (ibid, 223-4) 
Dummett's talk of the platonistic theory of mathematics ought not lead us to believe that 
he is addressing a narrow, local issue in philosophy of mathematics. What he calls 
'platonism' is just the truth-conditional theory of meaning, and this argument against it is 
fully general and appeals to no special feature of mathematical discourse. This argument 
strikes at the basis of the support for the truth-conditional account of meaning. 
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However, Dummett's version of the publicity constraint is not quite right, or at 
least not as explicit as one would like. It's not use that must exhaustively determine the 
meaning of an expression, it's all public features of the expression. That includes not just 
use, but context of use. Perhaps Dummett intends to include context within use, in which 
case he has merely left implicit something fairly important. 
Dummett's claim, then, is that we can't grasp the truth-conditions of an assertion 
on the basis of publicly available evidence about that assertion. But for anything to be the 
meaning of an assertion, it must be graspable on the basis of publicly available evidence. 
Hence, truth-conditions are not meanings. But why can't we grasp the truth-conditions of 
an assertion on the basis of publicly available evidence? Dummett says, with respect to 
sentences that can't be proved or disproved: 
Since the sentence is, by hypothesis, effectively undecidable, the condition which 
must, in general, obtain for it to be true is not one which we are capable of 
recognising whenever it obtains, or of getting ourselves into a position to do so. 
Hence any behaviour which displays a capacity for acknowledging the sentence 
as being true in all cases in which the condition for its truth can be recognised as 
obtaining will fall short of being a full manifestation of the knowledge of the 
condition for its truth: it shows only that the condition can be recognised in 
certain cases, not that we have a grasp of what, in general, it is for that condition 
to obtain even in those cases when we are incapable of recognising that it does. 
(ibid, 225) 
The idea is that, if we can't recognize the truth-conditions of the sentence whenever they 
occur, then what we can display in using the expression is an only partial grasp of the 
sentence's truth-conditions. So no more than some instances of the sentence's (no doubt 
multitudinous) truth-conditions can constitute the meaning of the sentence. 
Consider, for example, some sentence Φ. Native speakers/parents/other people 
seem to assert Φ just under the condition that they become aware of the presence of a 
rabbit. What we can correlate asserting Φ with, then, is not the presence of rabbits, but 
just presences of rabbits of which the speaker is aware. But what we really display, then, 
are not the truth-conditions, but the belief-conditions, of the sentence. Thus meaning is 
either: some idiosyncratic collection of instances of truth-conditions, or else: belief 
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conditions. The latter seems more plausible. But this dialectical situation can be turned 
around. If we can show that meaning is either: some idiosyncratic collection of instances 
of belief conditions, or else: truth conditions, then the truth-conditional view would be 
more plausible. 
Surely there are at least as many belief conditions for a sentence as there are truth-
conditions for it: at least one such condition that puts one in a position to know that the 
truth-condition holds. But it will be the unusual sentence that has a truth-condition that 
can only be checked one way. I can see the rabbit out of my left eye, or my right, or I can 
hear about it, or I can hear it, or I can see it from a foot to the left of where I was 
standing.... For mathematical statements, there are of course infinitely many proofs 
(possession of which are belief conditions) for each statement. We don't know most of 
those proofs, but on the discovery of a new one, we can sometimes recognize it as a 
condition of belief for a sentence we already understood. We don't thereby experience 
ourselves as changing the meaning of the sentence by adding a new belief condition; in 
fact, we don't really think of finding a new proof of an old sentence as anything having to 
do with meaning at all. Knowledge of truth-conditions can easily outstrip the available 
conditions of belief, which are the only conditions that one can grasp on the basis of 
publicly available evidence. So we aren't forced to choose between a few instances of 
truth-conditions or else all of the belief conditions; we're forced to choose between a few 
instances of truth-conditions or else a few instances of the belief conditions. 
And on the other hand, it's not at all difficult to exhibit an understanding of the 
complete set of truth-conditions for an assertion: anyone who utters a true, lawlike 
Tarskian T-sentence for an assertion, displays all of the truth-conditions of the assertion. 
Dummett would respond with the second of the arguments I mentioned above: 
An ability to state the condition for the truth of a sentence [e.g., with a true, 
lawlike T-sentence] is, in effect, no more than an ability to express the content of 
the sentence in other words. We accept such a capacity as evidence of a grasp on 
the meaning of the original sentence on the presumption that the speaker 
understands the words in which he is stating its truth-condition; but at some point 
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it must be possible to break out of the circle: even if it were always possible to 
find an equivalent, understanding plainly cannot consist in the ability to find a 
synonymous expression. (ibid, p. 224) 
This is an attack on the idea that a semantic theory can help to account for linguistic 
understanding. Of course it's true that rattling off T-sentences does not demonstrate an 
understanding of a language. But the structure of a Tarskian truth theory nevertheless 
solves the problem Dummett presents. 
Dummett accepts, in the statement of his argument, that we can acquire partial 
grasp of truth-conditions — grasp of some of the truth-conditions, the ones that are also 
belief-conditions — on the basis of publicly available evidence. His complaint is that 
we're limited to this partiality. My task, then, is to show how we can bootstrap from 
partial to total grasp. To do so, I will appeal to the holistic nature of Tarskian truth 
theories. 
Assume that we're trying to translate/interpret/learn some sentence Φ, which is 
affirmed by natives/other speakers/elders only under condition that they can confirm that 
a rabbit is present. For Dummett, Φ means the circumstance that a rabbit is known to be 
present, whereas for me, Φ means the circumstance that a rabbit is present. But consider 
Dummett's belief conditions. If the speaker says that Φ under conditions under which 
there is no rabbit present, but, instead, she thought she saw a rabbit, will we interpret Φ to 
mean "It seems like there's a rabbit"? If so, we will radically misinterpret an enormous 
amount of speech. For instance, if such a theory were correct, then no one who learns 
English will have any idea what the point is of saying, "It seems like," since such a 
prologue would be implicit in every observation sentence. If not, then we're beginning to 
be selective about which belief-conditions will count as part of the meaning. If we want 
to avoid any slippage due to a misinformed informant, we'll have to select exactly those 
belief-conditions in which the belief that Φ is true. 
Φ is asserted under the conditions that a rabbit is believed to be present. How, 
then, can it mean, not that a rabbit is confirmed to be present, but that a rabbit is present? 
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If we leave Φ at the grammatical level of the complete sentence, thereby severing its 
connections to the rest of the language of which it is an expression, the meaning will 
indeed be limited to conditions known by speakers to obtain. But as we begin to learn the 
grammatical structure of Φ, we put ourselves into a position to grasp its meaning on the 
basis of the other utterances in which Φ's words appear: that is, we can deduce Φ's 
meaning on the basis of the axioms of a Tarskian truth theory. Ψ, for instance, is uttered 
under the conditions that Anya is confirmed to be afraid of rabbits. Φ and Ψ share in 
common the element α, which we might reasonably suppose is a word used to refer to 
rabbits, or perhaps it is a predicate satisfied by all and only rabbits. By accumulation of 
these sentences, we can begin to construct the axiomatic infrastructure of a Tarskian truth 
theory. Rather than try to determine the meaning of each sentence individually, we rely 
on the overall structure of the theory to determine the meanings of sentences. 
How does this help? The problem was that knowing a T-sentence for a sentence 
of a language did not qualify one as understanding the sentence. But if one knows T-
sentences for many sentences of the language, and one knows them on the basis of 
axioms of reference and satisfaction that are confirmed by large bodies of evidence, then 
uttering T-sentences does count as displaying knowledge of truth-conditions. The 
confirmation of the T-sentences of a theory confirms the theory as a whole, so all of the 
experience that has helped to yield the entire theory can be displayed in any given T-
sentence that the theory itself yields. Tarskian theories, as we will see in 2.2, can be quite 
worldly, embedded things. 
Dummett said that we must break out of the linguistic circle; but that is not 
apparently necessary. Since the entire Tarskian theory must be supported by empirical 
evidence, we enter the linguistic circle only through the gamut of worldly experience. 
Tarskian truth theories are not circles that imprison us, and we need not be liberated from 
them. 
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My solution might seem a touch extravagant. While it's no doubt true that anyone 
who knows a true, empirically confirmed, Tarskian truth theory for a language, and 
knows that she knows it, and knows that it's on this basis that she understands that 
language, understands that language, surely such knowledge doesn't account for anyone's 
actual knowledge of a language. As Stephen Schiffer says: 
...whether or not knowledge of the kind alluded to in [a true, lawlike Tarskian 
truth-theory meeting certain empirical constraints] would, if one had it, suffice for 
understanding a language, it seems very clear that no actual speaker has such 
propositional knowledge. (Schiffer 1987, p. 116) 
Tyler Burge would agree. He likens linguistic understanding to perceptual judgment, 
which does not, he says, flow from any sort of reasoning, and is not based on any sort of 
theory or other judgments about context: 
Linguistic training gives one a reliable understanding of what others say. Status as 
a competent understander and normal use of associated conceptual apparatus 
yields a defeasible warrant that obviates the need for evidence or justification. 
Justification is needed only when anomalies arise, or when one cannot rely on the 
transformations afforded by presumptive overlap with one's own idiolect. It is not 
a from-the-beginning open question what someone else says, if a reliable 
understander presumes on seeming immediate understanding. The understander is 
prima facie entitled to immediate presumptive understanding. (Burge 1999, p. 
242) 
Of course it's true that interpretation of another speaker doesn't start from scratch each 
time one needs to interpret. But the fact that one doesn't start anew each time one 
interprets doesn't imply that there is no basis whatsoever for interpretive judgments, or 
that that basis is some sort of terminally inchoate skill that can't be accurately captured by 
an explicit semantic theory. 
The analogy with perceptual judgments does not obviously have the weight Burge 
wants it to have. Is it true that we would regard someone's perceptual judgment as 
knowledge if she did not possess appropriate contextual judgments (including other 
perceptual judgments) about the nature of the situation in which the original perceptual 
judgment was made, that support the validity of that judgment? Consider the most 
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elementary sort of example: this table is brown. Would we say that I know that the table 
is brown if I didn't also believe (implicitly) that I'm seeing the table in decent light? 
Would we acknowledge that I know that I see the table in decent light if I didn't believe 
(implicitly) that these light bulbs put out normal light, that those windows admit normal 
light — and that these are light bulbs, those are windows, that this is light.... It seems 
intuitively plausible to me that when we attribute even the most elementary perceptual 
beliefs, we must attribute the existence of some range of supporting (perceptual) beliefs 
about the context to the effect that the situation is one that supports the veridicality of 
perception even in lieu of extraordinary checks. 
Davidson himself accepts the claim that Schiffer and Burge make: 
...claims about what would constitute a satisfactory theory are not, as I said, 
claims about the propositional knowledge of an interpreter, nor are they claims 
about the details of the inner workings of some part of the brain. They are rather 
claims about what must be said to give a satisfactory description of the interpreter. 
We cannot describe what an interpreter can do except by appeal to a recursive 
theory of a certain sort. It does not add anything to this thesis to say that if the 
theory does correctly describe the competence of an interpreter, some mechanism 
in the interpreter must correspond to the theory. (Davidson 1986, p. 96) 
This passage is opaque in intent. In what sense must the theory "correspond" to the 
competence of the interpreter, if to say that the interpreter has, believes, or knows the 
theory would be false (since it is a claim about propositions, but not about propositional 
knowledge of the interpreter)? It's not plain what the significance of a theory would be 
for interpretation if nobody possessed it: how could we learn, e.g., that interpretation is 
holistic in nature by studying the holism of a theory that nobody actually uses for 
interpretation? 
The problem with which I'm trying to deal is a challenge by Dummett that 
uttering T-sentences does not display linguistic comprehension. My reply is that, while 
that is true, knowing a T-theory within the appropriate context of a semantic theory and 
on the basis of the appropriate empirical basis does constitute linguistic comprehension. 
But if Schiffer, Burge, and (alas) Davidson are right, my solution might seem a bad one 
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because no one could actually display her understanding of a language by stating T-
sentences for its sentences, because no one actually knows such a theory. I disagree: I 
want now to argue that ordinary speakers are in possession of Tarskian truth-theories for 
the languages that they understand. 
Here I will contend that Schiffer and many others are afflicted with a form of 
philosophical hubris: they think that the vulgar are too simple-minded to grasp something 
as sophisticated as a Tarskian truth-theory. I disagree. The problem with explaining 
Tarskian theories to non-philosophers is that ordinary people expect philosophical 
theories to be subtle and esoteric, not ordinary and commonsensical. Since Tarskian 
theories are so obvious to everybody, and since they express knowledge that everybody 
has, the only problem the vulgar have with them is their apparent pointlessness. ("Do 
philosophers really sit around repeating commonplaces to one another?" they might ask.) 
Here is an argument suggested by Ernest LePore.26 Let us, with Burge, adopt what 
seems to me to be to be an implausibly extreme form of externalism about perceptual 
justification: a belief that is true and caused by some procedure that reliably causes only 
true beliefs counts as knowledge, even in the absence of background (perceptual) beliefs 
about the context supporting the notion that the first belief was caused appropriately to be 
veridical. Even if this sort of view applies to perceptual judgment, obviously it doesn't 
apply everywhere. Imagine that a student runs reliable logic software, and comes to 
believe every theorem that the software proves. We might not be apt to say that the 
student knows these theorems, and we certainly would not say that the student knows 
them if the student doesn't know (much less doesn't believe) that the software is reliable. 
Likewise, consider someone who believes, based on a speaker's assertion, "I 
believe that φ," that the speaker believes that φ. If the belief that the speaker believes that 
φ were caused by the speaker's utterance in much the same way as the belief that there's a 
bird is caused by the bird's being their, then we might not be apt to say that the belief 
                                                
26 See LePore 1999, esp. pp. 60-1. 
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constituted knowledge. Beliefs based on other people's autobiographical utterances about 
their mental states won't count as knowledge without being based on other beliefs with 
logical relations to the belief in question. Mere reliable habit won't make for knowledge 
in the case of linguistically based attitude attribution. 
To pump the intuition further, let's consider cases. Let's say that you ask me why I 
believe that there's a bird there, and I say, "Got me. Looks like there's a bird there." We 
might, with Burge, be inclined to find this adequate to count me as knowing that there's a 
bird there (if there's a bird there and I wasn't hallucinating or in some Gettier situation). 
But let's say that you ask a listener why he believes that the speaker believes that φ. He 
replies, "Got me. Sounds like she believes that φ." Let's further assume that we think that 
we're really getting the full story: he genuinely doesn't have any further beliefs about 
what the speaker meant when she said "I believe that φ," beliefs that would be pressed 
into service to interpret that utterance to show that she believes that φ. Then I doubt that 
we would attribute the speaker knowledge that the speaker believes that φ (even if she 
does &c).  
What's the difference between the observation sentence, "There's a bird," and the 
non-observation sentence, "The speaker believes that φ?" What makes the latter not an 
observation sentence? When attributing to a speaker (in this case, the listener whose 
utterance is "The speaker believes that φ") some belief that can be expressed as an 
observation sentence, we might not demand of ourselves that we also attribute to the 
speaker some other beliefs that give her a reason to believe the observation sentence. 
Perhaps we only have to think of her as having been caused to hold the belief. However, 
to attribute some belief that can't be expressed as an observation sentence, we're not 
really interpreting the speaker unless we also attribute to her some reason for believing 
the sentence. But, as Davidson says, "...nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief 
except another belief." (Davidson 1983, p. 141) Interpretation requires some sort of 
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supporting theory, and that is obvious when we move beyond interpreting observation 
sentences.  
While very few speakers have ever articulated it, all of them have tacit semantic 
knowledge of approximately the sort codified in a Tarskian truth theory. When we try to 
explain what we mean by an utterance, we tap into that knowledge, and doing so affords 
us the opportunity to display the truth-conditions of sentences. 
Dummett's attack on the truth-conditional theory of meaning was that we could 
not exhibit a grasp of truth-conditions, only of belief-conditions. I responded that we can: 
we can exhibit it through saying (or saying things that convey or imply) appropriate 
Tarskian T-sentences. The fact that such a theory has a holistic structure, and is as a 
whole based on empirical evidence, means that these linguistic performances are not 
mere rattlings-off of meaningless synonyms. And the fact that we're apt to be internalists 
about the justification of content-attributions to other speakers implies that we do have a 
semantic theory of some kind.27 
I'm not quite sure what's behind this critique from Dummett, Schiffer, and others. 
However, I suspect that it's something like this. There's a disjoin between the critics' 
conception of a Tarskian theory, and what they think is necessary for understanding a 
language. Understanding a language is, we might say, a warm-blooded behavior. We 
understand on the basis of long experience and embeddedness within a community of 
speakers. (To accentuate the mammalian bias here, we might aver to "mother's-knee" 
learning; a first language has been called one's "milk tongue.") A Tarskian theory, on the 
other hand, is a mechanical device, cold and formal. The latter could not possibly account 
for the former: it lacks the richness of real linguistic behavior. The critics see the same 
deficiency in Tarskian theories that later Wittgenstein saw in the Tractatus, and they 
declare, "Back to the rough ground!" 
                                                
27 'Semantic' in the immediately preceding discussion is not intended to include only "semantic" theories in 
the sense of Tarskian theories, but just some sort of codification of the meanings of utterances. 
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But why should we assume that Tarskian theories are known in such a cold-
blooded fashion? On the contrary, the general attitude of Dummett's own use theory of 
meaning should convince him that knowing a Tarskian theory is a very rich cognitive and 
behavioral activity. Knowing, on the sort of late Wittgensteinian view that Dummett 
adopts, is inherently rich and warm and embedded in a form of life. But a Tarskian theory 
is known on the basis of wide social contacts, broad experience, and subtle distinction-
drawing in the context of all different kinds of interpersonal transaction. Knowing a 
Tarskian theory is as richly connected to the world and social life as it is public, and it is 
completely public; as public as anything can be. So knowing a Tarskian theory is 
likewise rich and warm and embedded in a form of life. Such a knowing might well 
account for linguistic comprehension. Dummett seems to treat the formalism of the 
Tarskian theory as exhaustive, not just of the known theory, but of the knowing of it; but 
knowing a Tarskian theory is just what later Wittgenstein thought that knowing is: an 
embodied expression of a form of life. 
2.1.2 A Fregean Objection 
In this section, I want to respond to another attack, of a Fregean nature, on the 
semantic theory of meaning. Obviously the first analytic presentation of this sort of 
argument was in Frege's "On Sense and Reference." Kripke discusses some versions of 
this general form of argument under the rubric of a puzzle about belief, each of which 
centers on (approximately) the substitution of co-referential names; Schiffer offers what 
amounts to the same argument only centering on natural kind terms. I'll focus my remarks 
on David Sosa's interpretation and extension of Kripke's discussion.28 
For Kripke, the point of the discussion of the puzzle about belief is this. A certain 
Fregean form of argument against the direct reference theory works as a reductio, by 
assuming that the direct reference theory is true and applying it to a group of assumptions 
                                                
28 See, respectively, Frege 1892a, Kripke 1979, Schiffer 1987, pp. 55-60, and Sosa 1996. 
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describing a plausible thought experimental situation. But the same assumptions can 
generate the same contradiction even in the absence of inferences warranted by the direct 
reference theory; or, more precisely, it turns out that those inferences can be warranted 
even without relying on the direct reference theory. Thus, Kripke argues, Frege's reductio 
fails against the direct reference theory: Millianism was not the guilty premise. Sosa 
argues that even Kripke's reformulated reductios tacitly rely on an implication of the 
direct reference theory. He calls this implication the Hermeneutic Principle, [H]: 
If a name in ordinary language has a single referent, then it may correctly be 
represented logically by a single constant. (Sosa 1996, p. 388) 
While there are versions of Kripke's reductio that avoid each other possibly relevant 
commitment — to even the most trivial principles of disquotation or translation — all of 
them seem to rely on the Hermeneutic Principle. For example, consider version [MA] of  
the paradox: 
(1) Peter is rational. Assumption 
(2) Peter, on reflection, assents to 'Paderewski has 
musical talent.' 
Assumption 
(3) Peter, on reflection, assents to 'Paderewski does not 
have musical talent.' 
Assumption 
(4) Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent. 2, [Disquotation] 
(5) Peter believes that Paderewski does not have 
musical talent. 
3, [Disquotation] 
(6) Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent 
and Peter believes that Paderewski does not have 
musical talent. 
4,5, conj. 
(7) If Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent 
and Peter believes that Paderewski does not have 
musical talent, then Peter has contradictory beliefs. 
[Hermeneutic Principle] 
(8) Peter has contradictory beliefs. 6, 7, m.p. 
(9) If Peter has contradictory beliefs, then Peter is not 
rational. 
Analytic 
(10) Peter is not rational. 8,9, m.p. (ibid, p. 380) 
Sosa explains that the Hermeneutic Principle is at work on line (7) on pp. 387-8. The 
assumptions are obviously unobjectionable. One of several subsidiary principles such as 
Disquotation is at work in each of Sosa's more explicit displays, but it's not the same 
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principle in all of them and we can probably generate a version of the paradox that 
employs none of them (ibid, p. 384). Sosa concludes that the problem is [H]. How does 
[H] help us derive (7)? This argument is not plainly valid: 
 [H] If a name in ordinary language has a single referent, then it may correctly be 
represented logically by a single constant. 
Therefore, 
(7) If Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent and Peter believes that 
Paderewski does not have musical talent, then Peter has contradictory beliefs. 
Obviously, some further premises are necessary to put [H] in contact with (7). But what 
should draw our attention is that [H] seems, superficially, an eccentric premise to employ 
in the derivation of (7). (7) is obvious, and should be derivable from uncontroversial 
general principles, like the definition of 'contradictory beliefs.' 
We may characterize contradictory beliefs as beliefs such that the logical 
representation of one of them is the negation of the logical representation of the other. 
Such a conception of contradictory beliefs puts the consequent of (7) in contact with the 
notion of logical representation in [H]. It also opens up enough of a distance between the 
antecedent and consequent of (7) that we can see a need for subsidiary premises, such as 
[H]. But why should we open up such a space? Consider the same reductio, but allow that 
'Paderewski' is an ambiguous name: in some instances, it is the name of a famous pianist, 
in others, that of a philistine politician. If we were to allow (7) under those circumstances, 
then we would find contradictory beliefs that weren't contradictory. So we need some 
tighter notion of contradictory beliefs. Such a notion is afforded us by the 
characterization of contradictoriness of belief with reference to the translations of the 
beliefs into formal logic being such that one is the negation of the other. 
In order to deduce (7) from [H], we need additional premises to put the antecedent 
(A) of (7) in contact with its consequent: 
(A) Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent and Peter believes that 
Paderewski does not have musical talent. (assumption for conditional proof) 
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(H) If a name in ordinary language has a single referent, then it may correctly be 
represented logically by a single constant. 
How shall we show the consequent (C) of (7), that Peter has contradictory beliefs? It's 
plain that we'll need some premise about contradictory beliefs; how about: 
(B) ∀x∀Φ∀Ψ{[Φ is a representation in formal logic of one of x's beliefs ∧ Ψ is a 
representation in formal logic of one of x's beliefs ∧ (Φ = ~Ψ)] → x has 
contradictory beliefs} 
We'll furthermore need something to apply [H] to the name 'Paderewski': 
(P) The name 'Paderewski' is a name in ordinary language with a single referent. 
The predicate of Peter's beliefs is now a problem (this, incidentally, is where Schiffer's 
version of the argument makes its intervention, since his puzzle is the same as Kripke's 
but for its focus on natural kind terms rather than names). Our [H] only governs the 
translation of names. We'll need an additional Hermeneutical principle for predicates: 
[Hp] If a predicate in ordinary language has a single satisfaction condition, then it 
may correctly be represented logically by a single constant. 
And we'll need something to apply [Hp] to the predicate 'has musical talent': 
(T) The predicate 'has musical talent' is a predicate in ordinary language with a 
single satisfaction condition. 
With this array of premises available, we may now deduce (7) from first principles: 
[H] If a name in ordinary language has a single 
referent, then it may correctly be represented 
logically by a single constant. 
Hermeneutical Principle 
(P) The name 'Paderewski' is a name in ordinary 
language with a single referent. 
Assumption 
(*) The name 'Paderewski' may correctly be 
represented logically by a single constant. 
[H], (P), ∀, → 
[Hp] If a predicate in ordinary language has a single 
satisfaction condition, then it may correctly be 
represented logically by a single constant. 
Hermeneutical Principle 
(T) The predicate 'has musical talent' is a predicate in 
ordinary language with a single satisfaction 
condition. 
Assumption 
(**) The predicate 'has musical talent' may correctly be 
represented logically by a single constant. 
[Hp], (T), ∀, → 
(A) Peter believes that Paderewski has musical talent 
and Peter believes that Paderewski does not have 




(***) "Tp" is a representation in formal logic of one of 
Peter's beliefs and "~Tp" is a representation in 
formal logic of one of Peter's beliefs. 
(*), (**), (A) 
(B) ∀x∀Φ∀Ψ{[Φ is a representation in formal logic of 
one of x's beliefs ∧ Ψ is a representation in formal 
logic of one of x's beliefs ∧ (Φ = ~Ψ)] → x has 
contradictory beliefs} 
Definition of 'Contradictory 
Beliefs' 
(C) Peter has contradictory beliefs. (***), (B), ∀E3, →E 
(7) A → C (A), (C), → 
The assumptions define a plausible thought experiment. The definition of contradictory 
beliefs flows from the necessity that mere paradoxes born of ambiguity not show as 
contradictions. If (7) gets us into trouble, then, it's because of one or the other of the 
Hermeneutical principles involved in its derivation, and we're now in a position to see the 
precise role of those principles. 
Lines (1)-(3) of the original argument define a plausible thought experiment, so 
they're not the problem. (7) is supported by the same assumptions supporting the same 
plausible thought experiment, plus a plausible definition of contradictory beliefs and the 
Hermeneutical principles. (9), the claim that if Peter has contradictory beliefs, then Peter 
is not rational, is held to be analytic. Since (1)-(3) aren't the problem, it must be one of 
(7) or (9). Since (7) is supported by a group of premises of which the only controversial 
ones are the Hermeneutic principles, the problem is either the Hermeneutic principles or 
else (9). But the Hermeneutic principles are supported by the Davidsonian theory that the 
contribution of a name to the meaning of a sentence is its referent. I'm therefore forced to 
deny (9): I claim that though Peter has (occurrent, reflective) contradictory beliefs, Peter 
is nevertheless, for all we know, rational. 
Sosa contends that this position "appears to be theory-laden." (ibid, p. 391 n.14) 
He points out that, "...the contradictory beliefs in question are logically contradictory (not 
merely incompatible) — their form would be such that one is simply the negation of the 
other. No difficult procedures would be employed to ascertain their inconsistency." (ibid) 
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As I've tried to make graphically clear, that last claim is not true. Two Hermeneutical 
principles are necessary for those of us with a knowledge of formal languages to ascertain 
the inconsistency, assuming that we use the sort of discerning account of inconsistency 
embodied in (B).29 But that account can only be comprehended by those of us with a 
knowledge of formal languages. If we use a correct account of contradiction, then only 
speakers of first-order logic who know the Hermeneutical principles could discover 
certain contradictions. Surely, then, things are not so easy. 
However, we may assume, with Kripke, that Peter "is a leading philosopher and 
logician. He would never let contradictory beliefs pass." (Kripke 1979, p. 122) Since all 
leading philosophers and logicians know formal languages and the correct account of 
contradictory beliefs, Peter, one might think, can discover contradictions just as well as 
we can. So Peter can run the argument [MA] that I'm discussing, diagnose the problem 
(that is how he refrains from letting contradictory beliefs pass), and reject some belief or 
other. 
However, to run [MA], Peter needs (7). To get (7), he needs to believe all of the 
various premises I introduced to get (7) from [H]. Among those premises is one that he 
doesn't believe, (P): The name 'Paderewski' is a name in ordinary language with a single 
referent. Peter believes that 'Paderewski' is an ambiguous name in ordinary language, so 
he cannot derive (7) from [H]. He is therefore not in a position to discover the 
contradiction that he believes, because he is not in a position to get his contradictory 
beliefs into explicitly contradictory form. 
Line (9), I propose, is false. Believing contradictions is not irrational, because it's 
possible to believe two sentences, one of which would be the negation of the other if both 
were translated into a formal language, without knowing that they are contradictory. Line 
(9) is superficially attractive because it's near to the more plausible (if still approximate) 
(9'): If Peter has contradictory beliefs and knows that he has contradictory beliefs, then 
                                                
29 ...and inspired by Sosa's example of Rock's beliefs about Paris and Paris; ibid pp. 386-7 
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Peter is not rational. (9') wouldn't lead to a contradiction, because Peter does not know 
that he has contradictory beliefs. 
I want to make clear just what I take my commitment to [H] to amount to. [H] 
says that, if two tokens of one word refer to the same object, then those two tokens may 
be translated into the same constant of an appropriate formal language. But this is not all 
to which we should commit ourselves. We should commit ourselves to: 
[H*] If one (or more) name(s) in ordinary language has (have) a single referent, 
then it (they) may correctly be represented logically by a single constant. 
How shall we apply this? Return to Peter, but give him some beliefs about Hesperus and 
Phosphorus. He has somehow acquired these beliefs: that Hesperus is hot, and that 
Phosphorus is not hot. But 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' are one or more names in an 
ordinary language that have a single referent; thus, they may correctly be represented 
logically by a single constant. We may, if we wish, represent these as Hh and ~Hh. Peter 
would not do that, of course, since he doesn't know that the two names share referent. But 
as we from the outside try to ascertain the consistency of his beliefs, we reveal a problem 
by making the translation in this way. 
Early Wittgenstein committed himself to [H*] when he wrote 5.53: "Identity of 
the object I express by identity of the sign and not by a sign of identity." But his denial of 
the significance of identity claims is immediately followed by his rejection, at 5.54, of 
intensionality. Denying that difference of natural language word could be represented by 
a difference of formal language translation would bring in train the rejection of 
intensionality in formal languages. If we could not represent 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' 
by different constants, then we could not display, in a formal translation of Peter's beliefs, 
that Peter is not irrational. But surely we could do so, if we wanted to. 
Notice that the Hermeneutical principles are all written as permissions. Various 
translations into formal languages might be done for various reasons. If we're trying to 
capture contradictions, then we're trying to capture beliefs both that a truth-condition 
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obtains and that it doesn't. To capture contradictions, then, we should follow the 
procedure of Wittgenstein's 5.53 and translate all co-referential terms with the same 
constant, since only that translation will avoid appearing to multiply truth-conditions. But 
capturing contradictions is not the only task we might perform by translating into a 
formal language. We might be trying to simulate some actual reasoning done by Peter, 
for instance, or gain insight into his plans or beliefs. In that case, it would be absurd to 
translate co-referential terms to the same constant (even if they're the same word, as with 
'Paderewski'). We should translate more or less as Peter himself would, if we're trying to 
capture his beliefs as he understands them. 
Contradiction is absolute, but the appearance of contradiction is relative to a 
language. If translations from a natural language into a formal language are done in 
accordance with the Hermeneutic principles and ordinary empirical facts (like that 
'Paderewski' isn't ambiguous), then the formal language can display contradiction 
perfectly; that is why the appearance of contradiction relative to a formal language is, 
according to my definition of contradiction, identical with contradiction. For Sosa, 
denying (9) is "theory-laden," but it seems that accepting it is much more theory-laden: 
for to accept (9) is to accept that everyone knows the translation of their beliefs into a 
formal language done according to a correct application of the Hermeneutical principles 
and with a complete knowledge of the identity and difference of reference of all of their 
referring terms. Earlier, I shockingly attributed to all speakers knowledge of a Tarskian 
truth theory for the languages that they understand. But accepting (9) requires attributing 
much, much more explicit semantic knowledge to ordinary people than a mere Tarskian 
theory. 
So far, this treatment has been superficial, dealing as it has with language, and 
never with what we mean by our utterances. The Fregean challenge is deeper than I've 
been treating it so far. Here, I take it, is the idea. Meanings are what we grasp when we 
understand language. They are present to the mind, as they are our thoughts. So we have 
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special cognitive powers and authorities when it comes to meanings. I can't really go far 
wrong when it comes to my own thoughts. (This way of thinking leads someone to 
believe that subjective clarity and distinctness is a mark of truth.) But to accept a 
contradiction is to accept as true two thoughts that can't both be true. Perhaps I can do 
that if I'm not very reflective or I don't think the two contradictory thoughts at the same 
time. But to have such thoughts reflectively and occurrently is impossible, unless I just 
don't care about whether what I take to be true, is true. And that's one way of being 
irrational. So, as long as I'm rational, I won't reflectively and occurrently believe any 
contradictions. 
The problem here is with the notion of special cognitive powers that serve to 
protect a rational person against contradiction. What could justify our belief that these 
powers exist? Dummett says, about Fregean meanings: 
...a sense cannot have any features not discernible by reflection on or deduction 
from what is involved in expressing it or in grasping it. Only that belongs to the 
sense of an expression which is relevant to the determination of the truth-value of 
a sentence in which it occurs; if we fail to grasp some features of its contribution 
to the truth-conditions of certain sentences, then we fail fully to grasp its sense, 
while, on the other hand, any aspect of its meaning that does not bear on the truth-
conditions of sentences containing it is no part of its sense. It cannot be, therefore, 
that the sense has all sorts of other features, not detectable by us.... A thought is 
transparent in the sense that, if you grasp it, you thereby know everything to be 
known about it as it is in itself. (Dummett 1981, pp. 50-1) 
While the reasons for this conviction are complicated and perhaps obscure, the notion of 
a meaning, many are convinced, is the notion of something that is given wholly to the 
mind; that reserves nothing from the mind to which it is given. Hence contradictions are 
on the surface as everything relating to meaning is on the surface. 
Ironically, senses so construed would fail to achieve the theoretical task Frege 
designed them to perform. Consider the cognitive value of a sentence like "Hesperus is 
Phosphorus." Since it can't mean just that Venus is itself, nor that the word 'Hesperus' is 
co-referential with the word 'Phosphorus,' it must mean that the sense of 'Hesperus' and 
the sense of 'Phosphorus' determine the same object. But if determining objects were all 
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that the senses did, then of course anyone with the two senses in mind would immediately 
ascertain that they determined the same object. That that isn't what happens every time 
someone grasps the meanings is precisely what senses were invoked to explain. If senses 
aren't at least as obscure as what they determine, grasping them would be sufficient to 
grasp identities of referents, including truth-conditions. But grasping two senses that are 
both true under the same circumstances is not sufficient for grasping the identity of the 
two senses' truth-conditions. So senses must be as obscure as what they determine. 
Davidson likewise disagrees with Dummett's view, and the view implicit in Sosa's 
claim about contradictions and rationality, line (9). As against that Cartesian fantasy of 
mental contents totally exposed to a mental eye, he writes: 
...if a thought is constituted the thought it is by the mind's knowledge of an 
identifying object, then someone knows what thought she is thinking only if she 
knows which object she has in mind. Yet there seems to be no clear meaning of 
the idea of knowing which object one has in mind. The trouble is that ignorance 
of even one property of an object can, under appropriate circumstances, count as 
not knowing which object it is. This is the reason philosophers who have wanted 
to found knowledge on infallible identification of objects have sought objects that, 
like Hume's impressions and ideas, 'Are what they seem and seem what they are' 
— that is, that have all and only the properties we think they have. Alas, there are 
no such objects. (Davidson 1989, p. 54) 
Fregean opposition to the semantic theory of meaning rests on the assumption that 
(reflectively believed, occurrent) contradictions are transparent to the mind, and that's 
believed because the contradictory beliefs are held to be transparent to the mind. Since 
truth-conditions aren't transparent to the mind — as shown by the fact that contradictions 
between them aren't transparent — they must not be meanings. But nothing is 
transparent, so truth-conditions' opacity doesn't disqualify them from serving as 
meanings. 
2.2 INTERPRETATION AND CHARITY 
If the presentation so far has been reasonably compelling, theories of meaning 
other than the truth-conditional theory will seem problematic or unmotivated; at least the 
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truth-conditional theory of meaning will be seen to have survived some sharp challenges. 
But it remains to be seen that the truth-conditional theory can satisfy the publicity 
constraint. To check that, we should consider the thought experiment of radical 
interpretation. 
In radical interpretation, someone who does not understand a speaker must 
develop an interpretation of the speaker's beliefs and utterances on the basis of no prior 
knowledge of the language or intentional states of that speaker. The situation of radical 
interpretation, then, is a test case for our ability to generate Tarskian theories of truth 
within the publicity constraint. Davidson characterizes the situation like this: 
The evidence cannot consist in detailed descriptions of the speaker's beliefs and 
intentions, since attributions of attitudes, at least where subtlety is required, 
demand a theory that must rest on much the same evidence as interpretation. The 
interdependence of belief and meaning is evident in this way: a speaker holds a 
sentence to be true because of what the sentence (in his language) means, and 
because of what he believes. Knowing that he holds the sentence to be true, and 
knowing the meaning, we can infer his belief; given enough information about his 
beliefs, we could perhaps infer the meaning. But radical interpretation should rest 
on evidence that does not assume knowledge of meaning or detailed knowledge of 
beliefs. (Davidson 1973b, pp. 134-5) 
Why does a speaker say, assertively, φ? Presumably, because she believes that φ means 
what it does — say, ψ — and she believes that. (Also, that it made sense to say φ under 
the circumstances: it was pertinent.) If we knew what the speaker meant, we could infer 
what she believed; if we knew of what belief she was trying to assert the content, we 
could infer what she meant. But we know neither. We have, as it were, one equation with 
two variables. 
Davidson's solution to this problem is to hold belief steady: we assume that we 
know the speaker's beliefs in advance, so we have only to solve for meaning. But how do 
we identity the beliefs? The various answers to this question have all been called "the" 
principle of charity. These proposals all center around the idea that the beliefs of the 
speaker are approximately what ours would be, were we to find ourselves in the situation 
of the speaker. Sometimes this notion is put with reference to the idea of finding that the 
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speaker's beliefs are mostly true, but, since we're the ones making the assignments of 
truth, finding that the speaker believes (what we believe to be) the truth and finding that 
the speaker believes what we believe (to be the truth) will be effectively the same 
assumption. Here's an early statement of the principle: "We want a theory that satisfies 
the formal constraints on a theory of truth, and that maximizes agreement, in the sense of 
making [speakers] right, as far as we can tell, as often as possible." (ibid, p. 136) 
Various of the principles of charity have been subject to many criticisms, of 
which I'll discuss one below; the rest will turn out to be unhelpful given the results of that 
discussion.30 It's reasonably plain that Davidson's own best version of the principle is the 
principle of optimizing truth: we take the speaker to be saying something true whenever 
we can. I turn to the discussion by Lepore and Ludwig, which adds considerable clarity to 
the issue. 
The point of the radical interpretation thought experiment is to show how we can 
go from publicly available evidence to an interpretive truth-theory for a speaker. We can 
understand this as the task of explaining how we can move from behavioral evidence like 
(L) to T-sentences like (TF): 
(L) For all speakers S, times t, ceteris paribus, S holds s true at t iff p. 
(TF) For all speakers S, times t, s is true for S at t iff p.31 (Lepore and Ludwig 
2005, pp. 183-4) 
We must somehow move from observing speakers holding a sentence true under 
circumstances, to those sentences being true under those circumstances. Further, our 
                                                
30 Beyond the usual suspects, see Cutrofello, 1999, Goldberg, 2004, Vahid 2001, and especially McGinn 
1977; for explorations of similar ideas, see Lewis 1974 and Grandy 1973; for basically clueless rebuttals to 
the principle of charity, see Norris, 1985 pp. 193-217, and Fuller, 1988, pp. esp. pp. 139-62. One 
sometimes finds Hacking 1979 mentioned as a locus classicus contra the principle of charity. Since the 
alleged criticism allegedly finds its basis in Foucault, of whom I think quite highly, I would be quite 
concerned about any such criticism. However, I don't find one. The overwhelmingly best treatment of the 
principle of charity — most sensitive and sympathetic in its interpretation and most trenchant in its 
criticism — is Lepore and Ludwig 2005, pp. 174-208. 
31 It should (but won't) go without saying that being "true for S" is not a matter of truth being relative in the 
sense of subjective. A sentence is true for one speaker and not for another if there is a difference in the 
values of indexical expressions appearing in the sentence. "I am Spartacus" is true "for" Spartacus, false 
"for" the rest of us. 
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(TF)-style sentences can't be just any materially adequate T-sentences. p must give the 
meaning of s; not just some condition that happens to hold iff s is true, but the truth-
condition of s. Ignoring that constraint, the obvious principle to warrant the inference 
would be: 
(Veracity): For all speakers S, times t, sentences s, ceteris paribus: S holds s true 
at t iff s is true (S, t). (ibid, p. 186) 
However, this principle is inadequate. Not just any Tarskian theory that maps true object-
language sentences on to true metalanguage sentences will be an adequate theory of 
meaning: this principle will warrant a Tarskian theory that gives materially equivalent 
metalanguage sentences for each object-language sentence, but mere material 
equivalence is obviously not sufficient for interpretation.  
Before moving on to a better version of the principle of charity, I want to attend to 
just one argument against Davidson's principle of Veracity, which is not only a powerful 
argument in its own right, but also points us in the right direction. Colin McGinn argues: 
...the motivation for Davidson's principle has much in common with certain 
assumptions that (in part) prompt a description theory of names: viz, that 
denotation is fixed by a certain sort of semantic fit between an object and the 
predicates a speaker associates with a name and supposes true of its bearer. And 
what Kripke-type counterexamples to that theory show... is precisely that 
reference is autonomous with respect to truth. It is a consequence of this 
autonomy that a scheme of reference for a given (natural) language cannot be 
adequately characterized as that total assignment of objects to singular terms 
which induces a certain distribution of truth values upon those sentences of the 
language to which its speakers are disposed to assent: e.g., the assignment that 
maximizes truth. If charity recommended such an assignment as determining a 
scheme of reference, as it does, it would very probably deliver an incorrect 
scheme. (McGinn 1977, p. 527) 
McGinn's complaint about Veracity is that, by assuming that the referent of a word is 
whatever would maximize the number of sentences in which that word appears that are 
true, Davidson makes his theory of reference susceptible to Kripke cases. To avoid 
Kripke cases, Kripke invoked the causal theory of naming; similarly, Putnam invoked the 
causal theory of reference to natural kinds. But for Davidson, words are theoretical 
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entities: names and natural kinds terms get their referents because of the sentences in 
which they appear. We may have that view and also avoid Kripke cases if we relate entire 
sentences causally to entire situations, rather than relate names to objects. What's 
necessary both to have an effective principle to take us from (L) to (TF) and to solve the 
problem McGinn points out is what Lepore and Ludwig call Grace: 
(Grace) Ceteris paribus, when we replace 'p' in (S) 
(S) S believes at t that p 
with a sentence that expresses the content of an environmentally prompted belief 
of S's, the sentence expresses also a condition in S's environment that prompts that 
belief. (ibid, p. 194) 
The leading idea is that we should identify the content of a sentence with its cause. Vahid 
makes what amounts to the same suggestion in different jargon; he suggests that the best 
version of the principle of charity is: 
(CHc) Beliefs supervene on their causes. (Vahid 2001, p. 317) 
Davidson would endorse these suggestions: in a passage to which I recur, he 
contends that "...we must, in the plainest and methodologically most basic cases, take the 
objects of a belief to be the causes of that belief."32 (Davidson 1983, p. 151) A lot of 
work has to be done here.33 The first problem is that causes are concrete individual 
                                                
32 Given the context of this remark and the role played by what we must do, I would 
suggest that this is another of Davidson's own versions of the principle of charity, though 
it is not recognized as such by the commentators. 
 
33 The fact that Grace, not Veracity, is the requisite Principle of Charity provided the 
dialectical pressure for my complaints about Davidson's own truth-conditions-free 
account of truth in section 1.3.1-3. If radical interpretation is to proceed only if some 
contents are causes, then it's important that at least some contents (the ones that are 
causes) be real, concrete entities, not abstract, theoretical ones, since, only realia are 
causes. Likewise, it was important in 1.3.4 to establish (however weakly) that events, 
which are in Davidson's theory of causality causes and effects, could be truth-conditions; 
else they could not be contents, and either Grace or Davidson's theory of causation would 
be false. (I'm prepared to entertain that Davidson's theory of causation is false, but I'm no 
prepared to discuss that tangential matter here.) 
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events, while contents are no more individual than the general laws by which they are 
assigned to sentences. So what can it mean that "cause is content"? The second problem 
is identifying a unique (enough) cause, out of the enormous array of events that 
occasioned the belief, to be "the" cause that gets to be content (however it is that cause is 
content). 
To solve the first problem, I want to begin by defining two very simple technical 
notions: the belief set, and the truth-conditional predicate. A belief set is a set of beliefs 
unified around a common truth-condition: two beliefs belong to the same belief set just in 
case they have the same truth-condition. This is intended to be a fairly strong condition. 
Neither material nor necessary equivalence is sufficient for sharing truth-condition. In 
fact, it's impossible to say what would be sufficient for sharing a truth-condition, since 
trying to articulate truth-conditional identity would require the prior articulation of the 
notion of a truth-condition, and this, as I have argued, cannot be done. But the intuitive 
idea is clear: two beliefs share truth-condition just in case they are necessarily equivalent, 
and, whether true or false, are true or false for exactly the same reason. It's a consequence 
of the opacity of meaning that I may have multiple beliefs within the same belief set, for I 
may have multiple beliefs with the same truth-condition and yet not realize it; and of 
course, you and I have many beliefs within the same belief set, for you and I have many 
beliefs with the same content. 
The second notion is the truth-conditional predicate. A truth-conditional predicate 
is some predicate satisfied by each of the members of a set of truth-conditions and 
nomically correlated with the existence of members of some belief set. There is a 
defeasible, lawlike relation between the existence of a satisfier of the truth-conditional 
predicate (in the appropriate context) and the existence of members of a certain belief set. 
The idea is that the satisfiers of the truth-conditional predicate are the causes of the 
beliefs. That means, of course, that not all belief sets have truth-conditional predicates: 
only observation beliefs, beliefs that are caused pretty directly by their truth-conditions, 
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are members of belief sets with truth-conditional predicates. The satisfiers of the truth-
conditional predicate are a set of truth-conditions that, collectively, are the content of the 
belief set. 
This reference to a collection is what's to solve the first problem with the simple 
and rosy formula that "cause is content." The problem with the slogan is that it elides a 
type-token distinction34. Consider my belief, held right now, that it's Wednesday. 
Consider, likewise, my belief, held a week ago, that it was Wednesday. In one sense, 
these two beliefs share content; obviously, any utterance of mine of "It's Wednesday" will 
be true iff it's Wednesday at the time of utterance. But the beliefs also have different 
contents: the truth-condition of my belief last Wednesday was that it was Wednesday 
then, which is different from its being Wednesday now. The sense in which they have 
different contents is the sense in which they have different token causes; the sense in 
which they share contents is the sense in which they share a type of truth-condition. 
There is a belief set for all of my beliefs that it's Wednesday (held whenever). 
There is also a truth-conditional predicate holding of all of the truth-conditions for all of 
those beliefs. When I say that x's cause is its content, I mean that x's token cause is a 
member of the set of satisfiers of the truth-conditional predicate of the belief set of which 
x is a member. The cause is a token member of the content-type. 
I want to move on now to the second problem, the problem that saying anything 
about "the" cause of anything is problematic. To speak of "the" cause of anything, 
including a belief, is to select a point in a long chain of causes. On what basis can we 
select some one point of this chain that culminates in a belief, and say that that is the 
cause (and satisfier of the truth-conditional predicate)? Here, Davidson introduces the 
notion of triangulation. 
Try to imagine a thinker with no communicative relations to other thinkers. The 
thinker's experience of the world is, as it were, a point along a chain of causes. The next 
                                                
34 ...known sometimes as the character-content distinction. 
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point out in the chain occurs somewhere in the nervous system; the next point happens at 
the interface between the sense-organs and the world; the next point happens out in the 
world where objects and events send energy to strike that interface. Why should we 
choose one of these points, rather than another, and call it the cause and the content? 
In a confused attempt to naturalize epistemology, Quine chose the very last point 
before internal mental processing begins: 
...a stimulation σ belongs to the affirmative stimulus meaning of a sentence S for 
a given speaker if and only if there is a stimulation σ' such that if the speaker were 
given σ', then were asked S, then were given σ, and then were asked S again, he 
would dissent the first time and assent the second.... 
The stimulations to be gathered into the stimulus meaning of a sentence have for 
vividness been thought of thus far as visual, unlike the queries that follow them. 
Actually, of course, we should bring the other senses in on a par with vision, 
identifying stimulations not just with ocular radiation patterns but with these and 
the various barrages of other senses, separately, and in all synchronous 
combinations.... (Quine 1960, pp. 32-3) 
What belongs to the meanings, for Quine, are stimulations, and stimulations are 
irradiations of the senses. This is the nearest one can come to sense-data without actually 
introducing sense-data. The problem with meanings being sense-data, or irradiations of 
the senses, is that both views make meaning private. Sense-data are, of course, terminally 
private. And, as some languages are actually known, but nobody knows much about the 
irradiations of anyone's sense organs (their own or others'), grasping surface irradiations 
can't possibly be necessary to grasping meanings. 
Quine's approach has the advantage of not being arbitrary. The last available point 
on the causal chain culminating in the belief has a claim on being "the" cause of the belief 
that it's not obvious that any other point could have. Why should any other point get 
priority? Davidson's answer to this question introduces a second person and makes 
thought exist only against the background of communication. For Davidson, only an 
interpreter's correlating my utterances to what seems to the interpreter to be the 
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prompting circumstance can settle the question which point in the causal chain is "the" 
cause, and content, of the utterance: 
All creatures classify objects and aspects of the world in the sense that they treat 
some stimuli as more alike than others. The criterion of such classifying activity is 
similarity of response. Evolution and subsequent learning no doubt explain these 
patterns of behavior. But from what point of view can these be called patterns? 
The criterion on the basis of which a creature can be said to be treating stimuli as 
similar, as belonging to a class, is the similarity of the creature's responses to 
those stimuli; but what is the criterion of similarity of responses? This criterion 
cannot be derived from the creature's responses; it can only come from the 
responses of an observer to the responses of the creature. And it is only when an 
observer consciously correlates the responses of another creature with objects and 
events of the observer's world that there is any basis for saying the creature is 
responding to those objects or events rather than any other objects or events. 
...until the triangle is completed connecting two creatures, and each creature with 
common features of the world, there can be no answer to the question whether a 
creature, discriminating between stimuli at the sensory surfaces or somewhere 
further out, or further in. Without this sharing of reactions to common stimuli, 
thought and speech would have no particular content — that is, no content at all. 
It takes two points of view to give a location to the cause of a thought, and thus to 
define its content. (Davidson 1991, pp. 212-3) 
This passage is complicated. It begins with an argument that I think is misleading. The 
idea behind the opening argument is that nothing counts as similar except when judged 
similar by an observer. But if I try to judge two things to be similar, my judgments 
themselves count as similar only when judged similar by an observer. So any two of my 
judgments count as similar only when judged similar by an observer. But if no two of my 
judgments count as similar to one another, then there are no relations of synonymy or 
inference between my judgments, so they aren't really judgments. Hence, to have beliefs, 
one must be interpreted be an outside observer. This argument suffers from two defects: 
nominalism, and false alternative. The first premise is that nothing counts as similar 
except when judged to be similar. Only nominalism would justify that claim, and 
nowhere does Davidson present an argument for nominalism. He presents an argument 
against the usefulness of universals for theories of facts, but not an argument against 
universals. But even if we were to accept the nominalism (and I am inclined to), the 
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argument takes for granted that if my responses aren't judged to be similar to one another 
by some external observer, they aren't judged to be similar to one another. But why can't 
I check my own responses, and judge them similar to one another? 
As I say, I think that the passage opens misleadingly; nevertheless, it moves into 
deep waters and navigates them well. Here's the real idea. Two events of type Ψ occur, 
and each time one of them occurs, I give response Φ. But, beyond both being events of 
type Ψ, the events are both connected to the responses Φ by similar causal chains. What 
makes it the case that I'm responding to the events of type Ψ, rather than to some event 
between the Ψ event and the Φ response, or to the causes of the Ψ events, is that I'm 
interpreted as responding to the Ψ events. From the inside, I can't tell the difference 
between the Ψ events and their causes, or between the Ψ events and the effects mediating 
between them and my Φ responses. From one end of the line, no two points along the line 
can be distinguished. But if someone from the outside correlates my responses to the Ψ 
events, and the correlation holds up in a lawlike way, then a standard has been imposed to 
determine what point along the causal chain culminating in the belief should count as 
"the" cause of the belief: it's the point counted that way by an observer. 
What is the basis for the observer's choice? No doubt the same as the basis for my 
own similar responses: the Ψ events seem similar and salient. The judgment of salience is 
the choice of point along the line, and that is the judgment that I can't make from one end 
of the line. 
The role of the interpreter, then, is crucial. Without being interpreted, I literally 
don't have beliefs, because there is no basis for saying that any of my responses to the 
world have any particular contents as opposed to a wide variety of causally related 
contents, and a state with no particular contents is not a belief. 
The obvious thing to do is ask about non-observation sentences. Observers are 
able to determine that they are assertions, and determine their content; yet theoretical 
sentences are not correlated with well-organized sets of similar causes. Why must any 
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belief be so correlated? Why couldn't there be a thinker without observation sentences? 
Non-observation beliefs acquire their content from the observation beliefs to which they 
are connected by relations of inference. In the absence of any observation beliefs, we 
would not have non-observational beliefs. Thus, we must have observational beliefs to 
have any beliefs at all, and such beliefs must be correlated to sets of causes. 
That isn't to say that each and every observation belief is caused by a satisfier of 
the appropriate truth-conditional predicate. Some, typically false, observation beliefs, are 
brought about by deviant causes. But if there were no standard sort of cause from which 
to deviate, the beliefs couldn't be assigned a content and hence wouldn't actually be 
beliefs. Before one counts as a believer, one must be observed to respond similarly to 
similar situations. 
Couldn't the observations be mistaken? What if a third party were to mistakenly 
correlate a set of responses to events that had no causal relations to them? An interpreter 
cannot make up content from whole cloth. The role of the interpreter is to determine 
which point along the causal chain culminating in a response counts as the content of the 
response. The causal chain is a pre-existing and absolutely objective reality. An 
interpreter that assigned causes not along the chain would be mistaken.35 
What I've been doing here is trying to clarify and defend the principle of Grace, 
the principle to which I will allude with the slogan "Cause is content." The argument for 
Grace is that nothing else but an interpreter's assignment of causes to observation beliefs 
could possibly lend distinct content to any belief, so if cause is not content, there is no 
content and hence no beliefs. 
Recall the role that Grace is to play. It's not immediately obvious that the truth-
conditional theory of meaning satisfies the publicity constraint. So we introduce Grace as 
a principle that licenses the inference from behavioral evidence to a Tarskian theory. The 
                                                
35 But couldn't the observer assign the wrong point along the line? I take up this 
issue in 2.4, since it raises an instance of the indeterminacy of content.  
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question was whether the truth-conditional theory could satisfy the publicity constraint: 
the answer is plainly yes. 
By discussing Grace along with triangulation, I offered Davidson's argument that 
content doesn't even exist without its causal connections to the world. That is a profound 
argument and it gets to the deepest depths of Davidson's causal and social externalism. 
However, the principle of Grace is crucial, so I want to continue to offer reasons for 
accepting it, even if those reasons aren't as deep. Rather than focusing on what we could 
call the metaphysical determination of content, whatever it is that makes such-and-such 
be the content of a belief, the rest of this discussion will focus on the epistemic 
determination of content, whatever it is that makes such-and-such seem to be the content 
of a belief to someone trying to figure out what the belief's content it. Since we determine 
content through interpretation, and the paradigm of interpretation is radical interpretation, 
I return to that situation. 
The procedure of radical interpretation is approximately this. We observe the 
elder/foreigner. We formulate defeasible ceteris paribus laws stating what situations 
seem to prompt her utterances. On the basis of these laws and the principle of Grace, we 
infer what the contents of those utterances seem to be. On the basis of these inferences, 
which are the first theorems of our Tarskian theory for the speaker, we begin to formulate 
axioms from which these theorems are derivable. On the basis of our axioms, we 
formulate more theorems, which will be testable consequences of our nascent theory. We 
then proceed as scientists, often revising the axioms of our theory, sometimes rejecting an 
observation (on the basis of a presumed defect in the usual causal path that should prompt 
utterances of the observed sort), until we reach an equilibrium point at which our 
theorems predict a speaker's utterances except in cases in which it seems natural to 
attribute error (defeat of the relevant causal laws) to her. 
I want to urge two (additional, superficial) arguments in favor of Grace. One is a 
sort of quasi-transcendental argument. That argument will be comparative, and so can 
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only really be carried off through an exhaustive survey of the objects of comparison. The 
second argument will be somewhat more definitive, or at least won't suffer from the 
open-ended, dialectical nature of the first.36 
Here is the quasi-transcendental argument. The simplest, neatest, least ad hoc 
theory of meaning that can't be refuted is the (strictly, "a") true theory. The truth-
conditional theory of meaning is probably that theory, so it is probably the true one. But 
if the truth-conditional theory of meaning is true, then Grace must be true: for Grace is a 
precondition on the formation of interpretive Tarskian truth theories in the situation of 
radical interpretation, which formation is possible iff the truth-conditional theory of 
meaning is true. Thus Grace is probably true. 
As befits its comparative nature, the argument is modest in its conclusion. To 
eliminate "probably," I would have to compare the truth-conditional theory with every 
alternative. This I cannot do. However, I have tried to discuss certain plausible 
competitors with an eye to making them seem less so. All internalist and Platonist 
theories, it seems to me, fail to satisfy the publicity constraint. The use theory of meaning 
might satisfy the publicity constraint, but it fails to satisfy the extensionality constraint. 
The truth-conditional theory meets all three. 
Because of its modesty, this argument is disappointing. One wants something 
more definite. The second argument that I will propose will be in the tradition of Turing: 
not the Turing of the famous Test, but the code-breaking Turing. (The similarity between 
the two is really quite striking.) 
Let us assume that we know that some object is subject to interpretation. We 
know that because it is a human being, and it operates a radio, and it operates that radio in 
an army, and we're fighting that army. We are able to track this particular radio operator. 
For instance, perhaps he is using WWII-era signals equipment and our skilled signals 
                                                
36 I note that the only arguments for Grace discussed by Ludwig and Lepore (see their (2005), pp. 200-8) 
are transcendental arguments of roughly the sort I'm discussing. 
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operators can identify the "hand" of the operator, the pattern or beat of his particular 
signaling. We pay attention to the signals that the operator is sending (to his 
headquarters? — let's not presume), but, sadly, the operator is signaling in a unique 
language, spoken only by enemy radio operators, and intentionally formulated to balk 
attempts to interpret it. Such a language is known as a code, of course; call this one Code. 
But we can imagine that the situation is somewhat unlike those with real WWII-era 
codes.37 Real codes often obey compositionality: just like natural languages, they have 
finitely many words but infinitely many possible sentences. The enemy's Code, we may 
imagine, has finitely many possible sentences. Each sentence is communicated with a 
single symbol, and the operators have a Codebook that amounts to a Tarskian truth-
theory without the axioms, in which Code is the object language and their natural 
language is the metalanguage. Because of this failure of compositionality, we cannot, as 
Turing did in the actual war, relate individual symbols of Code to individual symbols of 
German and just crunch possible relations until we had a match that would give us a 
Tarskian theory, in German, of Code. 
Nevertheless, despite this cryptographic difficulty, there is a procedure that we 
could employ to interpret the operator. We could observe circumstances as they impinge 
on the operator, and correlate his utterances in Code to the circumstances of the 
utterances. The procedure would be difficult. On a given day, the operator transmits "." 
What prompted the utterance? The sun was shining; the artillery was landing; the 
supplies were interrupted on their way to the front.... Any of these might have prompted 
the utterance. But that that makes interpretation difficult suggests that discovering what 
prompted the utterance is in fact key to interpretation. Isn't it prima facie plausible that to 
find the prompting circumstance is to find the meaning? 
Assume that, contrary to actual practice, the codebook is retained across time (and 
not replaced every 12 or 24 hours, depending on the paranoia of the enemy). Then we 
                                                
37 For reality, see the classic account in Lewin, 1978, esp. pp. 25-138. 
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have access to many utterances of "." Slowly, by checking to see what might have 
prompted the utterance, we might begin to develop hypotheses about its meaning. For 
instance, if "" is uttered each and every time we attack the operator's position with 
tanks, but never when we attack it with artillery or the sun is out, then we might begin to 
hypothesize that "" is true in Code iff the speaker is being attacked by tanks. We could 
probably rule out that "" is true in Code iff it's sunny where the speaker is, or artillery 
is attacking the speaker. 
Of course, we could make room for deviant causal paths; the law connecting "" 
utterances to attacks by tanks would be defeasible. Let's say that we attack them with 
infantry, and also some fake tanks (big shaped balloons that infantrymen are carrying, or 
something). The enemy radio operator signals "." Of course we do not revise our 
theory so that our T-sentence for "" is now "'' is true iff the speaker is being attacked 
by tanks, or else by fake tanks being carried about by infantrymen." We understand how 
the causal relations between the operator's utterances and the world have been defeated, 
so we discount the case. Meaning is typical cause. Meanings are assigned to sentence-
types, and only through those to their tokens. 
We have entered into this situation with the assumption that the enemy radio 
operator is apt to be saying things of military significance. We discount at the outset the 
possibility that he is in fact telling his hearer how he is indexing a collection of old china, 
and that, by some cosmic coincidence, every time he tells his hearer "," that is, that he 
is putting the brightest remaining piece of old china in the leftmost available of the 
topmost available positions in the display case, we happen to be attacking his position 
with tanks. We assume that the operator shares a certain set of interests with us, and that 
he will find salient the same situations in his environment that we do. The more his 
interests and ours diverge, the harder it will be to interpret him; not because of cosmic 
coincidences, but because it will just be hard to figure out what situations prompt his 
utterances. The fact that that would make interpretation harder suggests that discovering 
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utterance-prompting circumstances is crucial to interpretation. Again, that lends support 
to Grace. 
This case is a much better example of interpretation than an example that has been 
used as the basis for a critique of Davidson's view, the decipherment of Linear B. 
Wallace argues, on the basis of a discussion of the history of that decipherment project, 
that Davidson (and Quine) is (are) wrong about how radical interpretation happens.38 
Vermazen has pointed out39 that the decipherment of Linear B was a decipherment, not 
an interpretation: the idea was that the Linear B scripts were written in a language already 
better-understood, but in an unusual character set. Relating one character set to another is 
not particularly similar to radical interpretation.40 However, some aspects of the task do 
seem to be interpretive. Better to point out that we have no reason to believe that the 
inscriptions in Linear B were "the plainest and methodologically most basic cases" of 
interpretation, so the method of interpretation will have to be enriched in ways to be 
discussed in the next section. The principle of charity, however construed, will have an 
indirect or sophisticated application to this case. Grace is intended to apply directly to 
observation sentences, only indirectly to non-observation sentences. But as Wallace 
notes, in the attempt to do the decipherment, 
In order to get on with their task, the interpreters every now and then have to put 
aside the puzzling inscriptions, and go off and study some aspect of the real 
world. How many sheep are there in Crete? What is the point of keeping wethers? 
...These are some of the questions Killen finds it necessary to take up in the 
course of his article [on the decipherment].  The interpreter knows what aspect of 
the real world is relevant, because he has a good idea of the scheme of activity 
into which the records fit — contextual frame again. (Wallace 1986, p. 230) 
By 'contextual frame,' I imagine Wallace to mean 'context, as understood by the speaker 
(or in this case, scribe).' Why is real-world knowledge necessary for the decipherment? 
Insofar as the decipherment is interpretive, it would help the interpreters if they knew 
                                                
38 Wallace 1986, esp. see the summary on pp. 230-1. 
39 Vermazen 1986. 
40 It is, however, more similar to what Turing did in the actual war than what happened in my 
cryptographic fantasy. 
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what range of contents they could plausibly attribute to the scribes. But what they seem to 
be checking for, albeit indirectly, is what sorts of causes would be apt to prompt the 
scribes' utterances (inscriptions). So far from a counterexample, Wallace has produced a 
weird confirmation of the prediction that Grace will be relied on in cases of 
interpretation. 
2.3 SEMANTIC AND ATTITUDINAL HOLISM 
Before I begin in earnest, I want to put the two kinds of holism in touch with one 
another. I want to address both semantic and attitudinal holism in this section, and I don't 
want to be too discerning about which one I'm talking about most of the time. Why is this 
lax procedure permissible? 
Recall the problem of radical interpretation. In radical interpretation, we need to 
solve for both meanings and attitudes. If we knew what someone meant, we could infer 
her attitudes; if we knew her attitudes, we could discover a semantic theory of truth for 
her utterances. But we can't discover either one without knowing the other. Because 
attitude attribution of the peculiarly fine-grained sort we're used to only emerges as a 
product of interpreting speech, any holism that inheres in the interpretation of utterances 
will inhere also in the interpretation of the attitudes posited to account for those 
utterances. If we were to distinguish between two moments of radical interpretation 
according to whether the focus at that moment is on speech or attitudes, then, since the 
evidence base for the one interpretive moment lies largely in the other, the holism of the 
one is automatically the holism of the other. So, for the purposes of this section, I'll 
routinely ignore which holism I'm discussing and allow the arguments to range over both 
moments of radical interpretation. 
In this section, I want to raise three objections to the semantic theory of meaning 
as so far presented, and solve them by introducing the holistic component of Davidson's 
view. I'll also address a basic objection against holistic views, and conclude by discussing 
an apparent inconsistency between externalism and holism. 
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The first objection is that the account so far doesn't distinguish between rational 
agents with intentionality, and every other object that can be affected by its environment 
— i.e., every other object. Consider, for instance, the beach. As I walk along it, I leave 
footprints. The theory so far has it that an utterance has its cause as its content. But the 
footprints are effects. Why should I not interpret each of them as an utterance by the 
beach, meaning, "I was stepped on here"? What's special about effects that are intentional 
utterances, to distinguish them from all other effects? 
The second objection is that the account so far completely fails to pay any 
attention whatsoever to the intensionality of attitude attributions or semantic content. 
Whenever water's being wet causes an utterance, H2O's being liquid at room temperature 
causes that same utterance. Yet an utterance of "water is wet" is not in every way 
equivalent to an utterance of "H2O is liquid at room temperature." So something other 
than external cause must differentiate utterances and attitudes from other utterances and 
attitudes with the same cause or truth-condition. But if external cause is content, then that 
condition could not be met. 
The third objection has to do with what happens when we move beyond the most 
methodologically basic cases of interpretation. Perhaps it's plausible to say that, if its' 
raining around here routinely causes me to say, "It's raining around here," then its' raining 
is the content of my utterance. But when I say something like, "Neil Gaiman is able to 
blend many world mythologies into a natural-seeming milieu because of his commitment 
to a Jungian conception of the existence of narratives," it had better not be the case that in 
order for my utterance to be interpreted, a would-be interpreter needs to correlate my 
utterances of this sentence to events of Neil Gaiman's conceptions determining his 
abilities. Since I've never been in the presence of any such events, this utterance of mine 
isn't going to have any content, if content is cause. (Perhaps the content to assign it is, 
"I've been reading a lot of Neil Gaiman," since having read a lot of Neil Gaiman is what 
triggers the utterance.) 
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The answer to all of these objections lies in the holistic nature of Tarskian theories 
and attitude attributions. I have, in a sense, already appealed to this aspect of Davidson's 
view. As I explained in 2.1.1, Dummett argues that knowing a T-sentence does not 
qualify one as understanding the left-hand sentence of the T-sentence. That is the 
complaint that the semantic theory of meaning does not count as a theory of meaning 
because it attributes far too little sensitivity and understanding to those who are said to 
understand a language. My response was that knowing a T-sentence within the 
appropriate large semantic theory, on the basis of a large body of evidence, does qualify 
one as understanding the left-hand sentence of the T-sentence. That was an appeal to 
holism, more or less. 
Holism is implicit in the structure of Tarskian theories, and it was explicit from 
Davidson's first presentations of his theory of meaning: 
If sentences depend for their meaning on their structure, and we understand the 
meaning of each item in the structure only as an abstraction from the totality of 
sentences in which it features, then we can give the meaning of any sentence (or 
word) only by giving the meaning of every sentence (or word) in the language. 
(Davidson 1967, p. 22) 
Of course, this degree of holism is too much: surely I don't have to be able to understand 
everything a speaker might say, given his current speech dispositions (that is, which 
Tarskian theories will work as interpretive theories of meaning for him) in order to 
understand anything he might say. I return to this issue below, after showing why holism 
solves the three objections with which I began the section. For the moment, assume that 
holism has been moderated into plausibility. 
Consider the first issue: interpreting beaches. Interpretation consists, according to 
Davidson, in generating a Tarskian theory for a speaker that assigns its truth-conditions to 
each possible utterance of that speaker. How might I go about doing this for the beach? If 
I wanted to interpret each of the footsteps as the utterance, "I was stepped on here," given 
the nature of semantic theories of truth, I would have to derive, as a theorem, the T-
sentence "footprint" means (in the beach's idiolect), as uttered by beach B at time t and 
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place p that B was stepped on at p at t, the moment at which the utterance began. But 
from what axioms could I possibly derive this sentence? Only if I forewent the holistic 
nature of Tarskian theories would I try to have the theorem without its substructure. If we 
require the T-sentences to be derived from axioms, then we won't try to interpret beaches, 
or anything else that can't be interpreted on the basis of the axioms of a Tarskian theory. 
Recall the enemy radio operator from last section. The radio operator's language, 
Code, is much like the beach's would-be language, in that each utterance is absolutely 
atomic, not composed of parts that can be used to relate utterances to one another. Does 
my refusal to interpret the beach not undermine my use of the radio operator as an 
example? 
Yes and no. Recall that the reason we took for granted that we could interpret the 
radio operator is that we knew in advance that he was human, and we took for granted 
that we could interpret humans. In the absence of that assumption, it's not plain that the 
radio operator could be interpreted: his radio signals themselves would not, I suggest, 
convince us to think that he is a speaker of a language. That is not a defect thrown up as 
an artifact of the structure of Tarskian theories; it points the way to a deep truth about 
thought and language. 
Davidson appeals to the holistic nature of Tarskian theories to rule out 
"counterfeit theories" that assign to left-hand sentences non-interpretive material 
equivalents, such as the theorem that "snow is white" is true iff grass is green. The 
trouble with such theorems is that it's hard to see how we can have axioms governing 
"snow" and "white" from which we could both (1) derive grass's being green as the truth-
condition for "snow is white" and (2) derive only true T-sentences. Since the axioms are 
put to use in deriving many theorems, and many of those theorems must be borne out by 
experience for the axioms to count as confirmed, it's unlikely that axioms with such wild 
consequences could be maintained. Since holism is necessary to get the right 
 149 
interpretation, we have a transcendental argument for holism not unlike the 
transcendental arguments for externalism I discussed in the last section. 
Fodor and LePore want to stop the holism right there, by arguing that this fact 
about how an interpretive theory should look is only a consequence of the fact that it's a 
theory for a compositional language, rather than the fact that it's an interpretive theory: 
...this is a good argument for semantic holism only if the appeal to 
compositionality really is required to rule out T-theories that entail [counterfeit] 
theories...; and it's possible to doubt that it is. Indeed, on reflection, it's hard to see 
how it could be. If it's really only because of the structural similarity between 
"Snow is white" and "That's snow" that the former means that snow is white (and 
not that grass is green or that 2 + 2 = 4), then it would seem that there is an a 
priori argument against the possibility of a noncompositional language. The 
expressions of such a language, according to this argument, could not have 
determinate truth conditions. We doubt that there could be such an argument. 
(Fodor and LePore 1992, p. 65) 
Fodor and LePore offer the example of two children, one of whom speaks atomic 
sentences of English (but no sentences with sentential connectives), the other of whom 
utters what Fodor and LePore suggest are one-word "sentences" under the same 
circumstances. If the first child is willing to infer "That's cold" from "That's snow," then 
the second one is willing to infer, say, "Mary" from "Sam" (and is inclined to say "Mary" 
whenever the first would say "That's cold," and "Sam" whenever the first would say 
"That's snow.") 
Since the second child's "language" is non-compositional, if there were no non-
compositional languages, then his "language" wouldn't be a language. But obviously, 
Fodor and LePore say, it is. "After all, whether the child means anything by his 
utterances presumably depends on the intentions with which he utters them. What a priori 
argument would show that a child couldn't utter "Sam" with the intention of thereby 
saying that snow is white?" (ibid., p. 66) This contention is obviously question-begging, 
since if the child can't be attributed anything with the content that snow is white, then he 
can't be attributed the intention to say that snow is white; and the denial that the child 
speaks a language at all will rapidly bring in train the denial that the child has intentions. 
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Nevertheless, it's not at all obvious what prevents the child from having his one-word 
sentences. 
The first thing to be said about this language is that it will have no sensitivity to 
time and place. The child would never be able to say "That is white," because, to say 
something meaning that that is white is to say something that means something quite 
different from something meaning that that (other thing) is white. Without a word to 
ostend with, it's not at all plain that the child could manage to ostend anything. I'll 
temporarily assume that Fodor and LePore somehow manage to solve this problem and 
that the child could, if there are no other problems, be taken to utter observation reports. 
Recall the second objection to the truth-conditional theory: that it fails to account 
for the intensionality of the semantic. Recall also the third objection: that it fails to give 
content to non-observation sentences. Those objections apply with a vengeance to Fodor 
and LePore's language of one-word sentences. The child who speaks the non-recursive 
component of English can distinguish between "water is wet" and "H2O is liquid at room 
temperature," but how can the child with one-word sentences do so? To interpret that 
child, there would be nothing but correlating circumstance to utterance, but a given 
circumstance can be described in endlessly many ways, many of which would not 
accurately reflect the state of mind of the speaker prompted by that circumstance to make 
an utterance with that circumstance as its truth-condition. As Davidson puts it: 
One way of telling that we are attributing a propositional attitude is by noting that 
the sentences we use to do the attributing may change from true to false if, in the 
words that pick out the object of the attitude, we substitute for some referring 
expression another expression that refers to the same thing. The belief that the cat 
went up that oak tree is not the same belief as the belief that the cat went up the 
oldest tree in sight. (Davidson 1982, p. 97) 
This intensionality of the attitudes is of course shared by the semantic theory 
specifying contents of utterances. The problem is that for interpretation to succeed, we 
want our T-sentences to be as sensitive and informative as possible. To assign its truth-
condition to a sentence under just any old description of that truth-condition is not 
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adequate for good interpretation. We want to assign truth-conditions under the sorts of 
descriptions the speaker has in mind. The language of one-word sentences affords us, at 
best, truth-conditions, but allows us no finer distinctions. We have no basis on which to 
choose one description of the truth-condition of the utterance rather than another, so we 
have no way to respect intensionality. But an interpretation that fails to respect 
intensionality is a bad interpretation. 
It might seem at this point that I have a robustly contradictory approach to 
intensionality. In discussing Sosa's Fregean argument against semantic externalism in 
2.1.2, I was, it might seem, dismissive of the intensional aspect of attributions of 
contradictory beliefs: beliefs might contradict, I contended, without the believer in the 
contradictory beliefs being irrational. I identified contradictoriness and hence content 
with something external to the mind, and hence, one would think, with something 
semantically extensional. If content is extensional, then I've no right to intensionality. 
Though it's not immediately plain why, I do have the right to intensionality. The 
truth-conditional theory of meaning, and its attendant approaches to attitude attributions, 
can fully respect intensionality. At a very superficial level, I understand the problem of 
intensionality like this. Some utterances are extensionally equivalent: they may be 
intersubstituted salva veritate in extensional contexts. Yet they are intensionally 
inequivalent: when those utterances appear in attributions of attitudes and other 
intensional contexts, they may not necessarily be intersubstituted salva veritate. For 
Fregeans and many others, this failure of intersubstitutability is to be accounted for with 
reference to a difference in meaning between the utterances, and this move drives a 
distinction between meaning and extension. By identifying meaning with extension, I 
block that move. 
To distinguish between co-extensional utterances, I must appeal to something 
other than their meanings. But that's easy, for utterances, and the attitudes they express, 
have many features, not just their meanings. There are also utterances'/attitudes' relations 
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to other utterances/attitudes: that is, there is also a holistic aspect to these states. 
Davidson remarks: 
Why doesn't the fact that a horse or a duck discriminates many of the things we 
do strongly suggest that they have the same concepts we do, or at least concepts 
much like ours? ...there is little reason to take the suggestion literally. Someone 
could easily teach me to recognize a planet in our solar system without my having 
a clear idea what a planet is. A horse can distinguish men from other animals, but 
if it has a concept of what it is distinguishing that concept is nothing like ours. 
Our concept is complicated and rich: we would deny that someone had the 
concept of a man who did not know something about what distinguishes a man 
from a woman, who did not know that fathers are men, that every man has a 
father and a mother.... (Davidson 2001a, pp. 136-7) 
Consider, for instance, my attribution to someone of the belief that Hesperus is 
Hesperus. I'm unwilling to, on the basis of this attribution and the semantic identity 
between 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus,' attribute to someone the belief that Hesperus is 
Phosphorus. It's true that this belief has the same content as the first, so I may, if I'm not 
trying to be particularly discerning, attribute the belief that Hesperus is Phosphorus, and 
I'll be right. But I won't have captured the speaker's state of mind. The belief that 
Hesperus is Hesperus lacks certain inferential connections with other beliefs that are 
partly definitive of the belief that Hesperus is Phosphorus; for instance, if someone 
believes that Hesperus is hot and that Hesperus is Hesperus, she might not be apt to 
believe that Phosphorus is hot, even though in believing that Hesperus is Hesperus, she 
does believe something with the same content as my belief that Hesperus is Phosphorus. 
Subjective intensionality is a consequence of our differential willingness to draw 
inferences from beliefs that share content, which is a consequence of the opacity of the 
objects of thought. 
The child in Fodor and LePore's thought experiment is prompted by experience to 
make a noise, say, "Sam." The circumstance that prompts this utterance is snow's being 
white. But that circumstance is identical to frozen crystalline precipitation's reflecting 
equally all bands in the visual spectrum. Whether we attribute to his utterance one of 
these or another as its meaning is indifferent if we ignore mental context, since they're the 
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same circumstance. But these two beliefs of ours have different relations to our other 
beliefs; that's what makes them distinct beliefs. If we can't attribute any one of those 
beliefs in particular, it's hard to see why we should attribute any belief at all. 
I want to shift to another problem for a moment before returning to this one. 
Fodor and LePore claim that the child is willing to draw appropriate inferences, and 
would no doubt extend their thought experiment to make the child as sensitive as you 
like. But how could any utterance of the child ever possibly be attributed any content 
beyond immediate experience? How could Fodor and LePore respond to the third 
objection to the truth-conditional theory, when applied to their own approach? What 
could the child ever do to convey the content "2+2=4," as distinct from any other claim 
that's always true? In contending that Fodor and LePore could not handle this problem, I 
hope to show how Davidson's could and hence why holism is necessary. 
The problem here is how we could attribute to an utterance a content that is 
general. General utterances are not prompted by the occurrence, in the immediate 
environment of the speaker, of a circumstance the occurrence of which makes the 
utterance true. So it's not possible to identify their content with their cause. Fodor and 
LePore were straightforwardly identifying content with cause, so they have no means to 
attribute content to general utterances. 
That is not a problem that we face with a Davidsonian theory. In a Tarskian 
theory discovered and tested in the situation of radical interpretation, while we begin to 
assign axioms to words on the basis only of their appearance in observation sentences, we 
can check our axioms against theorems about general sentences, as well as further 
observation sentences. If our axiom for some symbol is that something satisfies that 
symbol iff it is a father, then our axiom is wrong if it mispredicts the role of that symbol 
in general sentences about fathers. In this way, we can both begin to understand the 
natives' general utterances, and also confirm and confute our tentative axioms for words 
appearing in observation sentences. 
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The child speaking Fodor and LePore's language, though, cannot display the 
relations between his observation sentences and his more general sentences. We might 
see something that we suspect to be an inference, but we won't be able to figure out what 
the inferred general sentence said, only, at best, that it was one of the many general 
sentences that may be inferred from the observation sentence with which we began. Thus 
"snow is cold" is beyond reach of the child, as it is general.41 
Let me return to the second problem. Before we're willing to attribute to someone 
the belief that, say, snow is white, we would feel the need to attribute to him, among 
many other beliefs, the beliefs that white is a color and that snow falls from the sky: in 
general, we would think it necessary to attribute some appropriate set of other beliefs 
involving these concepts. Some of these beliefs are general in nature, not observation 
sentences. If the child says something that we should interpret as meaning "snow is 
white," then we should interpret the child as willing to say that white is a color and that 
snow falls from the sky. But this we would never do, since the child could never say 
anything general. So we should never interpret anything the child says as meaning "snow 
is white." Contrary to Fodor and LePore, I think that we are in possession of an a priori 
argument that there could be no non-compositional language: Observation sentences 
acquire their identity only in relation to both observed phenomena and general sentences; 
general sentences acquire their content only by their relation to observation sentences; in 
a non-compositional language, there would be no appropriate relation to observation 
sentences; hence there would be no general sentences, and no observation sentences. 
Davidson's view is not idiosyncratic. Sellars, for instance, agrees: 
...one couldn't have observational knowledge of any fact unless one knew many 
other things as well. ....the point is specifically that observational knowledge of 
any particular fact, e.g. that this is green, presupposes that one knows general 
facts of the form X is a reliable symptom of Y. 
                                                
41 Likewise, of course, the equally general 'Snow is white,' but I give that example to Fodor and LePore. 
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The essential point is that in characterizing an episode or a state as that of 
knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that episode or state; we 
are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify 
what one says." (Sellars 1956/1997, pp. 75-6) 
Recall that earlier, in 2.1.1, I distinguished between cases where attitude attributions on 
the basis of mere causal correlation between an utterance and some prompting 
circumstance could seem warranted, and those in which such attributions were obviously 
unwarranted. It might seem that, even in the absence of some supporting attributions, it's 
reasonable to attribute to someone a belief that can be expressed as a simple observation 
report. Such beliefs are prompted by immediate experience. But if Sellars is right, these 
cases also require attributions of additional, supporting content. The point, though, of 
noting Sellars's view is just that Davidson's view is actually widespread, not just one 
more unusual feature of an unusual system. Many Kantians who try to understand 
attributing content as attributing rationality will share some form of holism. 
By showing how Fodor and LePore could not handle the second and third 
objections, I hope to have shown how Davidson can. By insisting on using Tarskian 
theories, with their essential holism, in interpretation, a Davidsonian interpreter could 
respect the intensionality of utterances and attitudes, and could come to assign general 
content to various beliefs and sentences. 
However, the holism with which Davidson began was overkill. Fodor and LePore 
explain: 
...if you assume that properties like having a meaning in L and having the same 
meaning as some expression in L and the like are holistic, then a certain standard 
picture of how communication and language learning work would seem to be in 
jeopardy. The picture is that the linguistic and theoretical overlaps of speaker and 
hearer can overlap partially to any degree you like: you can believe some of what 
I believe without believing all of it; you can understand part of my language 
without having learned the rest of it, and so forth. This would seem to be essential 
to reconciling the idea that languages have an interpersonal, social existence with 
the patent truth that no two speakers of the same language ever speaker exactly 
the same dialect of that language. (Fodor and LePore 1992, p. 10) 
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If it were impossible for utterances in slightly deviant dialects to share content, then no 
two speakers could ever agree or disagree about anything, which would be bad for our 
understanding of scientific and moral progress — to say nothing of being bad for 
scientific and moral progress. 
Luckily, no holism so extreme is warranted by the nature of a Tarskian theory, as 
Davidson notes: "We could not recognize as capable of thought a mind that did not 
conceive of a supply of familiar objects and properties. Just which objects and properties 
is not fixed, though no doubt there are some we could not do without." (Davidson 1995, 
p. 13, emphasis added) If the objects and properties are not fixed, they are not fixed to 
exactly the same objects and properties of which I conceive. So Davidson rejects the 
extreme holism that he confusedly announced in the earlier paper. 
Fodor and LePore are not inclined to let holism off so easily. They discuss42 the 
possible response to their argument that runs like this. Holism commits us to an 
attitude/utterance's identity being determined by context. Unfortunately, no two such 
contexts — minds, idiolects — are identical. So no two attitudes/utterances are identical. 
Nevertheless, they could well be similar — in triggering circumstance and inferential 
relations — and that's all we need. 
But this is plainly inadequate. There's no plain way to apply the concept of 
similarity of triggering circumstance or inferential relation when there's in principle no 
way to apply the concept of identity of trigger or inference, even as an idealization. But if 
identity of belief required identity of inferential relations, then two minds would have to 
have exactly the same beliefs in order to share any beliefs at all. Trying to push similarity 
of belief off onto similarity of something else requires that the something else be 
identified independently of beliefs, but of course inferences are identified with reference 
to their premises and conclusions and the rules of inference employed in them, and the 
premises and conclusions are beliefs. 
                                                
42 Fodor and LePore 1992, pp. 17-22 
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There is no reason, though, why Davidson could not have identity of utterance or 
belief. The holism that requires identical minds for identical beliefs is too extreme. We 
can have identity of content in merely similar mental contexts. To solve the problem, we 
need to clarify what it is for attitudes to be identical, and we need to focus on the precise 
balance of externalistic and holistic aspects of interpretation. 
Two attitudes have the same content just in case they share truth-condition, but 
sharing content is inadequate for two attitudes to be identical. They also have to 
(correctly) seem to the person bearing the attitudes to warrant many of the same 
inferences and actions. In using a Tarskian theory to interpret, we try to give axioms that 
not only capture the truth-conditions of our interlocutor's utterances, but also identify an 
utterance within a web of other utterances, potential and actual, that help define its role in 
the rational life of the interlocutor. Two rational lives need not be entirely identical in 
order to be similar enough to share content. I think that this might best be illustrated by 
an extended example. The point of this example is that it proceeds according to the 
method of radical interpretation, and the holism is taken for granted; nevertheless, we 
won't find ourselves being tempted by the implicit holism to deny identity of content 
between two agents. That is, I'm not just going to show that we are not extreme holists in 
our interpretive practice, which is obvious. I'm going to show that we are not extreme 
holists when our interpretive practice is holistic in the way that Davidson's Tarskian 
radical interpretations must be. 
Assume that we have hypothesized the axiom for our theory of speaker s that '', 
as uttered by s at time t, refers to the object of s's ostension. This axiom seems to help us 
generate many well-confirmed theorems. While ostending a patch of snow, s utters 
"." Also, when snow begins to fall, s utters "." We might imagine that the 
former means "That's snow," and the second means "Snow falls." We could derive these 
T-sentences as theorems were we to posit the axiom that for any x, x satisfies ',' as 
spoken by s, iff x is snow. (And an appropriate axiom for '.') 
 158 
Assume that we continue in the interpretive endeavor, and find that we can get 
good confirmation on the posited axiom that for any x, x satisfies ',' as spoken by s, iff 
x is cold. When we inquire whether "," we get what we have theorized to be an 
affirmation. That encourages us in our axioms, since s seems to have agreed that snow is 
cold, which our axioms predict she would say. If s were more inclined to agree to the 
sentence the more cold snow she had seen, then we would feel even more encouraged. 
But now let's assume that s also tells us that "," while ostending the moon. 
We hypothesize the theorem that "," as uttered by s, is true iff the object of ostension 
is the moon, and we formulate the axiom that ',' as uttered by s, refers to the moon. 
(Devices to display the identity predicate, and predicative structure in general, seem 
either to be absent or to be escaping us; perhaps they're implicit?) 
But we then ask whether "," and we get bewilderment. The question seems to 
confuse s, whose people have never been the moon and don't know that it's cold. Should 
this lead us to back away from our posits about the reference of '' and satisfaction 
conditions of '?' This unexpected confusion at a well-known truth does provide 
evidence against our axioms. But it's very weak evidence. We can explain the confusion 
either with reference to theory error, or with reference to s's ignorance. We can't appeal to 
s's ignorance every time a prediction fails, but we can do so once in a while, especially 
where ignorance seems a plausible account for an otherwise outlying utterance. 
Assume that we find ourselves in this position. It's incredible to suggest, as Fodor 
and LePore do, that the holistic nature of the semantic theory and attitudinal attributions 
would lead us to reject our entire theory and abandon any hope of identifying s's 
meanings and attitudes with mine. Surely there is enough common ground to allow for 
identity by any reasonable standard thereof. S's utterances that I take to mean that snow is 
white and so forth play sufficiently similar roles in her mental life and mine for the 
correlation between them to function interpretively as an identification of s's meanings 
and beliefs. Fodor and LePore point out, correctly, that: 
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...we need to know how much the differences between the red-inferences I 
endorse and the ones that Shakespeare did count as differences in our concept of 
red. The extent to which this sort of question lacks a principled answer is the 
extent to which we have no notion of similarity of content that is compatible with 
a holistic account of belief attribution. And it lacks a principled answer entirely... 
(Fodor and LePore 1992, p. 21) 
I agree that there is no principled answer to the question of how much divergence there 
can be between two minds/languages while there can still be shared content. There can be 
some; that's obvious. As I plan to show in the next chapter, there can't be a lot. But the 
lack of a principled answer, while regrettable, does not vitiate holism. Making the 
appropriate judgments is easier in practice than in theory: we make the judgments all the 
time without having any very good theory about how to do it, but, as I argued above, 
languages have to be compositional and hence have to be holistic. 
I want to address a final problem, an apparent tension between holism and 
externalism. De Rosa argues: 
According to [Davidson's holism], the pattern of sentences and beliefs embedded 
in a language determines the meaning and content of each sentence and belief of 
that language. ...Davidson's externalism... says that in the case of occasion 
sentences, their meaning and the content of the beliefs they express are 
determined by some sort of causal relation between tokens of these 
sentences/beliefs and extra-representational events in the world.... Externalism 
would readmit two theses that holism ruled out, namely: 
(a) atomism, that is, the view according to which a belief or a sentence in a 
language can have the meaning or the content it has independently of any pattern 
of beliefs and sentences in which it is embedded; and  
(b) (a radically non-epistemic) realism, that is, the view according to which there 
is a world totally independent of our beliefs such that it could reveal all our 
beliefs about the world to be false. (De Rosa 1999, p. 203) 
On the face of it, the challenge is odd. How does externalism "readmit" theses ruled out 
by holism? Presumably, the conjunction of externalism and holism rules out everything 
that was ruled out by either conjunct. I guess that De Rosa has in mind that externalism's 
"readmitting" theses (a) and (b) consists, not in not implying their negation — just being 
consistent with them — but in implying them. 
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Hopefully, I've made clear how (a) is to be dealt with. An utterance's content is its 
worldly truth-condition. But to get refined T-sentences that really help us get into the 
mind of someone we want to interpret, we want to give a sentence its truth-condition 
under a description suited to the way our interpretee thinks of it. That requires that we 
attend to mental context. Externalism says that content is external, not that factors 
internal to the speaker have no effect on what external entity is to be the content, or how 
we should describe that entity when attributing it as content. So externalism does not 
imply (a). 
(b) is a typically overblown statement of realism, one that pretends that the point 
of realism is to imply scepticism. As I argued in the section on truth, truth-conditions do 
exist; they are not mere theoretical constructs. So I accept the part of (b) that states 
realism ("there is a world totally independent of our beliefs"), even while I reject the 
pretended epistemic point of realism (the independent world "could reveal all our beliefs 
about the world to be false"). I think that De Rosa is entirely right to point out that 
externalism implies realism, but whereas Davidson tried to wiggle out of the 
consequence, I accept it. 
De Rosa's challenge is that externalism implies (a) and (b), while holism implies 
their negations. Externalism does not imply (a), so there is no problem there. Externalism 
does imply (b). But why would holism imply (b)'s negation? De Rosa's argument here43 
relies on the assumption that holism requires identity of mind/language for identity of any 
content anywhere. Since that condition is never met, there is never identity of content 
between any two speakers. There can be no content over which two speakers can 
disagree. The role of the external world in resolving disagreement, then, which is central 
to realism, drops out. 
This argument is uncompelling. Realism is the claim that the truth of one's 
utterances/beliefs is determined by their content and how things stand in the world. 
                                                
43 De Rosa 1999, p. 203-4. 
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Realism, on its own, doesn't require disagreement to be possible. Again, De Rosa is 
confusing a certain epistemic implication (or pretended implication) of realism with 
realism itself. If we couldn't disagree, then realism would still be true. Whether my 
beliefs are true would still be determined by meaning and world. It's just that we would 
never have any disagreements to refer to the world for adjudication. 
The argument is also uncompelling because it takes for granted that the holism to 
be adopted is of the most extreme kind available, one that makes identity of entire 
mind/language a prerequisite for any shared content. As I've tried to make clear, that sort 
of holism is not implied by the structure of a Tarskian truth theory, so it is not implied by 
Davidson's theory of meaning. A more modest holism is all that's called for. 
2.4 SEMANTIC AND ATTITUDINAL INDETERMINACY 
Theses like the inscrutability of reference, the indeterminacy of translation or 
interpretation, and the relativity of ontology are ugly consequences, if consequences they 
are, of abiding by the publicity constraint in theories of meaning. To go personal for a 
moment, these sorts of theses freak me out. I rather wish that Quine had never thought of 
them, and I wish that Davidson's discussions thereof weren't such sterling examples of 
philosophical obscurity. But for good or ill, a modest indeterminacy of interpretation is a 
consequence of going empirical in the theory of meaning. Since I don't know of any 
reasonable alternative to going empirical in the ways described in previous sections, I 
don't know of any reasonable alternative to accepting a modest indeterminacy. In this 
section, I discuss semantic and attitudinal indeterminacy, trying to show its scope and 
limits. The indeterminacy has two sources: the structure of Tarskian theories, and the 
nature of radical interpretation. Davidson puts out the first sort of indeterminacy here, 
along with some mistakes: 
We don't need the concept of reference; neither do we need reference itself, 
whatever that may be. For if there is one way of assigning entities to expressions 
(a way of characterizing 'satisfaction') that yields acceptable results with respect 
to the truth conditions of sentences, there will be endless other ways that do as 
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well. There is no reason, then, to call any one of these semantical relations 
'reference' or 'satisfaction.' (Davidson 1977, p. 224) 
I want to discuss everything after the first sentence first, and then return to the first 
sentence, which is false. This passage points out a truism about empirical theories with 
the general form that Tarskian theories share. Such theories will consist in a set of axioms 
that are not themselves testable. The axioms will yield a set of theorems that are more or 
less testable against observation. But for any such set of theorems, if there is a set of 
axioms that imply them, there are many more such sets of axioms that would imply them. 
Thus, the evidence underdetermines the theory: many theories are consistent with all of 
the available evidence. In the case of Tarskian theories, there are many sets of axioms 
stating the reference and satisfaction conditions of individual words of the language that 
will yield the right theorems. 
It is often said that this is a less-than-profound and totally familiar instance of the 
underdetermination of theory by evidence, as, for example, by Searle: 
It is only by assuming the nonexistence of intentionalistic meanings that the 
argument for indeterminacy succeeds at all. Once that assumption is abandoned, 
that is, once we stop begging the question against mentalism, it seems to me that 
[the] objection [that what Quine has demonstrated is mere underdetermination] is 
completely valid. Where meanings psychologically construed are concerned, there 
is the familiar underdetermination of hypothesis by evidence, and that 
underdetermination is in addition to the underdetermination at the level of 
physical particles or brute physical behavior. So what? These are familiar points 
about any psychological theory. There is nothing special about meaning and 
nothing to show that where meaning is concerned there is no fact of the matter. 
(Searle 1987, p. 232-3) 
What this objection fails to grasp is that, with language, all is public. There are no 
semantic facts that can't be grasped on the basis of publicly available evidence. So, since 
the publicly available evidence leaves the semantic facts indeterminate, the semantic facts 
are indeterminate. Nothing beyond the public use of language can determine what 
theories of meaning are right about the user of the language, and public use of language 
doesn't determine that to the point of uniqueness. Thus there is no unique theory that is 
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right about the speaker. Searle claims that he accepts the publicity constraint, but he 
doesn't see what it implies: 
...let us grant that, for "public" languages... there is at least one clear sense in 
which semantic features are, indeed, public features. I take it all that means is that 
different people can understand the same expressions in the same way.... 
Furthermore, let us grant, at least for the sake of argument, that the public features 
are subject to underdetermination in at least this sense: I could give different but 
inconsistent interpretations of someone's words, all of which would be consistent 
with all of the actual and possible evidence I had about which sentences he held 
true. Now what follows? ...on Davidson's view the indeterminacy follows only if 
we assume from the start that different semantic facts must necessarily produce 
different "publicly observable" consequences. Only given this assumption can we 
derive the conclusion that a speaker's meaning and reference are indeterminate 
and inscrutable. (ibid, p. 244) 
By Searle's notion of what it is for semantic features to be public, we must all be able to 
understand the same expression in the same way. If the semantic facts did not produce 
different publicly available consequences, there would be no public basis by which we 
could coordinate our utterances and all mean the same thing by the same utterance. 
Whatever mentalistic phenomenon I attach as meaning to my utterance would be beyond 
being grasped by you, so you could never figure out what I meant. You might get lucky, 
and happen quite by chance to attach, to utterances of yours similar to utterances of mine, 
private mental meanings similar to the ones I attach to utterances of mine. But the odds of 
that happening are vanishingly small; small enough that, if that were the condition on 
understanding the same expressions in the same ways, we would never do it. While 
Searle is right to point out that indeterminacy is a consequence of taking a third-person 
perspective in theory of meaning, whatever we have access to only from the first-person 
perspective is not public, and hence not meaning. Indeterminacy is thus a consequence of 
taking the only perspective on meaning that we can. 
Searle makes other, more local, errors. He contends that one consequence of the 
indeterminacy would be that we can give "inconsistent" interpretations. Elsewhere, he 
says that, "The thesis of the indeterminacy of translation is that, where questions of 
 164 
translation and, therefore, of meaning are concerned, there is no such thing as getting it 
right or wrong. This is not because of an epistemic gulf between evidence and 
conclusion, but because there is no fact of the matter to be right or wrong about." (ibid, 
pp. 230-1) But it's true neither that the inscrutability of reference allows us to offer 
inconsistent interpretations, nor that the inscrutability of reference implies that we can't 
give a bad interpretation. 
The claim that inconsistent interpretations can be given is repeated by other 
commentators; Ludwig and Lepore, for instance, contend that, "...the interpreter must 
regard the different theories he can confirm as strictly incompatible with one another. 
According to the two theories, sentences of the object language will mean different 
things. In other words, it is incoherent for the interpreter to regard the different theories 
which he could confirm as both true." (Ludwig and Lepore 2005, p. 239) These 
accusations miss the point of Davidsonian indeterminacy. Davidson says: 
...we can suit the evidence by various ways of matching words and objects. The 
best way of announcing the way we have chosen is by naming the language; but 
then we must characterize the language as one for which reference, satisfaction, 
and truth have been assigned specific roles. An empirical question remains, to be 
sure: is this language one that the evidence permits us to attribute to this speaker? 
(Davidson 1979b, p. 240) 
We may think of a language as defined by a Tarskian theory. For any given set of 
theorems of such theories, there are many sets of axioms from which they could be 
derived. Each such set of axioms, along with the common set of theorems, is a distinct 
language. They are, nevertheless, empirically equivalent. Since there are no semantic 
facts not knowable on the basis of publicly available evidence, if two theories are 
empirically equivalent, either of them define a language that a speaker could be said to 
speak if she could be said to speak the other. But that doesn't imply that just any language 
could be attributed to just any speaker. Only the ones defined by Tarskian theories with 
the right theorems can be attributed to her. 
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Furthermore, there can be no inconsistency in the attributions. Consider how the 
indeterminacy would work. I could, let's say, give either of the following interpretations 
of some speaker's utterances, depending on whether I treat her as speaking L1 or L2: 
'Apollo' refers-in-L1 to Apollo 
'Apollo' refers-in-L2 to Lucky 
There's plainly no inconsistency. That a word refers to one thing in one language is not 
inconsistent with its referring to something else in another language. Likewise, there is no 
inconsistency at the level of theorems: 
'Apollo is sleeping' is true-in-L1 ↔ Apollo is sleeping 
'Apollo is sleeping' is true-in-L2 ↔ Lucky is sleeping 
Having one set of truth-conditions in one language is consistent with having a different 
set of truth-conditions in another language. 
At this point, though, we should begin to rein in the indeterminacy. For radical 
interpretation to succeed, our interpretive theorems must abide by the version of the 
principle of charity known as Grace, according to which the right-hand side of the T-
sentence must give the cause of the utterance of the object-language sentence under 
discussion. This fact rules out many possible permutations of reference and satisfaction 
that would yield theorems that gave mere metalanguage material equivalents of object-
language sentences. It would be very hard to come up with seriously divergent axioms of 
reference and satisfaction that yielded equally satisfactory theorems for observation 
sentences of the object language. 
Meditation on this point allows us to undo the standard 'gavagai' example of 
indeterminacy. Let's assume that I have generated the following theorem for one of my 
informants: 
'Gavagai!' is true-in-L1 for a speaker s at time t ↔ a rabbit is present near s at t 
Quine wants to claim that the following T-sentence would do equally well: 
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'Gavagai!' is true-in-L2 for a speaker s at time t ↔ an undetached rabbit part is 
present near s at t 
Since the second theorem is empirically equivalent to the first, we could, Quine says, 
equally well say that the speaker is speaking L2 as L1. And, since a rabbit being in one's 
presence is nomically equivalent to an undetached rabbit part being in one's presence, it 
might seem hard to distinguish between the two and end up identifying the correct cause. 
Speakers are sensitive to events. But, due to the opacity of events, events might 
have many features to which the speaker is not sensitive; that is, events might have 
features with no, or no salient, nomic correlation to the speaker's utterances. In 
identifying the cause of an utterance, we want not only to identify the relevant event, but 
also to identify it under a revealing description. The first desideratum here is that we get a 
description that we can relate to the utterance as a matter of law. A rabbit's being present 
is also a mammal's being present, but a mammal's being present does not have a lawlike 
relation to utterances of 'Gavagai!' That's why Quine's examples are all of other events 
nomically equivalent to the rabbit's being present. 
The second and more important desideratum is that we try to narrow in on 
descriptions that describe the event as the speaker understands her sensitivity to it. That 
is, we want our T-sentences to, as much as possible, state laws that the speaker would 
affirm. This desideratum is only the desideratum discussed in the section on holism: that 
we try to make our T-sentences reflect the states of mind of those we interpret as closely 
as possible, that we respect the intensionality of their utterances. 
The indeterminacy that remains will be quite limited. When it comes to 
observation sentences, the indeterminacy would probably be vanishingly small unless 
there are serious divergences between the resources of the object- and meta-languages. 
For the standard example, 'Gavagai!,' for instance, since I can tell perfectly well when 
someone is talking about rabbits and when she is talking about undetached rabbit parts, I 
could across time narrow in on the correct description of the event of the rabbit's being 
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present that describes the event in the most revealing way possible. Only if we genuinely 
couldn't tell which description(s) of the event the speaker felt himself to be sensitive to 
the event under, would we have indeterminacy at the level of observation sentences. We 
genuinely couldn't tell what the speaker had in mind only if the speaker could never say 
anything to make the distinction between rabbits and their undetached parts. But if he 
makes the distinction at all, he can exhibit that fact. 
Davidson argues that the indeterminacy, as I have described it, is no more 
threatening to the objectivity of meaning assignments than the difference between 
Fahrenheit and Celsius scales is to the objectivity of temperature assignments. Lepore 
and Ludwig reply44 that this defense would be devastating to the project of radical 
interpretation. The use of numbers to keep track of temperatures allows for multiple 
scales — assignments of numbers to temperatures — only because numbers are "richer" 
than temperatures: "The possibility of [keeping track of an empirical pattern among 
temperatures] in different ways shows that the pattern of relations among numbers is 
richer than that among the states that the number are used to keep track of." (Lepore and 
Ludwig 2005, p. 245) In general, if some phenomenon x can be represented, in multiple 
scales, by reference to distinct phenomenon y, then y is "richer" than x. However, when 
the radical interpreter interprets her own utterances, the language to be interpreted is not 
richer than the language in which interpretation occurs. Thus there could be only one 
scale. 
It seems to me that, if we assume that Lepore and Ludwig mean something clear 
by "richer than" — which is not obvious to me — then this is just correct and 
unproblematic. The indeterminacy of meaning is the fact that any language can be 
interpreted in the terms of another language in more than one way, not that any language 
can be interpreted in the terms of any language, even itself, in more than one way. They 
disagree, and contend that their point about richness shows that, as a background 
                                                
44 Lepore and Ludwig 2005, pp. 245-7. 
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assumption for interpretation, an interpreter must accept that "The relations among the 
object language sentences are not as structurally rich as those among the sentences of the 
interpreter's language." (ibid, p. 246) But this assumption seems to come out of nowhere. 
If we insist on the possibility of indeterminacy as a prerequisite for interpretation, then 
we might have to accept that the object language is poorer than the meta-language 
(though in fact we wouldn't; see below). But why insist on indeterminacy? Indeterminacy 
is a side-effect of going empirical, not something we went empirical to achieve. 
Even in object languages of equal or greater richness, though, there would still be 
a modest indeterminacy. For more theoretical sentences, there will be more 
interpretations available. The closer the ties between the sentence and prompting 
experience, the narrower will be the indeterminacy, because it will be correspondingly 
harder to come up with multiple descriptions of events all of which could, with equal 
plausibility, be said to be descriptions of events that the speaker would accept as giving 
the description under which she is sensitive to the event. Only in districts of theory with 
very little tie to the empirical is there apt to be really wide indeterminacy. There is, thus, 
just enough indeterminacy of meaning to be consistent with the nature of empirical 
theories, but not enough to seriously undermine our sense of ourselves as speakers whose 
utterances have a certain definition to them. 
I mentioned the second desideratum, flowing from holism and a desire to respect 
intensionality, of assigning the content event to observation sentences under a description 
under which the speaker thinks of herself as sensitive to the event. Identifying such 
descriptions would, of course, be enormously difficult. It leads to the second source of 
indeterminacy, the nature of radical interpretation. I can deal more quickly with this 
source of indeterminacy, since major objections have been covered already. 
In radical interpretation, I seek to interpret a subject. That consists in identifying 
the meanings of her utterances and the contents of her beliefs. To recur to the standard 
analogy, radical interpretation tries to solve one equation with two variables. But of 
 169 
course that can't be done, at least not to the point of uniqueness. We're left with a line 
through a coordinate grid, in which meanings are represented along one axis and beliefs 
along another. Infinitely many assignments of meanings and beliefs can be rendered 
consistent with the speaker's utterances. The idea is that, if an attribution of some belief 
seems odd, we can change it if we make compensating adjustments to assignments of 
meanings; if a certain meaning seems hard to assign, we can assign a different one by 
compensatory shifts to belief attributions. Davidson says: 
Underlying the indeterminacy of interpretation is a commonplace about 
interpretation. Suppose someone says, 'That's a shooting star.' Should I take him 
to mean it really is a star, but that he believes some stars are very small and cold; 
or should I think he means it is not a star but a meteorite, and believes stars are 
always very large and hot? Additional evidence may resolve this case, but there 
will always be cases where all possible evidence leaves open a choice between 
attributing to a speaker a standard meaning and an idiosyncratic pattern of belief, 
or a deviant meaning and a sober opinion. (Davidson 1973, p. 257) 
Grace sharply restricts the available attributions, of course, so what we have is not so 
much a line as a segment. But surely there is real, if limited, indeterminacy here. 
But we can ask just how much Grace can restrict, given the notion that only in 
triangulation and radical interpretation does content come into being. In 2.2, I answered a 
number of questions about the assignment of content in triangulation and radical 
interpretation. One question that went unanswered was, Couldn't the observer assign the 
wrong point along the line? Instead of assigning the Ψ events as causes of my Φ 
responses, what if she were to assign the causes of the Ψ events? The point of the 
objection is that it seems as though an observer could go wrong, and if an observer could 
go wrong, then there is an independent standard for determining content, one which lends 
determinacy to content. 
The objection misplaces the standard. Of course there is a standard, in the sense 
that an interpreter can make mistakes. But if the "mistake" appears in a well-confirmed 
empirical theory for a speaker, consistent with all the facts (that there will ever be), then 
it isn't a mistake. Absent the interpreter, no point along the line counts as right or wrong, 
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so it makes no sense to suggest that an interpreter could go wrong if her theory is 
empirically adequate. But, since there can be multiple empirically adequate theories, 
then, if some of them assign different points along the causal chain as causes, then all of 
those points equally well count as causes and hence as contents. 
The main significance of interpretation-based indeterminacy, from my point of 
view, is that it reminds us of a basic Davidsonian truth: "Having a language and knowing 
a good deal about the world are only partially separable achievements..." (ibid) In the 
situation of radical interpretation, I solve simultaneously for meaning and belief. 
Meaning and belief, then, can be seen as functions of one another. Much of what we want 
to say about meaning, then, will apply across this functional relationship to belief. For 
instance, we warp semantic assignments to allow for better attitudinal attributions; but the 
content of the utterance getting an assignment is the same as the content of the attitude 
we attribute on the basis of the utterance. If the content of the utterance, then, is its cause, 
then the content of the belief is the same external event. If we consider a number of 
previous semantic assignments before making an attitude attribution, the holism of 
language has played across into a holism about belief. 
2.5 SELF-KNOWLEDGE 
Attitudes are objects of knowledge; it's possible for me, and for you, to know that 
I believe that such-and-such. At a minimum, this fact gives rise to a philosophical 
question; that question will lead to problems or paradoxes depending on one's approach 
to belief and content. 
Consider the sort of classical Cartesian view of the attitudes and their content that 
people like to accuse other people of still accepting. According to this internalist 
approach, what it is for a belief to have a certain content is, if not to have a certain 
phenomenology, at least determined by its phenomenology. So there is no question of my 
knowledge of my own beliefs: I can feel the way the belief feels, and there's nothing else 
I need to know in order to know the content of the belief. This route permits the other 
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minds problem, since the phenomenology of other minds is something to which outside 
observers have no access and about which sceptical doubts can be raised. 
Externalism, though, when combined with the notion of first-person authority, 
gives rise not just to a problem, but to a paradox. For Davidson, what an interpreter can 
discover about my inner states is what there is to know about them. As a consequence of 
the fact that content only emerges in the context of triangulation, what an interpreter can 
discover is the standard for content. So other people's knowledge of my attitudes is 
certainly accounted for. But what about my knowledge of my own states? Since I can't 
triangulate for myself, how can I grasp the contents of my own thoughts? How can I 
know my own mind? 
So far, this is only a problem, on a par with the problem of other minds but 
reversed. We can be confident that the problem will find solution, since we're absolutely 
convinced that we know what we're thinking. But that conviction leads to paradox. For 
we think that, not only do we know what we're thinking, but also that we have special 
authority when it comes to our own attitudes: our beliefs about our attitudes are, if not 
infallible, very close. They're much closer to infallible than any outside observer's. So, 
despite the fact that the interpreter's point of view provides the standard for content, my 
own point of view is more reliable than the interpreter's. That's paradoxical. How could 
the standard be less reliable than anything else? 
Paul Boghossian offers a reductio of externalism that looks a little bit like an 
externalism anti-sceptical argument: 
...let us suppose that Oscar... is a compatibilist [about externalism and 
authoritative self-knowledge]. I claim that Oscar is in a position to argue, purely a 
priori, as follows: 
(1) If I have the concept water, then water exists. 
(2) I have the concept water. 
Therefore, 
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(3) Water exists. 
Since the conclusion is clearly not knowable a priori, one of the premisses in 
Oscar's evidently valid reasoning had better be either false or not knowable a 
priori. (Boghossian 1998, p. 275) 
(1) is intended to express one consequence of externalism, one similar to the premises of 
the anti-sceptical argument of 3.2.3 that I will label synthetic a priori. Our confidence in 
(2) is intended to be one consequence of the authoritativeness of self-knowledge. For 
Boghossian, each premise is known a priori, and that's the problem. If two premises are 
each known a priori, and they imply some conclusion, then that conclusion can be known 
a priori. But, though (3) is implied by the premises, (3) isn't knowable a priori, so the 
premises aren't each knowable a priori. 
The natural approach to take is to wonder whether the premises are, in fact, 
knowable a priori. To suggest that self-knowledge is a priori must be judged eccentric. 
That I know that I have a certain belief only on the basis of inner experience hardly 
implies that I know that I have that belief on the basis of no experience. Boghossian 
retreats from, or rephrases, his point: "...the a priori knowability of premise (2) just is the 
view that I have called the doctrine of privileged self-knowledge..." (ibid) But a prioricity 
and privilege are not the same. If the complaint is that (3) can be known with certainty, 
on the basis of an anti-sceptical argument based on the nature of content, then the 
complaint is just the insistence that the sceptic not be defeated by an externalist 
argument. I assume, though, that Boghossian can find some suitable description of the 
premises that neither begs the question nor is obviously confused. I should not be able to 
tell that water exists by engaging in philosophical reflection and personal introspection. 
The argument is directed at someone who can tell, by introspection, that she has 
the concept of water. That's because Boghossian directs the argument at Putnam style 
externalism, based on the Twin Earth thought experiment and the notion of a natural 
kind. Putnam's (and Kripke's) externalism involves the sort of term-by-term 
determination of content that Davidson rejects. For Davidson, concepts are theoretical 
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constructs, abstracted from beliefs. Identifying myself as a holder of the concept of water 
requires that I identify myself as a believer about water, and then abstract the concept 
from the beliefs of which it is a constituent. So the immediate self-knowledge is of my 
beliefs, not the concepts that I abstract from them. But what sorts of beliefs could I have 
from which I could abstract the concept water but that don't already commit me to 
believing that water exists? Furthermore, those beliefs will all be a posteriori. So 
Boghossian's reductio reduces to someone deducing, from his belief that water is wet and 
(the result of the anti-sceptical argument) that most of his beliefs are true, that water is 
wet. This does not represent any further cognitive achievement beyond the one already 
performed: acquiring the belief that water is wet. No new belief comes into the system 
through engaging in the reductio's reasoning. So no new a priori belief comes into the 
system. Boghossian's reductio fails. 
But that doesn't solve the main problem, which is the paradox of externalistic self-
knowledge. Why not just purchase the anti-sceptical result of the next chapter with a loss 
of self-knowledge? In a way, I wouldn't mind that result. I'm a lot less interesting than the 
rest of the world, and however self-obsessed someone is, surely very few of his beliefs 
are about himself. So trading self-knowledge for secure knowledge of the world would be 
a good trade. 
Nevertheless, it's impossible. It's easier to go wrong about the world than it is 
about one's own attitudes. In interpreting, I would have to go wrong if I were to 
systematically interpret someone as believing that φ but also believing that she does not 
believe that φ. Such an interpretation would make a hash of the speaker's self-attributions 
and/or her first-order beliefs; anyone so badly confused about her own attitudes doesn't 
count as having attitudes. This fact is a consequence of the holism of the attitudes. But, as 
Barry Smith points out, that fact is not enough to solve the paradox: 
Has Davidson explained how thinkers know what they are thinking without 
interpreting themselves? Given that there is something the speaker means when 
he holds a sentence true, there is something he believes. But in order to know 
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what he believes, surely he has to know what he means. We know this by 
constructing an interpretative truth-theory for his language that assigns truth-
conditions to the sentences he holds true. But how does he know what he means? 
As an account of self-knowledge, it tells us that the speaker knows what he 
believes, but not how he does. There is the interpretatively guaranteed fact of 
meaning something, or of our words meaning something. But what kind of 
knowledge does this give us of what we mean and think? (Smith 1998, pp. 416-7) 
Knowing that my higher-order self-attributions are massively correct doesn't tell me why 
they are. 
Here is a model of self-knowledge. Self-knowledge is formally very much like 
interpretations of others. I self-attribute attitudes toward certain truth-conditions, using 
sentences, and I understand those sentences, thereby giving substance to the self-
attribution. What we may think of as belief in certain sentences is the expression of self-
knowledge, but "I believe that the sky is blue" doesn't count as self-knowledge unless I 
understand the embedded sentence. We may express that knowledge in the familiar 
Tarskian form, "'The sky is blue,' as uttered by me now, is true iff the sky is blue." 
When I say that "I believe that φ," the word 'that' might refer to the sentence, 'φ.' 
Or it might refer to 'φ's truth-condition, the "fact" that φ. In either case, the self-attribution 
only counts as self-knowledge of I can connect 'φ' with the "fact" that φ. When I say that 
"'φ,' as uttered by me now, is true iff φ," I connect the sentence directly to its truth-
condition. Self-knowledge is to be knowledge of content, but content is how the world is 
if my beliefs are true. Self-knowledge, then, is knowing how the world is if my beliefs 
are true. Such knowledge can be grasped in the form of homophonic T-sentences for my 
own attitudes. 
Having self-knowledge homophonically might make things seem too easy: 
...self-knowledge is both fallible and incomplete. In both the domain of the mental 
and that of the physical, events may occur of which one remains ignorant; and, in 
both domains, even when one becomes aware of an event's existence, one may yet 
misconstrue its character, believing it to have a property it does not in fact 
possess. How is this to be explained? I know of no convincing alternative to the 
following style of explanation: the difference between getting it right and failing 
to do so (either through ignorance or through error) is the difference between 
 175 
being in an epistemically favorable position with respect to evidence — and not. 
To put this point another way, it is only if we understand self-knowledge to be a 
cognitive achievement that we have any prospect of explaining its shortcomings. 
(Boghossian 1989, p. 167) 
The model that I suggested above seems to simplify matters too much. Could "Know 
thyself" have possibly been the substantive command Socrates treated it as, if knowing 
thyself was so easy? 
While self-knowledge is hard, there are two aspects of attitudes that could account 
for the difficulty. Perhaps knowing the contents of my attitudes is hard. Not so, I say, 
since having the attitude is knowing its content; i.e., its truth-condition, plus believing, 
desiring, or whatever that content. 
Perhaps knowing the attitude is the problem. Grasping which sentences you have 
attitudes toward, and what your attitudes toward them are, is not always easy. I think that 
I believe that so-and-so is a good person, but in truth, I don't: I believe that so-and-so is a 
bad person. I thought that I desired that such-and-such occur, but in truth, I don't: I 
desired that some contrary, this-or-that, occur. The cognitive achievement of self-
knowledge lies in grasping what attitudes you have, not what they're attitudes toward. 
Since externalism is a thesis about content, not about the structure or nature of the 
attitudes themselves (except insofar as they're structured around external conditions), 
externalism makes this aspect of self-knowledge neither easier nor harder than it should 
be. 
What about the paradox? It's strange that, while what an interpreter can discover 
is the standard of content, an interpreter is much less liable to make errors about his own 
content than an interpreter. There are two things that need saying. 
First, "an interpreter" is a bit of an abstraction from all of the other people who 
interpret one. The interpreters as a group help determine the content of one's thoughts, by 
triangulating with one. They can't, in general, go wrong while still interpreting. But any 
individual one of them can go wrong (and, occasionally, they could even all go wrong, 
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though their interpretation will begin to lack coherence at that point). The 
authoritativeness of self-knowledge consists in the fact that I'm more reliable about the 
contents of my beliefs than any other person, not that I'm more reliable than other people 
in general. 
Second and deeper, I am exactly as reliable as other people in general. Knowledge 
of the contents of one's own beliefs can be represented as homophonic T-sentences for 
sentences with those contents. But those T-sentences make reference to the truth-
conditions of the embedded sentences, and those truth-conditions are determined, in 
triangulation, to be the contents of the embedded sentences. Knowledge of the contents of 
one's attitudes is reliable because it perfectly tracks the standard. No particular interpreter 
constitutes that standard, so any particular interpreter is less reliable than the believer 
herself. Nevertheless, the body of interpreters as a whole and across time are no less 
reliable than I am.
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3 Scepticism and Relativism 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, I begin to apply the theses developed in the previous chapters to 
issues outside of metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of language. Recall 
that my overall goal is to defend moral realism. My main foils are expressivism and 
moral scepticism. But moral scepticism comes in two kinds: as an implication of general 
scepticism, and as a distinctive doctrine distinguishing moral beliefs from others. This 
chapter refutes the first kind, by refuting scepticism in general, and prepares for the 
refutation of the second kind. 
In the first section, I take what might seem to be a detour through Kantian 
metaphysics. However, this section is in fact crucial to my overall approach. In it, I 
discuss Kant's approaches to scepticism and relativism. Of a non-exegetical purpose, I 
explore some of Kant's arguments in philosophical psychology and a notion of the 
synthetic a priori to which I will appeal later in the work. 
In the second section, I refute scepticism. Davidson has offered two arguments 
against scepticism at various times. One of them, the oft-discussed "omniscient 
interpreter" argument, fails to appeal to Davidson's core theses in philosophy of mind and 
language. It also comes up short, requiring facilitation by the very theses that were not 
employed in it. I offer an interpretation and defense of Davidson's more mature anti-
sceptical argument. 
In the third section, I turn to conceptual relativism. Davidson has remarked that 
this view is either unintelligible or boring, and I agree. I canvass some relativist 
approaches, and find them to be either benign and in no interesting way relativistic. 
Finally, I offer Davidson's positive argument against relativism. Anti-relativism is 
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important for the version of moral realism I lay out in chapter 5, as well as my response 
to certain moral sceptics. 
3.1 KANT'S REFUTATIONS OF IDEALISMS 
In this section, I take a brief Copernican break from the constant linguistic 
turnings of the rest of this work. I want to discuss three points. First, I want to relate the 
Davidsonian position that I'm developing to the Cartesian view criticized by Kant in the 
Paralogisms. One might be dismissive of Davidson's project for much the same reason 
Kant was critical of Descartes', but that would be a mistake. Second, I want to discuss the 
off-hand remarks about Berkeley's "dogmatic" idealism in the Refutation of Idealism. 
While Kant's allusive critique of Berkeley is of limited interest to me here, there is 
another way of looking at Berkeley (and Leibniz) that makes him parallel contemporary 
conceptual relativists, and another way of looking at Kant that makes him parallel 
Davidson's critique thereof. Third, I examine the critique of Descartes' cogito in the 
Refutation of Idealism, and show a close parallel between Kant's approach to Descartes 
and Davidson's approach to scepticism. By discussing these points, I hope to accomplish 
three ends. First, I lend some historical depth to my treatment (which otherwise might 
seem to fail to acknowledge any philosophy from before 1879). Second, I assimilate the 
entire project of this dissertation to a certain Kantian tradition that I find amenable to my 
goals in moral and political philosophy. Third, I introduce and anticipate the arguments 
of the rest of this chapter. 
3.1.1 Rational Psychology 
Consider Descartes' "rational psychology," as Kant calls it in the first chapter of 
the Paralogisms. Rational psychology is the attempt to deduce substantive truths about 
the self from the assertion that I think: 
Now rational psychology actually is an enterprise of this kind. For if the slightest 
empirical [element] of my thought — some particular perception of my inner state 
— were also mixed in with this science's bases of cognition, then it would no 
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longer be rational but empirical psychology. Hence we are indeed facing an 
alleged science which has been built on the single proposition I think... 
(A342/B400) 
Someone would be forgiven for thinking that Davidson's project is an updated version of 
rational psychology. Davidson begins with premises about language: that its leading 
features are graspable on the basic of publicly available evidence, that it is compositional 
in form, and so forth. On the basis of the premises about language, Davidson tries to 
deduce some quite remarkable conclusions: there is no diversity of conceptual schemes, 
we are in touch with an external world and other minds, there is no non-coincidental 
type-identity between any mental and any physical types, there can be no theory of 
truth.... The surprising move is from the subjective — the structure of consciously spoken 
language — to two areas of the objective, inner and outer. Davidson deduces conclusions 
about thinkers that extend well beyond facts about their subjective linguistic experience. 
Also, he deduces conclusions about the external world. Descartes, trapped within the 
demon's illusions, can't move from the subjective to both the inner and the outer, but he 
does move from the subjective to the inner objective. He moves from his own subjective 
thoughts to facts about a certain object, his own mind, that extend well beyond 
experience, such as the substantiality, simplicity, and immortality of the soul. 
What is the problem with rational psychology? 
...we can lay at the basis of this science [rational psychology] nothing but the 
simple, and by itself quite empty, presentation I, of which we cannot even say that 
it is a concept, but only that it is a mere consciousness accompanying all concepts. 
Now through this I or he or it (the thing) that thinks, nothing more is presented 
than a transcendental subject of thoughts = x. (A345-6/B404) 
The cogito presents either an empirical object of awareness, or a transcendental subject of 
awareness. If an empirical object, then rational psychology has been reduced to some sort 
of introspective empirical psychology. If a transcendental subject, then there is precious 
little to be said about it: it's transcendental, so no predicates apply to it that apply only to 
the realm of objects of awareness, such as substantiality and permanence. But these are 
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just the sorts of things Descartes wanted to show applied to the I of the cogito. By one of 
the standard tropes of the critical method, Kant has shown the problem with Descartes' 
rationalist approach to self-knowledge. 
Does a similar criticism apply to Davidson? Davidson is not an empirical 
psychologist or linguist. His arguments about the nature of language or mind are not 
based in empirical observation. Yet he comes to substantive conclusions with empirical 
application. Isn't Davidson just another rationalist? 
No. Rather, Davidson's approach mirrors not Descartes', but Kant's own. Like 
Kant, Davidson offers transcendental arguments; in his case, arguments from the 
possibility of language. A comparison to another Kantian, the economist Ludwig von 
Mises, may be helpful. Like Davidson, von Mises studies the structure of the human 
mind on the basis of the nature of human action. Where Davidson tends to focus on 
linguistic action, since his goal is to understand intentional attribution, von Mises 
broadens his focus to action as a whole, but also takes more or less for granted our ability 
to interpret others' actions. In discussing the discipline he calls 'praxeology,' effectively 
what we call 'decision theory,' Mises says: 
The scope of praxeology is the explication of the category of human action. All 
that is needed for the deduction of all praxeological theorems is knowledge of the 
essence of human action.... No special experience is needed in order to 
comprehend these theorems.... The only way to a cognition of these theorems is 
logical analysis of our inherent knowledge of the category of human action. We 
must bethink ourselves and reflect upon the structure of human action. Like logic 
and mathematics, praxeological knowledge is within us.... All the concepts and 
theorems of praxeology are implied in the concept of human action. (Mises 
1949/1966, p. 64) 
Is it not plainly a mistake, on a par with rational psychology, to say that all of decision 
theory or economics is an analytic consequence of one a priori truth? Yes and no. von 
Mises's self-interpretation would make his method mistaken like rational psychology, but 
a better interpretation of his approach would make him Kantian. The point becomes both 
murkier and clearer here: 
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[Praxeology's] statements and propositions are not derived from experience. They 
are, like those of logic and mathematics, a priori. They are not subject to 
verification or falsification on the ground of experience and facts. They are both 
logically and temporally antecedent to any comprehension of historical facts. 
They are a necessary requirement of any intellectual grasp of historical events. 
Without them we should not be able to see in the course of events anything else 
than kaleidoscopic change and chaotic muddle. (ibid., p. 32) 
Mises is even clearer here that praxeology is intended to be analytic a priori. But on the 
other hand, the theses of decision theory allow us to interpret experience. When we 
observe human action, we could not comprehend what we observe without applying to it 
what we know, a priori, about human action, and decision theory is nothing but a 
formalization of that a priori knowledge. 
But this shows the same structure as Kant's positive contribution in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic, not a structure that he subjects to 
critique in the Transcendental Dialectic. Economic categories are necessary for the 
interpretation of experience of a certain kind, and they automatically hold of the relevant 
sort of experiences. They are, in Kant's terms, Pure Concepts of Understanding. Mises is 
plainly wrong, then, when he says that "Aprioristic reasoning is purely conceptual and 
deductive. It cannot produce anything else but tautologies and analytic judgments." (ibid, 
p. 38) As Barry Smith notes: 
Austrian economics seems to be like other a priori disciplines in that it involves a 
multiplicity of concepts connected together not hierarchically but rather in a dense 
holistic network of mutual connections whose order is not capable of being 
antecedently established. ...in Mises, we are dealing with a family of a priori 
categories and categorial structures which are — in contradistinction to Mises's 
self-interpretation but still in concordance with his actual practice in economics 
— not analytic but synthetic. (Smith, Barry, 1994. p. 316) 
What we have in Mises and Davidson are two interpretive schemes, praxeology and 
Tarskian truth theories, known and knowable a priori45, such that it's constitutive of 
human action or speech that these phenomena be interpretable according to the schemes. 
                                                
45 No particular Tarskian theory for a speaker is known a priori, of course, since we have to observe the 
speaker and create the theory. But the general form of the theory is a priori in the same sense as Kant's 
categories. 
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Davidsonian reflections on language don't try to tease out the implications of 
some opening definition. Indeed, Davidson argues that there can be no opening definition 
in the theory of meaning: the opening concept, truth, is too fundamental to be defined and 
so there can be no analysis of it. Trying to offer such a definition would be rational 
psychology; rejecting the attempt is Kantianism of the highest order. Rather, Davidson, 
armed with Tarskian theory, gives us a transcendental perspective on language and 
thought. My argument in section 2.3 that a language must be compositional is in line with 
this approach. I didn't argue analytically on the basis of a definition of language that 
language must be compositional; nor did I observe that all actual languages were 
compositional. Rather, I argued synthetically, on the basis of the pre-conditions of 
linguistic comprehension. I offered what we can call a transcendental deduction of 
compositionality. Kant's critique of rational psychology, then, can no more apply to 
Davidson's frankly Kantian approach than it does to Kant's own Transcendental Analytic. 
3.1.2 Dogmatic Idealism 
I want to move on to the Refutation of Idealism and Berkeley. My first goal here 
is to draw an analogy between an idealism that one can find in Berkeley and Leibniz and 
contemporary conceptual relativism. Then, I want to try to draw some lessons about how 
we should respond to conceptual relativism. On Berkeley's idealism, Kant says: 
...the dogmatic idealism of Berkeley... declares space, with all the things to which 
space attaches as inseparable condition, to be something that is in itself 
impossible, and hence also declares the things in space to be mere imaginings. 
...the basis for this idealism has already been removed by us in the Transcendental 
Aesthetic. (B274) 
Berkeley argues46 that we have no concrete idea of space; rather, we have the sensation of 
the power of motion and the expectation of tactile sensations on the basis of visual 
sensations and vice versa. As these sensations define the space they occupy, there is no 
space distinct from the objects that constitute it; an empty space is no space at all. 
                                                
46 Berkeley 1710, p. 113 
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Kant rejects this notion of relative space. There is only one context in which it 
makes sense to talk of things spatially: the intuition of physical objects. But that we 
experience them in space is a pre-condition of our experiencing these objects. It is thus 
vain to suggest that space supervenes on objects: on the contrary, the very possibility of 
the objects supervenes on the space in which they're perceived.47 
But I want to take a different angle on this encounter. Consider how things must 
be to two people in a Berkeleyan universe. Each of them experiences ideas, including the 
sense of freedom of motion, and each of them anticipates tactile contacts on the basis of 
visual experience and vice versa. But, as they share no ideas, and space is identified with 
reference to its contents, they share no space. This privacy of space seems to be a 
consequence of Berkeley's relativity about space. 
The same idea appears in Leibniz's Discourse. Leibniz says: 
...the ideas of size, figure and motion are not so distinctive as is imagined, and... 
they stand for something imaginary relative to our perceptions as do, although to a 
greater extent, the ideas of color, heat, and the other similar qualities in regard to 
which we may doubt whether they are actually to be found in the nature of the 
things outside of us. (Leibniz 1686/1902, §XII, p. 18) 
Further: 
...every substance is like an entire world and like a mirror of God, or indeed of the 
whole world which it portrays, each one in its own fashion.... Thus the universe is 
multiplied in some sort as many times as there are substances... (ibid, §IX, p. 15) 
From the relativity of space, Leibniz adopts the privacy of space. Space is literally within 
the subject, and each subject has her own internal space with no contact with other such 
spaces. 
For Leibniz and (I suggest) Berkeley, space is private and idiosyncratic to each 
subject. That we can never share objects of awareness is either a premise supporting the 
conclusion of the privacy of space, or a consequence drawn from that alleged privacy. 
There is an analogy between the relativity of space to subject in early modern philosophy, 
                                                
47 Kant 1787/1986, A22/B37-A31/B45 
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and the relativity of conceptual scheme to subject in contemporary philosophy. For 
Berkeley space was defined with reference to the objects that appeared in it. But the 
objects were private. Hence space was private. For Leibniz, space was defined with 
reference to the objects contained in it. But the space was private. Hence the objects were 
private. In contemporary philosophy, figures like Kuhn have argued that the objects of 
awareness are defined with reference to the conceptual scheme employed to grasp those 
objects. Since the conceptual scheme is private, so are the objects. 
Leibniz and conceptual relativists have similarly structured arguments, and the 
position of Berkeley shows a distinct structural similarity to Leibniz's. So we might gain 
some insight into how to defeat conceptual relativists by looking at how Kant might have 
argued against Berkeley or Leibniz. On the notion of multiple (including multiple 
private) spaces, Kant says: 
...we can present only one space; and when we speak of many spaces, we mean by 
that only parts of one and the same unique space. Nor... can these parts precede 
the one all-encompassing space, as its constituents, as it were (from which it can 
be assembled); rather, they can only be thought as in it. Space is essentially one; 
the manifold in it, and hence also the universal concept of spaces as such, rests 
solely on [our bringing in] limitations. (A25/B39) 
It's a mistake to think that there could be more than one space. If we reflect on our 
attempt to give concrete meaning to the notion of multiple spaces, we'll find that we 
relate the spaces to one another, spatially. The only space is the space in which we find 
these "multiple" spaces. But if there can be only one space, then, if space is idiosyncratic 
to a subject, then it is idiosyncratic to that subject, and no other subject can experience 
objects in space. So Berkeley and Leibniz must either give up the privacy of space, or 
else deny the existence of more than one subject with spatial experience. 
The analogy with conceptual relativism is clear. Conceptual relativism identifies a 
conceptual scheme by reference to the objects that can be grasped in it, but also identifies 
those objects by reference to the schemes in which they can be grasped. It proceeds to 
have it that the schemes are private or at least multiple. To show that conceptual 
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relativism is false, then, it must be shown that, like space, conceptual schemes are exactly 
one in number. If I could show all conceptual schemes had to be conceptually related to 
one another, just as all private spaces have to be spatially related to one another, perhaps I 
would have solved the problem. 
Likewise, the early modern example constitutes a cautionary tale. Kant's 
argument for the unity of space rests on his dogmatic Euclideanism. If my argument 
against conceptual relativism is to share some sort of general structure with Kant's 
argument and yet be successful, it will need to avoid making a similar error. I would 
make a similar mistake if I were to identify some cluster of concepts or judgments and 
assert that these particular items must appear in every conceptual scheme, and having 
those items in common is sufficient for identity of conceptual scheme(s). Whatever items 
I chose, I would have done so on more or less the same basis that Kant asserted that space 
is necessarily Euclidean: I'm not imaginative enough to conceive of a conceptual scheme 
that lacks them. Such a dogmatic approach would undermine an anti-relativistic 
argument. 
3.1.3 Sceptical Idealism 
I want to move on to the rest of the Refutation of Idealism and its attack on 
Descartes' scepticism: the position that Descartes would have had, had he not indulged in 
the Cartesian circle in the Third Meditation. Kant's argument will show structural 
similarity to Davidson's. Each of them will contend that the self, Descartes' cogito, can 
only be understood or identified against the background of an external world that is 
largely as one understands it to be. Kant argues as follows: 
Theorem 
The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves 
the existence of objects in space outside me. 
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Proof 
I am conscious of my existence as determined in time. All time determination 
presupposes something permanent in perception. But this permanent something 
cannot be something within me, precisely because my existence can be 
determined in time only by this permanent something. Therefore perception of 
this permanent something is possible only through a thing outside me and not 
through mere presentation of a thing outside me. Hence determination of my 
existence in time is possible only through the existence of actual things that I 
perceive outside me. Now consciousness of my existence in time is necessarily 
linked with consciousness of the possibility of things outside me, as condition of 
the time determination. I.e., the consciousness of my own existence is 
simultaneously a direct consciousness of the existence of other things outside me. 
(B275-6) 
The leading idea of Kant's argument is that there is no self-awareness without awareness 
of a world beyond the self. To experience myself as an object continuing in time, I have 
to have some sort of standard or background against which to attribute myself continuing 
existence in time. This contention leads to three questions. First, why should there be 
such objects at all? Kant agues: 
...time by itself cannot be perceived. Hence the substrate which presents time as 
such, and in which all variation or simultaneity can in apprehension be perceived 
through the appearances' relation to it, must be found in the objects of perception, 
i.e., in the appearances. (A182/B225) 
All experience, Kant contends, is in time; moreover, in a single line of time. But to 
experience something in time, it must be experienced against some relatively enduring 
background. If it weren't, then there would be no sense in thinking of time as a single 
line; rather, we would experience time as, as it were, ending and beginning anew, which 
contradicts the notion of time's being a single line. 
Second, why must there be only one such object? For much the same reason. To 
whatever degree the background is broken up, our sense of a continuous time is also 
broken up. However, this line of argument does not imply that there must be some 
specific object, like the Earth or one's body, that one must use as background. Kant's 
claim in the First Analogy is that "In all variation by appearances substance is 
permanent, and its quantum in nature is neither increased nor decreased." (A182/B224) 
 187 
The Analogy does not claim that any particular substance, in the sense of physical object, 
is permanent; nor must we treat the Analogy as trying to prove the conservation of matter 
a priori.48 Strawson makes this suggestion: 
Kant, let us say, has shown the necessity of something abiding and permanent, 
viz. the whole frame of Nature; and if the word "substance" is to be linked with 
the concept of absolute permanence, it is to the whole frame of Nature that it 
should be applied — as it was by Spinoza. (Strawson 1966, p. 130) 
If Strawson is right, then the point of the First Analogy is that, in order to identify 
anything as existing in time, we must identify it against the background of the world as a 
whole.  
Third, why can't I, rather than the external world, form the background? This 
question returns us to the Paralogisms and the attack on rational psychology. Someone 
can use 'I' in two senses. In one sense, 'I' is the subject of all experience, which is not an 
empirical object of experience. But then no empirical categories, like time, can be applied 
to it. So this "object" can't be the background against which I identify events in time. In 
the other sense, 'I' refers to one among many objects of experience, the self and its 
beliefs, desires, memories, experiences, and so forth. But: 
...this permanent something cannot be an intuition within me. For all bases 
determining my existence that can be encountered within me are presentations; 
and, being presentations, they themselves require something permanent distinct 
from them, by reference to which their variation, and hence my existence in the 
time in which they vary, can be determined. (ibid., p. 290 note 46) 
The empirical referent of 'I' is, as Hume said, a fleeting bundle of impressions, not the 
ultimate background against which we identify ourselves as continuing across time. The 
empirical self is one of the objects that can be identified in time only relative to the 
background of something permanent. The point here is that the self can itself only be 
experienced coherently against the background of the world. In the absence of veridical 
worldly experience, I couldn't identify myself. Descartes is wrong. We need not argue 
our way out from subjective experience to an objective world. The objective world is 
                                                
48 See Allison 1983, pp. 199-215 
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what we experience, and the self exists only as a consequence of its experience of the 
objective world: "...inner experience as such is possible only through outer experience as 
such..." (B278-9) 
Davidson's argument against scepticism is strikingly similar. For Davidson, that a 
thought exists and has content is a consequence of its place in its causal and logical 
context. Without the external world and other speakers and interpreters, there is no 
thought; indeed, without being embedded in a context of mostly true beliefs, nothing can 
count as a thought. Given these similarities, having a grasp on Kant's refutation of 
scepticism should help lead to a sharper formulation of Davidson's refutation of 
scepticism. At a minimum, we can see a precedent for Davidson's approach in the work 
of a philosopher no one can dismiss. 
3.2 SCEPTICISM 
3.2.1 Preliminaries: The Sceptical Target and Transcendental Arguments 
Here, I take it, is a standard presentation of the sceptical problem. Allow that 
φ and ψ are not, intuitively, compossible. φ is some sentence that I take to be true in 
virtue of the appearance of the external world immediately surrounding me; for instance, 
that there is a cat on the mat. ψ, on the other hand, is some outlandish sceptical 
hypothesis, such as that I am the victim of (pointlessly) deceptive artificial intelligences 
who (pointlessly) use my body heat to supplement their nuclear fusion to power 
themselves, and who have arranged things so that my experiences and beliefs entirely fail 
to represent the world around me: where I think there is a cat on the mat, in truth, there is 
no cat and no mat but just a carapace designed to house my physical body and 
(pointlessly) collect heat from it. Because φ and ψ are not compossible, it seems that, if I 
believe that one of them is true and I consider the other possibility and their 
incompatibility, then I should be able to deduce that the other is false; alternatively, if I 
cannot convince myself that the other is false, then I should be forced to withdraw my 
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belief that the first one is true. I should like to believe that φ, but, sadly, I find myself 
considering the possibility that ψ, as well as the incompatibility between φ and ψ, and 
discovering that I cannot convince myself that ψ is false. I am thus forced to withdraw 
my belief that φ is true. But I see that I can repeat this experiment for any other φ, so long 
as it's a sentence that I take to be true on the basis of the appearance of the world around 
me. So I'm forced, by the possibility of deceptive AIs (and my commitment to logic) to 
admit that I shouldn't really believe anything on the basis of the appearance of the 
external world around me. 
Further light can be shed on the sceptical problem by considering a less extreme 
sceptical situation. I opine that φ, and a friend explains that I'm mistaken. There's no cat 
on the mat: there's a cat near the mat and a mirror on the mat. I check again and see the 
frame, get up and walk around the mirror, see where the cat is actually located, and 
confess that φ is false. It's worth wondering how this routine of checking the world could 
help. 
The problem with φ and ψ is this. If the world is as I take it to be, φ is true in 
virtue of some circumstance obtaining in the world around me, and that very 
circumstance plays a crucial role in bringing it about that I believe that φ. The reason 
φ and ψ are not compossible is that if ψ is true, then everything that brought it about that 
I believed that φ has nothing to do with φ's being true, but rather to do with the AIs and 
their (pointlessly) dastardly plans. But from the inside, I can't tell whether φ or ψ is what 
brought it about that I believe that φ. I am, as it were, on one end of a line, with my belief 
that φ. On the other end of the line is either φ or ψ, helping to bring it about that I believe 
that φ. In one case, my belief is true; in the other case, it's false. But the only way that I 
could check is by stepping off of the line and looking at the trigger of my belief from a 
different angle. That's what I do when I get up to check about the mirror, but I can't do it 
with a sufficiently pervasive deception, such as that encompassed by ψ. 
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Since I can't stand beside the line that connects me with (or divides me from) the 
world, I need help. I need some third person to stand beside the line between my belief 
and its trigger, and guarantee that they have the right match. Descartes appealed to God 
to do that job, but it didn't work out. A more successful approach would have it that the 
existence of an attitude that's susceptible to being true or false relies on the existence of a 
third person, whose securing of my content is also sufficient to guarantee its truth. By 
building the third-person perspective into the existence and nature of content, we can 
guarantee that our beliefs are, for the most part, true. 
Davidson's response to scepticism is, arguably, a transcendental argument, so I 
should consider how a transcendental argument is supposed to go. I begin with A.C. 
Genova's discussion of good transcendental arguments, which are to satisfy three criteria; 
such an argument: 
demonstrates transcendental principles (a unique and invariable conceptual core) 
as a necessary presupposition of all possible human experience with respect to a 
specifiable domain of objects, 
establishes the objectivity thesis, i.e., bridges any meaningful gap between the 
subjective necessity of the conceptual scheme and the specified objects..., and 
does this validly without the taint of verificationism. (Genova 1984, p. 476) 
Since no one likes verificationism, any argument should do whatever it does without the 
taint of verificationism. (3), then, follows from the goodness of good transcendental 
arguments, not necessarily from their transcendence. But it's not immediately obvious 
what the relationship is between (1) and (2), and why both should be necessary for an 
argument both "good" and "transcendental." 
It's possible to mistake criterion (2) for the criterion that a transcendental 
argument must defeat scepticism. That is not correct. An argument that satisfies (2) will 
show that there are objects answering to some specific conceptual scheme, not that most 
of our beliefs are true. The specific conceptual scheme in question is the one established 
by the argument if it satisfies criterion (1). 
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For Genova, a good transcendental argument will proceed in two phases, one to 
match criterion (1), and the other to match criterion (2). The first phase is a metaphysical 
deduction, an argument "which provides an a priori justification of a unique [conceptual 
framework] — a [conceptual framework] which is a necessary presupposition of all 
possible contingent interpretations of experience." (Genova 1984, 479-80) The second 
phase is a transcendental deduction, an argument "which provides an a priori justification 
for the objective validity of a unique [conceptual framework]..." (ibid, p. 480) The 
metaphysical deduction will select some conceptual framework as constitutive of an area 
of experience, while the transcendental deduction will show that the framework has 
objective application; that is, it applies to real objects. Genova will offer an interpretation 
of Davidson (to be discussed in 3.2.3) that treats his anti-sceptical argument as a good 
transcendental argument of this form. 
Whether Davidson's anti-sceptical argument is a good transcendental argument by 
Genova's criteria or not (it is not), it is at least in the general vicinity of a transcendental 
argument. It's important, then, to be clear on a way in which Davidson's view is 
completely unlike Kant's. Maker offers a misleading or incorrect assessment of the nature 
of transcendental arguments, at least if Davidson can he held to offer any transcendental 
arguments: 
In both Kant and Davidson, the transcendental procedure involves two stages. 1. 
Objectivity is subjectivized or interiorized. 2. It is argued that the distinction 
between objectivity as subjectivized (how things appear [for Kant], how we 
describe them in language [for Davidson]) and some radically other objectivity 
(some conception of objectivity which might be inaccessible from the domain of 
subjectivity) is unintelligible or incoherent. (Maker 1991, pp. 349-50) 
This has the appearance of being a bizarre misinterpretation. Whether it is misleading or 
incorrect, though, depends on just what Maker means. 
As Kant interpretation, the description seems correct. Kant "interiorizes" objects 
by turning them into phenomena, which exist only in relation to the synthetic activity of a 
mind. It makes sense to say that, for Kant, objectivity as subjectivized is how things 
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appear. But as Davidson interpretation, it seems off. Objects, and how they are described 
in language, are not the same. Objects can exist quite independently of our describing 
them in language. What Maker has in mind with his strange phrasings, though, might be a 
bit more on the mark: 
In the case of Davidson, objectivity is seen as accessible in that our access to it is 
construed in terms of an operation present within subjectivity.... Davidson asks us 
to understand objectivity as necessarily immanent within language as 
understandable. ...objectivity is subjectivized in the sense that a procedure said to 
be inseparable from subjectivity — ...the determination of linguistic meaning — 
is explained as an activity which can be accounted for on only the condition of the 
involvement of objectivity in it. (ibid, p. 352) 
Davidson's argument will certainly have it that thoughts can only exist against the 
background of the external world. If the essence of the transcendental approach is 
argument to the effect that the subjective can only exist against the background of the 
objective, then Davidson's approach is certainly transcendental. But Davidson's 
transcendence would be quite different from Kant's, since Kant's "interiorization of 
objectivity" is completely unlike Davidson's. 
Barry Stroud notes that, "If [Davidson's claim that] 'belief is in its nature veridical' 
were true..., some comparable [to transcendental idealism] explanation would surely be 
needed of how and why such a remarkable thing must be true." (Stroud 1999, p. 158) 
Stroud is right, and the explanation has to do with Davidson's theory of interpretation, 
especially its externalistic features. So Davidson does have a scheme, as powerful in its 
way as transcendental idealism, to buttress an anti-sceptical argument. In chapters 1 and 
2, I hope to have developed it adequately for present purposes. Unfortunately, the 
deployment of that scheme will have to await section 3.2.3. Section 3.2.2 will, for 
completeness' sake, take a detour through a defective presentation of the anti-sceptical 
argument. 
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3.2.2 The Omniscient Interpreter 
Davidson's (in)famous omniscient interpreter argument has been rejected by no 
less an authority than Donald Davidson: 
...the argument that summons up an Omniscient Interpreter does not advance my 
case. As with Swampman, I regret these forays into science fiction and what a 
number of critics have taken to be theology. If the case can be made with an 
omniscient interpreter, it can be made without, and better. (Davidson 1999a, p. 
192) 
An argument both science fictional and theological — a Lewisian argument, one might 
say — is surely a sad thing, as it strains credulity in at least two dimensions. If even its 
creator has abandoned it, it might not seem worthwhile to discuss it. For some 
philosophical purposes, this orphan could well be left to languish. However, there are 
also matters of interpretation and significance. In section 1.3, I discussed Davidson's two 
views on the nature of truth-conditions: according to one view, truth-conditions are 
theoretical constructs; according to the other, some of them are events in the world. In 
section 2.2, I mentioned alternative principles of charity. Some versions of the principle 
of charity sought to maximize truth in the speaker — which would beg the question 
against the sceptic — while some sought to maximize agreement between the interpreter 
and the speaker. As long as truth-conditions are theoretical constructs, the principle of 
charity that says to assign causes to utterances as their contents makes no sense: contents 
aren't real, so none of them are causes. But without the later principle of charity, 
Davidson's anti-sceptical argument can't work: it must take a form like the omniscient 
interpreter argument, which fails. The point of this discussion is to see exactly why the 
omniscient interpreter argument fails, and thereby show the significance, to an area of 
philosophy outside philosophy of language, of the choice we face in selecting a principle 
of charity. 
Davidson presents the relevant notion of charity for the omniscient interpreter 
argument here: 
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...we damage the intelligibility of our readings of the utterances of others when 
our method of reading puts others into what we take to be broad error. We can 
make sense of differences all right, but only against a background of shared 
belief. What is shared does not in general call for comment: it is too dull, trite, or 
familiar to stand notice. But without a vast common ground, there is no place for 
disputants to have their quarrel. (Davidson 1977a, p. 200) 
The principle of charity Davidson employs in the omniscient interpreter argument is the 
principle of massive agreement. This is actually an attractive principle, until it's 
compared with the principle of assigning causes as contents. 
Consider the discussion of holism from section 2.3. If I fail to assign the 
appropriate broad swath of beliefs, then I fail to interpret at all. But the appropriate broad 
swath must find a match in my own beliefs. Interpretation proceeds through the formation 
of a Tarskian truth theory for the speaker's utterances. Such a theory requires a match 
between the speaker's utterances and those of my utterances that I use to interpret her. If I 
systematically assign false (by my lights) sentences of mine as interpretations of the 
speaker's utterances, then it's not plain that I'm interpreting her. If she doesn't have any 
belief that I have about some sort of object, then I violate the intensionality of attitude 
attributions by assigning her any beliefs at all about that sort of object. I cannot, for 
instance, assign the speaker any beliefs at all about rabbits if she has no belief that I can 
identify as helping to fix, by logical implication, rabbits as relevant to any her beliefs. 
You can't believe that rabbits are reptiles unless you also believe that rabbits are fuzzy, 
eat carrots, tend to procreate at a rapid rate, and so forth in an undefined mass of beliefs 
that I hold. Denying that you hold any belief that I hold about rabbits makes it impossible 
for me to assign you any belief about rabbits, whether I share it or not. 
The fact that this argument flows — we do have to massively agree with speakers 
in order to interpret them — does not imply that finding agreement is the essence of 
charity. But Davidson latched on to this feature of charity and used it as the basis for the 
omniscient interpreter argument. 
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I must find the speaker to be massively right, by my lights. So, of course, when I 
take up the position of speaker, anyone who interprets me must find me to be massively 
right, by her lights. But why can't we be wrong together? 
We do not need to be omniscient to interpret, but there is nothing absurd in the 
idea of an omniscient interpreter; he attributes beliefs to others, and interprets 
their speech on the basis of his own beliefs, just as the rest of us do. Since he does 
this as the rest of us do, he perforce finds as much agreement as is needed to make 
sense of his attributions and interpretations; and in this case, of course, what is 
agreed is by hypothesis true. But now it is plain why massive error about the 
world is simply unintelligible, for to suppose it intelligible is to suppose there 
could be an interpreter (the omniscient one) who correctly interpreted someone 
else as being massively mistaken, and this we have shown to be impossible. (ibid, 
p. 201) 
I take it that this argument may be fairly represented as having three premises: 
(1) For any interpreter and interpretee, the interpreter must accept most49 of the 
interpretee's beliefs; 
(2) It must be that every belief held by the omniscient interpreter is true; 
(3) The omniscient interpreter interprets me. 
Thus, Most of my beliefs are true. 
The argument appears to be valid. So if there is a problem, then it is in the premises. (1) 
is supposed to be demonstrated on the basis of the holism and intensionality of attitude 
attributions. (2) is obviously true in virtue of the meaning of 'omniscient.' 
(3) seems to be false, since nothing is omniscient; or, in any event, (3) is false so 
far as we know. That fact inspired the first formal critique of the omniscient interpreter 
argument. Foley and Fumerton argue that: 
From [my premise (1)] If there were an omniscient interpreter employing 
Davidson's methods of interpretation he would believe that most of what Jones 
                                                
49 "Most" is not a standard quantifier. The obvious fallacy that someone could fall into by using claims 
about "Most Fs" is transitivity. But I have only one "most" quantifier in the premises, so I don't make that 
error. Davidson (Davidson 1983, pp. 138-9) says, puzzlingly, that "...there is no useful way to count beliefs, 
and so no clear meaning to the idea that most of a person's beliefs are true." He then recasts the claim that 
most of our beliefs are true as the claim that our actual beliefs get a strong presumption of truth. But it's not 
clear why there's no way to count beliefs. It can't be that there are infinitely many beliefs, since, if there 
were infinitely many beliefs, then one could believe the infinitely many theorems of a Tarskian truth 
theory, which one (Davidson contends) can't. 
 196 
believes is true, how is it supposed to follow that most of what Jones believes is 
true? From [(1)] we can infer [(3) → (Conclusion):] If there were an omniscient 
interpreter of Jones employing Davidson's methods, most of what Jones believes 
would be true. But surely we need to affirm the antecedent of this conditional if 
we are to conclude that most of Jones's beliefs are true. That is, we need to affirm 
that there is an omniscient interpreter of Jones. (Foley and Fumerton 1985, p. 84) 
All we can actually get, Foley and Fumerton point out, is that if (3) were true (which it 
isn't), then most of my beliefs are true. 
But Davidson didn't exactly say (3). What Davidson said was that "there is 
nothing absurd in the idea of an omniscient interpreter." One thus gets the urge to reform 
(3) along these lines: (3*) Possibly, an omniscient interpreter interprets me. But consider 
the merely possible existence of the omniscient interpreter. The problem that Foley and 
Fumerton point out is that possibly being omniscient and interpreting me doesn't make 
the omniscient interpreter agree with, and therefore guarantee, my actual beliefs. Maybe, 
since I'm massively wrong, the only way to actualize the possibility that I'm interpretable 
by the omniscient interpreter would be for me to totally change my beliefs. Brueckner 
replies that omniscience doesn't stop at the edge of reality: 
Davidson need make no assumptions concerning possible worlds containing both 
me and an OI [omniscient interpreter]. Instead, he just needs this assumption: 
(A) Some possible world W* contains an OI who has perfect knowledge 
about all possible worlds, including the actual world; thus he believes, 
among other things, all and only true propositions about the actual world. 
In other words, there might have been an OI with perfect knowledge about all 
possible worlds; if such a being had existed, he would have believed, among other 
things, all and only true propositions about this, the actual world. For all that has 
been assumed in (A), W* is not the actual world and does not contain me. 
(Brueckner 1991, p. 201) 
What Brueckner has in mind is that the merely possible omniscient interpreter would still 
agree with me about my world, were he to engage in trans-world interpretation. So 
possible agreement would be sufficient for agreement between the omniscient interpreter 
and me; even if she is not actualized in the actual world, her interpreting me is. So we 
may reform (1): 
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 (1*) For any possible interpreter and interpretee, the interpreter must accept most 
of the interpretee's beliefs; 
The argument obviously flows through despite these alterations. 
But (3*) makes no sense on Brueckner's version of the argument. His version of 
the argument relies on modal realism: for if there weren't really other possible worlds for 
the omniscient interpreter to live in, then it would be pointless to discuss the omniscient 
interpreter's interpretation of me. We would be discussing a fantasy as such — not the 
same as a thought experiment, in which we discuss a fantasy as though it were real. But 
the possibility that's to be realized is a trans-world possibility: that the (real but non-
actual) omniscient interpreter interprets me across worlds. If this bizarre claim is going to 
appear as a premise, then whether it is possible or not should be a subject for discussion, 
but, on the possible worlds semantics for modal talk, it isn't: possibility is reality in some 
possible world, but no relation between possible worlds is real in any world at all. 
Further, we're talking about what would be the case if the omniscient interpreter were to 
interpret us from afar: this is counterfactual talk, which we again can't make sense of 
when the counterfactual relates things from different worlds. Modal realism, especially in 
this context of trans-world relations, brings in train unintelligible talk about trans-world 
possibilities and counterfactuals, so any argument that relies on possible worlds realism 
has a corrupted approach to its modal aspects.50 
Brueckner's approach doesn't seem to save the argument from the Foley and 
Fumerton objection. There is an additional premise, however, that would solve the 
problem. The sceptic requires that I have beliefs; else, I have nothing to be wrong about. 
But what if interpretability by the omniscient interpreter were a prerequisite on having 
beliefs? 
'Interpretability' is a modal notion, and modal talk in this area is getting vexed. 
Here's what I mean, in the possible worlds jargon. x is interpretable by y iff, in some 
                                                
50 Thanks to Neil Sinhababu for helpful discussion on these modal matters. 
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world in which x has the same beliefs, with the same truth values, that he has in the actual 
world, y interprets x. y need not exist in the actual world, of course, as the omniscient 
interpreter does not. The premise, then, is that, if someone has beliefs, then, in some 
world in which she has just those beliefs with just the same truth-values, the omniscient 
interpreter interprets her. By tying my beliefs in the world in which I am interpreted to 
my beliefs in this world, this premise would defeat the Foley and Fumerton objection 
construed as an objection to the validity of the argument. 
The argument would need reform elsewhere, of course. For instance, we would 
need the premise that I do, in fact, have beliefs. The new premise set, then, is: 
(1*) For any possible interpreter and interpretee, the interpreter must accept most 
of the interpretee's beliefs; 
(2) It must be that every belief held by the omniscient interpreter is true; 
(3**) If anything interprets me, then it must be that an omniscient interpreter 
could interpret me; 
(4) Something interprets me; 
Thus, Most of my beliefs are true. 
This argument (modulo the steps I skip) also seems to be valid. And again, except for 
premise (3**), it seems sound. But what are we to make of (3**)? 
Allowing 'n' to refer to a noniscient interpreter, an interpreter absolutely wrong 
about everything, consider replacing (2) and (3**) with (2') and (3'): 
(2') It must be that every belief held by the noniscient interpreter is false; 
(3') If anything interprets me, then it must be that a noniscient interpreter could 
interpret me. 
From this premise set, one can conclude that most of one's beliefs are not true. Why 
should interpretability by the omniscient, rather than the noniscient, interpreter, be a 
prerequisite on having beliefs? 
What exactly is the problem with the noniscient interpreter? Of course, if the 
original argument succeeded, then there is no such thing as a noniscient interpreter, since 
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interpretation requires beliefs and beliefs are, by nature, massively true. But, on the other 
hand, if this second argument succeeded, then there could be no such thing as an 
omniscient interpreter, since interpretation requires beliefs and beliefs are, by nature, 
massively false.51 
If interpretability by an omniscient interpreter is made a prerequisite on having 
beliefs, then we can discover that any believer must be mainly right. If interpretability by 
a noniscient interpreter is made a prerequisite on having beliefs, then we can discover 
that any believer must be mainly wrong. But it's not plain at this point why 
interpretability by anyone has anything to do with beliefs. The omniscient interpreter 
argument proceeds as though the issues of triangulation and externalism had never 
emerged. Why can't I have beliefs without being interpretable, by ordinary thinkers or 
thinkers extraordinarily gifted or inept? If I can be a believer without being interpretable, 
though were it the case that, were I interpreted, I would be mainly right, nevertheless, 
since I can't be interpreted, I can still be mainly wrong. 
In offering the omniscient interpreter argument, Davidson focused on the form of 
a Tarskian truth theory to the exclusion of the procedure of radical interpretation. It's true 
that an interpreter must massively agree with the speaker in order to interpreter her. But 
the additional premise that's needed is that there must be an interpreter for there to be 
speech and belief at all. The new premise (3**) leads in this direction, but once we attend 
to the externalistic justification for the premise, we can skip that "premise" and directly 
conclude that scepticism is false. The omniscient interpreter argument is best understood 
as Davidson's anti-sceptical argument, shorn of its roots in radical interpretation, 
externalism, and the social nature of language. I now turn to the actual argument. 
                                                
51 To the best of my knowledge, this reply to Davidson was first offered in Dalmiya, 1990. It has also 
appeared in Carpenter, 1998, Ludwig 1992, and Ludwig and Lepore 2005 (pp. 326-9). 
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3.2.3 The Nature of Content 
I want to introduce the argument by discussing two interpretations of it, Peter 
Klein's and A.C. Genova's. Klein will correctly interpret the argument, but incorrectly 
assess its soundness; Genova will incorrectly interpret the argument, but correctly assess 
its soundness. The failure of Genova's interpretation will help us see exactly the sense in 
which Davidson's argument is not a (Genovan) good transcendental argument, and 
exactly what pre-conditions on the existence of contentful attitudes are relevant to the 
argument. It should emerge from the discussion that the argument is sound and that 
scepticism is false. 
As I understand it, the argument can be understood to proceed in two phases. The 
first phase uses externalistic premises to secure the truth of all normal observation beliefs 
(on a conception of normalcy for beliefs guaranteeing that the overwhelming majority of 
observation beliefs are normal). The second phase uses that conclusion, and content 
holism, to secure the truth of most non-observation beliefs. The conclusion is that most of 
our beliefs are true. One of the best general statements of the first phase of the argument 
appears here, in my favorite passage: 
What stands in the way of global skepticism of the senses is... the fact that we 
must, in the plainest and methodologically most basic cases, take the objects of a 
belief to be the causes of that belief. And what we, as interpreters, must take them 
to be is what they in fact are. Communication begins where causes converge: your 
utterance means what mine does if belief in its truth is systematically caused by 
the same events and objects. (Davidson 1983, p. 151) 
In radical interpretation, I formulate laws in the form of Tarskian theorems that relate a 
speaker's utterances to the situations that prompt those utterances. The utterances have 
those situations as their meanings. In virtue of meaning those situations, the utterances 
are connected with external reality in a way that defeats the sceptic. 
Klein contends that Davidson's argument is circular or groundless. Here is a 
requirement on any argument designed to defeat the global sceptic: "...an argument 
against global skepticism cannot employ any premise whose plausibility depends upon 
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knowledge of the actual world. To do so would clearly presuppose that we have some of 
the knowledge which the skeptic questions." (Klein 1986, p. 372) If we take for granted 
that we have knowledge of causes of beliefs, then we take for granted that we have 
knowledge of the external world, which would make the argument circular. But if we fail 
to take that for granted, then the argument from content is groundless. The essential 
feature of this reading is that it makes the causal determination of content the ultimate 
ground of the argument. 
Genova argues that this reading of Davidson is superficial: 
The [anti-sceptical argument]52... will not depend merely on the methodological 
thesis that belief content cannot be specified independently of the causes of belief, 
or on the supportive premise that scheme-content dualism is untenable. ...the 
validity of the [anti-sceptical argument] depends upon a still more fundamental 
background assumption, viz., Davidson's primary conclusion in his 'On the Very 
Idea of a Conceptual Scheme': translatability is a criterion of languagehood. 
(Genova 1999, p. 176) 
Notice the structure that Genova imposes on Davidson's argument. First, Genova says, 
Davidson will establish that there is only one (or, to put it another way, exactly zero) 
conceptual scheme(s). Then, and on that basis, he will establish that that conceptual 
scheme has objective validity. This structure is the structure of a Genovan good 
transcendental argument. First, we have a metaphysical deduction of a conceptual scheme 
as constitutive of experience of a certain category of objects. In this case, the conceptual 
scheme is our ordinary conceptual scheme, the one displayed in ordinary language and 
science. Second, we have a transcendental deduction of the objective validity of that 
conceptual scheme. In this case, the transcendental deduction is the argument against 
scepticism.  
For Genova, Davidson's attack on conceptual schemes is essential to the anti-
sceptical argument, and the causal determination of content is not. However, Genova's 
                                                
52 Genova calls Davidson's anti-sceptical argument the Omniscient Interpreter Argument, whether the 
version of the argument under discussion invokes an omniscient interpreter or not. Since that strikes me as 
misleading, I replace his abbreviation 'OIA' throughout. 
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interpretation of the opposition to conceptual schemes just is the causal determination of 
content: 
The idea of a system of beliefs or sentences which is not translatable or not 
interpretable is unintelligible. Consequently, if the idea of a coherent system of 
massively false beliefs is intelligible, it must be interpretable.... Interpretability, of 
course, is defined in terms of Davidson's methodology of interpretation; an 
interpreter constructs an empirical theory of truth for the speaker (as well as a 
theory of the speaker's beliefs, etc.) that conforms to the formal and empirical 
constraints on such a theory, and proceeds only on the basis of the relevant data 
for interpretation as grounded on the principle of charity — taking what one 
construes as the causes of beliefs as their truth conditions. (ibid.,  p. 180) 
For Genova, the fact that there is only one conceptual scheme is the fact that we identify 
causes of beliefs as their truth conditions. The contrast between Klein's and Genova's 
interpretations of Davidson's argument, then, loses its edge, and Genova's implicit claim 
that Davidson's argument is a good transcendental argument loses its point. The core of 
the argument is that interpretation relies on causal relations between utterances and their 
prompting circumstances. 
Now let me turn in earnest to the argument itself. To begin with, I need to recall 
two technical notions I defined in 2.2: the belief set and truth-conditional predicate. Two 
beliefs belong to the same belief set just in case they have the same truth-condition. A 
truth-conditional predicate is some predicate satisfied by each of the members of a set of 
truth-conditions and nomically correlated with the existence of members of some belief 
set. With these definitions in place, I can state and defend the first premise of the anti-
sceptical argument: 
(1) For all normal observational beliefs of mine, 
(a) there is a belief set, of which it is a member, and that has a truth-
conditional predicate; and 
(b) there is a satisfier of that truth-conditional predicate, and that satisfier 
caused the belief. 
Why do I refer to myself in the premise? Like all anti-sceptical arguments, this one must 
be framed in the first person, for to assume any premise not knowable from the first 
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person is to beg the question against the sceptic. The self-reference is present as a 
reminder. I will be even more important in the matching premise of the second phase of 
the argument. 
Why do I refer to normality? Here, I frame the premise as a defeasible or 
commonsense conditional.53 An anti-sceptical argument that purported to show that every 
belief is true would, of course, be hopeless. What I will try to show is that all normal 
beliefs are true. That might not seem very significant, unless there is some known ratio of 
normal to abnormal beliefs. But I characterize normality of belief in such a way that the 
overwhelming majority of beliefs must be normal. 
The defense of the first part of the premise is very easy. Every belief has a truth-
condition, so for every belief, not just all normal observation beliefs, there is a belief set 
(possibly consisting of just the one belief). Observation beliefs are just the beliefs that are 
nomically correlated with the occurrence of their truth-conditions, so all observation 
beliefs, not just normal ones, are members of belief sets with truth-conditional predicates. 
The defense of the second part of the premise is likewise easy at this late date. 
The second part of the premise is defended with reference to Grace, the principle 
summed up in the slogan that cause is content. For something to count as the content of 
an observation belief, it must satisfy a predicate nomically coordinated with the existence 
of beliefs with that observation belief's truth-conditions. In virtue of the coordination's 
being nomic, such a satisfier must usually appear as the cause of beliefs with that belief's 
truth-conditions; else, there would be no (defeasible, ceteris paribus) law connecting 
them. A "normal" observation belief is just one showing the typical causal ancestry for 
beliefs of its kind; abnormal beliefs will be those whose causes are of the wrong kind. By 
                                                
53 On which see the system of defeasible natural deduction offered in Bonevac, 2003, pp. 434-74. I appeal 
to no special feature of Bonevac's system, and I can't imagine any controversy to which my use of the 
defeasible conditional could give rise; rather, if my use of the commonsense conditional were problematic, 
then any use would be problematic. 
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virtue of Grace, and hence the causally and socially externalistic basis of content, all 
normal observation beliefs are caused by their own truth-conditions. 
(2) Necessarily, for all observational beliefs of mine, truth-conditional sets of 
which they are members, and truth-conditional predicates of those sets, if there is 
an event which satisfies the truth-conditional predicate and caused the belief, then 
the belief is true. 
The motivation (as distinct from the justification) of the necessity operator is that the 
argument is to show a defeasible conditional. From within the proof of a defeasible 
conditional, only modally closed sentences and some defeasible conditionals are 
available. Since I want the premise to be available within the defeasible conditional 
subproof, it must be modally closed. The justification is that the claim is a conceptual 
truth, hence necessary. 
Each observation belief of mine is a member of some belief set, and all normal 
members of that set are caused by a satisfier of the truth-conditional predicate of the set. 
Here, the claim is that, if a particular member of a belief set is caused by such a satisfier, 
then the member is true. The proof of this premise again recurs to the identification of 
cause with content. What it is to have a certain content is to be caused by it (modulo the 
intricacies discussed in 2.2), but contents are truth-conditions. So what it is to have a 
certain truth-condition is to be caused by it. But if a belief is caused by one of its truth-
conditions, then its truth-condition must obtain, so it must be true. 
The mere existence of a truth-condition for an utterance is, in many cases, not 
sufficient for the utterance to be true. The cause of my belief that, "Lo, a rabbit!" is, 
presumably, there being a rabbit. But if I mistake a raccoon for a rabbit, then the 
existence of a rabbit in the next county over won't make my belief true. The truth-
condition must not only exist, but also have the right relation to the belief. The causal 
relation is certainly sufficient for having the right relation, since it's the causal relation to 
the belief that made the cause into the content in the first place. 
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Note also that there being an appropriate cause for the belief is sufficient for truth, 
but not necessary. Even when discussing a specific range of beliefs, I'm leery of trying to 
set up necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being true. Any such condition 
would almost certainly not be as advertised, because, as I tried to show in 1.3, we can't 
articulate the notion of a truth-condition, and stating necessary and sufficient conditions 
for something's being true is at least in the vicinity of articulating the notion of a truth-
condition. 
In the two premises, we can see two themes from chapters one and two. The first 
premise tries to articulate the idea, present in the theory of interpretation, that cause is 
meaning. The second premise tries to articulate the idea, present in the theory of 
meaning, that meaning is truth-condition. By tying causal relations through meaning to 
truth, we can discover that our beliefs must be true under the right causal circumstances, 
and that those circumstances are, by necessity, almost always met. Hence most of our 
observation beliefs are true: only abnormal observation beliefs, brought about by deviant 
and statistically unusual causal chains, can be false. 
The two premises imply: 
(3) all of my normal observational beliefs are true. 
(1) tells us that a normal observation belief is caused by a satisfier of the truth-conditional 
predicate of its belief set. But (2) tells us that being so caused is sufficient for being true. 
So all normal observation beliefs are true. Abnormality is deviance of causal chain, and 
most observation beliefs with deviant causal chains are false.54 
To make this argument seem more plausible, I'll now use it against a standard 
brain-in-a-vat sceptical scenario. As the sceptic would describe it, in the scenario, I am 
not what, or where, I seem to be. Instead of the usual story I tell about myself, in which 
my sense organs are sensitive to energy sent from objects that are more or less as science 
describes them, in the scenario sense organs play no particular role in experience. For 
                                                
54 Note that Gettier cases are cases in which a deviant causal chain nevertheless gives rise to a true belief. 
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sake of the example not being too difficult, though, brains do: the parts of the brain in 
which my experiences occur are stimulated, not by nervous signals flowing from the 
sense organs, but rather by various electrodes and other devices connecting my brain to a 
computer, which stimulates me in accordance with a program designed to give me 
sensory experiences exactly like the ones I actually have. We may even imagine that the 
physical laws that the computer and my brain observe are nothing at all like the physical 
laws that I learned in school, and that 'computer' and 'brain' are only the closest analogies 
in English to the indescribable reality. 
Why is this scenario impossible? — for only its impossibility would allow us to 
rule it out and defeat the sceptic. Consider the contents of my beliefs. There is a nomic 
correlation between the computer operating according to a certain algorithm, and my 
having a certain belief. So an observer would assign the computer's operating according 
to that algorithm to my belief, as its content. If I have that belief as a consequence of the 
computer's operating according to the algorithm, then my belief is true, not false. The fact 
that I don't know much about the subvenient base of my experiences notwithstanding, 
those experiences prompt true beliefs. 
The fact that the brain-in-a-vat scenario is not actually a sceptical scenario is a 
consequence of the opacity of content. Content is external to the mind; while knowable, it 
is not knowable "throughout." Mental contents hide quite a lot from the minds of which 
they are contents. We can explore them to find out more about them, but that process 
would come to a close only with omniscience. 
To make this point clearer, consider the following "sceptical scenario." I think, 
but am wrong to think, that I am surrounded by middle-sized dry goods. In fact, I am 
surrounded by tiny particles in fields of force, which generate my illusory experiences. 
And the way they generate those experiences involve causal laws so mysterious that the 
closest we can come to understanding them involves the application of concepts like 
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"wave" and "particle" as analogies to a reality that can't be grasped. Surely, we can't rule 
out this possibility, and surely, were it actual, our beliefs would be massively wrong! 
Even before that description became commonsensical, it would hardly have 
counted as a sceptical scenario. It only posits that the subvenient base of experience is not 
yet known, and that reality has as-yet unanticipated features. That we don't grasp the 
external contents of our thoughts with full transparency doesn't mean that we don't grasp 
them at all. 
We can push the original scenario harder and learn more. What if the computer 
intentionally generates a new algorithm every time it wants to stimulate a certain 
"belief"? That is, what if there were no similarity between how it caused the same state in 
my brain at different times? If, under these antinomian circumstances, an observer 
couldn't correlate my utterances (never mind how they work) with any kind of stimulus, 
then she would have no basis on which to assign anything at all as the content of my 
mental states; that is, she would have no basis on which to claim that I have mental states. 
If I'm not interpreted as having mental states, then I don't. 
This puts a point rather starkly and paradoxically. Surely it could be the case that 
things are as the antinomian sceptic describes them, such that no mental state of mine can 
be nomically correlated with any external circumstance. And yet I would have internal 
states matching in feel every state that I actually have, including my beliefs and even my 
belief that I have beliefs. It's metaphysically possible for something to have all of my felt 
experiences, but none of my beliefs. But having a belief is not feeling a certain way. 
Having a belief is something that can be ascertained from the outside; how you feel is 
not. The sceptic will find no comfort in the possibility of the antinomian situation he 
describes, for that situation is one about which the sceptic is wrong. If I have no beliefs, 
then, while it's trivial that my beliefs are all false, it's also trivial that they're all true. 
Surely the sceptic has something else in mind: she means to attribute erroneous beliefs, 
not no beliefs. 
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Colin McGinn has a reply centering on the rationalization of action by belief: 
Suppose your brain and that of the person on the stimulation machine are sending 
out impulses causing your respective legs to move in a running motion (your 
brains, remember, are physically identical). Suppose also that you (but not he) are 
seeing a tiger running at you with ferocious intent and you believe that this is 
what you are seeing; you also desire to keep your life. Then we can say that you 
are intentionally moving your legs in this way because you believe there's a 
dangerous animal around and you want to escape from it.... But what can we say 
of your cerebral twin? We cannot say of him what we said of you because he does 
not have experiences and beliefs and desires with those contents. Nor can we 
rationalize his action by saying that he believes he is being stimulated by an 
electrode, etc. — for that belief would not rationalize his intentionally moving his 
legs.... (McGinn 1986, p. 361) 
It's not clear how my cerebral twin can send out impulses that cause his legs to move, 
since he has no legs. But we can perfectly well account for my twin's actions, however 
described. My twin believes, say, that algorithm-17 is active. When algorithm-17 is 
active, my twin knows, algorithm-73, which tends to trigger pain centers, is typically 
activated. Also, when algorithm-17 is active, other agents in the vat, those associated in a 
certain way with the functioning of the algorithm, tend to cease their agency. So, to avoid 
both algorithm-73's being activated, and the cessation of agency, the agent fires the 
nerves that tend to de-activate algorithm-17. We might analogically describe this action 
as "running away." 
Admittedly this account is forced. But if we were to redescribe an actual tiger as a 
pile of particles, we would take away its intensional ferocity just as much we would by 
redescribing it as an algorithm. Yet a tiger is a pile of particles, and its ferocity remains. 
Likewise, were a tiger an algorithm, it would be just as ferocious. McGinn seems to want 
to make mental imagery into the subjects of ferocity: 
The problem here is a general one: we just don't get a coherent, rational, sensible 
psychology by following Davidson's policy; but we do if we allow the intrinsic 
properties of the brain a larger role in determining content — in particular, if we 
attribute the same experiences to you and your cerebral twin. (ibid. p. 362) 
I'm happy to attribute the same experiences, in the sense of subjective feels, to my 
cerebral twin and me. But I don't run away from the tiger because of the way the tiger 
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feels to me. I run away from the tiger because I know that it's a tiger, and it's dangerous. 
Raw feels alone certainly never strike anyone as dangerous; it's only knowledge of 
dangers associated with objects experienced in a certain way that makes us fear things. In 
any event, fearing mental images makes no more sense than fearing an algorithm, and it 
seems to me to make a lot less sense. 
So far, this discussion has focused on the externalistic aspect of content, to the 
exclusion of the holistic aspect of content. It has also proceeded as though there were a 
clear distinction between observation beliefs and theoretical beliefs, which there is not. 
The second phase of the argument focuses on the holistic aspect of content. The first 
point that needs making is that the holistic aspect of interpretation (and hence of content) 
guarantees a level of coherence among the interpreted beliefs: 
...the interpreter will reject a semantic interpretation of a sentence a speaker holds 
true if the interpretation makes that sentence an obvious contradiction. The 
interpreter will look askance at an interpretation that finds contradictory two 
sentences the speaker holds true. Quite generally he must favor interpretations 
that make the speaker a subscriber to his own, the interpreter's, standards of 
consistency and rationality, though of course there are times when inconsistency 
at some point is the best way to accommodate the data. The point behind this 
policy should be obvious: propositions are identified by the position they occupy 
among other propositions. If someone seems to have shifted a proposition too far 
out of position, the reasons for identifying it as that proposition will be list. 
...Thought and belief belong to the realm of rationality. Considerable deviations 
from rationality are consistency with an underlying rationality; but the more 
extreme the deviations, the less clear it is how the deviations are to be described, 
and so the less clear it becomes that the norms of thought obtain. (Davidson 1993, 
pp. 44-5) 
The idea here is that the holistic nature of content guarantees that interpreted beliefs will 
be fairly coherent. Imagine that they were not. Then it's not plain what sort of evidence 
we could have for attributing those beliefs. We would not be able to generate Tarskian 
theorems governing the words in the sentences, because every such theorem would give 
bad predictions in the form of testable axioms. 
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But if beliefs must be coherent, and a coherent set of beliefs must include a body 
of (mainly true) observation beliefs, then it's plain that beliefs must be mainly true, for to 
cohere with a sizable body of truths guarantees truth. Obviously, this view is a form of 
coherence theory of justification. The basic objection to coherence theories is that 
coherence is a strictly internal feature of a set of beliefs, one that a set of beliefs can have 
quite independent of the world. But truth involves a relation to the world. So coherence 
does not guarantee truth, since it fails to guarantee the right kind of contact between the 
coherent things and that to which they must correspond to be true. But the present 
coherentist approach doesn't face that problem. As I tried to show in chapter two, it isn't 
possible for all beliefs to be theoretical; that is, many of one's beliefs must be observation 
beliefs, more or less directly triggered by the worldly circumstances that are their 
meanings. We would have no path to interpretation of a believer none of whose beliefs 
correlated with immediate external circumstance, so no such believer could exist.55 
For the purposes of the first phase of the anti-sceptical argument, I needed some 
characterization of normality of observation beliefs to give sense to the commonsense 
conditionals in the first premise and the conclusion. For the second phase, I need some 
further characterization of normalcy for theoretical beliefs. The last paragraph gives me 
that sense: a normal theoretical belief is one that coheres with the rest of one's beliefs. 
Most of one's theoretical beliefs have to cohere, else one wouldn't be interpretable and 
wouldn't have beliefs. So normalcy can be coherence if "normal" takes the sense of 
"usual." Further, incoherent beliefs are challenges to one's overall interpretation of the 
person interpreted as having the incoherent beliefs, for incoherent beliefs could, instead, 
be misunderstood ones. Only coherent beliefs fit into the space of evidence and reasons 
                                                
55 see Davidson 1982a for a discussion of the mismatch between what coherence theorists want to justify 
by coherence — coherent bodies of actual beliefs — and what critics say can't be justified by mere 
coherence — coherent bodies of independent propositions. The present account maps neatly on Bonjour's 
Observation Requirement that, for the members of a coherent body of beliefs to be justified, the body of 
beliefs must include beliefs in the reliability of observation beliefs, as well as a whole pile of observation 
beliefs. (see Bonjour 1985, pp. 140-6) 
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that are constitutive of the attitudes. So coherent beliefs are also "normal" in a normative 
sense. 
Having this sense of normalcy in place allows me to offer an argument for the 
truth of all of my normal theoretical beliefs that matches the structure of the first phase of 
the argument. 
(4) For all normal theoretical beliefs of mine, 
(a) it is a member of a coherent body of beliefs, 
(b) which includes many normal observational beliefs. 
The first part is defended with reference to the holism of the attitudes. An incoherent 
body of beliefs can't exist, and a normal theoretical belief coheres with a body of other 
beliefs; only statistically and normatively abnormal beliefs are incoherent. The second 
part is defended with reference to the externalism of the attitudes. Of course, all normal 
theoretical beliefs of mine also belong to coherent bodies of belief that include no 
observation beliefs as members; just take some proper subset of my beliefs that includes 
no observations. But the claim is that there is some set that does contain observation 
beliefs. If a normal theoretical belief were a member of no set of beliefs that contained 
any observation beliefs, then it would have no worldly contact and hence no content; it 
would be uninterpretable. (4) can be supplemented by the very obvious: 
(5) A belief that coheres with a body of beliefs, many members of which are true, 
is true. 
Coherence is an implicational relation,56 and implications carry truth. You can't be 
implied by a group of beliefs that are true, without being true. 
Premise (5), or the use to which I put it, is deeper than it looks. The discussion so 
far appears to indulge in the empiricist conceit that one begins with observations and then 
builds, foundationalist-style, one's theories on one's observations by way of following out 
their implications. That is not correct. The coherence that I'm talking about isn't a simple 
                                                
56 On coherence, see BonJour 1985, pp. 93-101. 
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one-way implication of theory by observation. On the contrary, as I tried to show in 
chapter two, there are no observation beliefs without supporting theoretical beliefs. The 
coherence of the body of beliefs is that body's having a rich, dense set of implications and 
other supporting relations, including inductive, abductive, and aesthetic relations. These 
relations are multi-dimensional, not the one-way relations of foundationalist support. 
(3), which tells us that normal observational beliefs are all true, (5), which tells us 
that to cohere with true beliefs is sufficient for being true, and (4), which tells us that all 
normal theoretical beliefs do so cohere, jointly imply that all normal theoretical beliefs 
are true. Only statistically and normatively deviant beliefs are false. Scepticism is 
mistaken. 
How has this argument been an improvement on the omniscient interpreter 
argument? The omniscient interpreter argument foundered on the possibility of a 
noniscient interpreter. A noniscient interpreter was universally mistaken, and the 
noniscient interpreter argument had it that interpretability by the noniscient interpreter 
was a prerequisite on having beliefs in the first place. But the omniscient interpreter 
argument, and its dark twin, failed to appeal to the fundamental theses about the 
determination of content that I discussed in chapter two, externalism and holism. The 
result of that discussion was that interpreters are partly responsible for someone's having 
content at all. An interpreter cannot interpret a speaker without grasping a well-confirmed 
Tarskian truth theory for that speaker, one that correlates her utterances with their causes. 
If there are no such actual theories held by actual interpreters, then there is no content to 
be interpreted. To grasp such a theory, the interpreter must be in position to correlate 
utterance to cause, and hence be correct about the causes themselves. That is inconsistent 
with being noniscient. So there could be no noniscient interpreter; interpreters, like the 
interpreted, must be at least mainly right. But interpretation does require massive 
agreement. So to be interpreted, I must massively agree with my interpreter, who has to 
be massively right in order to interpret me. The omniscient interpreter argument does 
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work, but it's unnecessary, as the modal complexities introduced by the notion of the 
omniscient interpreter add nothing but confusion to the argument, once the deep premises 
about content have been employed. 
Has the argument been a transcendental argument? A Genovan "good" 
transcendental argument? It has not been a Genovan argument. For Genova, the argument 
appeals, crucially, to Davidson's opposition to the possibility of alternative conceptual 
schemes. As can be readily ascertained, the argument that I've presented does not rely on 
that contention. (To be sure that things could go otherwise than in the order Genova says 
they go in, I've put off discussion of conceptual relativism until the next section.) 
Klein's, then, is the superior understanding of the argument. Klein, though, 
complained that the argument relied on knowledge of the external world. I don't agree. 
The fact that appropriate relations between oneself and the rest of the world must obtain 
for one to be a believer isn't an empirical fact. It's a synthetic a priori truth about the 
attitudes that they are constituted by their causal and inferential relations to worldly 
events and other beliefs. If I grasp that synthetic a priori truth, and also know what my 
beliefs are, then I know how the world must be for them to exist. That way is such that 
my beliefs are mainly true. 
According to Maker's conception of a transcendental argument, the argument is 
transcendental. There can be no wild divergence between someone's understanding of the 
way the world is and the way the world is, not because the mind constitutes its objects, 
but because the objects constitute the mind as having the contents it does. It's not plain, 
though, that any substance is left to the notion of a transcendental argument at this point, 
since any anti-sceptical argument, if successful, would demonstrate the same thing. 
Finally, we're now in a position to see the analogy between Kant's and Davidson's 
refutations of scepticism. For Kant, the mind can identify itself only as against the 
background of the independent world. But the mind can identify itself: it's possible to 
know how the world must be for my beliefs to be true. So the independent world must 
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exist more or less as it's believed to exist. For Davidson, there are beliefs at all only as 
against the background of causal and nomic relations between the believer and the world, 
and interpretive relations between the believer and other believers. But, if the sceptic is 
right, then one has beliefs. So the causal and nomic relations, and the other believers, 
must exist, and the exact nature of the relationships guarantees that one is generally right 
in one's beliefs about the world. 
3.3 RELATIVISM 
Davidson says that, "Conceptual relativism is a heady and exotic doctrine, or 
would be if we could make good sense of it. The trouble is, as so often in philosophy, it is 
hard to improve intelligibility while retaining the excitement." (Davidson 1974, p. 183) I 
concur with this assessment: intelligible doctrines that are called 'conceptual relativism,' 
'incommensurability,' and so forth turn out to be commonplaces; interesting doctrines 
with the same names turn out to be gibberish. Since the idea of conceptual relativism is 
sort of dated and not, I think, very popular these days, I'll be fairly quick with it. 
The notion of conceptual relativity is the notion that the truth of an utterance is 
relative to the conceptual scheme within which it appears. But, if 'conceptual scheme' just 
means 'language,' then the point is a truism. Of course the truth of an utterance is relative 
to its meaning, and it has its meaning only in the language of which it is an utterance. So 
of course truth is relative to language. I take it that the idea of the conceptual relativists is 
that conceptual schemes themselves might have a relationship, incommensurability, that 
means that some truths can't be understood by those who understand other truths. The 
incommensurability of conceptual schemes, then, seems to be the key to conceptual 
relativism. 
This well-known remark by Kuhn is exciting but of questionable intelligibility: 
"...we may want to say that after a revolution scientists are responding to a different 
world." (Kuhn, 1962/1970, p. 111) N. R. Hanson famously offers this little thought 
experiment: "Let us consider Johannes Kepler: imagine him on a hill watching the dawn. 
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With him is Tycho Brahe.... Do Kepler and Tycho see the same thing in the east at 
dawn?" (Hanson 1958, p. 5) One of course comes across reference to the conceptual 
schemes of the Azande and Hopi, so different from ours that we can't understand them. 
Samuel Delany projects the notion of incommensurable conceptual schemes in science 
fiction. 
In these typical examples, untranslatability is often criterial for conceptual 
incommensurability. But translation is a terminally linguistic concept. What exactly have 
conceptual schemes got to do with language? It's a consequence of the publicity 
constraint on meaning and the triangulation model of content-determination that one has 
a concept only insofar as one can use that concept in language. Having a concept is 
essentially a linguistic ability. That lays the groundwork for this remark of Davidson's: 
We may accept the doctrine that associates having a language with having a 
conceptual scheme. The relation may be supposed to be this: where conceptual 
schemes differ, so do languages. But speakers of different language may share a 
conceptual scheme provided there is a way of translating one language into the 
other.... We may identify conceptual schemes with languages, then, or better, 
allowing for the possibility that more than one language may express the same 
scheme, sets of intertranslatable languages. (Davidson 1974, pp. 184-5) 
However, translation isn't quite what we want. As Bar-On57 points out, giving the 
meaning, in English, of a remark in another language might be a matter of lengthy 
discussion. Such a discussion isn't really a "translation" as we usually use that word. 
Better to speak of interpretation. A theorem of a Tarskian truth theory can, in principle, 
be exorbitantly complicated and yet capture the meaning of the left-hand sentence. Such a 
theorem is an interpretation. So we should, at a first pass, identify conceptual schemes 
with inter-interpretable idiolects, and incommensurability of conceptual schemes with 
impossibility of interpreting one in terms of the other. 
But that's not right, either. Bernstein has it that the incommensurability that Kuhn, 
Feyerabend, and others talk about is what I would call commensurability: 
                                                
57 See Bar-On, 1994, esp. pp. 150-9. 
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...the "truth" of the incommensurability thesis is not closure but openness. For at 
their best, Kuhn and Feyerabend show us that we can understand the ways in 
which there are incommensurable paradigms, forms of life, and traditions and that 
we can understand what is distinctive about them without imposing beliefs, 
categories, and classifications that are so well entrenched in our own language 
games that we fail to appreciate their limited perspective. Furthermore, in and 
through the process of subtle, multiple comparison and contrast, we not only 
come to understand the alien phenomenon that we are studying but better come to 
understand ourselves. This openness of understanding and communication goes 
beyond disputes about the development of the natural sciences; it is fundamental 
to all understanding. (Bernstein 1983, pp. 91-2)58 
It's not plain that what Bernstein is describing is all that exciting, but it's certainly 
intelligible. I think that the most useful way to take Bernstein's interpretation of the idea 
of incommensurability is that an expression in another idiolect might not be interpretable 
in my idiolect at a given moment. Incommensurability is a dynamic phenomenon. To 
commensurate the currently incommensurable, I need to change my own idiolect, 
possibly by forming new concepts or taking over pieces of the alien idiolect. That is, 
some idiolects must be changed to become inter-interpretable.59 
If that's all incommensurability is, then it's intelligible but unexciting. To generate 
an exciting view, we should treat incommensurability as the notion that there could be 
rational agents that are terminally and in principle incapable of interpreting one another.60 
One of the agents in principle could never alter his conceptual scheme (other than by 
abandoning it entirely) in such a way that she could interpret those with the other scheme. 
Why "in principle"? As a matter of fact, I won't ever be able to interpret some 
speakers. I can't interpret Newton, much less Einstein, for I lack calculus; moreover, I 
can't interpret a calculus textbook. But this sort of contingent failure to learn isn't 
incommensurability. Incommensurability should be at least slightly exotic. 
                                                
58 For a similar approach, see Ramberg 1989, pp. 114-37. 
59 Feyerabend (Feyerabend 1987, esp. p. 266) observes that Putnam's critique of conceptual relativism 
relies on the false assumption that interpretation never requires an alteration of the interpreting language. If 
this temporal element is really the essence of their notion of incommensurability, then the Gorgiastic cabal 
gets too excited about it, thinking it profound while it's really just another element of ordinary 
interpretation. 
60 Perhaps I am "generating" this view, in the sense that no one has ever actually advocated it. 
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Neil Tennant offers one of the more concrete recent defenses of the idea of 
incommensurable conceptual schemes. The problem with real-life examples is that, in 
order to convey the content that is, allegedly, hermetically sealed off from we westerners 
(Einsteinians, whatever), the defender of incommensurability must state that content in 
terms that we can understand, thus proving by example that it's commensurable with our 
conceptual scheme. Tennant turns to hypothetical aliens in the science fiction sense; the 
ones the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence searches for. 
Tennant distinguishes between optimistic and pessimistic aliens. Optimistic aliens 
can be interpreted, though many of our observational beliefs are theoretical for them and 
vice versa. 61 Since incommensurability as I've defined it is uninterpretability, not unusual 
interpretability, this possibility is uninteresting if we're trying to convince ourselves that 
there can be incommensurable schemes. The pessimistic possibility is more interesting: 
We might have no way of rendering, in our terms, what would be common to all 
cases of the same-qualia-for-them. Thus, even prescinding from the problem of 
trying to communicate what it would be like for them to enjoy such qualia, we 
might be unable in principle even to specify objective truth-conditions, within our 
own scheme, for worldly situations that impinge on them in some constant-way-
for-them. Thus we might not be able to provide truth-conditions, even using our 
theoretical conceptual resources, for their observation statements. (Tennant 1999, 
p. 77) 
Undercutting the interest is the phrasing in terms of qualia. Qualia, as terminally private, 
have no role to play in meaning. The interesting pessimistic possibility is that I might be 
incapable of identifying truth-conditions for the utterances of an alien, though that alien is 
speaking. 
Davidson's reply to this sort of possibility is not convincing. He says that 
...nothing, it may be said, could count as evidence that some form of activity 
could not be interpreted in our language that was not at the same time evidence 
that that form of activity was not speech behaviour. If this were right, we probably 
ought to hold that a form of activity that cannot be interpreted as language in our 
language is not speech behaviour. (Davidson 1974, pp. 185-6; emphasis added) 
                                                
61 See Tennant 1999, pp. 76-7. 
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The general idea behind this claim is that we have no way to apply the concept of truth 
except in Tarskian truth theories, which are theories of truth in languages. So we can't 
apply the concept of truth to a language that we can't interpret with a Tarskian theory, 
which theory would be in our language. That's true. But the fact that we can't interpret a 
speaker doesn't imply that nothing could. The pessimistic aliens' conspecifics can 
triangulate with them and interpret their utterances. 
Narrowly, the pessimistic aliens aren't really a possibility. You don't count as a 
believer unless you engage in triangulation and interpretation. But to do that, you have to 
have certain concepts: cause, belief, truth, desire, truth, meaning, and so forth. If the 
pessimistic aliens really have no beliefs in common with us, then they don't have any of 
our concepts, including these crucial intensional concepts, and so they don't have 
beliefs.62 Could they have only our intensional concepts, but otherwise entirely lack our 
cognitive apparatus? As a consequence of the holism of the mental, plainly not. 
Broadly, it's not plain that this sense of incommensurability is what anyone has in 
mind. The notion of a scheme is the notion of something that schematizes a content. If 
two schemes each schematize different content, then it's not plain that they're schemes in 
the same sense. Two theories of meteorology might differently schematize weather-
related phenomena, but there's no sense in which they are alternative schemes to some 
third, geological, theory. But the pessimistic aliens, by having no belief that we have, 
have entirely different content; hence their "scheme" isn't really a scheme at all but 
something different.63 
Bernard Williams offers a well-regarded defense of something called 'relativism.' 
For Williams, relativism is possible only when there are at least two systems of belief, 
each in some sense self-contained, exclusive one of the other, and yet having loci of 
contact at which the two systems give different answers to the same questions. That there 
                                                
62 Lepore and Ludwig make this nice, if obvious, point at Lepore and Ludwig, 2005, p. 319. 
63 These last two paragraphs have just drawn out a consequence of the holistic nature of content, which 
itself is required to respect the intensionality of content attributions. 
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are these loci of contact shows that incommensurability is not the focus of Williams's 
relativism. Another feature that the systems must possess is that the second system's 
giving an answer that is, in some sense, true, even by the lights of the first system, does 
not give adherents of the first system reason to switch systems. (Williams 1974, pp. 132-
5) What does this mean? For scientific relativism, the idea would be that observation 
underdetermines theory: I can stick with my theory despite your theory's predictions 
being borne out. For ethical relativism, the idea would be that behavior underdetermines 
theory. I think that Williams is just telling us that "is" does not imply "ought": 
...the practical question gets answered in actual fact, and this occurrence of course 
trivially satisfies the conditions [on there being a situation allowing for 
relativism]: the fact that a given question gets answered in this sense in a way that 
conflicts with, say, the consequences of S[ystem]1 does not constrain a holder of 
S1 to abandon his position (he may say that the agent was wrong to so decide). 
(Williams 1974, p. 136) 
This is, of course, not a very interesting idea. The fact that people are sometimes 
immoral, and sometimes don't know it, has no implications for relativism. 
What's much more interesting is what Williams calls64 the relativism of distance. 
Williams puts out this form of relativism with reference to two kinds of confrontation 
between the sorts of systems of belief that can allow for relativism, notional and real 
confrontations. (Williams 1985, p. 138) We can have a real confrontation with a system 
of beliefs that we could, in principle, adopt by choice. A confrontation with a system of 
beliefs that we couldn't really adopt (otherwise than by force, brainwashing, or something 
else that undercuts the sense of 'adopt') is merely notional. Your typical American, for 
instance, faces a real confrontation with the socialism-lite of Western Europe. One can 
envision (or read about) a severe recession and a charismatic leftist changing the structure 
of our economic system. Your typical American does not face a real confrontation with 
jihadism. One cannot envision (even in science fiction, if it's to have the least 
plausibility) any circumstances that would lead Americans, en masse, to adopt violent 
                                                
64 at Williams 1985, p. 162 
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Islamist beliefs. Nevertheless, we can understand those beliefs, and, in principle, 
construct arguments about them; we can even sympathize with them, though we cannot 
adopt them. 
The relativism of distance is this: "Relativism, with regard to a given type of S, is 
the view that for one whose S stands in purely notional confrontation with such an S, 
questions of appraisal do not genuinely arise." (ibid, p. 142; see also Williams 1985, p. 
161) The sense of this relativism is not obvious. Note my example: we can argue about, 
and even sympathize with, jihadism. But we also think that it's false, and we won't (can't) 
change our minds. So in what sense can't we assess jihadism? Williams believes that, in 
fact, our confrontation with jihadism is real: 
Relativism over spatial distance is of no interest or application in the modern 
world. Today all confrontations between cultures must be real confrontations, and 
the existence of exotic traditional societies presents quite different, and difficult, 
issues of whether the rest of the world can or should use power to preserve them, 
like endangered species... (Williams 1985, p. 163) 
This is a strange passage. When faced by an exotic culture, we Westerners do face a real 
option of destroying the culture, or tolerating it. But believing that traditional societies 
should be tolerated, or even protected, does not imply that we could, even in principle, 
accept the beliefs of the culture. So our confrontation does seem to be notional by the 
announced account of notion-hood; only by this new kind of confrontation, one that asks 
for tolerance, is the confrontation not notional. A distinction between confrontations in 
which we are tolerant, and those in which we are not, is orthogonal to a distinction 
between confrontations in which we might switch sides and those in which we can't. 
But allow that notional confrontations are those in which we will never meet a 
representative of the alternative system of beliefs. We face notional confrontations, then, 
only with historical or hypothetical systems of beliefs, not with any contemporary 
systems. Williams's relativism of distance, then, is that it makes no sense to assess 
systems of beliefs that we can only read about from the past or from speculation. 
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In a sense, this claim is true. There's something strange about aggressively 
condemning historical evils — ancient ones, at least  — or becoming frantically 
concerned with the survival of a yet-to-be-realized utopia that one could never join. On 
the other hand, if we remove the adjectives from what's strange, then there's nothing 
strange at all. It makes sense to really, deeply hate Nazis, since their atrocities took place 
in living memory and a movement dedicated to their evil still exists. It makes no sense to 
really, deeply hate Julius Caesar. That would be strange. But it makes perfect sense to 
think that Caesar should not have crossed the Rubicon. How can this be a senseless 
assessment? If the relativism of distance is a comment on the unseemliness of certain 
overpassionate assessments, then it's reasonable; if it's a serious form of relativism that 
intends to make some systems of belief incommensurable, then it seems wrong. 
Lepore and Ludwig give what I think is the best statement of what's supposed to 
be exciting in the notions of conceptual schemes and incommensurability: "The 
excitement of the doctrine of conceptual relativism lies in the thought that, by shifting 
from the point of view of one conceptual scheme to another, a true sentence may become 
a false one, while retaining its meaning." (Lepore and Ludwig 2005, p. 318) This sort of 
conceptual relativism is intended to be intra-linguistic, and it derives, not from 
anthropological or alien examples, but from examples drawn from the history of science. 
The idea is supposed to be that, while 'mass' means the same before and after Einstein, 
still, sentences that include it might change truth value across the revolution. It should be 
obvious that this sense of incommensurability is unintelligible on my view. Since the 
meaning of a word is its contribution to the truth-conditions of the sentences in which it 
appears, same meaning means same truth-conditions. I conclude that there is no exciting, 
intelligible sense of conceptual relativism. All speakers can, in principle, understand one 
another.
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4 Moral Expressivism 
4.0 INTRODUCTION 
Moral Realism consists of two claims: that some of our moral utterances are 
truth-apt, and that some of our truth-apt moral utterances are true. The usual name for the 
former thesis is cognitivism. The error theorist or moral sceptic denies the second claim, 
and the task of the balance of this work is to defeat the sceptic and establish the second 
claim. However, other anti-realist traditions deny cognitivism, and in this chapter I 
discuss one such tradition, expressivism, primarily as it shows up in the work of a 
contemporary and important expressivist, Simon Blackburn.65 
Section 4.1 attempts to state the expressivist thesis clearly. Explaining 
expressivism isn't easy, because most of the natural ways of stating the expressivist thesis 
display at least one of two difficulties: 1) they are negative, stating only that assertivism 
is false, but without actually stating what the expressivist has in mind, or 2) they're 
patently inconsistent with the main defenses of expressivism against the criticisms to be 
discussed below. Explaining expressivism is also made more difficult by a lack of clear 
statements of the thesis by its proponents. 
                                                
65 I should say something about why I don't discuss other, at least equally important, non-cognitivists, such 
as Ayer, Stevenson, Hare, and Gibbard. Ayer's discussion (in the first, 1936, edition of Ayer 1946, esp. pp. 
102-13) was seminal for spurring discussion of emotivism, which took on a more complete form in the 
work of Stevenson (see Stevenson 1944 and Stevenson 1963). For precision, though, we should note the 
deeper historical root in Ogden and Richards 1923/1956, (pp. 124-5, pp. 149-50) perhaps the true source of 
emotivism this side of Hume. While these historical theorists still maintain some interest (see Wilks 2002), 
my intent is not chiefly historical and there's precious little of even remotest plausibility in the older 
theorists that isn't maintained, in a more sophisticated context, in contemporary expressivism. My excuse 
for ignoring Hare's prescriptivism (on which see Hare 1952) is twofold: on the one hand, Hare's opening 
moves are so different from those of other non-cognitivists that they would require lengthy discussion on 
their own but, on the other hand and paradoxically, the objections to expressivism would apply almost 
unmodifed to Hare's view. Thus the discussion-to-insight ratio would be disadvantageous despite 
appearances. Finally, no dismissive footnote would be complete without explaining why I avoid Gibbard's 
well-received and influential theory (on which see Gibbard 1990). Here I admit that the excuses are 
wearing thin. However, as I think one can see by consulting a symposium on Gibbard (Gibbard 1992a, b, 
Blackburn 1992, Carson 1992, Hill 1992, and Railton 1992) and other discussions, such as Horwich 1993 
and Wedgewood 1997, and comparing the arguments appearing there with my own comments on 
Blackburn, once again the issues are very similar. 
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Section 4.2 discusses and evaluates various arguments for expressivism. The main 
argument for expressivism has to do with the connection between moral utterances and 
moral motivation. Blackburn tightens this relation beyond what's supported by the facts. I 
go further and extend the attitudinal holism put forward in section 2.3 to give an alternate 
account of the facts about moral language and motivation for which the expressivist is 
trying to give an account. 
4.3 and 4.4 attempt to show that expressivism is false by showing that the theory 
cannot cope with a number of facts about moral discourse and reasoning. I characterize 
the problems for expressivism as two embedding problems. The first embedding problem 
flows from the fact that moral utterances can be the arguments of truth-functions, such as 
the material conditional; I discuss this problem in 4.3. Blackburn tries several times to 
solve this problem by using the first quasi-realist maneuver, a reinterpretation of 
complex utterances within which moral utterances appear so that moral utterances do not 
appear as the arguments of logical connectives. There are several versions of the first 
maneuver corresponding to the phases of Blackburn's career, but I'll focus on an early 
first maneuver, in which moral utterances that are seemingly the arguments of logical 
connectives are taken to refer to the attitudes they would express outside of the seemingly 
logical context, and a late first maneuver involving a modalized reinterpretation of moral 
discourse. Neither version of the maneuver is satisfying. 
The second embedding problem, discussed in 4.4, flows from the fact that moral 
utterances can appear embedded in contexts like "... is true" or "... is a belief of mine." 
Blackburn tries to solve the problem by the second quasi-realist maneuver, the 
application of minimalism about truth and belief to moral discourse. This maneuver is 
substantially deeper than the first maneuver, as, were it successful, it would solve both 
embedding problems. However, I show that it undermines the sharp cognition/motivation 
distinction that was to demonstrate expressivism in the first place. 
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Some opponents of expressivism, such as MacIntyre, might suggest that there is a 
third embedding problem: moral utterances can also be embedded within rational 
arguments and they motivate us in ways that they would not if they were not assertions 
about objective moral facts but rather expressions of speakers' behavioral tendencies.66 I 
suspect that there is such an embedding problem. However, this issue is substantially 
more difficult than the two embedding problems I discuss in 4.3 and 4.4, and it's not clear 
to me that the expressivist can't make responses that are plausible enough to require 
extremely lengthy discussion. So I ignore the third embedding problem, though it may be 
the most important of the three. 
4.1 WHAT IS EXPRESSIVISM? 
To characterize expressivism, I must begin by characterizing its replacement for 
cognitivism. I'll use the word 'claim' as a piece of jargon.67 'Claim' ranges vaguely but 
happily over every speech act and mental state — any narrower meaning would either 
make the formulations of moral realism question-begging or would make redundant the 
truth-aptness of the moral. For instance, if I were to characterize cognitivism with 
reference to the truth-aptness of moral assertions or beliefs, then I would make 
cognitivism redundant. Assertions and beliefs are truth-apt by nature. 'Claim,' however, 
through lack of systematic use, may be allowed to vary over cognitive and non-cognitive 
mental states, and truth-apt as well as non-truth-apt utterances. 
I'll begin by characterizing expressivism with reference to language. Though I 
begin by talking about speech, I move through speech acts to the mental states that, I will 
say, the speech acts present. I say that a speech act presents a mental state just in case the 
                                                
66 See MacIntyre 1984, esp. pp. 6-35. For some discussion, see the sympathetic and critical treatments, 
respectively, in Lemos 2000 and Unwin 1990. I take the impression (which Lemos confirms at the outset) 
that MacIntyre's critique of emotivism has not been a focal point of discussion, however often it's 
mentioned in passing. An interesting difference between Hare's non-cognitivism and expressivism is that 
Hare's view might have an easier time responding to a MacIntyrean critique. Since Hare's view is a form of 
Kantian constructivism, it places requirements on moral prescriptions much stricter than those placed on 
moral expressives by expressivists; the greater strictness might give Hare the argumentative assets required 
to deal with MacIntyre. 
67 It appears in the canonical statement of moral realism in Sayre-McCord 1988b, 5. 
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speaker, in performing the speech act, illocutionarily commits herself to the expression of 
that mental state; or, what I take to be a variant way of saying the same thing, the speech 
act illocutionarily entails a speech act that would be an expression of the mental state; or, 
to put it yet a third way, the mental state is the sincerity condition of the speech act. 68 
Cognitivism has it that some moral utterances are truth-apt, while any specific 
non-cognitivism must say just what it is that moral utterances are up to other than being 
truth-apt. Cognitivism and the alternatives are best characterized, in linguistic terms, with 
reference to Searle's taxonomy of illocutionary acts.69 For Searle (as for Austin and other 
speech act theorists), a speech act is divided into an illocutionary force marker and a 
propositional content. The initial insight that such a distinction is necessary was, of 
course, Frege's.70 
The linguistic focus in earlier parts of this work has been on meanings. But 
expressivism requires that we consider an additional aspect of linguistic usage: 
illocutionary force. Davidson himself is no fan of the Searlian approach to illocutionary 
force that I adopt in this section. I've complained about many things that Davidson has 
said in previous sections of this work, but on every other issue, I've thought that 
Davidson was at least in the neighborhood of the right answer, or had gotten lost for 
plausible reasons. But his account of grammatical mood is hopelessly wrong. I'll discuss 
my approach briefly while beginning to define expressivism, and then reply to Davidson's 
objection. 
The kinds of speech act with which cognitivism and expressivism are concerned 
are assertive and expressive speech acts. Here are two sample assertives: 
SA1) I have drawn a Queen. 
                                                
68 On illocutionary commitment and entailment, see Searle and Vanderveeken 1985, 129-60. On sincerity 
conditions, see Searle 1979, pp. 4-5, and Searle, 1969, ch. 3. but esp. p. 60. 
69 Searle 1979, pp. 1-29. It may seem strange that I state these theses in the vocabulary of speech act theory 
— especially since this vocabulary seems to be totally foreign to expressivists — but I don't know of any 
clearer vocabulary to use. An earlier application of speech act theory to expressivism appears in Urmson, 
1968, esp. ch. 11. 
70 see Frege 1879, pp. 52-3. 
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SA2) I wish I had drawn a Queen. 
Here are two sample expressives: 
SE1) Would that I had drawn a Queen! 
SE2) Damn! (Uttered immediately after drawing something other than a Queen.) 
The content of SA1 and SE1 are each that I have drawn a Queen. The content of SA2 is 
that I wish I had drawn a Queen. The propositional content of SE2 is that I have not 
drawn a Queen. 
The attitudes presented by the assertions are beliefs71 with propositional contents 
— meanings, truth-conditions — identical to those of the acts. What makes SA1 and SA2 
assertives is that they represent their propositional contents as true.72 Likewise, what 
makes the attitudes they present beliefs is that they represent their propositional contents 
as true. Assertives and beliefs are thus tied together in two ways: each represents its 
content as true, and, for this reason, assertives are used to present beliefs, rather than 
some other mental attitude. 
What makes SE1 and SE2 expressive is that their point is to express the mental 
state they present. They make no claims about the world (or on any person in it). SE1 
expresses a non-cognitive attitude (a wish, in this case) toward its content. Likewise, SE2 
expresses non-cognitive frustration toward its content. These attitudes are non-cognitive 
because they do not represent their contents as true; they aren't cognitions (even failed 
ones) about the world. Expressives are tied to non-cognitive attitudes: neither an 
expressive nor a non-cognitive attitude73 presents its content as true. For this reason, the 
presentation of a non-cognitive attitude is an expressive speech act. 
Two small digressions for clarity. Not every expressive speech act presents a non-
cognitive attitude. Repeating a catechism, for instance, does not assert the content of the 
                                                
71 I call all cognitive mental states "beliefs." 
72 Not to be confused with asserting that the content is true. 
73 ...hereafter to be called "desires," with no implicit "mere" or "only" to reduce non-cognitive states to 
some dubious or questionable state of philosophic disrespectability. 
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catechism but expresses the speaker's belief in it. Second, though the desire expressed by 
an expressive speech act obviously does make a demand on the world (that's what desires 
do for a living), the expression of it does not itself make a demand in the same way that 
some other speech acts, such as orders and promises, do. The illocutionary point of an 
expressive is to express, not, as with orders and promises, to obligate. 
Davidson has no interest in this sort of account of illocutionary force or 
grammatical mood. On the contrary, he gives an account somewhat similar to his 
paratactic account of "that"-clauses. The order, "Get back to your room" turns out to be 
two utterances, both truth-apt: "You will get back to your room. That was in the 
imperative mood."74 But the overall utterance is not a conjunction, so it is not truth-apt. 
It's not clear to me what the overall utterance is. It's not a conjunction of two assertions, 
but what is it instead? 
Given the obscurity of Davidson's view, I'm happy to set it aside, but I should still 
attend to his critique of the illocutionary alternative. Sadly, Davidson doesn't discuss the 
best account of illocutionary force, but he does discuss related approaches. Of Dummett's 
treatment of Frege's judgment stroke, Davidson says that, 
...what bothers me is the implied claim that assertion and the indicative mood can 
be this closely identified. For there are many utterances of indicative sentences 
that are not assertions, for example, indicative sentences uttered in play, pretence, 
joke, and fiction; and of course assertions may be made by uttering sentences in 
other moods." (Davidson 1979, p. 110) 
Our inability to line up assertive force with grammatical mood might lead us to think that 
the moods were not a good analytical idea. Alternately, we might start drawing some 
distinctions. For instance, we might distinguish between direct and indirect speech acts.75 
When we make an assertion by way of uttering a sentence with a different mood, we can 
still have made an assertion by way of uttering a sentence with a non-assertive force, as 
long as we acknowledge that an utterance can have multiple forces, direct and indirect. 
                                                
74 Davidson 1979, pp. 119-21. 
75 Searle 1979, pp. 30-57. 
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For instance, if I say, "I need the salt," while the direct illocutionary force is assertive, the 
point of my utterance was plainly to get you to hand me the salt, so the utterance has an 
indirect directive illocutionary force. 
We might also distinguish between illocutionary and perlocutionary acts.76 A 
perlocutionary act is a non-linguistic act carried out by performing an illocutionary act. I 
can perform the perlocutionary act of persuading, by way of performing the illocutionary 
act of asserting. When Davidson says that a joke or a piece of fiction is never an 
assertion, he has confused perlocutionary and illocutionary acts. I can joke, entertain, or 
even lie by way of making an assertion. Being insincere does not disqualify an utterance 
from being an assertion. 
The root of Davidson's dissatisfaction with the illocutionary approach is that it 
fails to satisfy all three of his requirements on a treatment of mood: 
(1) It must show or preserve the relations between indicatives and corresponding 
sentences in the other moods... 
(2) It must assign an element of meaning to utterances in a given mood that is not 
present in utterances in other moods.... 
(3) Finally, the theory should be semantically tractable. If the theory conforms to 
the standards of a theory of truth, then I would say all is well. And on the 
other hand, if... a standard theory of truth can be shown to be incapable of 
explaining mood, then truth theory is inadequate as a general theory of 
language. (Davidson 1979, pp. 115-6) 
The illocutionary approach satisfies (1), because the same propositional content appears 
in the order to clean up your room, as well as the prediction that you will clean up your 
room, the observation that you have cleaned up your room, and your report that you have 
cleaned up your room. The illocutionary approach does not satisfy (3). It does not attempt 
to reduce force to anything semantic. Whether the illocutionary approach satisfies (2) or 
not is up for grabs. By positing additional elements of an utterance beyond its content, 
                                                
76 Searle 1969, p. 25. 
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does the illocutionary approach posit additional elements of meaning? Or something 
else? 
The demand that a theory of force should be a semantic theory is quite arbitrary. 
The (depressing to Davidson) conclusion that if a theory of force is not a semantic theory, 
then the truth-conditional theory of meaning does not exhaust what there is to say about 
language is only depressing if you began with the expectation that language was limited 
in features to lexicon, syntax, and semantics. We're not depressed that syntax is not 
semantic; why should we worry that force is not semantic? Sans arbitrary demands on the 
content of theories about language, Davidson has no case against the notion of 
illocutionary force. 
I return to the main thread. Cognitivism involves the thesis that some moral 
utterances are assertives, which present cognitive mental states, beliefs. Expressivism is 
best understood as involving the thesis that (no moral utterances are assertives but that) 
some or all moral utterances are expressives, which always present non-cognitive mental 
states.77 
However, expressivism has a bit of explaining to do at the outset. Consider the 
moral utterance, "What you did was wrong." The utterance has all of the markers of an 
assertive. The most obvious interpretation of the utterance is that it has the assertive 
illocutionary force and that its content is that what you did was wrong. The expressivist, 
however, will interpret the utterance as an expressive. How? 
We may begin with some early remarks by Blackburn. In this early presentation, 
Blackburn called his view 'projectivism,' and argued that moral utterances involve the 
"projection" of our moral attitudes. To clarify the notion of projection, Blackburn 
explains that a hypothetical moral language that "wears its expressive nature on its 
sleeve" (Blackburn 1984, p. 193) would need 
                                                
77 Expressives do not all present non-cognitive attitudes; it's specifically because moral utterances are 
moral expressives that expressivism would say that they present non-cognitive attitudes. There are 
expressives, such as the repetition of a catechism, that present cognitive attitudes. 
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to become an instrument of serious, reflective, evaluative practice, able to express 
concern for improvements, clashes, implications, and coherence of attitudes.78 
Now one way of doing this is to become like ordinary English. That is, it would 
invent a predicate answering to the attitude, and treat commitments as if they were 
judgements, and then use all of the natural devices for debating truth.... This is 
what is meant by 'projecting' attitudes onto the world. (ibid. p. 195.) 
To project an attitude is to express it through the use of a speech act that appears to have 
the assertive illocutionary force but in fact has the expressive force. Which attitude is 
expressed is signaled by which "moral predicate" is used. So while the cognitivist (and 
most natural) interpretation of the example, "What you did was wrong" would have it that 
the utterance is an assertive the content of which involves the predicate 'wrong,' for the 
expressivist, 'wrong' does not serve to predicate. One might call it a pseudo-predicate. It 
answers to the attitude that it expresses, not to some real property (like, say, wrongness) 
that it's used to predicate. So one may guess that the content might be that you did what 
you did, or that you did that. The attitude expressed is, say, condemnation. The use of the 
moral pseudo-predicate 'wrong' signals that condemnation is the attitude expressed by the 
utterance. So for the expressivist, moral predicates serve as illocutionary force indicators 
as well as markers for the particular non-cognitive attitudes expressed. 
I think the foregoing has positioned us to understand expressivism. Expressivism 
consists in two theses. The first is that the mental states presented by moral utterances are 
non-cognitive. That is the central claim that must be established for us to accept 
expressivism, and arguments for it will occupy us in the next section.79 Here, I want to 
spell out just the one implication of it that's important enough to designate as the second 
defining thesis of the expressivist. The second claim, expressivism in a narrow sense, will 
be the linguistic correlate of the first; it is that the illocutionary point of moral utterances 
                                                
78 Blackburn fails to explain why it is that moral discourse that is overtly expressivist could not serve these 
functions, and that taking on the guise of truth-aptitude is necessary for moral discourse to serve its 
functions. Why is it that moral discourse can't look like its true expressive self and still function? Why must 
it wear the mask of assertiveness and cognitive value? 
79 A prescriptivist who believes that moral utterances are directive speech acts — orders, more or less — 
will accept the first thesis of expressivism, but deny the second. Most expressivists believe that moral 
utterances are expressive, but also perhaps directive and sometimes even assertive, though no expressivist 
can believe that moral utterances are assertive about their moral content. I'll leave these complexities aside. 
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is to express the mental states the utterances present. There's a gap between these claims. 
It could be that, though we have no moral beliefs but only moralistic desires, 
nevertheless, in our moral discourse, we're really trying to assert facts. Even though we 
have no moral beliefs, we talk as though we did. In that case, expressivism about 
language would be false, though non-cognitivism about moral attitudes would still be 
true, because, while moral utterances could only present desires, not beliefs, they would 
still be trying to present beliefs (because the assertion of a fact is the presentation of a 
belief). So it remains to be seen why the expressivist adopts expressivism (in the narrow 
sense) in addition to non-cognitivism. The expressivist adopts expressivism because it is 
necessary to ground his belief that some of our moral speech acts are fully successful. 
That a speech act is fully successful is a matter, I say, of three factors.80 Let's call 
the first factor the performative factor. Sometimes, I may fail to even perform the speech 
act I intended to perform. I may try to assert that it is hot in here, for instance, but say, 
"It's cold in here." In that case, I failed to do what I tried to do. Likewise, however hard I 
try to perform a marriage ceremony joining an ice cube to a calculator in civil matrimony, 
my "I now pronounce you man and wife" fails to pronounce anything. 
The second factor is the sincerity factor. I may, for instance, succeed in 
performing the act of asserting that p, without believing that p. In that case, I've lied 
about p, and my act was not fully successful. I succeeded in asserting that p, but 
something has nevertheless gone wrong. Likewise, if I promise to a, without intending to 
a, then, though I have in fact performed the promise, I was insincere and again was not 
fully successful. 
The third factor is the satisfaction factor. Assertives are satisfied just in case they 
are true. Orders and promises are satisfied just in case they are carried. Not all kinds of 
speech act have satisfaction conditions; expressives, notably, do not. 
                                                
80 At least the first factor is of course a massively complex bundle of sub-factors, and all three raise plenty 
of difficulties that make no difference here. 
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Consider two conflicting anti-realist directions. Anti-realism will have it that there 
are no moral facts. Though non-cognitivism has saved our minds from error (we have no 
false moral beliefs, for we have no moral beliefs to be false), an anti-realist might say that 
our speech is in error. For when we perform a moral speech act, we perform an assertive 
act. Such an act fully succeeds only if it is satisfied; it is satisfied only if it is true; but, 
since there are no moral facts, every such act is not true but false. Hence, none of our 
moral speech acts fully succeed. 
As a rule, there's something wrong, weird, or confused about performing speech 
acts that, it's known in advance, can't fully succeed. So the anti-realist might worry that 
the first thesis has undone our moral discourse. That might not be acceptable; we might 
need our moral discourse: it might be important that some of our moral utterances be 
fully successful. So the expressivist turns another direction. She responds to the worry by 
denying that when we perform a moral speech act, we perform an assertive act. By 
turning at this point, the non-cognitivist adopts expressivism. That saves moral discourse 
by loosening requirements on the full success of moral speech acts. If moral speech acts 
are expressives, then they are fully successful just in case they are performed and sincere. 
There's no question that there are moral desires for these expressives to express (that's 
guaranteed by non-cognitivism), and obviously we perform them all the time (even if, on 
reflection, we tend to get confused and think that we're performing assertives). So, for the 
expressivist, our moral speech acts can be fully successful even though there are no moral 
beliefs or facts. The expressivist thus leverages expressivism into the full success of some 
moral utterances and saves moral discourse from looking erroneous. 
4.2 ARGUMENTS FOR EXPRESSIVISM 
In an early work, Blackburn presents three arguments for expressivism that recur 
through his later work. These are the economic, the metaphysical, and the motivational 
arguments, and they are the focus of sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2, and 4.2.3, respectively. 
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4.2.1 The Economic Argument  
Considerations of economy yield an ordering of meta-ethical theories. According 
to the expressivist, expressivism is more economical than realism. If we assume that the 
more economical a theory, the more likely it is to be true, then the expressivist may infer 
that expressivism is more likely to be true than realism. The argument is thus inductive, 
in that it only provides evidence for some theories and against others. No meta-ethical 
theory is a deductive conclusion of any economic argument. 
Because it's only inductive, the premises and validity of this argument can be 
accepted at the same time that expressivism is rejected. It may be that, though 
expressivism is more economical than realism, nevertheless, realism has some other, 
more important advantages over expressivism. Further, it may be that, though 
expressivism is more economical than realism, some other theory is more economical yet. 
What are the economic advantages of expressivism? Though the argument recurs 
through Blackburn's later writings, the following early statement is pretty complete: 
[Expressivism] asks no more than this: a natural world, and patterns of reaction to 
it. By contrast a theory assimilating moral understanding to perception demands 
more of the world. Perception is a causal process: we perceive those features of 
things which are responsible for our experiences. It is uneconomical to postulate 
both a feature of things (the values they have) and a mechanism (intuition) by 
which we are happily aware of it. (Blackburn 1984, p. 182) 
We should first consider what ordering is generated. Consider not two theories, but three: 
cognitivism, scepticism, and expressivism. Cognitivism and expressivism agree that our 
moral discourse is essentially in order. Cognitivism and scepticism agree that moral 
claims are beliefs and assertions. Scepticism and expressivism agree that there are no 
moral facts. Note that cognitivism and scepticism will both "assimilate moral 
understanding to perception." The cognitivist will think of moral understanding like a 
working sense like sight, while the sceptic will think of moral understanding like a non-
working sense like telepathy. But they will agree that moral understanding is cognitive in 
structure and function, disagreeing only over whether it succeeds. Scepticism, for this 
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reason, posits no more than what expressivism posits. It will interpret some mental states 
as errors instead of non-cognitive attitudes, but it posits no more attitudes or (working) 
means of cognition than expressivism. So the economic argument begins only by ranking 
expressivism and scepticism above cognitivism, which is not obviously helpful to 
expressivism, though it is obviously bad for realism. 
The problem here is that the economic argument will work equally well for any 
non-realist theory, because all non-realist theories refrain from positing the supposedly 
uneconomical moral properties and cognitions. So the economic argument doesn't really 
provide even inductive support for expressivism. If successful, it only provides evidence 
that any anti-realist theory is better than any realist theory, as far as economy goes. 
It's not really plain that realism objectionably posits much more than 
expressivism. Here are the posits, according to Blackburn, of the two theories, with the 
arrows representing some sort of explanatory relation: 
Cognitivism:81 Shapeless underlying class  shapely property M  perception of 
it by those with proper affective dispositions  perception of a reason for action 
 action 
Non-Cognitivism: Shapeless underlying class  attitudes in those with specific 
affective dispositions  action (Blackburn 1998, pp. 98-99.) 
The first crucial concept here is the "shapelessness" of the underlying class and the realist 
posit of a "shapely" normative class supervening on the underlying class. Elsewhere, 
Blackburn explains: 
Let us suppose... that some group of human beings does share a genuine tendency 
to some reaction in the face of some perceived properties or kinds of things. 
Surely it need not surprise us at all that they should know of no description of 
what unifies the class of objects eliciting the reaction, except of course the fact 
that it does so.... Any description is likely to have a partial and disjunctive air.... 
This may not be a merely practical matter: there is no a priori reason to expect 
there to really be a unifying feature. Let us describe this by saying that the 
grouping of things which is made by projecting our reactive tendency onto the 
world is shapeless with respect to other features. (Blackburn 1981, p. 167) 
                                                
81 He has in mind realisms like those of McDowell and Wiggins. See, for instance, McDowell 1981 and 
Blackburn's criticisms thereof in Blackburn 1981. 
 235 
A class is shapeless, then, just in case its members share nothing in common other than 
triggering a certain non-cognitive response. Now this makes Blackburn's assumption that 
the realist and non-cognitivist each start with a shapeless class patently question-begging: 
according to the realist, the class is normatively shapely. That it isn't, say, 
physicalistically shapely is a consequence of the irreducibility of the normative to the 
physical, which is a familiar concept from philosophy of mind. So, with Blackburn's 
explanation in mind, we have to generate a new characterization of shapelessness that is 
not question-begging. 
Recalling Blackburn's naturalism, we might guess that a class is shapeless just in 
case its members are not physicalistically similar to one another. And it's surely true that, 
for at least any normative class I can think of, it is not a physical class nor reducible to 
one in any way otherwise than very partially and disjunctively. This guess may be 
supported by the fact that Blackburn's point here is apparently that the shapely normative 
property posited by the cognitivist has no explanatory power, and hence doesn't exist. If 
we take for granted that only physical classes have explanatory power, and then point out 
that normative classes are not physical, then we have shown that normative classes lack 
explanatory power. If we decide that, if a class exists, then it has explanatory power, then 
we will have decided that there are no normative classes. 
There are problems with having a problem with physicalistically shapeless 
classes. Consider a class that Blackburn does posit, "attitudes in those with specific 
affective dispositions." This class is shapeless along (at least) two dimensions. 
First, dropping the guessed physicalistic aspect of shapelessness, it's not even true 
that all responses to, say, injustice, are similar attitudinally. My response to what I would 
call 'injustice' might range from cynicism to apathy to irritation to anger to revolutionary 
fervor. It might even range so far as delight, if I gain a sense of identity from agitating 
against things I call unjust and I delight in the existence of injustices against which to 
agitate. Nothing holds together our responses to injustice other than that they are 
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responses to injustice. If there's no injustice to which they are responses, then nothing 
holds them together. From a hermeneutical point of view, we need injustice if we're 
going to group responses to it together. Yet Blackburn does think that this shapeless class 
of attitudes has explanatory power with respect to action; at least that's what he appears to 
be thinking when he puts this shapeless class on the left side of an explanatory arrow with 
actions on the other side. 
Second, let's forgive Blackburn this point and assume that every time any person 
calls something unjust, she has exactly the same attitude toward it: apathy, say. Let's even 
be forgiving enough to pretend that nothing else triggers apathy, so that the expressivist 
won't be tempted to misidentify, say, apathy-inducing bad movies as unjust. But what is it 
that makes my apathy a member of the same class as your apathy, or two of my apathies 
members of the same class? Apathies are mental states, and classes of mental states are 
not nowadays widely thought of as physical or reducible to physical classes (or at least 
not to any such classes that could be identified other than partially and disjunctively). In 
Davidson's view, the irreducibility of the mental to the physical is a consequence of the 
holism of the mental. If Davidson's approach to mind is even approximately correct, then 
the classes of mental states that Blackburn posits are shapeless and as likely to be devoid 
of explanatory power as realism's normative properties. 
There are (at least) two types of consideration of economy, token economy and 
type economy. Two theories that each posit only members of the same type are not 
radically different in overall economy however different may be the number of tokens 
they posit — especially in philosophy, which rarely posits or has much concern with 
particular tokens but rather with types. But if one theory posits, but another does not, 
entire types, then there is a sharp difference in economy between the two theories. 
Since Blackburn is arguing that anti-realist theories have an advantage over realist 
theories on grounds of economy, he is considering either a token- or a type-economic 
advantage. If it's token-economy, then an advantage accrues to the theory that posits the 
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least, regardless of what the posits are. A theory that failed to posit moral attitudes would 
have an advantage over expressivism, which would have an advantage over realism. 
However, given that it's the shapelessness of moral properties that makes them 
objectionable, it appears that Blackburn's argument focuses on type-economic 
consideration: there is a rule against accepting shapeless types. In that case, a theory that 
failed to posit moral attitudes would have an enormous advantage over both expressivism 
and realism, and expressivism would have only a very small advantage over realism. 
To be sure, the objectionable class was listed as 'shapely property M,' not as 
'shapeless property M.' Perhaps Blackburn has the following in mind. Property M is 
really just the shapeless underlying property. But, by treating the property as though it 
were shapely, the realist makes the mistake of treating a shapeless property as though it 
were shapely. Thus Blackburn can object to the introduction of a shapeless property, at 
the same time that he attributes to the realist the belief in a shapely property. But this 
would not be an economy objection. Claiming that a property is shapely, rather than 
shapeless, is not less economical than admitting that it's shapeless. 
Blackburn's comparison of the economies of realism and expressivism contained 
a further difference. Whereas expressivism posits (physicalistically shapeless) classes of 
"attitudes in those with specific affective dispositions," realism posits (also 
physicalistically shapeless) "perception of [normative properties] by those with proper 
affective dispositions  perception of a reason for action." Here, there is 
straightforwardly no difference in economy. Realism posits nothing expressivism doesn't 
also posit. The realist interprets as cognitive the attitudes the expressivist interprets as 
non-cognitive. 
It may be that Blackburn's point is that it's less economical to interpret something 
as a cognition than it is to interpret it as an affective disposition. If so, he hasn't explained 
why one kind of interpretation is more economical than the other. But I think that 
Blackburn understands realism as though it were trying to be more like expressivism than 
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it is. He writes, "...in connection with naturalism, the question to ask of [realism] is why 
nature should have bothered. Having, as it were, forced us into good conative shape, why 
not sit back? Why should this [affective moral response] be merely the curtain-raiser for a 
perceptual system?" (Blackburn 1993, 170) Let me broaden this question, and ask it from 
the point of view of radical interpretation. Why should we ever attribute any beliefs? All 
of our evidence for any attitudinal attribution is behavioral; we attribute attitudes on the 
basis of observed actions, including speech acts. But all actions are, Blackburn would 
say, caused by desires, never beliefs. That includes acts of assertion. Why do we need 
beliefs to help account for actions at all, including assertions? Nature, having gotten 
everything in order when it came to causing action — conation — needn't have bothered 
with cognition at all. 
Obviously, we aren't going to do away with beliefs with this sort of line. Consider 
assertion. We interpret an utterance as an assertion because it has the relevant syntactic 
markers, and when we do so, we also assign a belief in its content. I won't say here why I 
think that we do that, but it's an intrinsic part of our interpretive practice. Whatever 
argument we should use to support a belief in beliefs in general is an argument that runs 
counter to Blackburn's attitudinal economy. We may apply it to moral utterances and 
achieve the same result for moral attitudes. 
Blackburn, however, wrote about a curtain-raiser on a "perceptual" system, 
whereas I treated him as though he were talking about a "cognitive" system. Perhaps I 
should take the choice of words more seriously: perhaps Blackburn is wondering why it 
is that nature needs to give us both a inherent intuition, requiring little or no training, that 
allows us to perceive moral properties, and also the capacity to be motivated by those 
properties. Maybe Blackburn's objection here has to with intuitive cognition, not 
cognition in general. This interpretation would fit neatly with another remark I quoted: 
"Perception is a causal process: we perceive those features of things which are 
responsible for our experiences." But this version of the argument is just as lame as the 
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last one. When arguing against the last version, I didn't say anything about whether the 
assertions for which we attribute beliefs are observation sentences or not. Assume that 
they are. In that case, why don't we do away with the belief (say) that this is red, and 
replace it with a spontaneous desire to assert that this is red? The object's being red could 
cause a desire just as easily as a belief. 
For Blackburn, it seems that expressivism is more economical than realism for 
two reasons. First (though second as I've considered them), realism claims that moral 
attitudes are cognitive. Second (though first as I've considered them), realism accepts the 
existence of shapeless normative classes. These reasons correspond to the two theses of 
realism. The first corresponds to the claim that moral claims are truth-apt, because their 
truth-aptness is explained with reference to their being cognitive. The second corresponds 
to the claim that some truth-apt moral claims are true, as their being true is explained 
with reference to the physicalistically shapeless normative classes. Only the first of these 
specifically involves expressivism. Positing cognitive attitudes is less economical than 
not doing so, but we have, in general, rejected this consideration of economy: we reject it 
every time we attribute any belief at all. The second involves expressivism only insofar 
as expressivism is a form of anti-realism. It suggests that any form of anti-realism enjoys 
an advantage over any form of realism. However, it either suggests that expressivism is 
almost is uneconomical as cognitivism (because it posits equally objectionable shapeless 
classes), or else that expressivism enjoys no more advantage over cognitivism than a 
view that did entirely without shapeless classes of moral attitudes would enjoy over 
expressivism (because expressivism posits some shapeless classes, whereas cognitivism 
posits more). In neither case does expressivism emerge as a winning view. Expressivism 
enjoys no more than a very small economic advantage over realism. 
4.2.2 The Metaphysical Argument  
The metaphysical argument for expressivism deals with the supervenience of the 
moral on the physical. According to Blackburn, moral properties supervene weakly, but 
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not strongly, on physicalistic properties.82 Expressivism can explain this fact, realism 
cannot. Expressivism therefore has greater explanatory power and, if we assume that 
truth tracks explanatory power, expressivism is more likely to be true than realism. As 
with the economic argument, the metaphysical argument is inductive. It may be that, 
though when it comes to supervenience, realism has less explanatory power than 
expressivism, realism has greater explanatory power elsewhere. It may be that, while 
expressivism has more explanatory power than realism, nevertheless some other theory 
has yet more. So we could, in principle, accept the soundness of the metaphysical 
argument without accepting expressivism. As it turns out, we need not accept the 
premises. 
Here are claims for the supervenience relations in question: 
WEAK: Within a given world, if x and y are identical with respect to their non-
moral properties, they are identical with respect to their moral properties. 
STRONG: If x and y are identical with respect to their non-moral properties, they 
are identical with respect to their moral properties, even if x and y are in different 
worlds from one another and/or the speaker. 
According to Blackburn, WEAK is true, but STRONG is not. Expressivism can explain 
WEAK, while realism cannot. 
Any theory that committed itself to strong supervenience would gain weak 
supervenience as a trivial consequence: STRONG implies WEAK. So it may be that a 
realism can explain weak supervenience with reference to strong supervenience. But for 
Blackburn, it's plain that the moral does not strongly supervene on the non-moral: 
It does not seem a matter of conceptual or logical necessity that any given total 
natural state of a thing gives it some particular moral quality. For to tell which 
moral quality results from a given natural state means using standards whose 
correctness cannot be shown by conceptual means alone. It means moralizing, and 
bad people moralize badly, but need not be confused. (Blackburn 1984, p. 184) 
If STRONG is true, then claims of the following sort would be necessarily true (if true): 
                                                
82 Blackburn does not use the vocabulary of strong and weak supervenience. I'm borrowing it from Kim, 
1984. 
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For anything with non-moral properties F1...Fn, that thing has moral property G. 
 This claim is not known to be true as a matter of conceptual or logical analysis. From 
this premise, Blackburn then leaps to the conclusion that the claim is not a necessary 
truth. It seems that Blackburn regards necessity as at least extensionally equivalent to 
analyticity (being logically true) and a prioricity (being conceptually true). But it's now 
widely accepted that that there are synthetic, a posteriori, necessary truths. Unless this 
currently fashionable view is false, Blackburn's argument is a simple non sequitur. So far 
as I know, he's given us no reason to reject the fashion. 
However, it would be unfortunate if realism relied on STRONG: we wish to 
assume as little as possible. So it's important to see why it is that realism is, without 
invoking STRONG, still no less able to account for WEAK than expressivism is. A good 
way to start on this is to look at Blackburn's account of why the expressivist has such an 
easy time accounting for WEAK. But before we can look at his account, there's a 
problem. Expressivism, as a version of anti-realism, denies the existence of moral 
properties. For the expressivist, there are no moral properties to supervene on non-moral 
properties. How can anyone account for the supervenience of properties that don't exist?83 
One way would be to introduce moral properties in some allegedly special, non-
realistic way, while maintaining that moral properties introduced in this special way don't 
violate the original anti-realism. I'll discuss such a project in 4.4 and find it wanting. 
Here, I'll do something less ambitious: I'll come up with some other relevant properties, 
that are not moral properties, but that are such that the expressivist can explain their weak 
supervenience on other non-moral properties. To do this explaining, we should appeal 
directly to expressivism. If a speaker performs a moral utterance, such as "Murder is 
wrong," she expresses her desire that murder not happen. Such an utterance might prompt 
us to look at the properties of murders and see whether any of them explain why the 
                                                
83 I follow my routine of using 'property' and 'predicate' more or less interchangeably; when I affirm that 
some properties supervene on others, I mean either that some universal supervene on others, or else that 
some predicates' application conditions have a supervenience-like relation to other predicates. 
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speaker has this attitude, and the property of causing this sort of non-cognitive attitude 
might be what it is that supervenes on other non-moral properties of murder. So 
expressivism might not commit itself to WEAK, exactly, but rather to: 
QUASI-WEAK: Within a given world, if x and y are identical with respect to 
their other non-moral properties, they are identical with respect to their non-moral 
properties of causing moralistic desires that they (i.e., x and y) occur or exist.84 
This is perhaps not a spectacularly lucid statement of the thesis. The idea is that, whereas 
the realist can divide properties into normative and non-normative ones, and claim that 
normative properties supervene on non-normative ones, the expressivist can't do the same 
because the expressivist doesn't accept normative properties. So the expressivist, in order 
to defend any supervenience thesis, must introduce a distinction among the non-
normative properties. The distinction is between the property of causing moral attitudes, 
and all of the other non-normative properties. The thesis is that if one thing causes a 
certain moral attitude, and a second thing is like the first in every way other than causing 
moral attitudes, then it is also like the first in causing that moral attitude. To allow for 
bad moralizing and hypocrisy, we can allow QUASI-WEAK to be defeasible or 
otherwise soft enough to handle contingencies. 
Why should QUASI-WEAK be true? Blackburn explains that, "Our purpose in 
projecting value predicates may demand that we respect supervenience." (ibid, p. 186) 
Why would that be? Because when we perform a moral utterance, "We intend 
coordination with similar avowals or potential avowals from others, and this is the point85 
of the communication. When this coordination is achieved, an intended direction is given 
to our joint practical lives and choices." (Blackburn 1998, pp. 68-9) The idea appears to 
be that, if our moral attitudes were not systematically related to non-moral properties of 
things (other than their non-moral power to cause moral attitudes), then the point of 
having moral attitudes would be thwarted. If I don't value consistently, I can't coordinate 
                                                
84 STRONG implies WEAK. But neither STRONG nor WEAK imply QUASI-WEAK. 
85 Coordination is not the illocutionary, but the perlocutionary, point. Blackburn's claim is not inconsistent 
with my formulation of expressivism in the terms of speech act theory. 
 243 
my actions with those of others, and so I may as well not have the moral attitudes in the 
first place.86 Expressivism explains QUASI-WEAK with reference to the purpose of 
having moral attitudes. 
The tasks facing the realist and the expressivist are incommensurable. The realist 
must explain WEAK, while the expressivist must explain QUASI-WEAK. However, the 
two theses play similar roles in their respective overall theories, so the burden on the 
realist doesn't seem sufficiently different from the burden on the expressivist to wreck the 
metaphysical argument, which is supposed to show that expressivism has more, not just 
different, explanatory power from realism. 
How might a realist explain WEAK? The trouble with using the metaphysical 
argument to show that expressivism is superior to any version of moral realism is that 
there are many versions of moral realism, and some of them may have a better time of 
explaining WEAK than others. To explain WEAK, one would have to articulate a 
metaphysics of morals. This isn't the place for that, though I make an approach on this 
issue in 5.2.3. The metaphysical argument invites a philosophical set-piece in which the 
realist articulates a complete realistic theory to explain the supervenience. But no such 
set-piece is necessary to defeat the metaphysical argument. The metaphysical argument is 
a comparative argument, and to defeat it it's sufficient to show that expressivism has no 
more explanatory power than realism. One way of doing this is to show that expressivism 
has no explanatory power. So, instead of showing that realism can explain WEAK, I'll 
show that expressivism can't explain QUASI-WEAK — and in the bargain, show that 
expressivism would probably imply something like STRONG if it did imply QUASI-
WEAK. While this extra implication isn't objectionable to everyone, Blackburn would 
find it objectionable. 
                                                
86 I assume that we needn't take seriously Blackburn's exact wording: it's obviously false to say that the 
point of moral utterances is to coordinate utterances; surely the expressivist thinks that the point is to 
coordinate actions in general. 
 244 
For Blackburn's expressivism, the account of QUASI-WEAK is that moral 
utterances aim at coordination. But if we explain QUASI-WEAK with reference to our 
needs for coordination, then QUASI-WEAK should apply only where we have a need to 
coordinate. To make clear the difference between what the expressivist wants and what 
she can have, I'll rephrase QUASI-WEAK (and rename it, BROAD QUASI-WEAK) and 
introduce a new thesis, NARROW QUASI-WEAK: 
BROAD QUASI-WEAK: Within a given world, if x and y are identical with 
respect to their other non-moral properties, then, even if no coordination is 
necessary with respect to x and y, they are identical with respect to their non-
moral properties of causing moralistic desires that they (i.e., x and y) occur or 
exist. 
NARROW QUASI-WEAK: Within a given world, if x and y are identical with 
respect to their other non-moral properties, then, if coordination is necessary with 
respect to x and y, then they are identical with respect to their non-moral 
properties of causing moralistic desires that they (i.e., x and y) occur or exist.87 
Two small points for clarity. First, it's obvious that whether coordination is necessary 
with respect to x and y is not to be one of the "other non-moral properties" in either 
thesis. Second, 'desire' is a generic term for a motivational attitude. On this use of the 
term, I can desire that something happened, or not have happened, in the past. For 
instance, I desire that William have been beaten at Hastings. Also, I can desire that 
something happen or not in a future that I believe won't be realized; for instance, I desire 
that the Greens beat the Reds in Kim Stanley Robinson's science fiction novels about the 
settlement of Mars, even though I don't believe that there will be Greens and Reds. 
Expressivism can account for NARROW QUASI-WEAK. For expressivism, the 
purpose of moral attitudes is to coordinate action. Since, in NARROW QUASI-WEAK, 
coordination with respect to x and y is necessary, and having attitudes that failed to 
respect NARROW QUASI-WEAK would make the attitudes non-coordinating, having 
                                                
87 QUASI-WEAK implies BROAD QUASI-WEAK (through being essentially the same thesis), which 
implies NARROW QUASI-WEAK. Neither STRONG nor WEAK imply or are implied by any of the 
QUASI-theses. 
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attitudes that failed to respect NARROW QUASI-WEAK would defeat the point of 
having the attitudes. So expressivism can account for NARROW QUASI-WEAK. 
However, where coordination is not necessary, neither is supervenience. For 
instance, you and I do not need to coordinate on the subject of whether Julius Caesar 
should have crossed the Rubicon, or on what either of us should do in private. However, 
even though I don't need to coordinate with regard to Caesar, I can have a negative 
attitude toward his treachery, and that attitude needs to line up with my attitudes about 
other people's non-morally similar actions. Likewise, though you and I do not need to 
coordinate on private matters, we often have attitudes about the moral qualities of others' 
private acts. These attitudes and condemnations don't serve the goal of coordination, so, 
on expressivism, there's no reason they should respect the supervenience of the moral on 
the non-moral. 
It's true that we rely on facts about the past to guide us in future moral decisions, 
and that we rely on our judgments about similar private cases in making judgments about 
our own private behavior. But why is that? We feel comfortable relying on the past and 
the wider world as a guide just because we accept the supervenience of the moral on the 
non-moral. So we need to coordinate about the past and matters not of mutual concern 
because we already accept the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral. Blackburn's 
approach inverts the direction of explanation. For Blackburn, the need to coordinate 
explains supervenience. But, in lieu of supervenience, we only need to coordinate our 
attitudes toward future actions of mutual concern. So, in lieu of supervenience, we would 
have no coordinative need that would account for the supervenience of the moral on the 
non-moral in the past, or outside a realm of mutual concern. So there is no expressivist 
explanation for the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral in the past, or outside of 
a realm of mutual concern. Yet supervenience holds in those areas. Expressivism thus has 
no explanatory advantage over realism. 
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To be sure, Blackburn did say that the point of moral utterances was 
"coordination with similar avowals or potential avowals from others," but this claim is 
obviously false. We don't talk so that we can coordinate our talking, we talk so that we 
can coordinate everything that isn't talking. If all we could coordinate were our moral 
utterances, then it would be false that, through coordination, "an intended direction is 
given to our joint practical lives and choices." Our joint practical lives and choices extend 
beyond our moral utterances. Further, the point of coordinating attitudes is only to 
coordinate behavior. Where we have no need to coordinate behavior, we have no need to 
coordinate attitudes. So I assume that Blackburn's wording was off and that expressivism 
does not involve the thesis that our moral talk has no extralinguistic purpose. 
To add insult to injury, I want to point out that, if the expressivist could account 
for QUASI-WEAK, she might also account for: 
QUASI-STRONG: If x and y are identical with respect to their other non-moral 
properties, they are identical with respect to their non-moral properties of causing 
moralistic desires in the speaker that they (i.e., x and y) occur or exist, even if x 
and y are in different worlds (from one another and/or the speaker).88 
Why? Because the expressivist believes that coordination is the point of moral attitudes, 
she is in fact limited to explaining supervenience as it applies to moral discourse where 
coordination is necessary. But, if she could break this limit and account for supervenience 
where coordination is not necessary, then there's no reason to think that she wouldn't 
account for supervenience across worlds. We don't need to coordinate on the subject of 
events that won't take place but could (e.g. as of this writing, Nader's inauguration), just 
as we don't need to coordinate on events in the past (e.g., Caesar's crossing the Rubicon) 
or that otherwise don't involve us (e.g., private behavior). The expressivist who rejects 
STRONG or QUASI-STRONG would need to explain why supervenience applies to 
some moral discourse about which no coordination is necessary, but not others. We can 
argue about the merits of a Nader inauguration, knowing that there will never be one, just 
                                                
88 QUASI-STRONG implies all of the other QUASI-theses, but it neither implies nor is implied by either 
STRONG or WEAK. 
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as we can argue about the merits of Rubicon-crossing, though our attitudes don't help 
coordinate anything, or a private act, though our attitudes have no effect on whether the 
act occurs and hence our coordination (and presumably attitudes) is (are) pointless. 
The metaphysical argument is a comparative argument that tries to show that 
expressivism is more likely to be true than realism because it can explain the weak 
supervenience of the moral on the non-moral. To defeat this argument, it's sufficient to 
show that expressivism has no more explanatory power than realism, and to show this 
point, it's sufficient to show that expressivism has little or no explanatory power when it 
comes to the weak supervenience of the moral on the non-moral. Since the expressivist 
explanation only applies where coordination is necessary, and yet there is moral 
discourse on matters about which coordination is not necessary, the expressivist 
explanation fails. With respect to explanatory power, as with respect to economy, 
expressivism enjoys no advantage over realism. 
4.2.3 The Motivational Argument  
The motivational argument for expressivism is also the motivating argument for 
expressivism; this is the argument which recurs most through Blackburn's later writing, 
and which has the deepest roots in the history of philosophy. 
The motivational argument begins with the standard belief-desire account of 
action. Given an agent's belief that the glass contains caffeine, and her desire to drink 
caffeine, we have an explanation for her drinking the contents of the glass. But neither 
any belief nor any desire could account for any action on its own.89 So, if moral 
utterances present beliefs, then those beliefs require supplementation by desires before 
                                                
89 This may be too simple. A simple action, engaged in as an end in itself, could be explained by a desire 
absent any beliefs. If I desire to wiggle my toes, that desire is probably sufficient on its own to explain my 
wiggling of my toes. The desire might need supplementation by beliefs like that wiggling my toes will not 
cause other things I desire not occur (e.g., nuclear war), but this sort of supplementation seems, on face, 
different from the sort of supplementary belief that tells you that this action will help you fulfill your 
desires. 
 248 
they can help explain moral behavior. Likewise, if they present desires, then those desires 
require supplementation by beliefs before they can help explain moral behavior. 
The discussion of belief-desire explanations is to help show that moral utterances 
present desires: 
It seems to be a conceptual truth that to regard something as good is to feel a pull 
towards promoting or choosing it, or towards wanting other people to feel the pull 
towards promoting or choosing it. Whereas if moral commitments express [i.e., 
moral utterances present] beliefs that certain truth-conditions are met, then they 
could apparently co-exist with any kind of attitude to things meeting the truth-
conditions. Someone might be indifferent to things which he regards as good, or 
actively hostile to them. (Blackburn 1984, p. 188) 
The argument is that, if moral utterances did not present desires, then there would be no 
explanation for our attraction to what we call 'good' or 'right.' The mental states presented 
by our (sincere) moral utterances line up very neatly — not perfectly, but almost — with 
our behavior. Usually, for any x that a speaker calls 'good' or 'right,' that speaker behaves 
in such a way as to bring it about that x exists or occurs. This would be natural if calling 
something 'good' or 'right' expressed the desire that it exist or occur. But if calling 
something 'good' or 'right' only presented the belief that it is good or right, then there 
would be no such explanation. Why can't beliefs incline us toward moral action? Because 
"...we have no conception of a 'truth condition' or fact of which mere apprehension by 
itself determines practical issues. For any fact, there is a question of what to do about it. 
But evaluative discussion just is discussion of what to do about things." (Blackburn 1998, 
p. 70) Unlike the economic and metaphysical arguments, the motivational argument is a 
deductive argument with expressivism as its conclusion. If it is sound, then expressivism 
is true, so I want to lay it out a little more precisely. Here is the motivational argument as 
I understand it: 
1) The mental states presented by our moral utterances help to explain our moral 
behavior. 
2) The mental states presented by our moral utterances help to explain our moral 
behavior if and only if they are motivational. 
Thus, C1) The mental states presented by our moral utterances are motivational. 
3) No motivational mental state is cognitive; they are all non-cognitive. 
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Thus, E1) The mental states presented by moral utterances are non-cognitive. 
The validity is obvious, but of the premises, none is uncontroversial. 
How might the realist deny 2? To deny 2, the realist must accept that the mental 
states presented by our moral utterances do help to explain our moral behavior, but deny 
that they need to be motivational in order to play their explanatory role. Consider this 
explanation of an action: 
Des: that I drink water 
Bel: that if I drink the contents of this cup, then I drink water 
Explains (ceteris paribus) 
Act: that I drink the contents of this cup 
That's pretty straightforward. No one would be tempted to suggest that, were the agent of 
this action to say, "If I drink the contents of this cup, then I drink water," that the agent 
had expressed some non-cognitive attitude about the cup and water. But it's not obvious 
that we should react any differently to this explanation: 
Des: that I do what's most good 
Bel: that if I do this, then I do what's most good 
Explains (ceteris paribus) 
Act: that I do this. 
Why is the expressivist tempted to claim that, if this agent says, "If I do this, then I do 
what's most good," or "This is the most good thing to do," the agent thereby does not 
assert a fact but rather expresses a non-cognitive attitude? What's the difference between 
the two cases? 
When we deny 2, we can see many ways in which the attitudes presented by 
moral utterances could help explain action. They could motivate by being beliefs that an 
action is good, which work in tandem with a desire to do the good. Or each one could 
cause and rationalize a matching desire. Or each one could cause and rationalize a 
matching intention; there's no reason our motivationally powerful attitudes need to be 
desires. Blackburn, however, thinks that the posit of a desire for the good is a concession 
to the expressivist: 
 250 
...we seem to be faced with the following zig-zag structure. We start with 
something bad such as the piano being on your foot. An agent is concerned about 
that. ...But the philosopher worries that this is very mere attitude or emotion on 
the part of the agent. So she substitutes, as the focal point of ethics, that the agent 
believes that she ought to help — a belief that is true, and carries the authority of 
truth. So if an agent fails to believe that she ought to help, it would be an 
Apollonian defect, not merely one of Dionysus. But then, alas, there are immoral 
and amoral agents, who know this truth and do not care about it. Are they 'merely' 
wrong on the Dionysian side? Perhaps we had better find a property of the moral 
belief that should sway them; for instance, that it is reasonable to be swayed by it 
and only it. ...But suppose they do know that it is unreasonable, but just don't care 
about that? ...Eventually, we will be bound to finish by appealing to Dionysus for 
help: 'But don't you care about things going well, or flourishing or social 
coordination, or peace, or contracts?' Fortunately, most agents do care.... All the 
zig-zags have been a delaying tactic, for, as Hume saw, somewhere there will 
always have to be a practical, dynamic state. (ibid, p. 91) 
Perhaps Hume is right, but the fact that there must somewhere be a desire that's relevant 
to the explanation of moral behavior does not imply that that desire must be somewhere 
in particular. It needn't be the one presented by a moral utterance. The zig-zag structure 
would be a delaying tactic for a realist who wants desires to play no role in morality. This 
sort of realist, who tends to put 'mere' before 'desire,' has an allergy to allowing desires to 
play a role in the explanation of moral behavior, but a realist doesn't have to have this 
allergy. The fact that the realist believes that moral utterances are on the side of Apollo 
doesn't mean that she must claim that morality doesn't in any other way involve 
Dionysus. Furthermore, Blackburn needs to account for his choice of motivating attitude: 
why desire? Why must the "practical, dynamic" state be one of "caring," with its 
attendant features extraneous to its motivating function? 
However, I've not yet offered an explanation of the motivational power of moral 
claims. I've shown that it's possible that the mental states that incline us to behave 
ethically line up with our moral utterances. But why should they? 
The answer flows from the holistic constraints on radical interpretation: 
...we could not begin to decode a man's sayings if we could not make out his 
attitudes towards his sentences, such as holding, wishing, or wanting them to be 
true. Beginning from these attitudes, we must work out a theory of what he 
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means, thus simultaneously giving content to his attitudes, and to his words. In 
our need to make him make sense, we will try for a theory that finds him 
consistent, a believer of truths, and a lover of the good... (Davidson 1970, p. 222, 
emphasis added) 
In previous chapters, I've discussed holism as it applies to attitude attributions and 
semantic content attributions. Here, I should narrow the focus and look at holism as it 
applies to normative utterances and motivational states. 
Consider the procedure of radical interpretation. We're proceeding as normal, 
hypothesizing T-sentences, inventing axioms to account for them, generating new 
theorems to test the axioms, often revising the axioms and occasionally rejecting the 
evidence. We suspect that a good axiom for '' might be: for any x, x satisfies '' iff x is 
good. 
The fact that we're necessarily motivated by our moral convictions suggests that 
more will be necessary for us to check this axiom than is necessary for some other 
axioms. For instance, the fact that our informant systematically agrees that good things 
are  will provide excellent evidence for the axiom, but what if she never does anything 
that she regards as ? We would count this as very strong disconfirming evidence for 
our axiom. No predicate can mean what 'good' does unless believing that something 
satisfies that predicate (somehow) inclines the believer toward it. While 'good' predicates 
are ordinary predicates that appear in cognitive judgments, they are by nature closely 
connected with motivation. A speaker's attitude toward an act cannot be captured by our 
concept of the good unless the speaker is inclined toward the act. I provide a more 
detailed argument along these lines in 5.2.4 
Considerations like this lend support to the idea that, to speak a language, one 
must be a lover of the good (in some, perhaps passionless, sense of 'lover'). Since one 
must be inclined toward what one believes to be good to count as having such beliefs, the 
belief that something is good need not itself motivate one toward good behavior. The 
necessary connection between believing that something is good, and wanting it, is 
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provided by a holistic constraint on radical interpretation of normative concepts, not by 
the belief's really being a desire in disguise. 
This account of the connection between motivation and moral conviction is 
superior to the expressivist account. As I'll show in later sections, expressivism has large 
explanatory obligations, and fails to fulfill them. This account, on the other hand, flows 
from an attractive attitudinal holism that stems from general constraints on interpretation. 
My holistic account, then, takes a very large lead on expressivism, at least if the 
arguments of sections 4.3 and 4.4 are correct. 
4.3 THE FREGE-GEACH PROBLEM 
The Frege-Geach problem is the problem of embedding moral utterances in 
complex logical sentences once they have been construed expressivistically, as not truth-
apt.90 For instance, consider the expressivist interpretation of an utterance like, "Your 
action was wrong." For the expressivist, 'wrong' is a pseudo-predicate the linguistic 
function of which is to mark the attitude being expressed toward the subject of the 
sentence. If we represent the cognitivist interpretation of the utterance like this, using the 
Fregean 'judgment stroke' to indicate assertive illocutionary force: 
┣ that your action was wrong 
...then we can represent the expressivist interpretation of the utterance like this, using 'E' 
to represent the expressive illocutionary force: 
E contempt: that you performed your action. 
So far, no problem. But we should ask how expressivism manages utterances like these: 
Ex1) If your action was wrong, then you should be punished. 
Ex2) If your action was murder, then your action was wrong. 
Ex3) If your action was wrong, then you will be punished. 
                                                
90 The seminal presentation of what's come to be known as the Frege-Geach problem is Geach 1965; 
earlier, related discussions are Geach 1960 and Searle 1962. See Price 1994 for discussion. Price, 
unfortunately, tries to help the expressivist avail himself of the same minimalist solution that section 4.4 
will show to be unavailable to the expressivist. 
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Each of the three conditionals has at least one moral pseudo-predicate; Ex1 has two 
('wrong' but also 'should'). 
First, how does the cognitivist deal with these contexts? What, for the cognitivist, 
do the embedded moral propositions mean, when embedded? The cognitivist draws 
immediately on the Fregean lesson that neither the antecedent nor the consequent of a 
conditional is asserted when it appears in the conditional. The assertive illocutionary 
force attaches neither to the antecedent nor to the consequent, but to the conditional as a 
whole. The propositional content of the assertion is logically complex: 
┣ (your action was wrong → you should be punished) 
The cognitivist can offer this interpretation because of the nature of the assertive 
illocutionary force. The assertive force operates directly over contents. Those contents 
can be embedded in logical complexes that can be asserted. So the content is the same, 
whether embedded or not. 
But the expressive force doesn't work that way. What's expressed is not a content, 
but an attitude toward a content. Expressive speech acts are more complicated than 
assertives, because, while both assertives and expressives represent contents, expressives 
also express attitudes toward those contents. Assertives do not express attitudes, not even 
beliefs (though they do present them, since that one believes the content of an assertion is 
the sincerity condition for the assertion). Likewise, if a moral utterance appears as the 
antecedent or consequent of a conditional, it is not being used to express an attitude. 
Expressivism, then, has to explain how a speaker can perform an expressive act without 
expressing anything. 
Attitudes can appear in language in two ways. First, they can be expressed. 
Second, they can be referred to. Blackburn's first (but also his most recent) attempt to 
solve the Frege-Geach problem suggests that sometimes, utterances that would ordinarily 
express attitudes refer to them instead. Such an approach appears by implication in 
Spreading the Word (pp. 193-5), but explicitly in the more recent Ruling Passions: 
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Suppose I say that the sentence 'Bears hibernate' expresses a belief.91 Well, it only 
does so when the sentence is put forward in an assertoric context. So what 
happens when it is put forward in an indirect context, such as 'If bears hibernate, 
they wake up hungry'? For here no belief in bears hibernating is expressed. The 
standard answer is to introduce a proposition or thought, regarded as a constant 
factor in both the assertoric and the indirect context. When we say bears 
hibernate, we express or assert the proposition,92 and represent ourselves as 
believing it; when we say 'If bears hibernate...' we introduce the proposition in a 
different way, conditionally, or as a supposition. Frege thought that in this second 
kind of context we refer to the thought that we assert in the assertoric context. 
(Blackburn 1998, p. 71) 
This leaves a lot to be desired as Frege interpretation. Blackburn's errors begin with his 
failure to grasp the difference between two contexts in which a proposition appears 
unasserted: when it appears embedded in a logically complex utterance, and when it 
appears in an indirect context, such as those defined by "...is true," "I believe that...," and 
so forth. In the latter, indirect, cases, Frege claims that we refer to the thought that we 
would have asserted with the same utterance, had it appeared in a direct context. But 
when I say "If the sky is blue, then grass is green," I have referred to neither the thought 
that the sky is blue, nor the thought that the grass is green. I have referred to no thoughts 
at all, though I have asserted a complex thought that's partly composed of the thoughts 
that the sky is blue and that grass is green. 
Even in the indirect contexts, we don't refer to attitudes. If I assert that, "Bob 
believes that grass is green," I haven't referred to Bob's belief. I've referred to the thought 
that grass is green, but not to Bob's belief in that thought. I've asserted that Bob has such 
a belief. Blackburn is trying to Frege his way out of a Frege-Geach, but his proposal is in 
fact entirely novel: 
If this [the aforementioned pseudo-Fregean story] is allowed to solve the problem 
for ordinary beliefs, it might simply be taken over by the expressivist. In the 
Fregean story a 'proposition' or 'thought' is simply introduced as the common 
element between contexts: something capable of being believed but equally 
                                                
91 Notice that on this sentence's use of 'express,' the objects of this verb are attitudes, such as belief. 
92 Notice that in this sentence, 'assert' and 'express' appear to have the same sense, and the objects of both 
verbs are propositions, not attitudes. It would be nice if expressivists could use the word 'express' in some 
sort of consistent, clear way. 
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capable of being merely supposed or entertained. So why not say the same about 
an 'attitude'? It can be avowed, or it can be put forward without avowal, as a topic 
for discussion, or as an alternative. Just as we want to know the implications of a 
proposition or a thought, we want to know the implications of attitude. What 
implies it, what is it right to hold if it is adopted? (ibid, emphasis original) 
This explanation leaves a lot to be desired. It's not plain that attitudes have implications; 
in fact, whether attitudes have implications (or are implied) is sort of the problem to be 
addressed.93 It's not plain what it is to put forward an attitude one doesn't have, or, 
indeed, to put forward an attitude. But, since it doesn't mean to express the attitude, we 
may guess that it means to refer to the attitude. 
We can gain more insight by returning to the original presentation from Spreading 
the Word: 
...the first thing we need is a view of what we are up to in putting commitments 
into conditionals. Working out their implications, naturally. But how can attitudes 
as opposed to beliefs have implications? At this point we must turn again to the 
projective picture. A moral sensibility, on that picture, is defined by a function 
from input of belief to output of attitude. Now not all such sensibilities are 
admirable.... And amongst the features of sensibilities which matter are, of course, 
not only the actual attitudes which are the output, but the interactions between 
them. For instance, a sensibility which pairs an attitude of disapproval towards 
telling lies, and an attitude of calm or approval towards getting your little brother 
to tell lies, would not meet my endorsement. (Blackburn 1984, p. 192) 
As usual, we're adrift in seas of uncharted language. Moral utterances are here 
commitments, but there's no word on what a commitment might be. We have to guess 
'expressive' and move on. Likewise for endorsement, and again we must guess 
'expressive.' A 'pairing,' presumably, is just two attitudes had by the same person. 
Somehow, though a sensibility is a function from beliefs to non-cognitive attitudes, a 
good example of the workings of sensibility deals with sensibility as a function from non-
cognitive attitudes to other non-cognitive attitudes. Presumably, sensibility can take 
                                                
93 It's worth noting again the difference between Frege's account and Blackburn's: for Frege, we entertain, 
not beliefs, but thoughts, whereas for Blackburn, we entertain attitudes toward thoughts. On the general 
issue of expressivism and logical consistency, see Tersman 1995, van Roojen 1996, and Björnsson 2001. 
van Roojen's discussion included an historical perspective that helped me to see the differences between 
Blackburn's positions across time. Tersman's paper links the issue of consistency with the issue of 
supervenience from section 4.2.  
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either cognitive or non-cognitive attitudes as arguments, and yields non-cognitive 
attitudes as values. 
The point of an apparently logically complex moral utterance, I think Blackburn 
is suggesting, is to express an attitude toward n-tuples of attitudes, where the last member 
of the n-tuple is non-cognitive, and earlier members might be cognitive or non-cognitive. 
In his expressive language, Blackburn adopts the B! and H! operators, as devices to 
indicate expressive illocutionary force as well as the particular attitude expressed; they 
function as moral pseudo-predicates would in English if expressivism were correct. 'B!' 
means 'Boo!,' and 'H!' means 'Hooray!' So for him, we can express an attitude toward 
lying, that goes in English like "Lying is wrong," like this: 
B! (lying) 
...and we can express an attitude about attitudes toward lying and getting your little 
brother to lie, that goes in English like "If lying is wrong, then getting your little brother 
to lie is wrong," like this: 
H! (B! (lying);B! (getting little brother to lie)) 
...where the vertical bars indicate indirect reference, and the semicolon indicates pairing. 
This utterance expresses the Hooray! attitude toward a certain ordered pair of non-
cognitive attitudes. This notation is inadequate to the task, because it doesn't reflect the 
ordering of the members of the pair.94 Blackburn has no way to distinguish between 
expressing the Hooray! attitude that you Boo! lying and that you Boo! getting little 
brother to lie, and expressing the Hooray! attitude that if you Boo! lying, that you then 
also Boo! getting little brother to lie. Though his notation is supposed to represent the 
latter, it clearly represents the former; this is because the semicolon is to represent 
"involve[ment] or coupl[ing]", 95 both of which notions are apparently conjunctive, not 
                                                
94 I draw this point from Hale 1986, pp. 72-75; he makes more or less the same argument at Hale 1993, p. 
343. Blackburn 1993 contains a discussion of the latter paper, but Blackburn mainly skips defenses to the 
modal presentation that I discuss below. 
95 The examples, as well as the explanation of the bars and semicolon, appear in Blackburn 1984, p. 194. 
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conditional.96 The original sentence, "If lying is wrong, then getting your little brother to 
lie is wrong," is supposed to express an attitude toward getting your little brother to lie 
that's conditioned by having a certain attitude toward lying. What Blackburn's 
interpretation gives us is, instead, an attitude toward having a pair of attitudes. The 
original does not express an attitude about what happens if you don't have a problem with 
lying, and also don't have a problem with getting your little brother to lie; Blackburn's 
interpretation does. 
The trouble here is that it's easy to understand what it is to have a pair of attitudes, 
but it's not so easy to understand what it is to infer one attitude from another. The usual 
objects of inferences are propositions, but Blackburn takes for granted that we can infer 
one attitude from others just as though the attitudes were propositions. This is just what 
needs to be explained.97 
 For Frege, the referent of an otherwise assertive utterance in an indirect context is 
a thought or proposition in the abstract, not anyone's belief. Likewise, for Blackburn, the 
referents of the various Boo! and Hooray! utterances, embedded within an utterance 
expressing moral sensibility, are attitudes construed abstractly. We should not agree with 
Frege that there are abstract entities, thoughts, to serve as the contents of attitudes 
(though there are truth-conditions to do the job). But it's clear that attitudes themselves 
are not abstract. Blackburn's notation tries to have reference to the attitudes in the 
abstract, but attitudes are not abstract entities. 
What expressivism needs is some way of displaying these utterances in expressive 
language but that also seems intuitively correct. Consider displaying Ex1 something like 
this (where regard is some suitable positive attitude): 
E regard: that if someone says "E contempt: that you did that" that they then say 
"E regard: that you be punished" 
                                                
96 It's possible that Blackburn has something else in mind, but his failure to define 'pairing' leaves me with 
no other plausible interpretive options. 
97 I draw this point from Zangwill 1992, esp. pp. 180-3, and Schueler 1988, esp. pp. 495-6. 
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Here's an alternative: 
E regard: that if someone has contempt: that you did that, that they then have 
regard: that you be punished 
This seems to match Blackburn's intentions, though to be superior to his own way of 
carrying out those intentions. In this little logic, Blackburn's attitudes have been replaced 
with propositions that make reference to the attitudes; those propositions can include the 
ordered conditional, instead of just Blackburn's conjunctive semicolon. Further, the 
attitudes are not treated as though they were abstract entities. 
Also, unlike with Blackburn's interpretation, we can see how moral reasoning 
might occur. Consider trying to figure out what attitude to have about getting your little 
brother to lie on the basis of the two attitudes expressed here: 
B! (lying) 
H! (B! (lying);B! (getting little brother to lie)) 
The first line gives us nothing, because the second already expresses a positive attitude 
toward having the attitude expressed in the first line. Presumably, the attitude in the 
second line is sufficient to bring it about that the agent with the attitude expressed in the 
second line has both of the conjoined attitudes. But, since the second line expresses an 
attitude already causally sufficient to bring it about that the agent has the Boo! attitude 
toward getting little brother to lie, independently of having the Boo! attitude toward 
lying, there are no logical relations between the attitudes. In English, you cannot infer 
that "Getting your little brother to lie is wrong" from "If lying is wrong, then getting your 
little brother to lie is wrong" in the absence of an affirmation of the antecedent. But that's 
not true in Blackburn's notation. 
Contrast that with the present notation: 
E contempt: that someone lies 
E regard: that, if someone has contempt: that someone lies, then, she has 
contempt: that someone gets his little brother to lie. 
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The second line expresses an attitude about what other attitudes someone should have, 
given that she has the attitude expressed in the first line. So someone who can sincerely 
perform both of these expressive acts should be caused, in a rationalizing way, to have 
the consequent attitude in the second line. 
So the correct translation of Ex1 should be clear. But what about: 
Ex2) If your action was murder, then your action was wrong. 
That isn't too hard. We can notate this as: 
E regard: that if someone says "┣ that your action was murder" that they then say 
"E contempt: that you did that action" 
Here's an alternative: 
E regard: that if someone has belief: that your did action was murder, that they 
then have contempt: that you did that action 
In Ex1, the antecedent is normative, and so is the consequent. So we can interpret the 
utterance, expressivistically, as expressing an attitude toward having one attitude in case 
you have another one. In Ex2, the antecedent is non-normative, and the consequent 
normative. So we can interpret the utterance, expressivistically, as expressing an attitude 
toward having a certain attitude in case you have a certain belief. Ex1 and Ex2, then, both 
relate attitudes to one another; the first relates two desires, the second a belief to a desire. 
But the following will be untranslatable: 
Ex3) If your action was wrong, then you will be punished. 
Here, the antecedent is normative, but the consequent non-normative. Unless the 
speaker is trying to suggest that whether or not you will be punished depends on how she 
feels about your action, there's no way to interpret this utterance in the expressivist 
notation I'm developing. The problem is that this sentence can't reasonably be construed 
as relating two attitudes. It takes something the expressivist construes as an attitude, and 
relates it to an independent fact. For further examples, consider: 
-No good deed goes unpunished. 
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-The most immoral politician is the one with the best chance of getting elected. 
Surely my high regard for your deed does not trigger punishment of you, and my low 
regard for a politician's character does not increase his chances of election. So the (rather 
silly) interpretation that the expressivist could offer obviously fails. 
Ex3 is a moralistic explanation.98 These explanations at least appear to appeal to 
moral facts. There may be no such facts to which to appeal, in which case every such 
explanation is false. But if our moral discourse never appeals to moral facts, as it would 
not if expressivism were correct, there would be no such thing as moralistic explanations, 
whether true or false. Yet there are. 
A first move that the expressivist might try is to adopt a local error theory of 
moral explanations: most of our moral discourse is expressive and fully successful, but all 
of our moralistic explanations are cognitivist and false. Such a move would be 
implausibly ad hoc: what's the expressivist explanation for our indulging in moral 
explanations, if nowhere else in our moral discourse do we speak as though there were 
moral facts? 
Blackburn tries three maneuvers to deal with moralistic explanations; I'll discuss 
two of them in this section and the third in the next. The first is to suggest that "the 
explanations are elliptical. Someone's citing injustice as the cause of revolution might be 
adverting to the population's perception of injustice, or belief that they are victims of 
injustice." (Blackburn 1990, pp. 204-5) Since, according to expressivism, there is no 
injustice to perceive and no beliefs about injustice, we need to reconstrue Blackburn's 
interpretation. For Blackburn, injustice played no causal role in the revolution; negative 
attitudes toward the rulers by the revolting populace must be the explanation intended by 
the speaker. This maneuver can be defeated by sheer stubbornness. If a speaker insists 
                                                
98 Gilbert Harman discusses moral explanations in Harman 1977, especially pp. 3-26; this led into a debate 
with Nicholas Sturgeon that includes Sturgeon 1984, Harman 1986, Sturgeon 1986a, and which led into 
Brighouse 1990, Blackburn 1990, and Sturgeon 1991. I've especially drawn from Brighouse's paper for this 
discussion of moral explanations. 
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that he was, in fact, trying to explain the revolution with reference to the injustice of the 
rulers, and not with reference to anyone's attitudes about anything, then the expressivist 
can no longer offer her reinterpretation. In some Christian and Marxist traditions, history 
is regarded as teleological, with the moral goal of a certain kind of society drawing events 
toward it without anyone so intending. Likewise, Confucian discussions of the Mandate 
of Heaven might not be best understood as indirect discussions of peoples' attitudes, but 
as discussions of the causal power of a real moral force. The expressivist can't correctly 
interpret these traditions if she refuses to accept that they are making the claims they 
make, and those claims turn on the explanatory power of morality. 
Blackburn admits that the first maneuver will often fail. For instance, the decency 
and humanity with which a child is raised will have an effect on that child's dispositions 
and well-being, independent of the child's beliefs about the decency and humanity of her 
upbringing. Thus Blackburn introduces: 
...the second projectivist line, which is that the explanation points downward to 
the properties upon which the moral verdict depends. According to me, an 
upbringing is decent and humane in virtue of other features — meeting the child's 
needs, engaging with its attempts at action and communication, and so on — and I 
may simply point toward those other, causally powerful properties by using the 
moral predicate. (ibid) 
What are 'the properties upon which the moral verdict depends?' The moral verdict is one 
of the moral attitudes, and those attitudes are brought about by features of the world. For 
instance, the attitude "Hooray! That you bring up your child like this" is caused by the 
facts that you meet your child's needs, engage with its attempts at action and 
communication, and so on. 
This interpretation will be hard for the expressivist to sustain. Imagine that I 
become aware that you bring up your child in such a way that her needs are met. 
Alternately, imagine that I become aware that you bring up your child in such a way that 
you engage with her attempts at action and communication. My reaction in either case 
will be the same: I'll regard your child-rearing practices as decent and humane. But why 
 262 
is that? For the expressivist, there is no such property, decency or humanity, that your 
different child-rearing practices instantiate. So what makes both your meeting of your 
child's needs, and your engagement with her attempts at action, instances of decency or 
humanity? Nothing holds the two physically distinct practices together morally. The 
expressivist must posit two psychological laws: seeing a child's needs met will generate a 
certain attitudinal response, and seeing a parent engage with a child will generate the 
same attitudinal response, even though the two stimuli are in no way similar except that 
they trigger the same response. The expressivist then owes us an explanation of this 
phenomenon: why the same response to different stimuli? The realist, on the other hand, 
can claim that these are different instances of the same stimuli: decency, or humanity. 
Each instance of meeting a child's needs is also an instance of decency or humanity. The 
realist then has an explanation for the similar responses. 
But even if the expressivist could deal with moralistic explanations, she has not 
dealt with every conditional with a normative antecedent and a non-normative 
consequent. Consider another conditional: "If Bob is rational and carries an umbrella, 
then Bob believes that it's going to rain." Action explanations and content attributions are 
all carried out against the normative background of rationality; this is a consequence of 
attitudinal holism. If Bob is a lunatic and carries an umbrella, then we don't know 
anything at all about his beliefs; he may be carrying the umbrella to protect himself from 
Napoleon, the Emperor of the Hippopotami. We can make content attributions on the 
basis of observable behavior only in light of the relations of rationalization that lie 
between the attributed content and the observable behavior. We attribute to people belief 
in the content of their assertions, for instance, but we would stop if we found out that they 
were compulsive liars or otherwise irrational about their speech. 
Content attributions made on the basis of observable behavior are not explained 
by the behavior. So an expressivist account of moral explanations wouldn't help with 
utterances relating content attributions to observable behavior relative to the normative 
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property of rationality. There are more conditionals with normative antecedents and non-
normative consequents than there are conditionals that are normative explanations. 
Blackburn's first attempt to solve the Frege-Geach problem appears to fail when 
confronted by some moralistic conditionals. 
Blackburn has offered an alternate solution to the problem in his paper "Attitudes 
and Contents." Here the solution is to articulate a logic for expressives that has modal 
roots.99 This solution makes no reappearance in Blackburn's 1998 Ruling Passions, but 
the earlier solution does reappear. The relation between the two solutions is nebulous, 
and it's not clear whether Blackburn has given up the modal solution or whether he thinks 
that it's consistent with the first solution. In any event, the modal solution is not 
successful. 
The solution begins with standard definitions of models and model sets, but 
moves on to allow the model sets to include special expressive sentences with H! and T! 
operators. The H! operator is familiar from the H! and B! operators earlier. The T! 
operator is to express tolerance of the propositional content of the expressive. There is no 
B! operator. The general idea is that the H! operator specifies a propositional content that 
is true in every ideal world, while the T! operator specifies a propositional content that is 
true in some ideal world. H! thus corresponds to expressive necessity, T! to expressive 
possibility. Hence: 
~H!(p)  T!~(p) 
~T!(p)  H!~(p) 
~H!~(p)  T!(p) 
~T!~(p)  H!(p) 
H! and T! sentences, of course, aren't susceptible to being true or false. Thus the negation 
signs that appear before the H! and T! markers are not the truth-functional negation. It's 
unclear what they might be; an expressive act can't be truth-functionally negated, but 
                                                
99 He draws on Hintikka 1969a. 
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there's no other kind of negation in the offing. We negate real moral utterances all the 
time, but it's not possible to negate expressive speech acts. What it is to negate one of the 
H! or T! sentences is what needs to be explained. 
This may be the most basic version of the Frege-Geach problem. Our real moral 
discourse employs negation over the entire contents of speech acts. But expressive 
discourse can't. The attitude presented by an expressive speech act can't be negated in a 
speech act. Consider the example of expressing a positive attitude toward the Yankees; 
this might take the form of "Go Yankees!" What would it be to perform an expressive 
speech act in which the positive attitude itself is negated? It's easy to express a different, 
conflicting attitude ("Boo Yankees!"). But how would one negate the positive attitude? If 
it appears negated, it must not exist; if it doesn't exist, then it can't be sincerely expressed. 
So far as I know, it's not possible to express the negation of an attitude. It's not clear what 
the negation of an attitude (as distinct from the absence of the attitude) would even be. 
The use of negation in a discourse is the most obvious sign that that discourse is 
intended to be truth-apt.100 It's through negation that falsehood, and hence truth, most 
obviously enters a discourse. So the presence of negation in moral discourse is the most 
obvious sign that moral discourse is truth-apt and that expressivism is false. Any 
expressivist re-interpretation of our moral discourse must either misinterpret that 
discourse, by leaving out negation of the entire contents of speech acts, or else introduce 
negation and, along with it, truth. 
Though they can't be true or false, H! and T! sentences can be satisfied, by way of 
taking contents that obtain. If p is true in a world, then H!(p) is satisfied in the same 
world. Consistency is a relation between satisfaction conditions. H!(p) is inconsistent 
with H!~(p), because the satisfaction of an H! sentence in a world requires the obtaining 
                                                
100 Thanks to Josh Dever for helping me get clearer on the relation between negation and truth-aptness. I 
should also mention that Dever's introduction of material on minimalism and expressivism (the debate 
starting with Smith, Michael, 1994) was enormously helpful to me when it came to understanding 
Blackburn later on. 
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of its content in that world, but T!(p) is consistent with T!~(p), as the satisfaction of a T! 
sentence in a world doesn't require the obtaining of its content in that world, but only in 
some of the next successive realizations of the ideal relative to that world. 
But now how does this help with moral conditionals, especially with moral 
antecedents and non-moral consequents? The normative and non-normative sentences 
can be connected by the conditional; for instance, p  H!(q) might represent "If you 
committed a murder, then you should be punished," with p representing "you committed 
a murder" and q representing "you are punished." The conditional, then, will say that, if 
we're in a world in which you committed a murder, then we're in a world in which 
Hooray! You being punished. But just what it is to imply "Hooray! something" is what 
needs to be explained. 
Further, there's no progress on the most problematic conditionals, ones with 
normative antecedents and non-normative consequents. H!(p)  q makes no sense, as it 
appears to say that, if I express a positive attitude toward some fact, then some other fact 
obtains. That is, as a rule, not true, and not what the speaker wants to say. The problem, 
as before, is not solved by translation schemes. What it is for "Hooray! something" to 
imply something else (other than another expressive) is what needs to be explained. 
Blackburn explains how this is supposed to help: "...endorsing the involvement 
[e.g., (~A v C), as a reading of (A  C)] is tying oneself to the tree: in other words, tying 
oneself to restricting admissible alternatives to those in which ~A, and those in which C. 
You have one or the other." (Blackburn 1988b, p. 197) But to what, exactly, is the 
speaker committing herself? Assume that a speaker says that H!(p)  q. She has said that 
q is true under a certain circumstance. But what circumstance is that? It can't be that 
H!(p) is satisfied; if that were the case then: 
[H!(p)  q]  [p  q] 
...which is, at best, obviously false; at worst, we really don't know what to do with the 
entire sentence as it truth-functionally relates something without a truth-value to things 
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with truth-values. The only thing that q can depend on is the attitude expressed by H!(p). 
But it's obvious that, if I say that no good deed goes unpunished, I am not saying that my 
regard for a deed causes it to bring punishment. 
Blackburn can't account for certain of our moral utterances: conditionals with 
normative antecedents and non-normative consequents. The point is not that he must 
claim that they are all false; he can't claim that. The point is that he must systematically 
misinterpret them. His two solutions to the problem are notational variations on a theme, 
and neither of them can explain how it is that I can try to explain an event with reference 
to a normative fact if nothing in my language suggests the existence of normative facts. 
Cognitivism takes a large inductive lead over expressivism, because cognitivism can 
correctly interpret these utterances that, correctly or incorrectly, we make with some 
frequency. 
4.4 EXPRESSIVISM AND TRUTH 
The second embedding problem for the expressivist deals with moral utterances 
appearing in sentences in which they precede "...is true," or follow "I believe that..." or 
"It's true that...." Of course, these aren't the only such sentences, but they're the core 
sample. When we utter sentences like these, we seem to be asserting that various 
propositions are true, or that they're the contents of our beliefs. But for expressivism, our 
moral utterances don't present any propositional contents as true; nor do we have moral 
beliefs. So, for expressivism, it seems that, "It's true that murder is wrong" is false, even 
though the expressivist might agree that murder is wrong. Further, even an expressivist 
who sincerely agrees that murder is wrong would not be able to sincerely say, "I believe 
that murder is wrong," since, of course, if she's right, then she has no moral beliefs. (Thus 
the expressivist is in the odd position of having to say the following: "Murder is wrong. 
But what I've just said is not true and I don't believe it.") Since "It's true that..." and "I 
believe that..." utterances with complete moral sentences replacing the ellipses play a 
major role in real-life moral discourse, it will turn out, on expressivism, that quite a lot of 
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our real-life moral discourse will be false. But a major point of expressivism was to save 
our moral discourse from the threat of moral scepticism; unless these consequences can 
be avoided, expressivism has failed to achieve its objective. But further, the fact that 
these moral utterances exist in contradiction to expressivist notions about the point of our 
moral discourse provides strong evidence that expressivism is false. 
Blackburn's strategy for rejecting the apparent consequence involves trying to get 
moral utterances to be truth-apt, and to present the contents of beliefs, while denying that 
there's anything cognitive or representational about truth-aptness or beliefs. The strategy 
has actually shown up twice before, in sections 4.2.2 and 4.3. In 4.2.2, I discussed the 
metaphysical argument that expressivism can account for the supervenience of the moral 
on the non-moral, while realism can't. One of the problems with the metaphysical 
argument is just trying to phrase it: if there are no moral properties, then it's hard to 
explain how they supervene on anything. In 4.2.2, I gave the expressivist some properties 
— of causing moralistic responses in people — that went proxy for real moral properties. 
But I also pointed out that the expressivist might try to introduce moral properties, while 
insisting that the expressivist's moral properties don't violate the ban on moral properties, 
though the realist's moral properties do. For the expressivist to pursue that strategy is for 
the expressivist to introduce something corresponding to moral predicates, and hence to 
do a large part of the work for the introduction of moral propositions; if the expressivist 
could carry off such a project in a non-realist way, then she is closer to solving the second 
embedding problem. 
In 4.3, I noted that Blackburn presents three maneuvers designed to help deal with 
the phenomenon of moral explanation. While two of them were found wanting in 4.3, one 
of them remains to be dealt with. The remaining maneuver is the attempt to introduce 
moral explanations that don't violate the ban on using moral properties to explain things. 
The original Frege-Geach problem would be solved as a side-effect of some ways 
of solving the second embedding problem. The Frege-Geach problem emerges from the 
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fact that moral utterances sometimes appear in contexts that require truth-apt utterances, 
but expressive speech acts aren't truth-apt. But if they were truth-apt after all, then the 
Frege-Geach problem would disappear. 
The maneuver used to solve these problems (and, by extension, the Frege-Geach 
problem) is minimalism about truth, belief, and properties.101 I'll begin by addressing 
minimalism about properties, since this allows me to tie up the loose ends I've just 
mentioned and leads in to the deeper issues about truth and belief. The reason to 
introduce minimalism about properties is to solve the problem about moral explanations I 
discussed in the last section, as well as to make sure that we can express the 
supervenience of the moral on the non-moral. On this view, F-ness is a property just in 
case a sentence of the form "Fa" is meaningful, for some suitable a. 
According to Blackburn, should the first two solutions to the problem of moral 
explanation fail, the expressivist can always just introduce moral properties with 
explanatory power that are nevertheless not the properties that the moral anti-realist was 
concerned to deny: 
It will not be obvious that this position is available to the projectivist. But here is 
a sketch of the way it might be. The first part is to establish our right to talk of the 
moral feature or property. Now, if the projectivist adopts quasi-realism, he ends 
up friendly to moral predicates and moral truth. He can say with everyone else 
that various social arrangements are unjust, and that it is true that this is so. Once 
this is said, no further theoretical risks are taken by saying that injustice is a 
feature of such arrangements, or a quality that they possess and that others do not. 
The first step, in other words, is to allow propositional [i.e., assertive] forms of 
discourse, and once that is done we have the moral predicate, and features are 
simply abstractions from predicates. (Blackburn 1990, p. 206) 
                                                
101 The combination of minimalism (or related deflationary views) with expressivism, despite its 
contradictory nature, is actually a classic view. Perhaps the first to combine expressivism with minimalism 
was Ayer himself. Seminal for contemporary discussions of the problems with trying to combine 
expressivism with minimalism is Boghossian 1990. Several philosophers agree with Blackburn that 
minimalism and expressivism make a nice pair; see Stoljar 1993, Smith, Michael, 1994a, b, Jackson, Oppy, 
and Smith 1994. For the view that minimalism demotivates expressivism, see Divers and Miller 1994 and 
Horwich 1994. I draw heavily on the latter papers. I also ignore my discussion of minimalism from chapter 
one, since focusing on the errors of minimalism would distract from trying to understand Blackburn. 
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Blackburn speaks of quasi-realism, his famous project that I haven't yet mentioned. 
According to the expressivist, our moral utterances have as their illocutionary point to 
express desires. Yet their overt linguistic shape is undeniably assertive, not expressive. 
So the expressivist must explain why, though there's nothing assertive about our moral 
discourse, nevertheless, there's nothing expressive about the appearance of our moral 
discourse. Quasi-realism is Blackburn's attempt to do this job of explaining. 
Section 4.3 was partly about one version, the translation version, of quasi-realism. 
On translational quasi-realism, the quasi-realist provides translations into an overtly 
expressive language of our apparently assertive moral utterances. Then she explains why 
expressive moral language is, so to speak, our first moral language, and why we always 
speak in a second, apparently assertive, language. The translation schemes between real 
moral language and expressive language are the first thing the translational quasi-realist 
must generate. To explain why we dress up our ejaculations in assertive language, the 
expressivist must first explain which ejaculations we have dressed up, and how; she must 
systematically relate our actual moral language to some moral language that wears its 
expressive nature "on its sleeve." In 4.3, I showed how an expressivist could translate 
some of our moral utterances into expressivistic language, but that she could not translate 
our moral explanations into expressivist language; I conclude that translational quasi-
realism fails. Stating what non-cognitive attitude we express in giving moral explanations 
is part of translational quasi-realism. Unless that sub-project is complete, translational 
quasi-realism can't be appealed to. Blackburn's third way of dealing with moral 
explanations begins by appealing to his completed project (that the expressivist "adopts 
quasi-realism" is sufficient for her to "become friendly to moral predicates and moral 
truth"); that's the project that he's working on at the moment. He can't further his project 
by appealing to it. 
I want to look at how that third way was to continue once quasi-realism allowed 
for the introduction of moral properties. Expressivism has more than the semantic 
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problem of securing reference to moral properties; it also has the metaphysical problem 
of accounting for the explanatory powers of those properties. If the expressivist secures 
reference to moral properties, but in such a way as to guarantee that any moral properties 
to which we can refer has no explanatory power, then it will turn out that all of our moral 
explanations were false; again, that we give such explanations will exceed the 
explanatory power of expressivism, and expressivism will have to yield before moral 
scepticism. 
Blackburn explains that moral properties might have causal power because an 
account, similar to Davidson's and Lewis's mental-physical token-identity theories, or 
Jackson and Pettit's programme explanation theory, might hold for moral properties. Each 
instance of a moral property might also be an instance of some physical property with 
causal powers, and that would account for the causal powers of the instance of the moral 
property. 
The trouble with this extension of the solution is that it's substantive and realist, 
not minimalist. Consider it in relation to the analogous Davidsonian account of mental 
causation. For Davidson, each mental event is also a physical event. This is obviously a 
realist account of the mental; for on the account, the mental is the physical, and we're 
realists about the physical. Likewise for Blackburn's account of moral properties. If the 
moral is the physical, then, unless we're anti-realists about the physical, then we're 
realists about the moral. Blackburn can introduce moral properties into moral 
explanations only at the expense of affirming realism about moral properties. 
The translational method is not the only version of quasi-realism. There is also the 
minimalist version. On minimalism about truth and belief, "p" is truth-apt just in case 
sentences of the following forms are meaningful: "'p' is true," or "It's true that p"; "p" 
presents a belief just in case a sentence of the following form is meaningful: "I believe 
that p."  
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On this version, there's no contradiction between a language "wearing its 
expressive force on its sleeve" and being truth-apt and presenting the contents of belief. 
Every utterance that appears to assert the obtaining of content will do so; every utterance 
that appears to present the content of a belief will do so. Minimalism removes any 
appearance-reality gap when it comes to assertiveness. Looking like an assertion, for 
minimalism, is sufficient for being an assertion. 
However, minimalism implies the first claim of realism, cognitivism: some moral 
claims are truth-apt. That's why Blackburn adopts minimalism to save expressivism from 
the second embedding problem. If we accept minimalism, then we have a neat 
explanation for the truth-aptness of moral utterances, and that truth-aptness would solve 
the second embedding problem. However, the truth-aptness of moral utterances is 
precisely what cognitivism claims exists, and what any non-cognitivism must deny. 
Blackburn seems to be explaining phenomena that he should be denying. Blackburn tries 
to avoid this implication in two ways. Here's the first: 
Subtlety with the concept of belief, or with the concept of truth or of fact, may 
enable the expressivist to soften this opposition [between realism and 
expressivism]. Theory may enable us to understand how a commitment with its 
center in the expression of subjective determinations of the mind can also function 
as expressing belief, or be capable of sustaining the truth predicate — properly 
called 'true' or 'false'.... It means separating truth (in this application at least) from 
'represents' and its allies, but nobody has ever pointed out the harm in that. 
(Blackburn 1993, p. 185) 
The parenthetical phrase makes the passage a little hard. There are two possibilities. On 
one possibility, Blackburn adopts general minimalism, minimalism about all regions of 
discourse, and holds that the minimalist concept of truth is the one and only concept of 
truth. In that case, his view entails cognitivism. The cognitivism of the minimalist is thin, 
in that truth has been separated from notions it had been thought connected with, such as 
representation or correspondence. But nevertheless, if minimalism is the correct theory of 
truth, then all that the realist needed to show in order to defend her claim that moral 
utterances are truth-apt is that they are minimalistically truth-apt; since it's obvious that 
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our moral utterances are minimalistically truth-apt, cognitivism will be a truism. 
Minimalism, so far from giving expressivism greater explanatory power, makes 
cognitivism trivially true (and hence any theory, such as expressivism, that denies it, 
trivially false). 
However, it may be that truth is to be separated from representation or 
correspondence only in some regions of discourse. All truth concepts would share the 
commitments of minimalism about truth. But some truth concepts might have substance, 
and different truth concepts might have different substance. It might be that the truth 
concept that applies to our non-normative discourse is the correspondence notion of truth, 
while the truth concept that applies to our normative discourse has more to do with 
acceptability at the end of normative reflection, or in reflective equilibrium. In that case, 
since Blackburn isn't applying a cognitive notion of truth to normative discourse, and is 
not applying to normative discourse the same notion of truth he applies to non-normative 
discourse, his minimalism will have no implications about the cognitive content of 
normative utterances. In that case, Blackburn's minimalism would allow him to have his 
truth-aptness, without accepting anything disreputably cognitive. 
Blackburn gives no reason to believe that we do in fact mean to say something 
different about a moral utterance when we embed it in "It's true that..." than when we 
embed a non-moral proposition in the same context.102 But more important, the solution 
is problematic in other ways. Consider the Frege-Geach problem. Translational quasi-
realism failed to solve the Frege-Geach problem, but minimalist quasi-realism held out 
hope. Even if minimalism plus a diversity of truth concepts could solve the second 
embedding problem, it could not solve the first. A valid argument is truth-preserving. But 
if the premises of an argument had different sorts of truth, what sort of truth would be 
                                                
102 The fact that he offers no such reason encourages us in the belief that he intends to adopt minimalism 
across the board, but his parenthetical remark would then be misleading. There's really no telling exactly 
where Blackburn intends to apply his minimalism. 
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preserved in the conclusion? Would it be substantive, cognitive, representative truth? Or 
minimal, expressive, non-representative truth? Consider this example: 
You are a captain. 
A captain should go down with his ship. 
Thus, you should go down with your ship. 
The argument appears to be valid. But the truth concepts to be applied to the two 
premises are different, since one of the premises is non-normative and the other is 
normative. So which kind of truth is preserved through to the conclusion? Since the 
conclusion is normative, presumably we're to apply to it the notion of truth that applied to 
the second premise. But this notion of truth is non-cognitivist and non-correspondentist; 
it has to do, perhaps, with what we would accept at the end of moral reflection. What is 
the reason for believing that the first premise, which was true in a cognitive way, would 
have implications about what we would accept at the end of moral reflection? Also, 
consider this example: 
You should go down with your ship. 
Only captains should go down with their ships. 
Thus, you are a captain. 
Again, the argument is valid. The truth of the premises should be preserved through to 
the conclusion. But while both premises are normative, the conclusion is not. Somehow, 
the normative notion of truth has dropped out of this inference, and been replaced with 
the cognitive notion of truth, even though truth was preserved. 
I've looked at two versions of quasi-realism, translational and minimalist. 
Translational quasi-realism failed to even get started, since it couldn't offer translations 
for some of our moral utterances. Minimalist quasi-realism fails for one of two reasons. 
First, if minimalism is adopted across the board, then cognitivism is a direct implication, 
and expressivism is false. Second, if minimalism is adopted only for moral utterances or 
as a basis for assigning different notions of truth to different regions of discourse, then 
the original Frege-Geach problem, that various apparently valid inferences would go 
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invalid, would remain unsolved; also, the second reading of minimalism has no 
buttressing argument. 
I want to continue to consider the prospects of general minimalism as a defense of 
expressivism, since we can gain some insight into Blackburn's proposal by looking into 
this line of argument; this is also where I'll look at Blackburn's second attempt to avoid 
the cognitivist implication of his minimalist maneuver. On general minimalism, 
expressivism appears to have been a waste of time. Realism consists partly in 
cognitivism, the claim that our moral utterances are truth-apt. Expressivism was supposed 
to be an alternative to realism because it's an alternative to cognitivism. But by adopting 
general minimalism, the expressivist accepts cognitivism. Why the detour? If we were 
going to end up as cognitivists anyway, and we were going to be forced to by evidence 
that was available at the outset, why waste our time with expressivism?103 Blackburn 
replies, 
But in fact this is no objection, and there is no tail-biting. We must remember 
Wittgenstein's dismissive attitude to invocations of truth and representation when 
he is dealing with the kinds of commitment that interested him. Just because of 
minimalism about truth and representation, there is no objection to tossing them 
in for free, at the end. But the commitments must first be understood in other 
terms. (Blackburn 1998, p. 80; second emphasis mine) 
This contrast between the beginning and end of inquiry is a frequent theme in Blackburn; 
here it shows up again: 
...by now many readers will be wondering what remains that is distinctive of 
projectivism. In the old days (they will complain) it was easy: we knew what 
emotivists and prescriptivists stood for. But this new, conciliatory position is 
harder to pin down, harder to recognize as a position. My view has always been 
that it is a question of explanation, of 'placing' our propensity for ethics within a 
satisfactory naturalistic view of ourselves. I distinguish between the ingredients 
with which you start, and what you can legitimately end up saying as you finish. 
To place ethics, I deny that we can help ourselves to moral features and 
explanations from the beginning. We have to see them as constructions, or, as I 
call it, projections, regarding ourselves as in the first instance as devices sensitive 
                                                
103 Sturgeon addresses the issue of whether the expressivist and the realist should accept this position and 
stop arguing in Sturgeon 1986b. 
 275 
only to natural facts and producing only explicable reactions to them. (Blackburn 
1990, pp. 207-8) 
What I think this remark might suggest is that Blackburn is in fact pursuing a project, not 
stating a theory. When it comes to the truth of a theory, it doesn't matter in what order 
you say things. But when it comes to pursuing a project, you must go in the right order. 
I'll call this project explanatory quasi-realism, since I think it's a third attempt to 
escape the embedding problems. While we are to "construct" moral properties and 
explanations, and explain why we speak as though there were such things, we have to 
construct them out of something and explain them on the basis of something. We are to 
construct them out of "natural" facts, and "explicable" responses to those facts, because 
these are available to us "in the first instance." But first instance of what sequence? By 
defining alternative sequences in which we progress, constructively, from expressivist 
reality to cognitivist appearance, we define alternative versions of explanatory quasi-
realism. 
Explanatory quasi-realism may be the larger project within which translational 
quasi-realism would find life. Explanatory quasi-realism will give some constructive 
sequence. At the beginning of the sequence, there will be nothing moralistic; at the end 
will be our seemingly cognitivist moral discourse. To give intuitive sense to the 
beginning of the sequence, we can use a moral language that displays its expressive 
nature on its sleeve. The construction will be the explanation of how we got to our real 
moral discourse from the original, expressive discourse. Translation, then, will play at 
least a pedagogical or presentational role in explanatory quasi-realism, because the 
translations give us access to the explanatory base. 
It may be that the construction happened across historical time. Perhaps 
Blackburn thinks that there was once a primal moral language that was overtly 
expressive, and that that language shifted into our apparently assertive moral language. 
He certainly hasn't said anything that would explain that shift, and so hasn't said anything 
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relevant to reconstructing any such shift. Maybe the sequence is psychological or 
biographical. Perhaps Blackburn thinks that we construct our moral language on the basis 
of desires in much the way the positivists thought that we construct our scientific 
language on the basis of scraps of sensation. If that's the goal, then he's started the 
reconstruction. The first step in such a reduction of scientific language to sensation 
language would be to generate a sensation language into which we could translate 
scientific language; the second step would be to prove that the scientific language was 
actually constructed out of the sensation language to which we're trying to reduce it. 
Blackburn has tried to generate some parts of the corresponding expressive language, 
though he's never said anything that would encourage us to think that the expressive 
language he created provides the basis for our moral language. So again, we have little 
guidance in guessing what the project might be. 
A third option would have it that the sequence is from reality to appearance. Our 
real moral discourse is expressive; it only appears to be assertive. Maybe what's to be 
explained is why there is something in the world that takes this particular appearance. In 
reality, there are only desires, and expressions of those desires, and actions to satisfy 
those desires. The desires appear in the guise of beliefs, the expressions appear in the 
guise of assertions, and the actions to satisfy the desires appear in the guise of behavior 
subject to moral considerations (of which there are none in reality). The difference 
between expressivism and scepticism is that the expressivist will try to "preserve the 
appearances" in the sense that she won't try to argue us out of accepting those 
appearances (in some sense of "accept"). But if that's the sequence, then the reality seems 
inexplicable to expressivism. We treat moral utterances as truth-apt, but they aren't really. 
Why would we treat moral utterances as truth-apt, if they weren't? And why wouldn't we 
be in error to do so? Blackburn has created expressivist languages for moral discourse in 
his effort to explain what we really mean by our apparently assertive moral discourse. 
Why don't we speak one of those? Expressivism is a non-starter until it can explain why 
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our cognitive-seeming moral discourse looks so very little like the non-cognitive reality 
allegedly underlying it.
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5 Moral Realism and Moral Scepticism 
5.0 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is the culmination of my defense of moral realism. In it, I offer a new 
version of moral realism called Hermeneutical Moral Realism, and show that this theory 
can explain what expressivists cannot, offer an appealing approach to moral principles, 
and withstand very sophisticated sceptical attacks. 
In the first section, I begin to place my theory within an historical context by 
discussing what's known as New Wave Moral Realism. New Wave Moral Realism is the 
nearest logical relative to Hermeneutical Moral Realism; it's my Kantian approach's 
Aristotelian cousin. The New Wave theory is designed to respond to Moore's Open 
Question argument, and I discuss the dialectic between Moore's concern and the New 
Wave. 
In the second section, I offer my own version of moral realism. I stress the 
application of externalism and holism to the hermeneutics, and hence the nature, of moral 
beliefs. The fact that moral beliefs' contents are their truth-conditions undermines moral 
scepticism. The holistic nature of moral beliefs underwrites an approach to the nature and 
importance of moral principles that is modestly particularistic, and yet recognizes that the 
employment of moral principles is essential to most moral reasoning. Further, inter-
attitudinal holism accounts for the relationship between moral beliefs and moral action 
more satisfyingly than alternative accounts. 
In the final section, I reply to the moral sceptic. First, I deal with J. L. Mackie's 
standard arguments. Then, I turn to a later development offered in reply to the New 
Wave, the Moral Twin Earth argument. I contend that the Moral Twin Earth argument 
succeeds against the New Wave, but, because the New Wave was based on an erroneous 
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version of externalism, Moral Twin Earth is not a counterexample to Hermeneutical 
Moral Realism. 
5.1 NEW WAVE MORAL REALISM 
The Moral Twin Earth Argument is directed at what its inventors call New Wave 
Moral Realism. New Wave Moral Realism is a version of moral realism developed in 
response to Moore's Open Question Argument, itself largely responsible for the demise of 
moral realism earlier in the twentieth century. The response was made possible by 
developments in philosophy of mind, language, and science. 
I begin with the Open Question Argument. For Moore, "...propositions about the 
good are all of them synthetic and never analytic." (Moore 1903/1993, p. 58) Why would 
that matter? That there can be an analytic proposition about x is the mark of x's 
complexity; that which is analyzed is a complex of parts into which it can be analyzed. 
So goodness, as shown by its unanalyzability, is simple. And that matters because 
"Definitions... which describe the real nature of the object or notion denoted by a word, 
and which do not merely tell us what the word is used to mean, are only possible when 
the object or notion in question is something complex." (ibid. p. 59) If goodness were 
simple, then it would be impossible to describe its real nature. Why should we believe 
that goodness is simple? "...whatever definition [of goodness] may be offered, it may be 
always asked, with significance, of the complex so defined, whether it is itself good." 
(ibid. p. 67) If we were to assert that, analytically or definitionally, goodness is that 
which is conducive to human well-being, and we were to agree that something in 
particular is conducive to human well-being, it would still make sense to ask whether it is 
good. However small the step from agreeing that something is conducive to human well-
being to agreeing that it is good, there is a step, and that disproves the analyticity of the 
claim that goodness is that which is conducive to human well-being. We could agree with 
the claim, of course, we just couldn't hold it to be true analytically. 
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Since goodness is indefinable, it isn't possible to state its nature. Were its nature 
something natural, then it seems that it would be possible to state it; hence, it isn't 
something natural, it's something non-natural. With the demise of such Platonic 
pleasantries as non-natural properties, moral realism itself collapsed and anti-realist 
ethical systems like emotivism came to the fore. 
The revival of Moral Realism that I want to address, New Wave Moral Realism, 
takes its lead from alternatives to Moore's semantic presuppositions. For Moore, the fact 
that we can't a priori close the open question shows that the definiens doesn't define 
goodness: meanings are mental or Platonic entities, and their sameness is apparent. Brink 
notes that the Open Question Argument 
...appears to be a consequence of the traditional theory of meaning according to 
which the meaning of a term is the set of properties that any speaker competent 
with the term associates with it. It seems hard to believe, on this theory of 
meaning, that one could doubt that two terms were synonymous [as one can with 
'good' and any proposed definiens] if the properties one associated with them were 
the same. (Brink 1989, p. 153) 
Content internalism, one of my main targets in the first two chapters of this dissertation, 
is the semantic context in which the Open Question Argument finds life. Of course, it 
would be denying the antecedent to conclude that moral realism must be true because one 
argument against it is rooted in bad semantics. But better semantics opens up a space in 
which new versions of moral realism can be tried. 
Horgan and Timmons, in setting up the target of their Moral Twin Earth 
Argument, gave several104 developments in mid-century philosophy that undergirded the 
New Wave. First was "rejection of a synonymy criterion of property identity." (Horgan 
and Timmons 1990, p. 451) That criterion was active in the Open Question Argument: 
failure of synonymy between definiens and 'good' was what was to show failure of 
identity. Thanks to Putnam105 and others, properties may now be identified synthetically. 
                                                
104 Six, to be precise; I'll ignore the fifth, since it seems to be a rephrasing of the first and second. 
105 See, obviously, Putnam 1975a. 
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Second was the notion of rigid designation, a causal, externalistic conception of 
reference.106 With the older approach to reference, reference was a matter of a match of 
some kind between a meaning — a cluster of properties subjectively associated with a 
word — and referents. After the Kripke-Putnam semantic revolution, many referring 
terms were held to be rigid designators, terms that referred to some object or property 
regardless of subjective associations. If 'good' were a rigid designator, then it would refer 
to whatever property it referred to quite regardless of our inability to identify that 
property. Of special relevance is the notion of rigid designation of a natural kind. Not 
only objects can be rigidly designated: properties can, too, if they have appropriate causal 
powers. Such properties are the natural kinds, and they are the properties that science will 
accept as it nears "the end of inquiry." If goodness were such a property, then it could be 
a naturalistic property despite having no known definition, just as many natural kind 
terms have no known definitions prior to the discovery of their essences by some 
appropriate science; e.g., chemistry's discovery of the essence of water, physics' 
discovery of the essence of light, and so forth. Moreover, if goodness were a natural kind, 
then there could be a pleasant and perhaps instructive connection between ethics and 
biology, since biology is the science that identifies the essences of living phenomena, 
such as human beings, and ethics seems to have to do with our essence. On such a basis 
in quasi-Aristotelian metaphysics, there could be a revival of Aristotelian ethics. 
Third, and connected with the peripatetic aspects of the last, is Putnam's 
functionalism about the mind.107 For functionalism, what it is to be a mental state of a 
certain kind is to be a token of some (paradigmatically biological) kind, tokens of which 
typically have certain causal relationships. These typical causal relationships determine 
what sort of mental state is in question, because a typical causal relationship, if selected 
for, is a functional state, and mental states are understood functionally. What has this to 
                                                
106 See, obviously, Kripke 1972. 
107 On which see Putnam, 1960, and Putnam, 1973, among a great many works by Putnam and others. 
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do with the New Wave?108 Functionalism provided a paradigm for the naturalistic 
treatment of concepts not susceptible to reduction to the physical. If mental concepts 
could be treated as concepts of functional states in a naturalistically reputable way, then 
perhaps moral concepts could, too. Goodness, for instance, might be connected with the 
flourishing — the biologically proper functioning — of a human being. A morally good 
person is one that functions well in certain ways. But these notions of well-being or 
functioning well could be given functionalistic accounts like mental concepts are in 
functionalism. 
Fourth, it's no longer considered necessary to treat a property as type-identical to 
some physical property for it to be naturalistically acceptable. For functionalism, 
functional properties might be realized in any of many physical substrata. Token identity 
between mental and physical tokens is enough to preserve the naturalness of the mental. 
Likewise, the New Wavers will note, for the moral. As long as every instance of 
goodness is an instance of some physical property, goodness is natural, even if goodness 
is not reducible to, or type-identical with, any physical property (or narrow set of physical 
properties). 
The last development is the development of naturalistic and coherentist 
approaches in epistemology. How could these be of use to the moral realist? Moral 
realism is plagued with the problem of how we could be in cognitive contact with the 
moral, if the moral is independent of the mind. But living organisms form moral beliefs 
as a consequence of the functioning of adapted cognitive structures; moreover, moral 
beliefs can cohere with one another and with relevant non-moral beliefs. If such reliable 
sources and unimpeachable methods can apply to morality, then there is no special 
problem for moral epistemology and there is new space for moral realism. 
                                                
108 For that matter, what has it to do with Aristotle? Aristotle has been interpreted, to my mind very 
plausibly, as forwarding a version of functionalism. See Nussbaum 1978 and Putnam 1973. For debate, see 
Burnyeat, 1992, and Nussbaum and Putnam, 1992. 
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Boyd and Brink are the paradigm New Wavers. I want to give a brief review of 
the essential elements of Boyd's views (which are more efficiently, for my purposes, 
presented, and massively overlap with Brink's), with special attention to the semantic 
background within which those views find life. Boyd gives an account of moral 
properties and how we may refer to them. The account of reference is solidly 
externalistic: 
Roughly, and for nondegenerate cases, a term t refers to a kind (property, relation, 
etc.) k just in case there exist causal mechanisms whose tendency is to bring it 
about, over time, that what is predicated of the term t will be approximately true 
of k... we may think of the properties of k as regulating the use of t (via such 
causal relations), and we may think of what is said using t as providing us with 
socially coordinated epistemic access to k; t refers to k (in nondegenerate cases) 
just in case the socially coordinated use of t provides significant epistemic access 
to k, and not to other kinds (properties, etc.). (Boyd 1988, p. 195) 
Allow t to be some moral term. Then t is causally coordinated to instances of some 
matching moral property p. Notably, Boyd appeals to the anti-sceptical elements inherent 
in externalism when he speaks of our epistemic access to the referents of natural kind 
(property, and so forth) terms. Since the term has its meaning only in virtue of its causal 
connection to its referent, the term can't be systematically misused. 
The notion of moral properties having causal powers — say, the causal power to 
regulate our speech — is, on face, hard to accept. Moral properties are (obviously?) 
irreducible to, distinct from, the physical properties that we expect to show up in serious 
causal laws. Boyd, however, has it that moral properties do have natural definitions; that 
is, they are conceptually connected with more scientifically respectable properties. He 
appeals to the idea of "property-cluster definitions."109 The idea is that a term might be 
associated, not with some one naturalistic property, but with a set of them that, in a 
defeasibly nomological way, cluster together. The clustering is a consequence of some of 
the properties attracting others, or that which leads to the instantiation of some tending 
also to lead to the instantiation of others. He calls this clustering, 'homeostatic' clustering. 
                                                
109 Boyd 1988, p. 196. 
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In what way is this approach different from the internalist line that a term's 
referent is determined by the properties associated with it by the speaker? The 
homeostatic cluster is a natural phenomenon. The speaker need not be familiar with the 
distinct clustering properties, nor why (or that) they cluster. As long as the speaker's use 
is guided by the instantiation of the cluster of properties, the cluster is the referent of the 
term, quite regardless of the speaker's subjective states. 
For the account to be plausible, Boyd must identify naturalistically respectable 
properties and explain their moral significance. The basis of his approach here is 
thoroughly Aristotelian. He begins with a homeostatic cluster of "important human 
goods, things which satisfy important human needs." (ibid, p. 203) The naturalism of the 
approach, presumably, lies in the concept of needs. Need's naturalistic credentials are 
certified by biology and other natural sciences (including, apparently, psychology). While 
Boyd doesn't say it, one can't help but think that the term regulated by this homeostatic 
cluster is intended to be 'happiness' — in the sense of eudaimonia. What has this 
naturalistically acceptable notion got to do with morality? 
Moral goodness is defined by this cluster of goods and the homeostatic 
mechanisms which unify them. Actions, policies, character traits, etc. are morally 
good to the extent to which they tend to foster the realization of these goods or to 
develop and sustain the homeostatic mechanisms upon which their unity depends. 
(ibid) 
Happiness (in my Aristotelian usage) is a naturalistically acceptable concept. Moral 
goodness is defined as that which causes happiness. That which is nomologically and 
causally connected to the naturalistically acceptable is naturalistically acceptable. Moral 
goodness, then, is naturalistically acceptable. 
This approach wouldn't have worked in the absence of the Kripke-Putnam 
semantic revolution. It's an open question whether that which is conducive to happiness is 
morally good. That matters a good deal on an internalistic approach to content, but much 
less on an externalistic approach. Internalism, plus naturalism, is lethal to moral realism. 
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To provide a naturalistically acceptable conception of moral goodness is automatically to 
provide a conception that leaves an open question. 
There is another, epistemic, issue that Boyd discusses. As things stand (in my 
presentation), Boyd's Aristotelian ethics are just a mere assertion. How could we confirm 
his identification of the morally good as the happiness-conducive? Boyd's answer is that 
goodness's nature is discovered by just the same procedure used in the sciences for the 
discovery of natures. However, his view about what that procedure is, is slightly startling: 
"...the dialectical interplay of observations, theory, and methodology, which, according to 
the [scientific] realist, constitutes the discovery procedure for scientific inquiry just is the 
method of reflective equilibrium..." (ibid, p. 200) It's not obvious that reflective 
equilibrium has any application in the natural sciences. 
Reflective equilibrium emerges in Rawls's efforts to define a method for deciding 
on principles of justice. Rawls has a contractarian approach to justice. But not just any 
contractual situation can decide on principles of justice that deserve adherence. A 
contract can go wrong, fail to be binding, for at least two kinds of reasons. First, the 
contract might be agreed to in the wrong situation. If I sign a contract under duress, it 
isn't binding. Second, the contract might try to oblige someone to do something 
impermissible. If you and I both willingly enter into a contract directing me to murder 
someone, then the contract isn't binding. We may assimilate the second sort of problem to 
the first by treating the relevant attitudes of the signatories as part of the situation. We 
may think that my willingness to murder someone for you is the root of the problem with 
the second contract. So we must design the situation in which a valid contract could be 
generated, making sure that the situation, both with regard to freedom to join or refrain 
from joining the contract, and the motivations of the signatories, can legitimate the 
contract. How shall we design this situation? 
By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual 
circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments and conforming them to 
principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial 
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situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which 
match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted. This state of affairs I 
refer to as reflective equilibrium. It is an equilibrium because at last our principles 
and judgments coincide; and it is reflective since we know to what principles our 
judgments conform and the premises of their derivation. (Rawls 1971/1999, p. 18) 
So stated, reflective equilibrium looks like the point at which our prejudices are 
consistent. But this passage describes only a first pass at reflective equilibrium, "narrow" 
reflective equilibrium. Later, Rawls proposed a "wide" conception: 
...adopting the role of observing moral theorists, we investigate what principles 
people would acknowledge and accept the consequences of when they have had 
an opportunity to consider other plausible conceptions and to assess their 
supporting grounds. Taking this process to the limit, one seeks the conception, or 
plurality of conceptions, that would survive the rational consideration of all 
feasible conceptions and all reasonable arguments for them. (Rawls 1975, p. 289) 
In narrow reflective equilibrium, I find an equilibrium between my own considered 
judgments and the general moral principles I antecedently found most plausible. In wide 
reflective equilibrium, I take into account general moral principles belonging to moral 
theories that I didn't, antecedently, find most plausible. The consideration of alternatives 
is to help overcome the inherent conservatism of coherentist approaches.110 
For realism, a coherentist methodology requires an antecedent reason to believe 
that many of the beliefs to be rendered coherent are, in fact, true.111 Certainly, this 
approach doesn't seem much like science. But that appearance is misleading. Recall the 
last element of Horgan and Timmons's list of recent philosophical developments 
undergirding New Wave moral realism. As Horgan and Timmons point out, naturalized 
and coherentist epistemologies are in vogue in philosophy of science. Such approaches 
would have it that the method of science is coherentist: the scientist seeks coherence 
between abstract statements of theory and particular observations. It's not at all 
unreasonable to believe that 'reflective equilibrium' is a moral theorist's term of art for a 
general coherentist approach to knowledge that applies in most areas of inquiry. 
                                                
110 See Daniels 1979, esp. p. 266. 
111 Rawls probably doesn't face this problem. Rawls appears to accept a coherentist theory of the truth of 
moral claims. Only realists with coherentist sympathies face the problem: anti-realists don't. 
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On the other hand, it's easy to see why science, in pursuing coherence, pursues 
truth. Its observations are mainly true, and its methods for relating judgments to one 
another, so as to capture coherence or winnow out incoherence, are unimpeachable. It's 
not so easy to see why coherence gives confirmation to moral views. What is the reason 
for suspecting that many of the moral beliefs to be rendered coherent are true? Recall that 
the moral properties themselves regulate our use of moral language. The New Wave must 
appeal to the anti-scepticism inherent in its externalistic account of moral language to 
show that our moral beliefs are, by and large, already in order before we begin to pursue 
reflective equilibrium. 
Note that Rawls speaks of "derivation" of judgments from principles. Derivation 
is a logical relation between beliefs, not a real relation between facts. Reflective 
equilibrium understood as the pursuit of derivations, then, has no distinctly realist tinge to 
it. Brink adds that tinge when he makes this suggestion: 
...explanatory coherence demands that we introduce more general, theoretical 
moral claims into our moral views in order... to unify and explain the more 
particular moral views we already hold. Coherence asks us to try to identify 
theoretical moral claims that will explain and support a number of our more 
firmly held moral views... (Brink 1989, p. 130; emphasis added) 
For Brink, the coherentist approach in morals112 will offer, not only derivations, but also 
explanations. General moral principles will explain particular moral judgments. 
Explanation has a worldly application that derivation lacks. Explanation turns on the 
capturing of real nomological connections that exist independently of theory in a way that 
derivation doesn't. For the New Wave moral realist, reflective equilibrium isn't a mere 
heuristic device. Rather, in pursuing reflective equilibrium, we pursue explanations for 
particular moral facts, in much the same way that the empirical scientist pursues 
explanations for particular natural facts in general laws. 
                                                
112 ...which he identifies with reflective equilibrium; Brink 1989, p. 131. 
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Prior to claiming that moral properties' essences are discoverable in reflective 
equilibrium, the New Wave had already appealed to the existence of moral properties to 
do more fundamental meta-ethical work. Moral properties causally govern the use of 
moral terms; that's why the terms have the properties as their meanings, and that's why 
our moral knowledge is assuredly correct in outline. The epistemic and semantic points 
combined show that what we will discover in reflective equilibrium governs our use, 
even now, of moral language. On the analogy between reflective equilibrium and 
scientific theory-building, that seems reasonable. It's H2O that always governed our use 
of 'water;' science identifies, as it asymptotically reaches closure, just that which had 
already governed our use of the terms science begins with and continues to employ. 
Likewise, it's always (say) being conducive to human happiness that governed our use of 
'good,' but only in reflective equilibrium will we be in a position to offer, synthetically, 
the identity of goodness. 
Finally, I turn to a feature of the New Wave that Horgan and Timmons don't 
discuss. Brink has a distinctive view about moral motivation, one that, he thinks, is 
required by moral realism. In theory of moral motivation, there are alternative views 
about the relationship between moral facts or moral beliefs on the one hand, and moral 
desires or inclinations on the other. The relationships might be held to be internal, or 
external: facts or beliefs might be internally related to desires, or externally related. I 
discuss these issues more thoroughly in 5.2.4, but here I'll talk about Brink's moral 
externalism about moral motivation. 
From my point of view, these remarks capture what's important about New Wave 
motivational externalism: "The externalist can claim, first, that moral considerations only 
contingently motivate or justify; second, that the motivational power or rationality of 
morality, whether necessary or contingent, can be known only a posteriori..." (Brink 
1989, p. 42) Externalism is intended to be the negation of internalism, which has it that 
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moral judgment necessarily motivates, and that this motivational power is a fact in 
philosophical psychology knowable a priori. 
Brink's argument for externalism consists in the claim that a certain agent, the 
amoralist, is conceivable. Taking Thrasymachus as a paradigm, Brink contends that we 
can imagine someone who makes moral judgments, but is systematically indifferent to 
them. Thus moral judgment does not necessarily motivate; when moral judgment 
motivates, the motivation is contingent on factors beyond the judgment itself, such as the 
specific moral psychology of the agent. 
But the depth of Brink's externalism is not plain. Here is his alternative to 
internalist moral psychology: "We all begin with certain ends and desires; we are 
attached to, and have desires for, particular people, activities, and states of affairs more 
than others. Now these ends and desires reflect evaluative judgments. In the case of most 
things we desire, we desire them because we think these things valuable." (ibid, p. 64; 
emphases original) Whether this is seriously externalistic or not depends on whether 
Brink would admit that an amoralist agent can both think an action valuable (most 
valuable all things considered) and also remain indifferent to whether she performs it. It 
seems that he does think that evaluations typically "force" desires: "...most of our 
attitudes and desires require this sort of value-laden explanation." (ibid, p. 78, emphases 
mine) If evaluative judgments can explain desires, then they must have some sort of 
causal power over them, and there must be a nomological connection between having 
evaluative judgments and having "matching" desires. This seems to me to be a variety of 
internalism. I conclude that the New Wave has externalistic aspirations in philosophical 
psychology, but does not have a clear view about moral motivation. 
 290 
5.2 HERMENEUTICAL MORAL REALISM 
5.2.1 Outline of Hermeneutical Moral Realism 
Hermeneutical Moral Realism is a version of moral realism with its argumentative 
basis in Davidson's approach to truth and his theories of meaning, belief, and 
interpretation. Here, I offer a very brief outline of the view as I will present it; in the next 
three sections I discuss three aspects of the view. 
Moral beliefs are identified in radical interpretation. There are three aspects to the 
identification and interpretation of moral beliefs that are of special interest. First, the 
contents of moral beliefs are their truth-conditions, and interpretation takes the form, or 
can be understood to take the form, of Tarskian T-sentences. Davidson's anti-relativist 
and anti-sceptical arguments flow from these claims. It's evidence for a T-sentence of the 
form "'φ' means that ψ" that "φ" and "ψ" are true under the same circumstances, and too 
much deviation between their truth-values on various occasions demonstrates difference 
of meaning. Thus there is no space for moral relativism and no basis for moral 
scepticism. 
So far, the view is standard, though more deeply defended than many other 
versions of moral realism. What makes it interesting and plausible is a pair of distinctive 
claims, both flowing from the holistic aspects of moral interpretation. The first has to do 
with the role of principles in moral reasoning. Theories of the place of principles can be 
placed on a spectrum from extreme generalism to extreme particularism. The extreme 
generalist wishes to deduce all moral claims from some single moral principle, plus 
normatively relevant non-moral facts about the situations to which the principle is to be 
applied. The extreme particularist holds that there is no place at all for moral principles. 
The view to be proposed here is a form of modest particularism; it is also a form of 
modest generalism. No statable principle could ever capture all moral truth. Nevertheless, 
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as a consequence of the interpretability of moral reasoning, there must be some fairly 
simple moral principles. Further, these principles must apply in most cases. 
The second holistic connection is not between moral beliefs at different levels of 
generality, but between moral beliefs and moral motivation. The second distinctive claim 
has to do with moral psychology and the debate between internalists and externalists 
about motivation. While the labels in this area get confused, we may say that externalists 
about moral motivation hold that moral motivation is externally related to moral belief: it 
is possible to believe, say, that something would be the right thing to do, but entirely lack 
the desire to do it. Internalists would have it that the relation is internal: moral belief 
implies, or even is, moral motivation. On the basis of the holistic nature of interpretation, 
I argue that it counts against an interpretation if it assigns someone a moral belief without 
the accompanying moral motivation. However, as with all such holistic constraints, the 
connection between belief and motivation is defeasible: it must be present in most cases, 
but need not be present in all. 
What's distinctive about the hermeneutical view is that it offers, in the holistic 
nature of interpretation, an account of facts generally known. It's broadly agreed that a 
rational agent with a certain moral belief will have the appropriate moral motivation. 
Rationality is typically what does the trick of accounting for the connection. But it's not 
clear how rationality makes beliefs cause desires. By claiming that there are inter-
attitudinal connections between moral belief and moral motivation in agents that can be 
interpreted as possessing moral beliefs, the hermeneutical approach will explain why 
rational agents have appropriate motivation. 
The core fact about moral interpretation is that it is interpretation. What's been 
said about interpretation, then, applies to it. However, as moral utterances are not the 
"plainest and methodologically most basic" utterances to interpret, we can't just apply 
Grace and have done with it. It's not remotely obvious that moral beliefs, even those 
nearest to observation, are among those beliefs whose causes are their contents; it's not 
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remotely obvious that moral truth-conditions have causal powers or are events. Let me 
offer three orthogonal distinctions among moral beliefs. 
The first distinction is that between judgments and principles. As distinguished by 
Rawls113, moral judgments are relatively low-level moral claims with narrow (perhaps 
unique) application, whereas more abstract principles apply to various contexts. Rawlsian 
judgments are intended to be considered convictions, but I want to let the notion of 
judgment range more broadly downhill to include snap judgments and moral 
observations. A principle is a universally quantified moral claim, one that ranges over 
many situations. A judgment is a moral claim that applies to only one situation. 
Judgments apply moral predicates to particular actions, people, institutions, and anything 
else that's morally evaluable. Principles apply moral predicates to all of the members of 
classes of morally evaluable objects. Among the moral judgments will be a special class 
of moral observations, which apply moral predicates to immediately present acts or 
people, on the basis of immediate experience. 
The second distinction is between directives and evaluations. This is Wiggins's 
distinction114 between, on the one hand, utterances about my own possible future courses 
of action, and utterances about all past and everyone else's actions at any time. Directives 
concern my beliefs about what I ought to do; evaluations concern my beliefs about what I 
ought to have done, what others ought to have done, and what others ought to do. 
The last distinction concerns the kind of moral predicate appearing in the moral 
utterance: thick or thin. This is Williams's famous distinction115 between more and less 
general and descriptive moral predicates. Among the thin moral predicates are terms such 
as 'right' and 'good,' terms of ultimate assessment that have little apparent descriptive 
force. If I accept someone's claim that an act would be good or right, I know very little 
                                                
113 Rawls 1971/1999, p. 18. 
114 ...drawn at Wiggins 1976, p. 95. 
115 ...drawn at Williams 1985, pp. 129-30. 
 293 
about the act. Among the thick moral predicates are terms such as 'honest' and 
'courageous,' terms of assessment with obvious descriptive force. 
As I say, the distinctions are orthogonal. However, principles range over past and 
future and more broadly than the speaker, so principles are by nature neither evaluative 
nor directive. We then have several sorts of moral claims: evaluative judgments 
employing thick, and those employing thin, moral predicates; thick and thin descriptive 
judgments, and principles connecting non-moral with thick, non-moral with thin, and 
thick with thin, moral concepts. 
The externalistic aspect of moral interpretation applies most directly to thick and 
thin evaluative judgments. The first, inter-belief, holistic aspect of moral interpretation 
applies most directly to principles of all kinds, and their relationships with evaluative 
judgments. The second, inter-attitudinal, holistic aspect of moral interpretation applies 
most directly to thick and thin directive judgments. Thus those sorts of judgments will be 
the foci of the next three sections, respectively. 
5.2.2 Externalistic Aspects of Moral Interpretation 
The most straightforward moral beliefs, the "most basic" in terms of 
interpretation, are evaluative judgments. These are the most obviously factual and 
mundane moral beliefs. Because they are evaluative, they don't have any obvious 
connection with the speaker's future actions. Because they are judgments, there is no 
controversy (among realists, at any rate) about whether we need them for moral 
reasoning. 
Let me consider first the case of moral observations with thick concepts, for 
instance, the observation that a certain act is generous. How is such a judgment made? I 
suggest that we recognize generosity in much the same way that that we interpret speech 
(which is recognizing meanings) or identify money. None of speech, money, or 
generosity is a physicalistic concept: judgments in which they're applied are anomalous 
with respect to the physical. They all involve norms not relevant to the physical 
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sciences116: we might, in a Kantian vein, hold that meaning, money, and generosity are 
intelligible, rather than sensible, phenomena. 
All beliefs about these intelligible, not sensible, phenomena are based, 
inferentially, on physicalistic beliefs. This is a problematic claim. If the application of 
these concepts is supported by physicalistic beliefs, then why are these concepts not 
physicalistic? I discuss this problem at some length in the next section. For the time 
being, I want to take for granted that concepts of intelligible phenomena can be applied 
on the basis of physicalistic evidence without being physicalistic concepts. 
To support the claim that physicalistic evidence is relevant, I want to discuss how 
other beliefs holistically support evaluative judgments. We may distinguish between two 
ways in which supporting beliefs might support. They might be background conditions 
required for a situation to cause a belief, or they might be the premises of an argument 
implying the belief to be supported. The difference is that the first kind of support 
consists in bringing it about that a prompting situation causes a belief; the second kind of 
support consists in causing a belief. The first kind of support is like the support that 
oxygen gives the striking of a match, support that allows it to light the match; the second 
is like the striking of the match. 
Consider a simple observation predicate, like '...is red.' We're able to apply that 
concept pretty directly on the basis of experience. But, as a consequence of the holistic 
nature of content, believing that something is red does require a host of supporting 
beliefs. With '...is red,' the supporting beliefs concern the context of observation. A 
situation might prompt me to believe that such-and-such is red, or not, depending on 
whether I believe that this is a situation in which normal laws hold. If I believe that I have 
recently taken LSD, I might discount the prompting of experience on the basis of the fact 
that I'm in a causally abnormal situation in which situations will prompt me to have 
beliefs that are false in them. 
                                                
116 See Davidson 1970, esp. pp. 221-2. 
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Interpretation is not like that. As I argued in section 2.1.1, interpretation requires 
supporting beliefs that imply, or at any rate provide logical support for, the interpretation. 
For instance, the belief that he said "such-and-such is red," plus the appropriate T-
sentence for the quoted sentence, imply the interpretation that he said that such-and-such 
is red. The T-sentence is an empirical generalization embedded within the synthetic a 
priori structure of Tarskian truth theories. The belief that he said "such-and-such is red" 
is a straightforward empirical belief about sounds coming from a speaker's mouth. 
Likewise with moral observations: moral observations call on logical support, not 
merely the sort of support that would allow a prompting situation to prompt it. The 
morally weighted situation prompts various non-moral beliefs about it; those beliefs 
imply or support the moral belief about the situation. Now, I want to say that this claim is 
just obvious. For what is the alternative? The alternative is to suggest that we can just see, 
directly, something's moral qualities. Wouldn't that require some sort of magic? 
Many might cite Wiggins and McDowell as philosophers who believe that we 
can, in a suitably sophisticated sense of "just see," just see moral properties. McDowell 
treats moral properties as analogous to secondary properties: 
The idea of value experience involves taking admiration, say, to represent its 
object as having a property that (although there in the object) is essentially 
subjective in much the same way as the property that an object is represented as 
having by an experience of redness — that is, understood adequately only in 
terms of the appropriate modification of human (or similar) sensibility." 
(McDowell 1985, p. 143) 
"Sensibility," obviously, is broader than perception. If McDowell disagrees with me here, 
his contention is that moral judgments can be observational judgments, that is, judgments 
made as a consequence of the direct prompting of moral facts. 
Phenomenologically, that is a plausible idea. We do seem struck by moral facts, 
and we often don't explicitly reason to them. However, often we do. Since moral concepts 
are routinely applied only on the basis of reasoning, it seems more plausible that we 
always apply them on the basis of reasoning, but that in many cases the reasoning is too 
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quick and automatic to register phenomenologically. One might reply that we sometimes 
reason to the application of observation concepts like redness. But the basis of such 
reasoning is entirely different. When I judge that something is red, if there is evidence for 
my judgment, it must be evidence from testimony or something of the sort. One doesn't, 
as a rule, consider other properties of a thing that one currently experiences and deduce 
from them that it must also be red. But that is just what one does to reason to a moral 
judgment. 
We may say that moral judgments, made however rapidly or automatically, are 
based on evidence. But not just any set of observations can count as evidence: moral 
predicates can't be applied to just any objects. In a famous passage, Davidson says that, in 
interpretation, "...we will try for a theory that finds [our interpretee] consistent, a believer 
of truths, and a lover of the good (all my our own lights, it goes without saying)." 
(Davidson 1970, p. 222. emphasis added) The same point about the external content of 
moral judgments that applies elsewhere in interpretation, applies also to the application of 
moral predicates. Philippa Foot discusses this fact. She wonders whether the application 
of moral predicates could be externally related to evidence, or whether the relation is 
internal. If the relation is internal, then we have no understanding of moral concepts 
independent of the sort of evidence we actually rely on in applying them. If the relation is 
external, then moral concepts can be applied to unusual objects on the basis of evidence 
that we wouldn't, ordinarily, recognize as evidence.117 Can moral predicates be 
meaningfully applied to just anything? Foot explains: 
On this hypothesis a moral eccentric could be described as commending the 
clasping of hands as the action of a good man, and we should not have to look for 
some background to give the supposition sense. That is to say, on this hypothesis 
the clasping of hands could be commended without any explanation; it could be 
what those who hold such theories call 'an ultimate moral principle.' 
I wish to say that this hypothesis is untenable... (Foot 1958, p. 112) 
                                                
117 While the line here is that the relation is internal, the relation is, in truth, only defeasibly or normally 
internal. The next section will be more precise on this issue. 
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Foot argues that it's literally nonsensical to ascribe to someone the belief that clasping 
and unclasping one's hands repeatedly is morally good, without also attributing to him 
some unusual beliefs about the effects of the clasping. In radical moral interpretation, we 
would count it against an interpretive scheme if it implied that the speaker believes that 
repeatedly clasping and unclasping one's hands is good, unless we attributed 
complementary beliefs about the context (such as that clasping is a conventional sign of 
respect which is warranted in this context). The belief being attributed to the speaker is 
nonsense, and we almost certainly misinterpret when we attribute nonsense. 
The argument concerns the thin moral predicate '...is good,' but of course it must 
doubly apply to the thick moral predicates. It's aggressively senseless to apply '...is 
generous' to an act that has nothing to do with helping someone, or '...is courageous' to an 
act that isn't done despite fear. Note that I'm not just stipulating what moral beliefs we 
must attribute, or which are true. I'm applying a general theory of meaning and 
interpretation to the moral case. The argument begins, not with ad hoc claims about 
morality, but with considerations about what a theory of meaning must look like. 
Scanlon agrees with the claim that I'm making: 
A reason is a consideration that counts in favor of some judgment-sensitive 
attitude, and the content of that attitude must provide some guidance in 
identifying the kinds of considerations that could count in favor of it. If it does 
not, then the question of whether something is a reason for it will make no sense, 
and any answer will seem truly arbitrary. (Scanlon 1998, p. 67) 
Scanlon's argument is that we would lose any sense for the content of a moral judgment 
— we would be unable to interpret it — if it lacked the appropriate holistic connections 
to just the right kind of evidence. The evidence, presumably, will consist largely in 
normatively relevant, but non-moral, beliefs about the act or object to be evaluated. 
What's to have been established is that a principle of charity applies to moral 
interpretation. To attribute too much moral confusion or falsehood undermines an 
interpretation. Since I can attribute too much falsehood neither to myself nor to those I 
interpret, I must find massive agreement between anyone I interpret and me. But it's 
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commonly held that there is massive, radical moral disagreement; there might even be 
terminally open, unanswerable moral questions. As David Cooper puts it: 
...there is a meagre number of significant moral sentences generally held true 
among us.... If there is this lack of consensus, and if it is taken as a lack of 
genuine moral consensus, the Davidsonian approach must, it seems, be impaled 
on one of two horns of a dilemma. Either we stand by the theory of meaning, in 
terms of agreed applications of terms (of sentences generally held to be true), in 
which case it looks as if moral terms have lost meaning; or, we do understand 
moral terms despite the lack of consensus on their application, in which case we 
must jettison the theory of meaning. (Cooper 1978, p. 105) 
Naturally, I reject the dilemma, because I accept the Davidsonian theory of meaning but 
also claim that we understand moral discourse. The premise of the argument concluding 
in the dilemma was that there is a lack of consensus on moral issues. I reject the premise. 
There is almost universal agreement on almost all evaluative moral judgments 
that could be made. Unfortunately, most of those judgments aren't ever made; we tend to 
produce moral evaluations only where there's a controversy. But, while there is moral 
controversy, it only makes sense against a backdrop of massive agreement. Christine 
Korsgaard puts the point much as I would. If we encountered moral aliens trying to study 
us, the fact that they engage in action (like study) implies that we share moral concepts: 
The exact shape of their [moral] problems may be different from ours, and so they 
may have different conceptions. But they will have views about what is right and 
what is good, and their language will have terms in which these views are 
expressed. So we will be able to translate our own terms into their language, and 
to talk to them about the right and the good. And if we can come at least to see 
their conceptions as solutions to the normative problems that they face, there will 
even be a kind of convergence. (Korsgaard 1996a, p. 116) 
The basic point that Korsgaard is making is that, if someone else engages in action at all, 
they must have our moral concepts. To engage in action is, as a rule, to do what one 
thinks best or most right, and one can't think something best or most right without sharing 
our concepts of the good and the right. Of course, there will be a divergence in 
application. But the divergence can largely be explained by difference of situation, and 
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we would agree, on reflection, with most of the relevant divergent applications once we 
grasped the non-moral facts. 
I don't want to just directly appeal to difference of non-moral context, or 
contingent error, to account for moral diversity. What I want to do is take an example of a 
spectacularly immoral practice, and try to make some sense of it by using our familiar 
moral concepts. The practice has to be one that's actually defended, on moral grounds, by 
its practitioners: hypocritical practices won't do. The familiarity of the concepts in terms 
of which we interpret the alien utterances is the fact that we can interpret them with 
axioms of Tarskian theories by, more or less, equating the divergent alien's words with 
words of our own. Thus the predicates must be mainly applied to the same things to 
which we would apply their translations in our own language. The practice has to be one 
that we don't think justified by a difference in context between us and the people that 
engage in it; ideally, it will be their response to a moral question that we also face. 
I take the example of honor killings. An honor killing is a killing, typically of a 
woman, by her family on grounds of sexual dishonor. This barbaric practice is 
uncommon even in the societies that engage in it, but it's most widespread in the broader 
Muslim world (though the Qur'an forbids it). Honor killings are done on many grounds. 
If a woman is killed on grounds of adultery, we can grasp the error. An adulterer or 
adulteress has violated an agreement, a peculiarly intimate and important one. It's not 
unreasonable that such a person should be in some way punished. Of course, the 
punishment shouldn't be death. But we can grasp how the punishment might have been 
exaggerated beyond reason; we can grasp it with reference to our understanding of the 
sorts of emotions adultery leads to. Here, we may understand the honor killing as a 
punishment, because the honor killers' concept of punishment is the same as ours. 
They've tragically misapplied it.118 
                                                
118 Those who oppose the death penalty, and yet understand arguments for it and sometimes even 
sympathize with them, obviously grasp the idea of a tragic misapplication of the concept of punishment. 
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More bizarre are cases in which unmarried women are killed for having sex out of 
wedlock. But again, we have a sense for what's going on, with reference to a traditional 
conception of the commitments of sexual intercourse. Conservative sexual moralists119 
speak of the unity of the human person, and the integration of two persons in intercourse. 
Unity may be understood in two ways: there is a unity between the mind and the body, 
and of the person across her history. To marry someone is (usually) to commit to sexual 
intercourse with him or her. But sexual intercourse integrates two people; it integrates 
their bodies, and, by way of the unity of the person, it integrates their minds and thus 
becomes a matter of moral commitment. The two people who are so integrated are 
themselves unified across time, and so the integration should be, in some sense, 
permanent. But a premarital integration with another person blocks the totality of the 
commitment, in a way not entirely dissimilar to adultery. So premarital sex is not entirely 
unlike cheating on one's spouse, in this conservative view. If adultery warranted 
punishment, then so should premarital sex. That this argument is very problematic isn't 
relevant to the point that I'm trying to make, which is only that we can comprehend, in 
our own moral terms, the thoughts of those alleged aliens that affirm honor killings. 
The final, most bizarre, and hardest case is this: a woman might suffer an honor 
killing on account of being raped. That can happen even if those ordering or carrying out 
the honor killing agree that their victim has been raped. How can one possibly cram this 
perversity into our moral thinking? 
I want to note the problem that would emerge if we were to give up here. We 
would like to be able to condemn, as immoral, the practice of honor killings. As a 
practical matter, we would like to be able to convince cultures no longer to engage in it; 
as a theoretical matter, we'd like to be able to think of them as culpably immoral if they 
still do. But, if we can't figure out what honor killers are even thinking, then it's not plain 
what basis we could have for talking with them or condemning them. We couldn't talk 
                                                
119 ...such as Vincent Punzo; see Punzo 1969, pp. 192-201. 
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with them, because we can't understand them; we can't really condemn them, since they 
don't so much as have the concepts necessary to see the wrongness of what they do. It's 
crucial that we comprehend these crimes in moral terms, because if we don't, we're 
reduced to rage or violence in the face of them — and we won't even be able to blame 
those at whom we're enraged. We would have to treat them as mad, or animals. 
How can we comprehend any justification for the idea that capital punishment fits 
the "crime" of being raped? Let me begin with an assumption. I assume that we can 
understand the moral philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Pakistani or Turkish honor killers 
might be beyond our ken, but Kant fits firmly within our western ways of thinking. If we 
can understand Kant, and Kant has a view that would at least nearly commend or allow 
honor killings, then we can understand those who commit honor killings. Kant has this to 
say on the subject of avoiding rape: 
At the moment when I can no longer live my life with honour, and become by 
such an action unworthy of life, I cannot live at all. It is therefore far better to die 
with honour and reputation, than to prolong one's life by a few years through a 
discreditable action. If somebody, for example, can preserve life no longer save 
by surrendering their person to the will of another, they are bound rather to 
sacrifice their life, than to dishonour the dignity of humanity in their person, 
which is what they do by giving themselves up as a thing to the will of someone 
else. (Kant 1997, p. 150) 
It is better, Kant says, to die than be raped.120 The superiority of the one choice over 
another is not an experiential, but rather a moral, superiority. Now, this view is 
preposterous. But we can get a grip on it.121 There's no question but that Kant's moral 
language is our own. He misapplies moral concepts that he shares with us. 
Kant's view is not identical to that of the honor killers. But we can see how the 
development would go. It's better to die than be raped; it doesn't matter too much by 
whose hand one dies. It's better to die than to live with the stain, the indignity, the 
                                                
120 Though see also Kant 1997, pp. 145-6, on Lucretia. Kant doesn't say that it's better for the victim of 
rape to commit suicide than not. He doesn't say that it's better to commit suicide than be raped, rather that 
it's better to be murdered than raped. So he doesn't sanction "honor suicide." 
121 And some people do try to get a grip on it; see Soble 2003, pp. 55-6, and Cooley 2006. 
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dishonor, of the degradation of one's own humanity. Even more preposterous than Kant's 
view, but, again, comprehensible in our own moral language. 
What has been the point of this example? Cooper offered an objection to 
Davidsonian moral realism, with reference to the diversity of moral views. Such diversity 
threatened the idea that we can understand the moral ideas of others. If we can't 
understand the moral ideas of others, then moral realism has become an implausibly 
chauvinistic doctrine. 
Typically, at this point in the dialectical interplay between realist and relativist, 
the realist claims that factual and other error can account for moral diversity. That's true. 
In this case, it's (psychologically, rather than evidentially, motivated) factual beliefs 
about the superiority of men over women, and over the preferences of the divine, that 
account for the mistake. But before error can be introduced to account for diversity, it 
must be established that the concept of error has purchase. It makes no sense to apply the 
concept of error across conceptual schemes, so what must be shown is that there is no 
multiplicity of conceptual schemes: that we can understand, in our terms, the discourse of 
another. That task was basically performed in 3.3, when I gave Davidson's argument 
against conceptual schemes. However, I wanted to make the point more concretely in the 
context in which relativism holds most sway. 
What is the result of this section? I've suggested that the interpretation of moral 
predicates, both thick and thin, is sensitive to the objects to which the predicates are 
applied. If we wish to interpret some predicate as meaning, in its language, what '...is 
courageous' or '...is right' means in ours, then the speakers of that language must, as a 
rule, apply their predicates to the same objects to which we apply our corresponding 
predicates. The diversity of moral views doesn't undermine this claim, because even the 
most horrific actions, if given moral justifications at all, receive moral justifications that 
we can comprehend in our own moral terms. 
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5.2.3 Holistic Aspects of Moral Interpretation 1: Moral Theory 
The goal of this section is to determine the role of principles and theory in moral 
reasoning. I begin by canvassing the end-points of the spectrum. 
Jonathan Dancy is the most prominent proponent of particularism, and his view is 
one of the more extreme ones available. His view is that "the possibility of moral thought 
and judgment does not depend on the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles." 
(Dancy 2004, p. 7) A moral principle would be a universally quantified claim connecting 
satisfaction of some predicates to the satisfaction of thin moral predicates. Why are there 
no such principles? Dancy appeals to holism about reasons: "...a feature that is a reason in 
one case may be no reason at all, or an opposite reason, in another." (ibid) Let me offer 
an example. A week ago, I had finished a section of reading, but I needed time to let 
some new ideas work themselves out. I needed to stop focusing on them. Getting together 
with friends would distract me from work, and that's exactly what I needed at the 
moment. So, under those circumstances, that getting together with friends would distract 
me counted in favor of doing so. Now, though, I'm in the thick of writing and I'm pressed 
with a deadline. I've had a chance to reflect, and I need to focus on getting this section 
written. It's very important that I not be distracted. So now, the fact that getting together 
with friends would distract me from work counts against doing so. Thus there is no 
principle governing distractions that tells me that its distractingness counts in favor of, or 
against, doing something distracting. The significance — "valence" — of the 
distractingness is determined contextually. 
Whether to gather with friends is not usually a moral question. In ethical 
particularism, the idea is that there are no principles connecting any other concepts with 
the thin moral concepts. No feature of an act counts, in a principled, systematic way, in 
favor of or against the goodness or rightness of that sort of act. 
Considering an obvious challenge offered by Jackson, Pettit, and Smith can 
sharpen this point: 
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[Particularists] might say that all that the right actions have in common is that 
they belong to the set of right actions. Grasp of the predicate 'is right' simply 
consists in a grasp of the various [objects] which constitute that set. But this 
cannot be all that unites the class of right actions. There must be some 
commonality in the sense of a pattern that allows projection from some 
sufficiently large subset of the [objects] to new members. If there isn't, we finite 
creatures could not have grasped through a finite learning process (the only sort 
there is) the predicate 'is right'. (Jackson, Pettit, and Smith 2000, p. 87) 
Here is the idea. It's admitted on all sides that the moral supervenes on the non-moral. So 
if a moral predicate applies to an object, it does so in virtue of a set of non-moral 
predicates that also apply to the object. Particularism claims that, while that is true, each 
application of a supervening predicate might well have a different base. The contention is 
that, if that were the case, then we could never acquire the supervening concept. Since it 
could result from any of infinitely many subvenient bases, and we would have to learn all 
of them to grasp the concept, we could never grasp it. 
Dancy's reply is to appeal to models of conceptual competence that, he says, don't 
involve "cottoning on to a pattern that is expressible at the level of the grounds." (Dancy 
2004, p. 111) This lack of patterns is the essence of particularism, and, as I'll show, it 
presents a peculiarly difficult problem for my Davidsonian view. Particularism has it that 
moral predicates have no systematic, principled relation to non-moral predicates. There is 
anomalism between the two conceptual realms. 
Jackson, Pettit, and Smith contend that, if we can't reduce the moral to the non-
moral with principles, then we can never grasp moral concepts. Thus, we can work the 
reduction. Margaret Little offers the nice reply that we learn, as it were, a reducible 
fragment of the concept, but then grasp the point of the concept and can leave the 
reduction behind: "Once we have come to 'catch on' to the concept, though, we are able to 
discern the very different shape [moral concepts] take in different contexts. To think we 
cannot is to confuse the conditions of learning with the content of what is learned." (Little 
2000, p. 283) While we might have to learn moral concepts in an impoverished, nomic 
 305 
way, that doesn't imply that the concepts are really nomically connected with the non-
moral bases of the application of the concept. 
Little, then, is trying to have both anomalism between the moral and the non-
moral, and also the acquisition of moral concepts. She continues by offering Davidsonian 
support for particularism, noting that particularism says nothing about morality that 
Davidson hadn't said about the mind. Recall my remark about moral judgments, like 
interpretations and the identification of money, being anomalous with respect to 
physicalistic beliefs. Little agrees: 
I suspect that holism is a unifying feature of the evaluative. I suspect, that is, that 
there is no way of cashing out propositionally the ways in which nonevaluative 
properties contribute to the evaluative natures of situations, actions, characters. 
(Those persuaded by Davidsonian considerations about interpretation will have 
theoretical backing to explain this unifying tie: whatever other connections 
between the evaluative and nonevaluative domains we might acknowledge, there 
is an essential anomological relation between them, where this is read as rejection 
of articulable laws, because each domain's concepts answer to distinct substantive 
interpretational constraints.) (ibid, pp. 283-4) 
Little suggests that holism is a common feature of phenomena governed by norms. But 
it's not obvious that this holism should everywhere play out as particularism would 
suggest. It's as a consequence of the holism of the mental that attributing to someone a 
certain belief counts as evidence that she has some other belief; for instance, if someone 
believes that grass is green, she probably also believes that grass is a plant, grows on the 
ground, and so forth. This fact applies across the board, to every speaker in every case. 
Particularism will not appeal to holism in remotely the way that Davidsonian 
interpretation appeals to holism. Davidson appeals to holism to unify and integrate a 
speaker's utterances and attitudes around a set of norms shared by all. Particularism 
appeals to holism to eliminate unity and integration of moral judgments in favor of 
irreducible diversity. 
Dancy rejects the claim that this diversity is problematic. Specifically, it does not 
show that moral judgments have no justificatory or cognitive relations to one another: 
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I claim... that one may find other cases instructive or suggestive, whether one is 
considering simply what features are acting as reasons there is just looking at how 
things stand there overall. The sceptical challenge is that this [is] just bluster, and 
that the effect of an extreme holism of reasons is an extreme epistemological 
atomism. (Dancy 2004, p. 157) 
Dancy's epistemological atomism is, we might say, not extreme. Moral judgments can 
have a wide variety of cognitive and justificatory relations to one another other than 
relations of implication. By reflection on cases, I can be sensitized to non-moral features 
that sometimes have normative significance. For instance, by reflection on a case in 
which tactlessness counted against an act, I can become sensitized to the normative 
significance of tactfulness in other cases.122 What I don't do is learn a principle telling me 
that their tactfulness always counts in favor of tactful actions. In some cases, their 
tactlessness counts for actions; in some cases tact is morally inert. 
One might think that a concept like tactfulness is the concept of an Aristotelian 
golden mean. The golden mean has a sort of Goldilocks rightness to it: the generous act is 
the one that is neither too miserly nor too liberal, but just right. Shouldn't there be 
principles connecting the golden mean to the right? No. An action can be evaluated along 
many possible dimensions, which might be orthogonal to one another. Assume that some 
action is measurable on the miserly-generous-liberal scale, and also on the cowardly-
courageous-foolhardy scale. Being at the golden mean along one such scale doesn't imply 
being at the golden mean along the other. Perhaps, in this case, generosity would be 
cowardly and the cowardliness of the action trumps, or even reverses, the generosity. So 
Dancy could withstand the idea of golden means. 
If moral reasoning doesn't involve the application of principles, how do we 
discover, justify, and explain moral judgments? Rather than knowing principles and how 
to apply them, what we learn in moral education is a skill:123 
                                                
122 Dancy's example from his 2004, p. 157. 
123 Beyond the passage quoted in the text, see Little 2000, pp. 296-7. 
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Particularists conceive of the knowledge brought to a new case as much more like 
knowledge-how than like knowledge-that. That is, it is a skill of discernment, not 
knowledge of a set of true general propositions discovered by thinking about 
previous cases and applied somehow to new ones. (ibid, pp. 142-3) 
The question whether moral cognition involves the application of principles, or is an 
inchoate and inarticulable skill, is an hermeneutical question. How shall we interpret 
moral judges? Shall we take their moral judgments to logically implicate a body of moral 
theory and principles, or shall we take their moral judgments to flow from an inarticulate 
ability? 
Dancy and Little, it seems to me, make a mistake about cognition's appeal to 
principles. Dancy speaks of "explicit rule[s]", and says that "One can only compute the 
articulable." (ibid. p. 108) This stress and claim seem to me to be mistaken. There's no 
problem with appealing to implicit, inarticulable principles. After all, the basis of my 
view is a concept of truth that, I insist, cannot be articulated. We can't state whatever 
principles govern our application of the concept of truth. But that's not a reason to treat 
the application of that concept as being in no way rule-governed. Dancy notes that:124 
What it is to go on in the same way need not be capturable in any rule, and what 
we bring to the new situation need not be an implicit grasp of a suitably context-
sensitive rule, but simply an understanding of the sort of difference that can be 
made by the applicability of this concept, and an ability to apply that 
understanding to cases that are quite different from the ones in which we 
originally learnt the concept — an ability that in no way requires either the 
existence or support of a rule. (ibid) 
At best, Dancy can show that we need not think of moral cognition as involving the 
application of implicit rules. He can't show that we must not think of it in this way. The 
question is an hermeneutical one: what interpretation of an agent makes the best sense of 
her actions? Phenomenology will be of no help, since the principles are supposed to be 
implicit: whatever evidence we appeal to here will need to be either behavioral or flow 
from the structure of interpretation itself. I offer behavioral evidence below, but here I 
want to make a point about interpretation. 
                                                
124 In addition to the passage in the text, see Little 2000, pp. 292-3. 
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Imagine a robustly skill-governed situation, a basketball game. We see player A 
duck left, feint right, and then pass the ball to her teammate C, and then we try to offer an 
interpretation of her play. Imagine how unsatisfying it would be to offer, as an 
interpretation, only "She knows how to play basketball," or "She's a skillful player." 
Surely we can do better. But what would a satisfying interpretation look like? It would 
appeal to various beliefs of the player at different levels of generalization. At the lowest 
level are beliefs like that she has already dribbled, so she must pass or shoot; that she's 
such-and-such a distance from the basket and covered by opponent D; that teammate C is 
over there and uncovered while teammate B, in whose direction she had initially ducked 
for a pass is over here and covered. But a satisfying interpretation will then appeal to 
general beliefs. She doesn't shoot, because she knows that, as a rule, she couldn't make 
the shot from here and that being covered by an opponent (such as D) lowers the odds 
even more. She doesn't pass to B, because B is at a position from which a shot is difficult 
and besides, the opponent covering B, as a rule, could intercept from that sort of covering 
position. She passes to C, because, as a rule, it's better to pass to uncovered teammates; 
also, C is at a position advantageous for a shot. To interpret the employment of the skill, 
we must attribute a set of beliefs. To offer the skill itself as the last word in interpretation 
is to offer a fairly unsatisfying interpretation. 
Here's another way of putting the point. Particularism is threatened by extreme 
epistemological atomism: the problem that no two cases will have any bearing on one 
another. The response is to appeal to non-logical connections between cases, such as 
suggestion or inspiration. Taking the right sorts of suggestions and inspirations will 
constitute a skill. Particularism thus replaces principles with skills as the unifying factors 
of moral reasoning. The great advantage of principles over skills is that we can gather the 
sense of someone's actions if we attribute belief in principles, but not if we attribute 
inchoate skills. The inarticulability of skills turns them into explanatory and 
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hermeneutical black boxes, preventing us from grasping the state of mind of those whose 
actions we would like to interpret. 
When we must offer a skill as explanation, we do in fact surrender intelligibility. 
The player's choice of whether to shoot or pass, and to whom to pass, was one that we 
could comprehend. However, the way the player moved her fingers when she passed 
probably overreaches what we can account for in specifically rational terms. The pattern 
according to which the palm and fingers begin concave but rounded around the ball, and 
end concave but more conical, having pushed the ball through space, is not a pattern that 
we could rationalize. If moral discernment is unintelligible like that, then Dancy is right, 
but I can't help but think that our moral discourse would be the poorer for it: poorer than 
it is. 
Could my suggestion that there are inarticulable principles be any better? Yes, it 
can. The principles to which we appeal in moral reasoning are not fully articulable. But, I 
will suggest below, there are defeasible, contextual specifications of them that are 
articulable. Most of our moral reasoning appeals to these articulate principles. 
The opposite extreme is generalism, and the generalist view that I want to address 
is a Kantian one. For Kant, application of moral principle is not a mere discovery 
procedure in ethics: it's constitutive of the ethical. Only in adherence to rules can we find 
autonomy, and only in autonomy can we act morally, as distinct from according to non-
moral inclinations, however prudent. 
As Rawls explains, Kant's view is centered in the ideal of autonomy, which is to 
regulate all practical life:125 
...the order of moral and political values must be made, or itself constituted, by 
the principles and conceptions of practical reason. Let us refer to this as 
constitutive autonomy. In contrast with rational intuitionism, constitutive 
autonomy says that the so-called independent order of values does not constitute 
                                                
125 See also Rawls 2000, pp. 226-37; also, of course, Kant 1785/1949, esp. pp. 56, 63-80. (orig. pagination, 
pp. 71-2, 78-99.) 
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itself but is constituted by the activity, actual or ideal, of practical (human) reason 
itself. (Rawls 1993/1996, p. 99) 
What would make such an image of the ethical attractive? Kant's ethics engages with us 
as we face choice.126 Construed in physicalistic terms, actions of big bundles of particles 
like us are physically determined. But the fact that my actions are physically determined 
doesn't alleviate the problem of choice. I face choice not as a bundle of particles, but as a 
rational agent. Agency involves rationality, which is constitutively normative. So I face 
choice not as a physical object, but only insofar as I satisfy predicates that do not appear 
in, and cannot be reduced to, the language of physics. But, since it's my agency in virtue 
of which I face choice, it makes no sense to look to facts independent of my agency to 
determine what to do. To look to physical facts or pre-rational urges to determine my acts 
is to pretend that I don't actually face a choice. Insofar as I come to grips with the fact of 
choice, I have nowhere to look for advice but myself. If my decisions were random and 
unpatterned, I could hardly be said to be choosing. If I aim to understand what I do, then I 
have to make myself interpretable: my decisions must follow according to some sort of 
rule that I can understand. My actions have to cohere as a whole. Since the only guidance 
I have is that I must act according to principles, the only principle I can follow is to act 
according to something that can be a principle: a rule that I could follow, and have others 
follow, consistently. Following such rules is constitutive of rational agency and moral 
behavior. 
I find this image attractive and persuasive — overwhelmingly so — despite the 
clumsiness of my expression of it. But if principles are constitutive of moral reasoning, 
how can we accommodate Dancy's plausible claim that a feature of an action can count in 
favor of it on one occasion while, on another occasion, the same feature might count 
against some other action that would also have it? If moral reasoning is constituted by 
principles, there should be universally quantified connections between the non-moral 
                                                
126 See Korsgaard 1996, pp. 94-108. 
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features of a possible act and its moral features. What else could a principle be? What 
else could I attribute to someone in order to have a rational interpretation of her acts? 
Davidson's Kantian position about the attitudes is that they are constitutively 
normative. However, the brain states that subvene those attitudes are not constitutively 
normative. There is thus anomalism between the mental and the physical.127 Particularism 
(especially in Little's interpretation) has it that the moral is also constitutively normative, 
unlike its subvenient base. So far, one would like to just accept both views. However, the 
holism of the mental has it that the constitutive normativity of the mental is its principled 
nature. Thus moral beliefs can't be identified unless they adhere to principle. Identical 
considerations drive both anomalous monism and particularism, but anomalous monism 
is in tension (at least) with particularism. 
I want to consider a related question of particularism about meaning. Dancy is a 
holist about linguistic meaning: a word's contribution to a sentence is determined by the 
context of the sentence. While Dancy does accept "weak compositionality," the claim128 
that sentence meaning is determined by word meaning, he does not accept "strong 
compositionality," the claim that a word contributes the same meaning to each sentence 
in which it appears. Rather, each contribution may be different. 
Jackson, Pettit, and Smith would reject Dancy's claim. There must be a finite 
number of possible contributions that a word could make; else, the word's meaning would 
be beyond our power to grasp. Dancy again appeals, albeit tacitly, to skill, this time in the 
guise of competence: 
...would not this mean that the term is essentially ambiguous? It looks as if terms, 
on this account, change their meaning as they move from context to context, and 
this is surely hard to swallow. To answer this, we need to remember that the 
meaning of the term is what one knows when one is a competent user of that term. 
If the term is capable of making a range of contributions in differing contexts, this 
is part of what the competent user must know.... The meaning of the term, 
                                                
127 See Davidson 1970. 
128 Dancy 2004, p. 193. 
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understood in general, is the range of differences that it can make... (Dancy, 2004, 
p. 194) 
Here is a point that I can grapple with directly on the basis of the linguistic and 
hermeneutical considerations of earlier chapters. Dancy's claim is this. A term has one, 
and only one, meaning. But that meaning is all of the possible contributions that it could 
make. In one context, a word is such that it makes a certain contribution, but, in that 
context, it's also such that, in other contexts, it would make a different one. So the fact 
that a word makes a different contribution to each sentence in which it appears doesn't 
show that the word is ambiguous. 
From an interpretive standpoint, the last component of the claim won't do. It 
undermines our grasp of real ambiguity. A term's ambiguity is just the fact that it makes a 
different contribution in different contexts; changing the traditional 'meaning' into 
'contribution' only required that we rephrase the traditional notion of ambiguity in the 
fancy new jargon. And then it turns out that Dancy has it that terms are systematically 
ambiguous. But they aren't. Obviously we sometimes use ambiguous language, but just as 
obviously, usually we don't. Note that Dancy has to know that words make systematically 
related contributions in different contexts; else, he would just urge that terms are 
systematically ambiguous. 
Imagine that we try to interpret some speaker, and there appears to be no pattern 
at all to her use of a term: it seems to make a different contribution to every sentence in 
which it appears. We would begin to wonder if we were missing something. Perhaps it 
isn't the same word in each context, because the language we're trying to interpret has 
tonal qualities that we hadn't noticed. Or something. We would lose our sense of the word 
being the same word from case to case if its use weren't patterned. 
Note that this isn't just a fact about language learning. It's a fact about 
interpretation in general. Consider that Dancy's sober assessment of language is more 
extreme than what one might say to satirize a language as effectively unlearnable: 
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There are some exceedingly useful words in this language [German]. Schlag, for 
example; and Zug.... The word Schlag means Blow, Stroke, Dash, Hit, Shock, 
Clap, Slap, Time, Bar, Coin, Stamp, Kind, Sort, Manner, Way, Apoplexy, Wood-
cutting Inclosure, Field, Forest-clearing. This is its simple and exact meaning — 
that is to say, its restricted, its fettered meaning; but there are ways by which you 
can set it free, so that it can soar away, as on the wings of the morning, and never 
be at rest. (Twain, 1880, p. 1150) 
The trouble with Schlag is that it isn't fettered by principles. Its contributions to the 
sentences in which it appears are too diverse for the word to be learnable. Notably, Twain 
is making a joke. Of course, German isn't really as awful as he says. No language could 
be. 
Dancy says that the meaning of a word is its range of possible contributions. 
That's true. The question is whether that range is small enough to be captured in a 
disjunctive Tarskian axiom, for such axioms are the principles that we would apply in 
linguistic comprehension and use if we apply principles at all. The axiom can even be 
rather long, consistent with the view that principles govern linguistic comprehension. If 
not, linguistic comprehension and use is a rather depressing and inchoate skill. I want to 
directly apply Davidson's theory of meaning here. Dancy's suggestion about language 
conflicts with the best theory of meaning on the table, so it's probably wrong. 
Of course, a word can be pressed into service for a wider variety of uses than the 
ones in its Tarskian axiom, however long the axiom. Doesn't that confirm Dancy's view? 
Not precisely. Dancy's claim is that we don't need principles to govern meaning. But we 
do. For in the absence of a relatively stable core of possible contributions, we couldn't 
identify a word as meaningful at all. Thus we wouldn't be able to press it into service for 
unusual purposes, such as puns, jokes, and other parasitic and aberrant uses. If Dancy 
opted for an extreme, and permitted any word to have any meaning in an appropriate 
context, we would ask about parasitic uses: Why choose that word, when any word can 
have any meaning? Dancy's view is not so extreme, but also not so moderate that a more 
moderate form of the question wouldn't be problematic for him. Dancy would be right if 
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he said that no Tarskian axiom can capture every use of a word. But he's wrong to say 
that principles are entirely unnecessary to linguistic comprehension and use. This 
argument against particularism about language presages my argument against 
particularism in general. 
I will propose that moral exceptions, situations in which our usual principles 
would lead us astray, are necessarily statistically abnormal, in much the same way that 
hallucinations and incoherent beliefs are statistically abnormal. Most morally relevant 
features have a standard valence, which shifts or becomes irrelevant only in fairly 
unusual circumstances. Dancy is sceptical of the idea of default reasons, that is, 
considerations with a standard valence that applies in all normal cases.129 He accepts that 
such reasons could possibly exist, he just doesn't know of an argument showing that they 
do. He is specifically sceptical of my view: 
The principle that it is wrong to lie cannot be merely a generalization, a claim that 
lies are mostly the worse for being lies, for if all moral principles were of this sort, 
the argument that moral thought and judgment depend on the possibility of moral 
principles would simply be the argument that such thought is impossible unless 
there is a preponderance of normal cases over abnormal ones. I have never seen 
this argument made... (Dancy 2000, p. 76) 
That is the argument I offer. 
I want to begin with a piece of behavioral evidence for the importance of 
principles. We do, in fact, appeal to principles, specifically, principles connecting thick 
moral concepts to thin. McNaughton and Rawling argue: 
That an act is cruel, mean, or dishonest counts against it; that it is kind, generous, 
or honest counts in its favour. On thin intuitionism [particularism], thick moral 
properties have no more intrinsic moral significance than non-moral properties. It 
will, presumably, turn out that these properties are 'commonly more important' 
than some others (though thin intuitionism owes us an account of why), but that 
not only understates their force, it seems to mislocate their centrality. It is not just 
that it is helpful to look at them because they often count; their counting is central 
to their being thick moral concepts. (McNaughton and Rawling 2000, p. 273) 
                                                
129 Dancy 2004, pp. 111-7. 
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McNaughton and Rawling offer the analogy of a "fit" between various concepts. The 
thick and thin moral concepts fit together as a consequence of the holism of the attitudes. 
Consider an attempt to interpret a speaker. Imagine that the speaker seems to 
believe, each time that a possible act would have feature G and no other morally relevant 
feature, that there is nothing to be said for the act at all. G cannot be generosity. Its 
generosity, by its nature, counts in favor of the generous act. That an act would be 
generous doesn't close the question whether to perform it: maybe I can't afford generosity 
right now, or maybe my potential beneficiary doesn't deserve my help. Moreover, there 
can be cases in which its generosity counts against an act. Perhaps someone needs to be 
left to fend for herself; her problem is that people have been too generous with her, and 
now she needs some cold reality. In that sort of case, generosity counts against. But 
usually, generosity is not enabling behavior. Their normal valences with respect to the 
thin moral concepts are constitutive of the thick moral concepts. Thus there are defeasible 
principles connecting the thick to the thin. 
If the particularist wants to accept that its generosity typically counts in favor of a 
generous act, then she must explain why. On particularism, there are no principled 
connections between the thin moral concepts and anything else. But we can see that we 
won't attribute beliefs involving the thick moral concepts to someone unless we're willing 
to attribute to her principles connecting those concepts to the thin moral concepts. That 
the principles are defeasible isn't relevant: they apply in most cases and all normal cases, 
and someone without the principles doesn't grasp the concepts. 
To attribute the belief that an act is generous, then, I must ordinarily also attribute 
the belief that there's at least something — its generosity — that counts in favor of that 
act. But I must also attribute other, non-moral beliefs. Assume that the speaker often tries 
to treat people G-ishly. However, the people she wishes to treat G-ishly are all 
enormously wealthy, much more so than the speaker herself. Also, they have no special 
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relationship to the speaker. Treating someone G-ishly is obviously not treating her 
generously, since you can't be generous to wealthy strangers. 
Here is my argument for principles. In interpretation, I must attribute beliefs 
holistically. There are defeasible but massive inferential connections between non-moral 
beliefs, thick evaluations, and thin evaluations. These connections are moral principles. If 
I interpret holistically, then I must interpret as if the speaker respects these principles: if 
she doesn't, I begin to lose any sense for what she means. So the speaker must have 
principles, since there isn't any difference between having and respecting principles. To 
be interpreted as one who has moral beliefs, one must be interpreted as one who has 
moral principles. Contrary to Dancy's particularism, the possibility of moral thought and 
judgment depends on the provision of a suitable supply of moral principles. 
Consider Little's remark that there is an analogy (at least) between Davidson's 
anomalism about the mental and particularism's anomalism about the moral. Jackson, 
Pettit, and Smith seem to require that moral distinctions be drawable in non-moral 
language; that is, their argument for principles is just that anomalism undercuts 
learnability. My view is intended to save the anomalism of the mental and the moral 
while simultaneously preserving principles. If the principles were reductions of the 
mental or the moral to something else, then anomalism would be lost. But the principles 
are not reductions. They are defeasible. They introduce sufficient regularity in the 
connections between the mental and the moral, on the one hand, and the non-mental and 
non-moral, on the other, to make these realms graspable on the basis of behavioral 
evidence, but not so much regularity that they're reduced to the physical. 
Note that when I speak of making the moral realm graspable, I don't mean to be 
speaking, as Jackson, Pettit, and Smith do, of the acquisition of moral concepts. I doubt 
that we acquire thin moral concepts; I suspect that they're part of an a priori theory of 
agency with which we approach the interpretation of agents. To grasp the realm of the 
moral here just means to be able to attribute attitudes involving moral concepts to 
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speakers and agents. The moral is anomalous with respect to the non-moral, but there still 
must be sufficiently strong connection between the two, and among beliefs within the 
former, for us to be able to treat moral believers' moral attitudes as holistically connected 
to their non-moral attitudes. Defeasible connectives provide exactly the right strength of 
connection. 
My view is closer to Holton's "principled particularism" than it is to other 
particularisms on the market. For Holton, different moral principles apply to situations 
depending on the situations' moral complexity. For instance, if the only morally relevant 
feature of an action is that it would be generous, then you should do it; if, on the other 
hand, it is generous but also enabling behavior, and those are all of the morally relevant 
features, then you shouldn't do it.... Each principle is a material conditional with a finite 
conjunction of morally relevant features, plus a "That's it" clause stating that there are no 
more morally relevant features, on the left, and a moral evaluation on the right. For 
instance, such a principle might run: ∀x(x is dangerous and x is courageous and That's it 
→ x is right). Moral reasoning involves concluding with the thin moral evaluation on the 
right, which follows from the assertion that the morally relevant features in the 
conjunction obtain, and "That's it," and the principle.130 
This approach has certain logical oddnesses.131 For instance, the 'that's in each 
such argument, even ones that apply the same principle, have different referents. 
Consider this argument: 
(1) ∀x(x is generous and That's it → x is right) 
(2) a is generous 
(3) That's it 
Thus, (4) a is right 
Imagine another argument, identical but that its (2') says that b is generous, and its (4') 
says that b is right. In the stated argument, the 'that' in (3) refers to (2). In the other 
                                                
130 See Holton 2002, pp. 199-201. 
131 Holton notes this oddness on p. 201; see also 204-6. I'm not completely sure that Holton's self-criticism 
is correct; if it isn't, then there may be less to decide between his view and mine. 
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argument, the 'that' in (3') refers to (2'). For (3) to hook up with (1), and (3') to hook up 
with (1'), the 'that's in (1) and (1') must similarly vary their referents. But, according to 
Holton, that gives them different meanings; they turn out to be different principles. That 
is not an acceptable consequence. The point of principles was to give unity to the mental, 
a unity without which the mental dissolves. If a different principle is called on for each 
instance of moral reasoning, the principle doesn't appear to unify. Some higher-level 
propensity for generating contextually appropriate principles would have to do the 
unifying work. So I think that defeasible conditionals are a superior model.132 
Recall that, while interpretation is holistic, there is also a structure in which 
application of predicates directly to objects has greater weight in determining predicate 
meaning than more abstract, farther-from-experience beliefs. Indeterminacy, likewise, 
increases with distance from experience. The same structure applies in moral reasoning. 
Evaluations have greater weight in determining the content of the moral concepts that 
appear in them than do principles. Without principles, moral evaluations wouldn't be 
what they are, but the mass of evaluations has greater evidentiary weight in decisions 
about what beliefs to attribute than principles do. It's easier to determine someone's 
evaluations than her principles, and the evidence flows accordingly. 
There is a further, related point. Defeasible principles don't apply everywhere. If 
moral reasoning consists in the application of principles to cases, then how do we do 
moral reasoning where our defeasible principles don't apply? It's true that we can't, in 
these cases, apply the principles. However, the morally relevant predicates that are 
present must also appear in inapplicable defeasible principles. In grasping those 
principles, we see the point of these predicates. That gives us an insight, though one that 
isn't rationally graspable or interpretable, in the exceptional cases. Ideally, it would give 
us an insight that we could then codify and justify, thus increasing the applicability of our 
principles and broadening the range in which our moral thinking is interpretable — is 
                                                
132 Little appears to offer a similar idea at Little 2000, pp. 299-300. 
 319 
thinking properly speaking. I would suggest that, in this way, we articulate more and 
more parts of the non-defeasible principles actually governing our uses and actions. 
These principles are too complicated to ever be fully articulated — like the concept of 
truth — but we can articulate their application in particular contexts, just as we can 
articulate our application of the concept of truth to particular speakers by forming 
Tarskian theories for them. Where so-far articulate principles don't apply, though, 
particularist descriptions of moral insight will have to do. 
With defeasible principles in place, I can move on to an issue in moral 
epistemology. The nature of the principles connecting between non-moral facts, thick 
evaluations, and thin evaluations suggests that reflective equilibrium has a justificatory 
role to play in moral reasoning. 
Particularism has little use for reflective equilibrium.133 For Kantian generalism, 
the role of reflective equilibrium is chiefly as a check on speculation. The Kantian 
believes that an act's rightness is a consequence of its being prescribed by a principle. 
Principles, then, do the real work. But a modest Kantian might reflect on the dangers of 
moral theories. How could one check that a moral theory, a body of principles, actually 
deserves rational acclaim? On the assumption that the rational moral principles are 
embedded in our actual moral evaluations, the Kantian might conclude that, while 
evaluations are fallible, they can provide some insight into the validity of principles. Thus 
we should check our principles against our evaluations in an effort to secure the 
principles most deserving of rational assent. 
In chapter 4, I opposed the sort of expressivist and prescriptivist approaches to 
moral language that could make it reasonable to secure assent to moral utterances without 
thinking that they're true. In chapter 1, I tried to show that truth involves a connection to 
independent truth-conditions. So I disagree with the traditional Kantian generalist that a 
moral utterance's deserving rational assent consists in its derivation from principles. On 
                                                
133 See Dancy 2004, pp. 153-4. 
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the contrary, we should give our assent to what seems to be true to independent truth-
conditions. 
As a consequence of the anti-sceptical argument of section 3.2, we can see that 
our moral beliefs are mainly true unless there is some special sceptical problem for moral 
cognition. Assuming that there isn't, what more could we ask for in a method for moral 
reflection than that we make our mainly true beliefs cohere with one another? The 
broadly coherentist epistemology implicit in Davidson's approach is adequate in morality, 
too. The fact that moral content tends to flow from evaluations to principles, but that in 
the absence of principles there would be no evaluations, shows that we need both sort of 
moral belief. The best way to get coherence, and hence truth, is to check evaluations 
against the systematizing principles, and contrariwise, until the system makes as much 
sense as we can make it. 
Susan Hurley distinguishes between "centralist" and "non-centralist" accounts of 
ethical concepts. Centralism has it that the normative content of thick ethical concepts is 
determined by their relation to the thin ethical concepts; non-centralism disagrees.134 My 
view is non-centralist. A thick moral concept is the concept it is because of its principled 
relations to various non-moral concepts, and to the thin moral concepts; but the thin 
moral concepts are the concepts they are because of their principled connections to the 
thick moral concepts. I note this because of a point that Hurley makes about a 
consequence of non-centralism: 
Non-centralism claims that there are logical connections between claims about 
what ought to be done, all things considered, and a list of specific values; the 
sense of ought that is a function of the specific values on the list can be used to 
challenge and revise views about the relationships among those values, but it 
cannot be used to endorse an entirely new list. Thus, non-centralism threatens to 
deprive us of a sense in which to disagree about things we seem to want to 
disagree about. In what sense can we disagree with someone who does not share 
our specific reason-giving practices? (Hurley 1985, p. 67) 
                                                
134 Hurley 1985, p. 56. 
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Where Hurley speaks of threats, I would speak of promises. The promise of the holistic, 
coherentist approach is that it puts our moral discourse in relationship with any and all 
moral discourse. Far from preventing meaningful disagreement, it lays the meta-ethical 
groundwork for moral engagement. By engaging with foreign moral theories, I come to a 
better understanding of the moral concepts embedded in both the foreign theory and 
mine. If I could reach wide reflective equilibrium, I would have taken into account all 
other moral theories, but our common moral concepts would only have been sharpened 
and revised, never done away with. Hurley's mistake is to think, as Fodor and LePore 
seem to,135 that holism commits us to either total agreement or else incommensurability. 
Notably, the argument Hurley offers accounts for the justification one gets from a 
coherentist approach in moral epistemology. There's no moral justification that won't 
justify most of my moral beliefs, since what it is to be a true moral belief is, 
approximately, to be, or to cohere with, my moral beliefs. So I know that my beliefs can't 
be massively wrong. Thus rendering them coherent is justificatory. 
How do things stand with Kantian autonomy? I want to suggest that my view is 
Kantian: rational agency is autonomous in its moral reasoning, despite its appeal to 
independent moral facts. For Kant, autonomy was a formal matter, because, for Kant, 
there was no content that something had to have to count as a mind. The mental was 
characterized with reference to a structure of categories and schemata. On this approach, 
the mind has only formalities to fall back on when it looks to itself for rational 
governance. 
Davidson's approach is squarely Kantian, in that it supports the anomalism of the 
mental. The mental is an autonomous conceptual realm, logically connected to the 
physical only by defeasible conditionals that don't try to articulate the nature of the mind 
in physical terms, but only to tie attitudes and contents to the behavioral evidence without 
which they couldn't exist. Nevertheless, Davidson's approach, in rejecting conceptual 
                                                
135 See the discussion back in 2.3. 
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schemes and in requiring massive agreement for interpretation, gives substance to the 
mind. A mind necessarily has certain content; anything without that content couldn't be 
interpreted and wouldn't be a mind. This is a rational requirement, and is itself anomalous 
with respect to the physical. 
If Kantian autonomy consists in a mind not looking beyond itself for reasons to 
act, then my approach is not Kantian. But I doubt that the core of Kant's approach is this 
negative idea. I suspect that the core of Kant's approach is the idea that the mind should 
not look beyond what it's rationally required to accept. Kant thought that all that we must 
accept, on narrowly rational grounds, were certain formal beliefs, analytic or synthetic a 
priori. The Davidsonian approach has a place for the synthetic a priori, as I've suggested. 
But the Davidsonian conception of rationality is substantive: to be rational, a mind must 
adopt a wide swath of beliefs. That set of beliefs is rationally required of us. So if 
Kantian autonomy consists in looking to the rationally required, then one can look to 
one's entire body of well-justified moral judgments and principles for guidance in action. 
5.2.4 Holistic Aspects 2: Moral Motivation 
In this section, I confront the problem of moral motivation by way of discussing 
holistic constraints on directive judgments (which, to recall, are specific beliefs about 
what the thinker herself ought to do in some particular situation). Here is the problem. As 
I argued in chapter 4, moral discourse is cognitive in nature: moral utterances present 
beliefs, not desires. However, moral utterances seem to have a tie to motivation. As a 
rule, when someone believes that she ought to do something, she experiences some 
pressure in favor of doing it. Nevertheless, belief is typically held to be motivationally 
inert. So, while the attitudes presented by prescriptive judgments are beliefs, which are 
motivationally inert, they seem correlated with motivation. What accounts for this 
correlation? 
In general, the problem is one about the nature of reasons for action. To begin, I 
need to distinguish between two completely different kinds of phenomena that are both 
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reasonably called reasons for action: motivating and explanatory reasons, or first-person 
and third-person reasons.136 A motivating reason is an independent factor that an agent 
considers when engaging in practical reasoning. An explanatory reason is a set of 
attitudes the agent has that cause her to act. The motivating reason for performing A is 
whatever the agent considered to count in favor of doing A. The agent might believe that 
there are motivating reasons that don't actually exist, as when the agent believes that the 
possible action would have a feature that it wouldn't have, and counted its having that 
feature in favor of performing the action. The explanatory reason is the cluster of beliefs, 
desires, intentions and so forth that cause her to do A. When we reason about what to do, 
we don't, as a rule, take into account our beliefs and desires: we take into account 
external facts. But when we try to account for why people do what they do, we don't, as a 
rule, take into account external facts: we take into account her beliefs and desires. 
From the first-person point of view, when considering possible actions, we mainly 
consider features of that action and its leading competitors. Being desired by us is not, as 
a rule, a relevant feature. If I decide to get some ice cream, I don't consider my desire for 
ice cream: I consider the flavor and texture and expense. Now, sometimes we do consider 
the desire as relevant. As with itches, desires sometimes attract so much attention that we 
would rather place elsewhere that we concede and satisfy the desire so as to set it aside 
and return to what we think best. 
From the third-person point of view, when explaining actions, we don't consider 
external facts. Sometimes, people act on the basis of false beliefs and expectations. I can 
hardly give a causal explanation of someone's action with reference to non-obtaining 
facts about the action. Since I should appeal to the same sort of factors in explaining 
                                                
136 The distinction is drawn, with varying degrees of distinctness, at Nagel 1970, p. 15; Bond 1983, pp. 22-
3, 28; Darwall 1983, p. 28; Audi 1986, p. 76; Brink 1989, p. 39; and Smith 1994b, pp. 94-5. 
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action based on true belief and action based on false belief, I should appeal to attitudes of 
the agent in both cases.137 
The question is about the nature of explanatory or third-person reasons, and the 
main contenders are Hume's theory and Kant's, or, at any rate, theories attached to these 
thinkers' names. The Humean theory, in brief, has two components. First, every 
explanatory reason has at least one desire as a component.138 Second, desires come in two 
kinds. First, there are basic desires. These desires are psychological contingencies that 
don't rationally derive from any other attitudes by any form of reasoning. Second, there 
are derived desires. These desires derive from basic desires. The derived desire is to 
perform some action that either will help cause the realization of a more basic desire, or 
will itself at least partly constitute the realization of a more basic desire. No desire is 
rationally derived from any attitude other than other desires.139 Of course, belief plays a 
role in the reasoning from basic to derived desire, and the derivation of derived from 
basic desires can be counted as a form of reasoning, but the beliefs and rational processes 
are themselves impotent to do anything but guide desire. 
Kant's theory has it that pure reason can motivate. Unfortunately, Kant is none too 
clear on what's going on. Rawls has it that, for Kant: "...our consciousness of the moral 
law as supremely authoritative for us must be so deeply rooted in our person as 
reasonable and rational that this law by itself, when fully known and understood, can be a 
sufficient motive for us to act from it, whatever our natural desires." (Rawls 2000, p. 255) 
Kant himself says in the second Critique that "What is essential in the moral worth of 
actions is that the moral law should directly determine the will." (Kant 1788, p. 75; orig. 
p. 71) How could that happen? On the one hand, Kant says that "...how a law in itself can 
                                                
137 It would lead me very far astray to explain why there is no analogy between this argument and (bad) 
arguments from illusion and hallucination for perceptual representationalism. Suffice it to say that there are 
many disanalogies, having to do with direction of fit, direction of cause, and the sort of content the different 
states have. 
138 Smith offers this idea at Smith 1994b, pp. 92-3. 
139 Williams offers this idea at Williams 1980, esp. p. 109. 
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be the direct motive of the will is an insoluble problem for the human reason." (ibid, p. 
75; orig. p. 72) Now, "a law in itself" can't causally account for action. What Kant means 
is that belief in the law accounts for moral action. And he admits that there's no way to 
understand how that could happen. But on the other hand, Kant had said a few years 
earlier in the Groundwork that for beings that, like us, aren't entirely denizens of the 
noumenal realm to "will what reason alone direct such beings that they ought to will, it is 
no doubt requisite that reason should have a power to infuse with a feeling of pleasure or 
satisfaction in the fulfilment of duty..." (Kant 1785, p. 77; orig. p. 96) To whatever 
degree we associate pleasure with the satisfaction of desire, this seems to be a concession 
to Hume. We may set aside such concessions in the name of having a distinct doctrine to 
call Kantian. For Kant, then, what's central to moral motivation is what Korsgaard calls 
the internalism requirement: "Practical-reason claims, if they are really to present us with 
reasons for action, must be capable of motivating rational persons." (Korsgaard 1986, p. 
317) I take Korsgaard to mean that moral beliefs must be capable of causing action. 
The first question, then, is whether the explanatory reason for an action must, in 
any interesting sense, include a desire. There is substantial scepticism about this claim. 
Nagel has it that, while every action is caused by a desire, this fact is a triviality with no 
explanatory power: 
The assumption that a motivating desire underlies every intentional act depends, I 
believe, on a confusion between two sorts of desires, motivated and unmotivated. 
...many desires... are arrived at by decision and after deliberation.... Rational or 
motivational explanation is just as much in order for that desire as for the action 
itself. 
The claim that a desire underlies every act is true only if desires are taken to 
include motivated as well as unmotivated desires, and it is true only in the sense 
that whatever may be the motivation for someone's intentional pursuit of a goal, it 
becomes in virtue of his pursuit ipso facto appropriate to ascribe to him a desire 
for that goal. But if the desire is a motivated one, the explanation of it will be the 
same as the explanation of his pursuit, and it is by no means obvious that a desire 
must enter into this further explanation. (Nagel 1970, p. 29) 
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Bond140 calls these motivated desires "logical ghosts." Here is the idea. It could be that, in 
order to account for action, a desire to perform it must be posited. But we may then ask 
what motivated the agent to perform the action, and also what led the agent to want to 
perform the action. We will typically offer exactly the same answer to both questions. It's 
not at all obvious why that answer must itself appeal to further desires. In fact, it will be 
fairly rare that the agent's considerations, her motivating reason, included any reference 
to her desires at all. Nagel's line, then, is to accept the first Humean claim as a triviality, 
and reject the second. 
McDowell offers a similar argument: 
Charitable behaviour aims at an end, namely the good of others. It does not follow 
that a full specification of the agent's reasons for a charitable act would need to 
add a desire to his conception of the circumstances in which he acted.... The 
desire for the good of others is related to charity as the desire for one's own future 
happiness is related to prudence; not, then, as a needed extra ingredient in 
formulations of reasons for acting. Rather, the desire is ascribed... in recognition 
of the fact that a charitable person's special way of conceiving situations by itself 
casts a favourable light on charitable actions. Of course a desire ascribed in this 
purely consequential way is not independently intelligible. (McDowell 1978, p. 
84) 
McDowell urges roughly the same consideration that Nagel does. When an agent focuses 
on considerations that favor her performing some action, she might be led to perform the 
action. If we wish, we may say that she is also led to desire to perform the action, in some 
formal sense of 'desire.' But the desire we posit is not an autonomous mental entity, and it 
lacks any real causal or explanatory power. It is a ghost of the actual explanatory factors, 
which are themselves beliefs that the action has features that recommend it more highly 
than its competitors.141 
If we should agree with the first Humean claim, taken as a triviality, what should 
we think of the second, the claim that all desires are either basic or derived from other 
                                                
140 See Bond 1983, pp. 9-13. 
141 Bittner, at Bittner 2001 pp. 18-22, offers another argument for the claim that the desires, and also the 
beliefs, in belief-desire reasons are not independently intelligible and have no apparent independent causal 
roles. 
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desires? Nagel and McDowell suggest the Kantian view that belief, by itself, can explain 
action, albeit by way of causing ghost desires. Are they right? Ross offers this argument 
for the second Humean claim: 
...it's not plausible that we can explain the directiveness of desires in terms of 
relations among intentional states which are not themselves directive states.... The 
basic point is that it's implausible that we can explain a state's having the causal 
role characteristic of directive fit, which involves behaving in ways to change the 
world in order to satisfy a certain representation of it, in terms of states with the 
causal role characteristic of descriptive fit, which doesn't involve behaving in 
these ways. (Ross 2002, p. 202) 
Ross distinguishes between beliefs and desires according to their directions of fit.142 
Beliefs characteristically try to match the world, and if a belief fails to match the world, 
the belief is what has gone wrong. Desires try to make the world match them, and if the 
world fails to match a desire, the world is what has gone wrong (from that desire's point 
of view, at any rate). If we want to admit that desires are required for action, then we 
must admit that one of the required states for action is something that seeks, 
constitutively, to change the world. That is perfectly natural. When we ask why an agent 
has a desire, we have two choices. We could either posit a non-rational explanation, from 
physiology or training or what-have-you, or a rational explanation. Desires with non-
rational explanations are basic desires; those with rational explanations are derived 
desires. If we then ask why an agent has some derived desire, Ross says, we must appeal 
to another desire. A desire, with its characteristic direction of fit, is necessary to 
rationalize any derived desire. The reason is that it's hard to see how beliefs alone could 
rationalize an attitude that isn't true or false. Beliefs rationalize by implication, and a 
desire can never be a logical implication, since implication is truth-preserving and desires 
aren't truth-evaluable. A desire can be rationalized by another when the desirer believes 
that the new desire is for something that would partly realize or help cause the 
satisfaction of the old desire; no logical relationships between the desires themselves are 
                                                
142 While Elizabeth Anscombe seems to have originated the idea of direction of fit in her book Intention, 
my understanding draws mainly from Searle 1983. 
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necessary, but a believed relationship of realization or causation between their contents, 
is. 
Consider an example from Stephen Darwall143, offered as part of an attack on the 
second Humean claim. We are to imagine that Roberta (the Buddha?) has grown up with 
little awareness of the pain in the world, but that, on maturity, she is shown a film 
depicting some among the many who suffer. She acquires the desire to ease their 
suffering. How shall we interpret the acquisition of this desire? 
The Humean has to interpret it as the derivation of a derived desire from basic 
desires, given new beliefs. But it's not obvious to which desire(s) there should be appeal. 
Derived desires are desires to perform actions that either cause or constitute the 
satisfaction of the relevant basic desire(s). Relieving this particular suffering would cause 
the world to be a better place, or constitute the partial satisfaction a more basic desire to 
relieve suffering in general. Does Roberta have a basic desire for the good? I return to 
this possibility. Does she have a basic desire to relieve suffering in general? Roberta has 
never before acted so as to relieve suffering, or spoken in favor of doing so. The only 
evidence in favor of her having that older basic desire is her new, allegedly derived, 
desire, but whether an old desire is necessary to account for it is what's in question. 
Ross just repeats his claim that it's implausible that the new desire could be 
accounted for without reference to some old desire. I can imagine the more serious 
Humean taking any of several directions. She might posit a whole set of innate moral 
desires. Hume, of course, couldn't do that. It's quite impossible to desire that Fa without 
having the concept of F-ness, and for Hume, no concept is innate. So the concept of F-
ness is not innate, and so neither can be the desire that Fa. This argument generalizes 
against any innate desire. Since content is determined only by causation and in 
triangulation, Hume was right about innate concepts, so this route is of no avail. 
                                                
143 ...at Darwall 1983, pp. 39-41. 
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She could posit the same moral desires, but all of them acquired. These desires 
would be basic because unrationalized, rather than basic because innate. The response to 
the Roberta case would be this. It's true that Roberta did not before have any relevant 
desire. Her new desire is the desire to relieve suffering, and it is not derived from any 
more basic desire. But that only counts against Hume's theory if the desire is nevertheless 
derived. But it isn't: it's not rationalized at all. It just so happens that, when we acquire the 
concept of suffering, we also acquire the desire to alleviate suffering. I have an argument 
against this suggestion, but it exactly matches my argument against the next suggestion, 
so I'll delay it a moment. 
The Humean might posit an acquired generalized desire for the good. Such a 
claim could be either a contingent psychological generalization, or else a philosophical 
claim analyzing some other concept, like rationality. If the claim is a psychological 
generalization, then I don't think that it's very interesting and I can't imagine what the 
Humean could even begin to use as evidence for it. On the other hand, if the claim is 
intended to be something like a partial analysis of rationality, then I think that it has much 
merit but has lost touch with the spirit of Hume. The claim would be that it's partly 
constitutive of rationality that the rational agent desires the good. Perhaps there is an 
interpretation of Hume according to which that sort of claim is natural to Hume. But it 
gives the appearance of being a synthetic a priori claim of exactly the sort no Humean 
could accept. 
Likewise if the posit is of many desires, such as a basic desire to ease suffering. 
Does the Humean intend a mere psychological generalization about people's responses to 
acquiring the concept of suffering? Or does she aim to tell us something about the 
constitution of the concept of suffering? If the former, the position is uninteresting. If the 
latter, it's not Humean. 
To prepare for a future argument, let me return to the first Humean claim. Perhaps 
the Humean can compromise with the Kantian. The Humean can maintain that a desire in 
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a more-than-formal sense is always necessary for motivation, while the Kantian can insist 
that belief alone can motivate. This compromise can be carried off by the introduction of 
"besires," states that are both beliefs and desires.144 I will argue that there could be no 
such states. Little offers a good treatment of what besires would be: 
...there is no one propositional content of a mental state with doubled directions of 
fit, anymore than there is one propositional attitude involved in such a state. It is a 
state with two complex properties: it is a believing-attitude directed toward one 
proposition, and it is a desiring-attitude directed toward another. (Little 1997, p. 
64) 
Consider a randomly chosen belief and desire. I desire that there be ice in my water, and I 
believe that the Eiffel Tower is in Paris. This belief and this desire could not, even by 
coincidence, be the same attitude. We may assume that what attitude it is, and what its 
contents are, are essential to any attitude. So, if there were a bidirectional attitude, then it 
would be essentially the belief that it is, and also essentially the desire that it is. Thus, if it 
could do without either its belief component or its desire component, then that component 
is not, actually, a component of the attitude, since it can't be that attitude without having 
that component if that sort of component is essential to its identity. Assume that my 
desire for ice is my belief about the Eiffel Tower. But surely I could still desire ice even 
if I had no belief, or a different belief, about the location of the Eiffel Tower. Thus the 
desire for ice is not, actually, a belief about the Eiffel Tower. 
Of course, that sort of example is not what compromisers have in mind. What 
they propose is that the belief that such-and-such would be a good thing for the agent to 
do is at the same time the desire that the agent do such-and-such. Even though this is 
much more plausible, it seems to me to fall prey to the same sort of problem. It overstates 
the strength of Kantian pure practical reason to say that, given some belief about what I 
ought to do, I necessarily — for identity is a relation that holds of necessity or not at all 
— desire to do it. Surely any (not 'every') moral belief that I have, I could have without 
                                                
144 This idea or at least the coinage is due to Altham, 1986; I rely on others' treatments. 
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the appropriate matching motivation. Likewise, for any (not 'every') moral motivation of 
mine, I could have it without thinking that the act in question is the right thing to do. The 
desire could have some other rationalization, or even be basic.145 
The Humean can't compromise with the Kantian, at least not like that. The first 
Humean claim seems to be trivial, and the second controversial at best. Let's take another 
look at the first claim. Michael Smith has proposed a simple and well-known argument 
for it, and, notably from my point of view, he quotes Davidson when stating the thesis: "R 
is a primary reason [i.e., explanatory reason] why an agent performed the action A under 
the description d only if R consists of a pro attitude [i.e., desire] of the agent toward 
actions with a certain property, and a belief of the agent that A, under the description d, 
has that property." (Davidson 1963, p. 5) Davidson himself offers no argument for this 
claim at all; his concern is with the kinds of relations explanatory reasons have to action 
and reconciling the rationalization relation with the causal relation. Smith, though, does 
offer an argument with that thesis as its conclusion: 
(a) Having a motivating reason [i.e., explanatory reason] is, inter alia, having a 
goal. 
(b) Having a goal is being in a state with which the world must fit. 
(c) Being in a state with which the world must fit is a desire. (Smith 1994b, p. 
116) 
Like Ross, Smith appeals to desires' direction of fit to show that they are necessary for 
action. This argument is better than Ross's, which held that an attitude with the world-to-
mind direction of fit had to descend from another such attitude. There's just no reason to 
believe that. 
Smith has it that worldly action performed to satisfy some attitude, must be 
performed to satisfy an attitude with the sort of direction of fit that makes the world 
responsible for satisfying the attitude. This more abstract (than Smith's) version of the 
argument is sound. Noteworthy about the actual argument is that premise (c) is obviously 
                                                
145 This argument is similar to Smith's attack on besires at Smith 1994b, pp. 117-20. It is, of course, 
reminiscent of Descartes' and Kripke's arguments for mind-body dualism, but it doesn't make the mistake of 
their argument(s): treating apparent conceivability as indicative of metaphysical possibility. 
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false. Desires are not the only attitudes that have the world-to-mind direction of fit. 
Intentions do, too. 
This isn't semantic fiddling; intentions are not a kind of desire, they are a distinct 
sort of attitude. Like desires, they have the world-to-mind direction of fit: when they 
aren't satisfied, it is the world, rather than the intentions, that are at fault. But intentions 
have different relevance. As Bratman notes,146 intentions play a distinct role in practical 
reasoning. Whereas a desire can still exist despite being set aside or outweighed, when an 
intention is set aside, it no longer exists. As long as an agent genuinely intends to do 
something, that intention plays a role in practical reasoning: decisions must allow the 
intention to remain satisfiable. If the agent makes an intention of hers unsatisfiable, and 
knows that, then the intention no longer exists. A desire, however, can exist despite one's 
practical reasoning determining that it will not be satisfied. This settledness of intentions 
is important. 
Davidson has an interesting suggestion about intentions and desires.147 
Unfortunately, his phrasing makes things hard, for he calls both desires and intentions 
'judgments,' which they obviously aren't. Neither desiring nor intending to do something 
is believing that it is desirable. Some charity is called for: here is his idea. We often have 
contradictory desires. I begin with the desire, say, to lose weight, and also the desire to 
eat doughnuts. This is a doughnut and I can eat it; but not eating it will help me lose 
weight. So I want both to eat the doughnut and to refrain. It's not reasonable to perform 
an act just because it belongs to the class constituting the content of some desire of mine 
(even if there is only one member of the class). A desire is the desire to perform members 
of a class of actions, all other things being equal. Since all other things are rarely equal, 
the desire must be played off against other attitudes in practical reasoning. Assume that I 
decide to eat the doughnut. It's still true that it's unreasonable to eat this doughnut just 
                                                
146 See Bratman 1984. 
147 See Davidson 1978, pp. 96-9. 
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because I would like to, all other things being equal. It's reasonable to eat the doughnut 
because eating it seems to be the best thing to do, all things considered. To complement 
desires, which are all-other-things-being-equal attitudes with world-to-mind direction of 
fit, we need intentions, which are all-things-considered attitudes with world-to-mind 
direction of fit. 
The point of this has been that Smith's premise (c) is wrong. We should agree 
that, whenever we act, our action is caused and rationalized by an attitude with the world-
to-mind direction of fit. We need not agree that the attitude is a desire. Intentions will do 
just as well, and probably better in many cases. Intentions are, in Bond's term, mere 
"ghosts" of the moral judgments that somehow bring them about. That may account for 
some differences in phenomenology that there may be between things that we want to do 
and things that we do from a moral sense. It's also presupposed by the common claim that 
an agent performs an act, not because she wants to, but because she has to or thinks that 
she ought. Scanlon agrees about the motivational efficacy of intentions: 
...a rational person who judges there to be compelling reason to A normally forms 
the intention to do A, and this judgment is sufficient explanation of that intention 
and of the agent's acting on it.... There is no need to invoke an additional form of 
motivation beyond the judgment and the reasons it recognizes, some further force 
to, as it were, get the limbs in motion. (Scanlon 1998, pp. 33-4) 
Scanlon presages my approach, though I will reintroduce desires. What's pointed out in 
his remark is that moral judgment somehow translates into moral action by way of some 
attitude with the appropriate direction of fit. What we need to know is how judgment 
leads to the appropriate attitude. 
Before turning to a few views on that subject, I want to mention the oft-quoted but 
terribly obvious contribution of Michael Stocker, that we are sometimes indifferent to 
what we agree to be good, and sometimes positively desire what we agree to be bad. 
Stocker notes that "only against a certain assumed background of agent mood and interest 
does citing the (believed) good make an act intelligible," (Stocker 1979, p. 746), and that 
"motivation and evaluation [i.e., moral belief, and desire or intention] need not point in 
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the same direction, that they are related through complex structures of mood, care, 
energy, interest, and the like." (ibid. p. 750) However we relate moral belief to moral 
desire or intention, we should bear in mind that the connections are defeasible and often 
complex. There might be some background condition required for beliefs to bring about 
intentions. 
The background condition offered by several philosophers is rationality. My 
general line is offered by Christine Korsgaard, who says: 
In order for a theoretical argument or practical deliberation to have the status of 
reason, it must of course be capable of motivating or convincing a rational person, 
but it does not follow that it must at all times be capable of motivating or 
convincing any given individual. It may follow from the supposition that we are 
rational persons and the supposition that a given argument or deliberation is 
rational that, if we are not convinced or motivated, there must be some 
explanation of that failure. (Korsgaard 1986, p. 321) 
For Korsgaard, a rational agent will be moved by moral judgment to perform moral 
actions. We've seen that action requires intention, so we may say that on Korsgaard's 
view, moral beliefs defeasibly bring about moral intentions. My concern in this section is 
with how that happens. What is rationality, such that it can effect this transition in the 
rational? And my answer will appeal to the holistic nature of the attitudes. 
Velleman offers one sort of account, one that appeals to a central moral desire to, 
as a Humean would have it, serve as a derivation base for moral intentions and other 
moral desires. Velleman proposes that the premises of the argument for Humeanism goes 
like this: 
Suppose that reasons for someone to do something must be considerations that 
would sway him toward doing it if he entertained them rationally. And suppose 
that the only considerations capable of swaying someone toward an action are 
those which represent it as a way of attaining something that he wants, or would 
want once apprised of its attainability. (Velleman 1996, p. 170) 
This argument appears to be one about the derivation of desire. A new desire can be 
generated from new beliefs only if those beliefs are about ways of satisfying old desires. 
What Velleman wants us to notice about the argument is that: 
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The first premise... doesn't entail that if a consideration fails to influence 
someone, then it isn't a reason for him to act; it entails that if a consideration fails 
to influence someone, then either it isn't a reason for him to act or he hasn't 
entertained it rationally. The inclinations that would make an agent susceptible to 
the influence of some consideration may therefore be necessary — not to the 
consideration's being a reason for him — but rather to his being rational in 
entertaining that reason. (ibid, p. 172) 
For Velleman, the rational consideration of certain facts is itself adequate to account for 
moral motivation. That's because certain inclinations are intrinsic to rationality. The 
inclination to which Velleman appeals148 is an inclination toward autonomy. I think that 
Velleman's account of this inclination is unintelligible or absurd. But I want to generalize. 
Velleman's view consists, for my purposes, of two claims. First, that the Humean is right 
to say that desire is only derived from desire. Second, that rationality is partly constituted 
by the possession of some core moral desire. The second claim neuters the first: that's 
why I earlier suggested that this sort of view was not Humean in spirit. 
Is the second claim plausible? Michael Smith has an argument against claims of 
this sort: 
...the objection... is... that, in taking it that a good person is motivated to do what 
she believes right, where this is read de dicto and not de re, externalists... provide 
the morally good person with 'one thought too many'. They alienate her from the 
ends at which morality properly aims. ...it is constitutive of being a morally good 
person that you have direct concern for what you think is right, where this is read 
de re and not de dicto. 
[An explanation like Velleman's] elevates a moral fetish into the one and only 
moral virtue. (Smith 1994b, p. 76) 
Smith is attacking externalists about motivation who claim that a desire to do the right is 
what accounts for derived moral desires. Since Velleman's view about motivation 
similarly posits one core desire from which all other moral desires are derived, it's 
formally like the externalist views whose form Smith is attacking, so Smith's argument 
ought to work against Velleman if it works at all. 
                                                
148 Velleman 1996, pp. 193-8. 
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Smith's argument concludes that we don't have a desire for the good; rather, we 
have desires for all of the particular goods. Attribution of desires and intentions, like 
attributions of belief, occurs in radical interpretation. We approach an agent with a 
synthetic a priori theory of interpretation, and we attempt to understand her actions in the 
terms of that theory. When an agent acts, we must attribute some attitude to rationalize 
and cause that act: an intention or perhaps a desire. To respect the holism of the attitudes, 
we must then also attribute other relevant beliefs, desires, and intentions in an intelligible 
network. What hermeneutical considerations would lead us to posit a desire to do the 
right or achieve the good? No such desire, Smith might say, is necessary to account for 
action. And it isn't obvious why one would be. 
Smith has his own model whereby rationality makes for the transition from belief 
to desire. Smith speaks of two relations between moral beliefs and moral desires. First, 
there is a normative relation captured in his thesis C2: "If an agent believes that she has a 
normative reason to φ, then she rationally should desire to φ." (Smith 1994b, p. 148) But 
the relation is not only normative: beliefs about normative reasons can cause desires.149 
Because the belief makes it rational to have the desire, the belief's actually bringing about 
the desire counts as a rationalization. So far, the account is plausible. 
The trouble comes in with Smith's account of normative reasons. Characterizing 
Korsgaard's view as a "platitude," Smith tries to clarify what the platitude says: 
...it tells us that what it is desirable for us to do in certain circumstances — let's 
call these circumstances the 'evaluated possible world' — is what we, not as we 
actually are, but as we would be in a possible world in which we are fully rational 
— let's call this the 'evaluating possible world' — would want ourselves to do in 
those circumstances. 
In terms of the background idea, facts about what it is desirable for us to do are 
constituted by the facts about what we would advise ourselves to do if we were 
perfectly placed to give ourselves advice. (ibid, pp. 151-2) 
                                                
149 Smith 1994b, p. 179. 
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I have a rational self, and it has desires for me. Those desires are, ex hypothesi, rational. 
Since my rational self is the one with the desires, then surely I should share them, and, if 
I don't, then I'm irrational. My reasons are constituted by the desires of my rational self. 
The problem should be obvious. Given a rational self with a set of ex hypothesi 
rational desires, it's obvious that, if I don't have those desires, then I'm irrational. But how 
did my rational self get the desires? What was it about his rationality that led him from 
moral belief to moral desire? Smith's account was to explain how rationality moves me 
from belief to desire, but it relies on my prior agreement that my rational self has rational 
desires. But to understand that, I have to understand what is rational about my rational 
self's desires. Smith's account is tantalizingly close to right, but it seems to give up at the 
crucial moment. 
I want to lay out a model of moral motivation. I need to begin by drawing a 
distinction between two kinds of defeasible connectives to which I appeal: rationally 
defeasible and causally defeasible connectives. A rationally defeasible connective 
appears in a defeasible principle that we attribute to someone as the content of her belief. 
When we attribute defeasible principles, we attribute an attitude that, while being 
completely rational, only defeasibly leads the thinker from premises matching the left of 
the principle to a conclusion matching the right.  
A causally defeasible connective appears in an hermeneutical rule that we use to 
interpret agents. When we attribute someone an attitude, we implicate many other 
attitudes that, all other things being equal, she has. Were she fully rational, she would 
actually have all of these other attitudes. But full rationality is an ideal never empirically 
realized. On the other hand, full rationality is that with reference to which we define 
rationality, so, to be rational, even less-than-fully, one must approximate to full 
rationality. Thus one must, all other things being equal, have the attitudes that one would 
have if fully rational. We should therefore approach interpretation with such causally 
defeasible rules in mind. While attributing the attitudes on the left only defeasibly implies 
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that we should attribute the attitudes on the right, that defeasible connection is what 
constitutes the attitude, and the agent, as rational. 
With this distinction in mind, I can offer two sets of causally defeasible 
hermeneutical rules about moral judgments and motivation. Let me begin with thin 
directive judgments, judgments like that this would be the right or best thing to do, or is 
the thing that I ought to do. I want to suggest that it's partly constitutive of judgments like 
this that they are defeasibly connected with moral intentions. My argument, predictably, 
is hermeneutical. For imagine that an agent routinely said that such-and-such would be 
the right thing for her to do right now, all things considered, but rarely or never did such-
and-such. Whatever role her concept 'right' plays in moral reasoning is entirely unlike the 
role played by our concept 'right' in ours. Thus, by the anti-relativist argument, it is a 
different concept. 
The argument is that thin directive judgments must be connected with action, but 
the conclusion is that they're connected with intentions. That is not a logical gap, for 
action is connected with intentions. Intentions to act are logical ghosts of action. They 
stand, hermeneutically, between the belief that this is the right action, and this action. 
Their role is to cause and rationalize action in a way that belief can't, since belief has the 
wrong direction of fit. 
The alternative concept of 'right' that I mention in the argument might be co-
extensional with our concept. But, as I've tried to argue, the identification of the content 
of attitudes with external truth-conditions shows that those contents are opaque. Two 
attitudes might share content, but have different logical and motivational connections 
with other attitudes, because, though they are the same sort of attitude toward the same 
content, they understand that content differently. Moral judgments are attributed on the 
basis, not just of their truth-conditions, but also of their place in the whole mental life and 
agency of the moral judge. 
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On the other hand, to count as an agent, one must perform intentional acts, and an 
intentional act is typically one caused and rationalized by an intention that had that act as 
its content. But, I suggest, an intention can only be understood when attached to a belief 
that its content is, all things considered, the best or right thing to do. Agents as such must 
have these thin moral concepts. It takes interpretation to find out how they express them 
verbally, and it might not be in the same terms that we use, but these facts are a 
commonplace. 
While thin directive judgments are to be associated with intentions, thick directive 
judgments are to be associated with desires. Just as being generous defeasibly (all-other-
things-being-equal) implies being the right thing to do, likewise one would like, 
defeasibly (all-other-things-being-equal), to do the generous thing. Here, appeal to my 
standard hermeneutical consideration is troubled. I suggest that thick judgment defeasibly 
implies desire. But that desire is one among many, none of which issues directly in 
action. Being motivated to perform an act is partly constitutive of believing that it would 
be generous, but performing an act is not partly constitutive of being motivated to 
perform it. So I can't just take the normal case of action and offer an interpretation in the 
form of attribution of moral desires. The argument that thick moral judgments are 
connected to desires will have to take an alternate route. 
I want to describe two situations, the normal situation, and one kind of abnormal 
one. In the normal situation, desires play no role. An agent has a number of beliefs, thick 
moral judgments and other, non-moral but normatively relevant beliefs, which she 
considers. She engages in practical reasoning, considering which features of possible 
actions are most right-making, which features undermine other features' right-
makingness, which features have which place in various hierarchies, and trying to do 
what she thinks, all things considered, to be best. She comes to a conclusion, a thin 
directive judgment that this is what she ought to do, or would be right or most good. 
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Since it's constitutive of such judgments that they defeasibly cause intentions to perform 
accordingly, the practical reasoning issues in belief, intention, and hence action. 
Note that the following sort of situation would be epistemically odd, but not 
abnormal from the point of view of moral motivation: an agent judges that an action 
would be right, even though she does not apply any positive thick moral concept to the 
act. The act is neither generous nor just nor anything else of the kind. This sort of 
situation can emerge because the thin moral concepts outstrip any statable principles we 
could use to derive them from thick moral concepts. Where this situation emerges, no 
moral desires will play any role at all in practical reasoning or moral motivation. 
The abnormal case gives us our reason for attributing desires to be generous, just, 
and the rest. The abnormal case is a kind of moralistic akrasia. Here is what Davidson 
has to say about akrasia in general: 
Why would anyone ever perform an action when he thought that, everything 
considered, another action would be better? If this is a request for a psychological 
explanation, then the answers will no doubt refer to the interesting phenomena 
familiar from most discussions of incontinence: self-deception, overpowering 
desires, lack of imagination, and the rest. But if the question is read, what is the 
agent's reason for doing a when he believes it would be better, all things 
considered, to do another thing, then the answer must be: for this, the agent has no 
reason. ...in the case of incontinence, the attempt to read reason into behaviour is 
necessarily subject to a degree of frustration. (Davidson 1970b, p. 42) 
Davidson's two ways of reading the question may be correlated to two descriptions of the 
action in question. Assume that the agent wanted to eat a doughnut, but decided that, all 
things considered, she shouldn't. And yet she finds herself driving to Krispy Kreme. If we 
described the action as eating a doughnut, then we can give an account for it. Its 
rationalizing cause is the desire to eat a doughnut.150 If we describe the action as doing 
what she thought, all things considered, was not the best thing to do, then there is no 
rationalization to be given. Akratic action, I would say, is action whose rationalizing 
cause is desire, rather than intention, and which is such that one's intentions are being 
                                                
150 This sort of case is why I said that intentional action "typically" flows from intentions. 
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thwarted by the action. This line commits me to the oddness of having to say that some 
intentional actions (driving to Krispy Kreme is not, in the example, something done by 
accident) are not caused by intentions, but I accept the consequence. The connection 
between intentions and intentional actions is only defeasible, but adequate to account for 
the conceptual and verbal link between the two. 
The point of the account is this. Akratic action is action, and it deserves a 
rationalizing cause. However, it does not deserve an intention as cause, because an 
intention is an all-things-considered attitude, and akratic action is necessarily not what 
the agent things it's best, all things considered, to do. So we must find an attitude that has 
the appropriate direction of fit to cause, in a rationalizing way, akratic action: that's 
desire. Furthermore, being caused by desire is not adequate: akratic action must frustrate 
one's all-things-considered judgments, which themselves yield intentions.  So akratic 
action is action caused by desires in contravention of one's intentions (or at least the 
intentions that one's thin directive judgments would come attached to, if the whole 
process weren't being defeated by the akratic action). 
The account of akrasia appeals to desires. Typically, one performs an akratic 
action for non-moral reasons. But surely, a person can believe that an act, while generous, 
is not the best thing to do all things considered, and yet akratically perform it anyway. If 
such moralistic akrasia is possible, then there must be moral desires that flow from thick 
directive judgments. Such desires will play the same role in moral reasoning that desires 
play in other sorts of practical reasoning: usually, no role at all, but sometimes, they 
override intention and lead to akrasia. 
The core of the account is the connection between thin directive judgments and 
intentions; moral desires are posited only because of the possibility of moralistic akrasia, 
and if that sort of action is impossible, then we can do without moral desires entirely. 
This account resembles that of R. Jay Wallace151; Wallace speaks of "association" 
                                                
151 See Wallace, 1990, esp. pp. 363-6. 
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between desires and evaluative beliefs, where I speak of causation, but I think that he has 
causation in mind. For Wallace, desires are rationalized by way of their associated 
evaluative beliefs being rationalized, but I suggest that the causal relation between thick 
directive judgment and desire, and thin directive judgment and intention, is itself a 
relation requiring rationalization. Luckily, possessing such rationalizing, causally 
defeasible, causal relations is partly constitutive of moral judgments. 
I said that Korsgaard's account pointed the way for mine. In what way have I 
appealed to rationality to move the agent from belief to action? My account appeals to the 
rationality of the agent, in the form of her being interpretable despite holistic restrictions 
on interpretation. To be interpreted as having the moral belief that thus-and-such would 
be the right thing to do, an agent must actually perform thus-and-such most of the time. 
To do otherwise is not irrational but arational. 
I said that Smith's account was nearly right. He appeals to rationality to account 
for the shift from belief to desire. In what way is my account different from his? I merely 
add that having the causal power to inspire intention is partly constitutive of moral 
beliefs. Moral beliefs are attitudes that we cannot attribute to an agent without also 
attributing to her the intention to perform an appropriate action. She (defeasibly) cannot 
have moral beliefs without having intentions to perform accordingly. That is the role of 
rationality: it provides a holistic constraint on the possession of moral attitudes. 
5.2.5 Comparison of New Wave and Hermeneutical Moral Realism 
Hermeneutical and New Wave Moral Realisms have similar, but not identical, 
metaphysical foundations. They are, however, very different in detail. In this section, I 
want to discuss the similarities and differences between Hermeneutical Moral Realism 
(hereafter, HMR) and its closest cousin (hereafter, NW). 
First, I want to discuss their relationships to the Open Question argument. I 
discussed NW's reply in 5.1. Moral properties may be identified synthetically, since 
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meanings are worldly; hence Moore's demand that moral properties be identified 
analytically or not at all is a mistake. How can HMR respond? 
Not the same way, and this leads into the main difference between HMR and NW. 
NW is based on a term-by-term theory of language. A certain object causes the use of a 
certain name, and a certain property causes the use of a certain predicate; thus that object 
and property are the referents of the name and predicate respectively. On my Davidsonian 
approach, words aren't the units of meaning, sentences are. Truth-conditions are the 
causes relevant for grounding meaning in the world. HMR doesn't accept moral 
properties any more than its semantic and metaphysical bases accept any kind of 
properties. Thus HMR rejects the demand that goodness be identified at all. 
No doubt a suitably revised version of the Open Question Argument could be 
developed having to do with predicates rather than properties. In that case, HMR would 
again reject the demand that satisfying moral predicates like '...is good' can be identified 
as satisfying some other set of predicates. Rather, the thin moral concepts are anomalous 
with respect to non-moral concepts; they stretch beyond any statable principles relating 
the two. For Moore, goodness must be absolutely simple, since it's undefinable; for 
HMR, 'good's indefinability is indicative of its complexity. 
Thus HMR lacks the first two components of NW that I discussed in 5.1, 
synthetic statements of property identity and rigid designation. There are no properties to 
be identified and no designation, rigid or otherwise. Kripke's and Putnam's semantic 
insights took place in the context of a theory of meaning that asked after the meaning of a 
word out of the context of a sentence, and so can only inspire, rather than instruct, 
semantic theory. 
NW and HMR also have similar analogies with philosophy of mind. NW looked 
to (Aristotelian?) functionalism's approach to mental properties for an analogy for moral 
properties. HMR looks to Davidson's Kantian anomalous monism for the analogically 
anomalous properties. Functionalism and anomalous monism are alike in being token-
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identity theories. Functionalism, however, looks to a fundamentally biological approach 
to the mind, while anomalous monism is resolutely dualistic in its approach the mental 
concepts. To plumb the depths of this difference would lead me too far astray; let me say 
only that a version of moral realism that finds a home in a biologistic conception of 
rationality threatens to overwhelm human agency and autonomy — our spirituality, one 
might say — with physical criteria masquerading as moral. 
If we focus on the idea of multiple realizability, though, we find more harmony. 
In functionalist approaches to mind, multiple realizability is the idea that functionally, 
and hence mentally, identical states can be realized in a multitude of physical substrata. 
So in NW, the idea is that moral properties, which are functionally defined, are multiply 
realizable. HMR would agree, so long as the point is rephrased without reference to 
properties. 
Moral concepts are related to one another, and to non-moral concepts, by way of 
principles. However, the left sides of the principles are unstatably complex disjunctions. 
Each disjunct states a possible satisfaction condition for the concept on the right. Thus 
there are multiple possible realizations of the concept on the right, one for each disjunct. 
Likewise, the naturalistic and coherentist epistemology of NW is not alien to 
HMR: HMR's moral epistemology is the pursuit of reflective equilibrium. However, we 
will not, in reflective equilibrium, identify the properties that have been causally 
connected with our use of moral language, as there are no such properties. Rather, each 
moral belief, once embedded in a true Tarskian truth theory for the speaker, already 
identifies its truth-condition, and, if a moral truth-condition can stand as the cause of a 
belief, then such beliefs identify their causes. The difference here is based on the fact that 
NW seeks to synthetically identify moral properties. For HMR, moral concepts' relations 
to other concepts resist codification because of their great complexity and their 
anomalism with respect to the non-moral. 
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The final difference is with respect to moral motivation. NW has externalistic 
aspirations: it wants the relation between moral belief and moral motivation to be an 
external one. HMR makes the relation defeasible, but internal. It's part and parcel of 
being a moral belief that an attitude cause appropriate desires and intentions. 
5.3 MORAL SCEPTICISM 
The locus classicus for moral scepticism is, of course, J. L. Mackie's Ethics: 
Inventing Right and Wrong. I want to address the main points of Mackie's scepticism 
before moving on to the Moral Twin Earth argument, which is intended to be a version of 
one of Mackie's arguments. 
Mackie calls his first argument the Argument from Relativity. This argument is an 
inference to the best explanation. There is a diversity of moral beliefs. What can best 
account for this? Mackie says: 
Disagreement about moral codes seems to reflect people's adherences to and 
participation in different ways of life. ...the argument from relativity has some 
force simply because the actual variations in the moral codes are more readily 
explained by the hypothesis that they reflect ways of life than by the hypothesis 
that they express perceptions, most of them seriously inadequate and badly 
distorted, of objective values. (Mackie 1977, pp. 36-7) 
If adherence to a way of life amounts to believing a certain moral theory, then part of 
Mackie's remarks amounts to explaining difference with reference to difference. He's on 
stronger ground with 'participation.' Again, his use of 'perception' is troubled. If Mackie 
seriously means to say that, for the moral realist, moral properties are phenomenally 
given to us just like perceptual properties, and that the moral realist must appeal to some 
sort of moral hallucination to account for moral error, then of course his moral realist 
opponent has nothing to do with hermeneutical moral realism. We should broaden the 
idea to moral belief. Mackie's more plausible claim, then, is that differences in moral 
belief are best accounted for with reference to non-cognitive determination of moral 
beliefs by ways of life, rather than with reference to cognitive error. 
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It's not plain, though, why the moral realist must choose. Because of the veridical 
nature of belief, true belief can pass unremarked, but error requires an account, and where 
there is moral disagreement, there is moral error. The moral realist must look somewhere 
to account for moral error. Why not look to culture? As culturally embedded people, we 
learn morality, but we also learn a set of interests and motivations that distort our moral 
reasoning. The distortions can be made apparent in the pursuit of reflective equilibrium. 
The argument from relativity can gain no purchase, because no form of 
conceptual relativity can gain purchase. To count as the same beliefs, two beliefs must 
have identical truth-conditions. Conceptual relativity requires that there be beliefs with 
the same meaning but different truth-values. Obviously, on the truth-conditional account 
of meaning, that's quite impossible. 
Mackie's second argument is the Argument from Queerness, and it has two parts, 
a metaphysical part and an epistemological part. I want to focus on the epistemological 
part first. Mackie says that "...if we were aware of them [objective moral values], it 
would have to be by some special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly 
different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else." (ibid, p. 38) I just don't 
know why this is supposed to be true, but I suspect that Mackie is taking for granted a 
foundationalist approach to knowledge in which the foundations are justified by 
perceptual experience. Such an approach is incoherent, for experience stands in no 
epistemic relationship to belief. 
Justified moral beliefs can come about in one of two ways. They could be caused 
by their truth-conditions; I'm sceptical of such an account, but I would be delighted if it 
were true. Or they could be caused, in a rationalizing way, by reasoning from other, non-
moral beliefs, according to defeasible synthetic a priori moral principles. Such principles 
are no more "queer" than are principles governing the application of intensional concepts, 
and they are not a faculty of perception or intuition. Just as the argument from relativity 
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presupposed internalism about content, this epistemic argument from queerness 
presupposes empirical foundationalism about epistemology. 
The other argument from queerness has to do with moral motivation: 
If there were objective values, then they would be entities or qualities or relations 
of a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe.... An 
objective good would be sought by anyone who was acquainted with it, not 
because of any contingent fact that this person, or every person, is so constituted 
that he desires this end, but just because the end has to-be-pursuedness somehow 
built into it. (ibid, pp. 38, 40) 
Here, Mackie doesn't rest on some assumption that I can quickly label and dispense with: 
it's the labeling, though, and not the dispensing, that's the problem. I claim that moral 
beliefs motivate. However, a belief could have the same truth-condition as a moral belief, 
without being a moral belief. Moral facts thus do not have to-be-pursuedness somehow 
built into them. Moral beliefs have to-be-motivating built into them, as a constitutive fact 
about such beliefs. Neither contingent desire nor external fact accounts for moral 
motivation: the holistic nature of moral belief does. 
This quick tour of Mackie's scepticism can't delve much into the details, but I 
hope to have made the basic point that traditional moral scepticism finds life in the 
context of internalism and foundationalism. Moral scepticism requires retooling to deal 
with contemporary forms of moral realism. My main target in this section is just such a 
retooled moral scepticism, the Moral Twin Earth argument of Horgan and Timmons. The 
argument can be seen as a generalization of an argument offered by Hare.152 Hare offers 
the example of a missionary among cannibals. The missionary and the cannibals 
obviously have a moral disagreement of some kind: the missionary opposes the cannibals' 
cannibalism, while the cannibals favor it. This disagreement obviously requires shared 
content. But if content is to be descriptions associated by speakers with their terms (by 
Fregean senses), then the missionary and the cannibals don't seem to share content. So 
they can't disagree; yet they do. So the content of normative concepts is not Fregean 
                                                
152 ...at Hare 1952, pp. 148-50. 
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senses. Hare concludes that a form of expressivism is correct, by a bad disjunctive 
syllogism in which the disjunction doesn't state all of the options. New Wave Moral 
Realism makes the meaning of normative concepts into worldly properties, not 
necessarily known to the speakers. So the moral disagreement between the missionary 
and the cannibals can be made possible by the properties to which they both refer with 
their normative terms, even though one or the other party is widely mistaken about the 
nature of those properties (and even which properties they are, perhaps). By negating the 
transparency of meaning, the semantic externalism on which the New Wave was based 
seems to solve Hare's problem. 
Enter Moral Twin Earth, which, as Merli points out,153 amounts to an updating or 
generalization of Hare's argument. Horgan and Timmons ask us154 to imagine a Moral 
Twin Earth. Moral Twin Earth relates to Earth somewhat as Twin Earth does in Putnam's 
thought-experiment. For Putnam, what causally regulates our use of the term 'water' is 
water, whereas what causally regulates our Twins' use of the term 'water' is something 
else, twin-water. Thus our terms have different meanings. Since the Boyd-Brink view has 
it that moral terms are natural kind terms, the same sort of thought-experiment should 
distinguish our moral terms from those of Twins whose moral thought is causally 
governed by different natural properties. But it can't, so Boyd and Brink are wrong about 
the semantics of moral terms. 
Here's the idea. We on Earth are gradually moving toward a reflective equilibrium 
in which, as Boyd and Brink say, we will identify the properties that have always 
governed our use of moral language. Assume that our reflective equilibrium will be some 
very sophisticated consequentialist theory. Note that the most sophisticated variants of 
deontology and utilitarianism offer the same judgments in most cases; we can assume 
that yet more sophisticated variants will move even closer together (though without ever 
                                                
153 ...at Merli 2002, p. 209. 
154 ...at Horgan and Timmons 1990, pp. 458-61, and Horgan and Timmons 1992, pp. 244-6. 
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agreeing on all cases). Our Twins on Twin Earth are also gradually moving toward a 
reflective equilibrium, but their equilibrium is a sophisticated deontological theory. 
Because the theories are in equilibrium, they will have massive overlap with one another, 
though without agreeing on every point. 
Assume then that we meet our Twins. While our philosophers and theirs begin to 
wrangle with semantic and moral issues, our psychologists and anthropologists and theirs 
note that, while we are slightly more sympathetic in nature than our Twins, they are 
slightly more guilt-prone than we are. All of these differences are intended to be narrow 
enough to allow Moral Twin Earth to count as a Twin, rather than as freakishly alien. 
As with the missionary and the cannibals, it's obvious that, in the marginal cases 
where our equilibria don't overlap, we have moral disagreement with our Twins. So we 
must share meaning. But if meaning is causally regulating property, then we don't, since 
our moral terms are governed by consequentialist properties, and theirs are governed by 
deontological properties. So we're faced with two alternatives. We could adopt 
relativism, and allow that we will never come to agree with our Twins about what to do, 
but that no one is wrong for all of that; or, we could give up on thinking that stating truths 
is something that moral judgments are any good at or are even designed for. Our options, 
then, are a perverse form of relativistic realism, or else expressivism. Neither option is 
acceptable to the realist. However, since neither option is acceptable period, realism is 
not the problem. There must be something wrong with the thought experiment. 
Much discussion of the thought experiment has missed the point. For instance, 
Copp contends that "despite the fact that corresponding moral and twin-moral terms do 
not express the same property... moral terms might be the best translation for the 
corresponding twin-moral terms." (Copp 2000, p. 121) Since that's a premise of the 
argument, it's not obvious how it's supposed to help. Copp's contention is that we can 
disagree with our Twins because we share prescriptive, rather than referential, content 
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with them. But that is the conclusion of the Twin Earth argument, not at all an 
implication of New Wave Moral Realism. 
David Brink offers a more interesting but no more helpful response. Brink gives 
up on what I see as the linchpin of the Boyd-Brink view, the notion of functional 
properties causally regulating our use of moral terms. He says: 
On this view, a natural property N causally regulates a speaker's use of moral term 
'M' just in case his use of 'M; would be dependent on his belief that something is 
N, were his beliefs in dialectical equilibrium. ...worries [about New Wave Moral 
Realism] are less compelling when we shift from the extensional to the 
counterfactual or dialectical understanding of causal regulation. (Brink 2001, p. 
169) 
Brink's strategy is to reconceive the relation between moral property and moral term. If 
having the moral property causally regulate the use of the appropriate moral term as 
water does 'water' leads to problems on Twin Earth, then the causal regulation must take 
some other form. 
"Extensional" causal regulation is the regulation that water does of 'water.' It's not 
at all obvious that "counterfactual" causal relation is any different. What Brink means by 
counterfactual causal regulation is causal regulation that is not defeated by any local, 
contingent error; the counter-to-fact hypothesis is that the speaker is in reflective 
equilibrium, and hence not at all error-prone. But surely the same applies to non-moral 
properties. The way in which water causally regulates 'water' surely accommodates the 
fact that we occasionally misidentify water. It's only our error-free identifications that we 
allow to count in determining the referent of 'water.' Likewise only our error-free 
identifications of moral properties count in determining the referents of the appropriate 
moral terms. 
"Dialectical" causal regulation doesn't appear to be a species of causal regulation 
at all. Boyd's idea was that, in reflective equilibrium, we identify the properties that have 
always causally regulated our use of moral terms. "Dialectical" causal regulation, then, 
would be parasitical on "extensional" causal regulation. If we cut the dialectic loose from 
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the causal histories that determine the referents of our moral language, then the properties 
identified in reflective equilibrium need have had no particular causal relationship with 
our use of moral terms. The entire attraction of the New Wave was its appropriation of 
externalist semantics to answer the Open Question argument; the Kripke-Putnam 
semantics shorn of rigid designation of natural properties determined by causal histories 
would be a thin theory indeed. 
Merli offers another incorrect defense. Merli notes that Horgan and Timmons 
accept that all Earth moral discourse is governed by the same set of moral properties; 
only we and our Twins show a difference. He then argues that 
The realist can preserve meaning across actual-world [i.e., Earth] disputes, we're 
assuming, though, if Horgan and Timmons are right, she can't preserve meaning 
between Earth and Moral Twin Earth. Thus the twin-moral practice must be 
different from our own moralizing in a way that puts it beyond the realist's reach. 
So there's pressure on Horgan and Timmons to make the details of twin-
moralizing much different from those of our own moral discourse; in an important 
sense, it must be like nothing we've ever seen before. (Merli 2002, p. 218) 
I think that this is a mistake. We use water for a wide variety of purposes. Our water-
discourse has massive overlap with our twins' twin-water-discourse in the following 
sense: if we remove 'water' from many sentences, and replace it with 'twin-water,' we 
preserve truth. Only in some chemical and physical theories, and some very obscure uses, 
is there a difference. Likewise with goodness and whatever our twins refer to with 'good,' 
twin-goodness. If we remove 'good' from many sentences and replace it with 'twin-good,' 
we preserve truth. Only in some ethical theories, and some very obscure cases, is there a 
difference. But just as water is not twin-water, goodness is not twin-goodness. 
I believe that the Moral Twin Earth argument is lethal to New Wave Moral 
Realism. Why is this relevant? New Wave Moral Realism is the closest philosophical 
relative to the Hermeneutical Moral Realism I offer. They both take off from externalist 
semantic theories, find analogues for morality in token-identity theories of the mental, 
and adopt coherentist methods in moral epistemology. Moral Twin Earth, then, is a 
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ready-made objection to Hermeneutical Moral Realism, one that I can use to show the 
strengths of the view. Naturally enough, the differences between the externalisms and 
token-identity theories that New Wave and Hermeneutical moral realisms are based on 
will account for their different prospects in the face of Moral Twin Earth. 
The key difference is that the New Wave's externalism has to do with reference. 
Names and natural kind terms are held to have referents determined by causal histories of 
uses of the terms. For Davidson, reference is a theoretical construct. Kripke-Putnam style 
externalism is based on a term-by-term semantics that ignores Frege's dictum that we 
should look for the meaning of a word only in the context of a sentence. Such a theory 
will have a terrible time accounting for the unity of the proposition. Note that it's the 
causal regulation of moral terms that Horgan and Timmons finds objectionable. 
Hermeneutical Moral Realism does not accept that the causal regulation of moral terms 
gives them content; terms never have content at all, they only have systematic 
contributions to the truth-conditions of the sentences in which they appear. 
The point of the Moral Twin Earth argument is that our twins have the same 
moral beliefs that we do — like us, they believe that things are good or wrong — but that 
their beliefs have nevertheless different truth-conditions and indeed different truth-values. 
That would show either that moral beliefs are externally related to their truth-conditions 
— relativism — or that they never had any truth-conditions at all — expressivism. 
How do we identify moral beliefs? Hermeneutical Moral Realism identifies moral 
beliefs with reference to three relata: their truth-conditions, other beliefs with which they 
have inferential relations, and other attitudes with which they have rationalizing causal 
relations. Moral Twin Earth is a counterexample to Hermeneutical Moral Realism just in 
case the Hermeneutical Moral Realist must agree that our twins share our moral beliefs 
— like us, they believe that things are good or wrong — but also must agree that our 
twins' moral beliefs don't share our moral beliefs' truth-conditions. We should agree that 
our twins share our moral beliefs. The strategy is to move from that premise through the 
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commitments of Hermeneutical Moral Realism to the conclusion that our twins' beliefs 
must share our beliefs' truth-conditions. 
Why do our twins share our beliefs? First, their moral beliefs have the same 
practical role that ours do. Like ours, their moral beliefs are internally, but defeasibly, 
connected with moral desires and intentions. Furthermore, and this is key, most of their 
moral beliefs are true under just the same circumstances that ours are. There is massive, 
though not total, overlap between their moral beliefs and ours. That was a condition of 
the thought experiment. Finally, there is substantial, though less, overlap between moral 
principles. For the sophisticated consequentialist as well as the sophisticated deontologist, 
that something is courageous or generous counts in favor of doing it, as a rule. 
The contention of the Moral Twin Earth argument is that our twins have a distinct 
reflective equilibrium point from the one at which we aim. That could well be true, as 
long as consider only narrow reflective equilibrium. Narrow reflective equilibrium is the 
point at which my judgments and principles are fully coherent. If the truth-conditions of 
our moral beliefs are what we think they are in narrow reflective equilibrium, and we and 
our twins can have different narrow reflective equilibria, then we and they can have the 
same moral beliefs but with different truth-conditions. In that case, the argument has 
succeeded. I reject the premise that the truth-conditions of our moral beliefs are what we 
believe them to be in narrow reflective equilibrium. 
First, wide, not narrow, reflective equilibrium represents the point of highest 
coherence in our moral beliefs. Our encounter with our twins would spur our 
philosophers and theirs to argumentative efforts on behalf of our respective divergent 
moral beliefs. Recall, specifically, that Horgan and Timmons offered to account for the 
difference in moral theories with reference to a difference in moral psychology: we're 
more sympathetic, our twins are more guilt-ridden. Perhaps the form of moral debate that 
we would engage in with our twins would be one in which we tried to convince each 
other that our moral psychologies were slightly erroneous in emphases. Sympathy and 
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guilt are holistic attitudes just like all the rest, and they have inferential and other 
relations with other attitudes; they can be changed by changes elsewhere in the system. 
Only after extensive debate with our twins would they and we enter into a state of wide 
reflective equilibrium, and there's no reason at all to believe that we would enter into 
different ones. Indeed, it would simply beg the question against the realist to assert that 
rational moral enquirers can't end at the same point because of contingent moral 
psychology. The truths of morality, I claim, are synthetic a priori: not contingent, but 
constitutive truths governing the application of moral concepts to the world. Since we 
agree that our twins share our concepts, then their correct applications and ours must be 
the same.155 
Second, even wide reflective equilibrium doesn't represent a stable stopping point. 
Our moral concepts outstrip in complexity our ability to articulate them in statable moral 
principles. Moral enquiry, like all philosophical enquiry, is a never-ending, terminally 
open, process. Moral realism is as always a form of realism; we shouldn't look at any 
epistemic process to determine, but only to discover, the truth. Even if we never achieved 
complete agreement with our twins, asymptotic approach to agreement across time would 
indicate common truth-conditions. Common truth-conditions, not agreement, is what we 
need to defend moral realism. Moral Twin Earth can't force us to divorce moral meaning 
from moral truth-conditions, so it fails against Hermeneutical Moral Realism. I conclude 
that the truth-conditional theory of meaning shows that some moral beliefs and utterances 
are true or false, and that some of those are true.
                                                
155 This reply is basically the same as Merli's, only without mistaken reference to properties. 
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